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As a historically racialized utterance, nigger has been a contested and despised word since the 
late 17th Century. Now, in the 21st Century, nigga is still considered one of the most impactful 
words in the English lexicon.  This dissertation provides one situated and contingent analysis of 
nigga as a moment of excess in the Higher Education classroom.  I wed Judith Butler’s 
theorizing of ex-citable speech via her analyses of J.L. Austin’s influential conceptualizations of 
speech acts and Louis Althusser’s interpellation to Henry Louis Gates’ theory of Signifyin(g) in 
order to interrogate the multitudinous articulations and appropriations of nigga as a Signifyin(g) 
performative.  Through my theorizing of nigger-nigga as a Signifyin(g) performative, I 
interrogate the continuity and discontinuity of use specific to the English Composition and 
Literature classroom, as well as within multiple Higher Education classrooms and discussions.  I 
interrogate use through the methodology of  what I classify as Foucauldian-lite Discourse 
Analysis, in order to examine nigger and nigga as ex-citable speech. My intention is to 
interrogate how these utterances inflect and influence constructions of multiply conflicting and 
complimentary histories, identities, subjectivities and power relationships of professors and 
students in visible and invisible ways. The Untitled Supplemental Image is a metaphor for my 
methodology.  The image is of my mother’s hands, which a woven throughout the dissertation, 
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This dissertation is about teaching, words, and language.  This is also a text about nigger/nigga.  
While it is not my intention to offend, it is also not my intention to supplicate.  It is only my 
intention to deliberate, converse, offer up.  If you and I, together, can begin the conversation, 
then my work here is done as well as just begun.  I am not here to impress upon you my values, 
nor alter yours.  This is simply a talking point, to be taken into your households, communities, 
classrooms. 
In the spirit of Sesame Street: Nigga is the Word of the day   

















Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Unspeakably more depends on what things are called than what they are… the name and 
appearance, the importance… have gradually… grown… on and into things and become their 
very body… [and] becomes almost always the essence in the end…  —Hilary Lawson 
 
Patricia J. Williams (1991) in her text The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law 
Professor begins with a parable about the power of Words.  In it, the “priests,” as they are so 
named, are masters of the Word. It is only through them that the Word can exist and, because of 
their increasingly intricate mastery of, over, and within the Word, they ascend to the level of 
gods (small g).  But it is their godlike status which also becomes their undoing, their failing, their 
boredom.  Some, not all, realize the meaninglessness of their Word Games and Word Magic and 
decide to chuck it all.  Dressing as pilgrims (I interpret this as hiding) they leave their sturdy, 
well-built and indestructible Celestial City in search of something… more? or less?  (either way 
it can be assumed that their humanist perspective adheres to the philosophy that progress is 
linear; hence they were looking for something better). It is in this recursive passage they 
acquired the knowledge of Undoing Words and thus they discover what lay beyond their 
Celestial City, a Deep Blue Sea.  But where does their travel get them?  Williams narrates that 
they wandered for many years and in this way, much like a Don Quioxte adventure, they end up 
half a circumference away from their City (hmmm… doesn’t seem very far…).  At this vantage 
point they can see the City, and it is from this position that they have an epiphany— realizing 
that the City is an illusion they are now in a place Beyond the Power of Words.  Satisfied, they 
drop anchor and once again attain (self-appointed, no doubt) godly status (apparently they have 
shed their pilgrim status). But what is a god without a worshipper?  Williams tells us that beneath 
the Celestial City lay dying mortals whilst at the bottom of the Deep Blue Sea sit drowning 
mortals.  The dying mortals are cursed, forced to listen to the violent, thunderous, hooves of the 
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galloping horses above, while the drowning mortals, confused by the priests-turned-gods’ 
anchors and plumblines, reach for the unreachable chains overhead, believing, regrettably, that 
these were lifelines for them.   
 
Williams’ allegory emphasizes, for me, the brutality of language, and the ways in which 
it acts aggressively and violently upon humans, forcing us to be caught up in its enticements.  
We are ever formed in language, in its agency, in its actions, even when we attempt to counter 
this force (Butler, 1997).  Judith Butler (1997) asks: Could language injure us if we were not, in 
some sense, linguistic beings, beings who require language in order to be? (p. 1-2). In other 
words, humans are bound to and by language, we are made vulnerable by language (Butler, 
1997), and it is this vulnerability, with respect to legal language, that Williams seeks to dissect in 
her text.  Williams admits that she is “…interested in the way that legal language flattens and 
confines in absolutes the complexity of meaning inherent in any given problem.” (p. 6).  Like 
Williams, Black, female, legal scholar, and like Butler, white, female, queer, feminist 
philosopher, my specific interest in language is also a mark of my profession.  I am an English 
professor; I have always been a lover of books, film, texts, all things written and spoken.  But 
teaching English has caused my wonder about language itself and the ways that we use language 
as well as the ways that language uses us (Butler, 1997). Both Williams and Butler (in her text 
Excitable Speech) highlight the contradictory, constitutive, incomplete relationship between 
language and the subject, a contradiction that I too grapple with as I stand in the English 
classroom.  As English professor I teach increasingly intricate Word games—priest and god—
throwing plumblines to the students who eagerly fill my classes.   But I am also gatekeeper, 
dispelling secret Word Puzzles and Word Magic for the dying and drowning mortals intent on 
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entrance to and acceptance in the Celestial City.  It is through me that they must pass, learning 
acceptable word combinations for entry into the esteemed City where dailyspeak and writing are 
known as Academic Discourse.  Yet I am also mortal—physically and linguistically marked as 
Black female (yes, I am essentializing here), lucky enough (and quite possibly smart enough) to 
have latched onto an anchor and risen in linguistic status while economically and socially 
treading in working-class waters.  When I look into the Deep Blue Sea, I see my own face 
reflected back at me and amidst the cacophony of galloping hooves I want to reach with my left 
towards those silent, desperate hands, while holding steadfast with my right to the solidly built 
gate; I mean… honestly… reach too far and I just might fall in.  
It is because of my contradictory, unstable, illusory position that I begin with Williams’ 
allegory.  I am curious for example, about the identities of the priests. “Who are these people?” 
(Morrison, 2017, p. 29).  Are they self-proclaimed gods or was godhood bestowed upon them by 
some Other?  Are they gods simply because they are able to manipulate the Word in ways that 
others cannot? And does this necessarily dictate that manipulation can only exist according to 
their rules?  Are they gods simply because they know the combinations to the locks (constructed 
by them, of course) and managed to wall themselves in, a ‘gated community’ so to speak?  Or, 
like the early settlers in what we now call the United States, did they make it up on the fly—
drawing up contracts as a substitute for an oral commitment; procuring signatures in the place of 
an X; barring slaves from reading and writing; conjuring deeds against Indigenous Peoples. 
Or is it all of the above? 
While it may be conjectured that Williams’ priests-turned-gods are the “founders” of 
language, self-proclaimed in their own important, segregated selves, I think of them in the same 
way Toni Morrison (2017) writes about the slave master: “How hard they work to define the 
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slave as inhuman, savage, when in fact the definition of the inhuman describes overwhelmingly 
the punisher…It’s as though they are shouting, ‘I am not a beast! I’m not a beast! I torture the 
helpless to prove I am not weak.’”(p. 29-30).   “I am not a mortal! I am not a mortal!” the priest-
gods believe, smug in their esteemed and valued difference as masters of the Word, positioned 
far above the mortals who are desperate for their acceptance, their admittance, their Love. 
Unfortunately, the truth of the matter is, there is no Truth, and these priest-gods are only priest-
gods because they have been constituted as such.  Their play, their word games, their Celestial 
City is, as they later realize, nothing more than a mirage, an image, created only because the 
Word(s) exist to make it so.  So, really, what the dying drowning mortals aspire to is illusory.  
Isn’t it evident that the priest-gods discovered this which is why they left the Celestial City in the 
first place?  And why, one wonders, did they leave disguised in laymen’s clothing?  Could it be 
because in their realization of the fragmentary, fluctuating, incompleteness of the Word, they had 
no choice but to hide themselves, and hide their truth (truth being incomplete as well)? Much 
like a fleeing, ousted dictator seeking asylum elsewhere, they knew if they were to be discovered 
the jig would be up!  Better to keep the dying drowning mortals in a state of ignorance; better to 
keep them in a constant state of desire for entry into those illustrious Celestial Cities in which the 
Word known as Academic Discourse is bestowed upon them in forms such as Composition-
Rhetoric and Comp-Lit.  And much like Morrison’s (2017) master, the Word is  delivered 
through lashings—in the classroom, when a student struggles to articulate or with the mightiest 
of instruments, the pen (I once had a student say to me she felt her paper, both literally and 
figuratively, was bleeding).  These are the lashings that the mortals I face receive, some from me, 
some from other professors of English, other mortals-turned-priests-turned-gods.   
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And what of The Word? It is the Word that constituted the Celestial City, the boat, the 
Deep Blue Sea, the horses and their hooves.  The Word constitutes the mortals as well as the 
priests-turned-gods, for without the Word we could not differentiate a priest from a mortal from 
a horse. But the Word does not only construct concrete objects and sentient beings, it is the Word 
which delimits suffering, anguish, Understanding and Superstanding (Williams 1991).  It is the 
Word which conjures understanding of allegory and enables one to move Beyond the Power of 
Words.  Williams takes up the interrogation of the Word through the language of contract law 
with the express purpose of examining “…legal issues within a framework inscribed not just 
within the four corners of the document—be it contract or the Constitution—but by the 
disciplines of psychology, sociology, history, criticism and philosophy.” (p. 6-7). Leaning in 
close, she tells her sister (and us, the readers bearing witness to her conversation) what she is 
cross-examining: “Floating Signifiers” (p. 7) she whispers.  The Word in Williams’ allegory has 
multiple meanings, much like her subject position when she wakes up that day.  For Williams the 
entanglement of race, subject position and contract law is also entangled with discourses such as 
psychology, sociology, history and philosophy (specifically poststructurally oriented 
philosophical assumptions); for Morrison, race and its discursive ‘power’ is examined through 
fiction, layered as well with multiple discourses, including the discourse of the imaginary; for 
Butler, it is gender, race, philosophy, linguistics, ideology, the State apparatus and theory; for 
me, it is the provocative discourse of Education,  specifically English Education, and its 
entanglement with race (what bodies are educable?) and language (whose language is worthy of 
the educated?). Whose knowledge is considered of “most worth?”  (The classic “curriculum” 
question, as articulated by the British philosopher, Herbert Spencer). I am neither priest -god nor 
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dying, drowning mortal but simultaneously both. Like Williams… subject position is everything.  
Straddling words and worlds, I am enmeshed in an (Un)Doing of Words... 
As a professor of English, I too am interested the Word, in how the language itself, the 
teaching of English and the discourses we use to teach English “flattens and confines in 
absolutes” (Williams, 1991, p. 6).  I am interested in how the teaching of English denigrates a 
complexity of interpreted meanings to universalizing, fixed ideologies and theories about 
language instruction, about usage, about curriculum, pedagogy and praxis. Hence, like Williams, 
you should know it’s a bad day, well actually, year(s).  In 2019 then president, Donald Trump, 
tweeted that four sophomore representatives should go back to where they came from, three of 
whom were born in the United States and one of whom became a US citizen as a teenager.   
Deceased president emeritus Ronald Reagan’s taped conversations with Richard Nixon indicate 
that he was calling African Americans monkeys. In August, the news reported a total of 29 dead 
in El Paso, TX and Dayton, OH after gunmen opened fire in public settings, and this is on the 
heels of a shooting at the Gilroy Garlic Festival in Gilroy, CA.   Trump  “dismissed” these two 
singular events as the work of men with mental breakdowns. In 2020 the world suffocated when 
we witnessed the eight minute 46 second asphyxiation of a man; we watched the fatal shooting 
of another who fell asleep at a Wendy’s drive-through; we cried globally about the young lady 
who was fatally shot and died in her sleep.  But George, Rayshard and Breonna are but a few of 
the names we do know (what of the others?).   These events force me to think of the ways that 
people of color have been linguistically castigated so much so that the killing of an innocent 10-, 
12-, 13-year old child or the caging of children has been justified.  Stuart Hall (1997) tells us that 
race is a floating signifier; it is a discursive construct, albeit of great import; however, in working 
like a language, its “…meaning is relational… constantly subject to redefinition in different 
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cultures, different moments [and that] there is always a certain sliding of meaning, always 
something left unsaid about race.”  
Somehow knowing this is no longer enough. 
 I cannot help but to think about the words, the utterances, the speech acts and 
performances of the 45th president and how these aid in the construction of the floating signifier, 
race.  If race, as Hall posits, is a floating signifier, then how are we educators of English to tackle 
the messiness of race as it interplays with the teaching of English? And how am I to enter a 
classroom of black and brown mortals and knowingly entice them into the Celestial City of the 
academy when their lives and the media tell them that their children are to be housed in cages 
along the border, that the consequence of race mixing is an assault rifle and twenty dead, and that 
the leader of the very country to which they aspire believes they should all go back to where they 
came from? Each of these material and discursive events is fraught with the floating signifier 
“race” which, as Williams so poignantly points out in her text, is unstable, highly variable, and 
empty of value. I cannot help to think about my classes, predominantly attended by Caribbean, 
Latinx, African students and immigrants who are subjected to configurations of what it means to 
be of color, immigrant, undocumented, ESL.  If, as Hall (1997) posits, race is a floating signifier, 
then it stands to reason that those words in the English language that construct meaning in race 
(as well as gender, sexual orientation and [dis]ability) also have the ability to act as floating 
signifiers, empty of value except within the socio-cultural and historical context in which these 
are used.  These thoughts cause me to wonder about Butler’s (1997) opening statements in 
Excitable Speech “To be called a name is one of the first forms of linguistic injury that one 
learns.  But not all name-calling is injurious. Does the power of language to injure follow from 
its interpellative power” (p. 2)?  
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My first lesson in linguistic injury occurred on one sunny summer afternoon while my 
mother was running errands in a neighborhood, not our own, in our Philadelphia hometown. I do 
not remember the exact time and place, but I do remember the brilliant blue of the sky, the 
excited cacophony of chirping birds and the pleasant serenity of a summer day.  I do not 
remember my age, but I do remember that I was old enough to jaywalk across a busy street but 
young enough to hold my mother’s hand.  And I remember this: the way my mother’s face 
contorted, the quick intake of breath, the way she jerked my hand back, dropped it, let go,  as she 
stopped mid-stride in the middle of a busy street.  And I do remember their snickers, of them, the 
two white boys—they were barely men—who’d caused my mother’s flash of hesitation before 
she turned stony.  I did not understand it then, but it was their smugness, which cut the thickness 
of the air on an already hot summer day, that caused me to wonder. They were self-aware, self-
possessed, self-assured as they crossed in front of us mid-street, their too old but too young 
saunter now much more authoritative than my mother’s gait. Nigger.  
I was almost unsure of what I’d heard; it was muttered so stealthily in the midst of 
passing cars and chirping birds that it almost flew over my head .  “Honkey,” she’d returned, 
quickly, too quickly mind you, as if she needed to do, say, voice something to reassert her place 
in the world. But I instinctively knew this had no impact on them; their body posture didn’t 
change, their stride maintained its fluidity, and the snickering continued to punctuate the air long 
after their bodies disappeared.  She snatched my hand back into action, commanded “C’mon 
Joyce!” and with it my little legs trotted to keep pace with her now determined, angry pace.  As I 
ran-walked next to her elongated strides, my hand numbing from the grasp of her fingers, I tried 
to catch a glimpse of them, neck twisted, head cocked, and eyes looking back to figure out what 
power they held over the woman I loved and revered. What was that word that caused my 
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always-in-motion mother to stop mid-pace in the middle of a busy street?  She practically 
dragged me, “Joyce! C’mon!  Pay attention!” I tried to peer up into my mother’s indignancy, 
only to wonder at the height of her, her face seeming so distorted, distant and disconnected from 
me.  She suddenly seemed bigger to me; yet, in hindsight, she was smaller in the world.   
My mother and I did not have a conversation about that day… have not had a 
conversation about that day…1 What I realize now is my mother’s quick-footed walk, her 
perfectly immobile face, and squared shoulders were her way of beating back a linguistic 
spectacle.  Those two young men had performed a hailing (Althusser, 1971; Butler, 1997) and it 
was through their hate speech that my mother was brought into linguistic existence. Her skin 
exuded anger, pride and determination, mingled with contempt, fear and degradation. The 
discursive space formed in the moment of their utterance marked my mother in subjugation, the 
effects of which showed materially through her body, stony face, irate voice, warrior stance.  Yet 
her verbal retort held no effects. Along with the material (non)effects, her retort discursively 
revealed her acknowledgement of their speech act. Her counter-speech produced ironic counter 
effects—the boys smiled wider, laughed harder, continued to amble down the street—which 
reduced my mother’s counterattack to mere prattle. Yanking me with her, the business she had 
yet to conduct was now of utmost importance.  We hurried to whatever destination, she 
completed her transactions and we hastened back into the car.  We sped away from that 
neighborhood and didn’t slow until the faces abruptly shifted from translucent white-pink to 
opaque layers of black and brown.  Get off the street. I realize now that was my mother’s goal, to 
remove us from this environment and to return to a space where our discursive lives and material 
bodies felt at ease. 
 




Butler (1997) contends that, “to be injured by speech is to suffer a loss of context… to 
not know where you are.” (p. 4).  I don’t remember where we were, but I do remember that my 
mother appeared lost that day. My first lesson in linguistic injury is also one of my lasting 
lessons in interpellative power. 
What Word magic did these white men-children possess? Nigger meant nothing to me, 
but it evidently meant something to my mother, and by default, I instinctively knew that 
“meaning something” was not positive. The word escaped me shortly thereafter.  As a floating 
signifier it held little value beyond that “specific proportion in time” (Butler, 1997, p. 2).  It was 
not until adulthood—a mother myself, an English professor obsessed with words and their 
meaning, a Teachers College graduate student grappling with poststructural theory, differing 
conceptions and constructions of identity, the Ivy and all of its effects, blackness, femaleness, 
feelings of linguistic inferiority, wifehood, motherhood, life!—did this scene play back in my 
memory.  Of course, I had heard the word several times in between the space of that day and the 
sudden shock of the memory.  Yet I. Did. Not. Hear. Nigger had become Undone.  Yet nigga 
was (Un)Doing.  How ironic it is that this same (or similar) word that caused my stoic, no 
nonsense mother to cringe, is now loosely passed around the tables of the cafeteria or hollered 
through the halls of the community college where I profess.  What does it mean to witness the 
(Un)Doing of a word that historically belonged to the priest-gods?  The paradox of this is the 
contradictory, conflicting, incomplete messages of the media—acceptable in rap music, on the 
Grammys, even at President Barack Obama’s White House Correspondents’ dinner (maybe) yet 
each POTUS tweet, statement, and slogan (MAGA, Send them back! Clean the swamp!) brings 
me back to that sunny summer day when I first learned about the Power of Words.  
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When my mother asks, finally, what my dissertation is about, I tell her it is about the 
word nigga.  “Oh!” is all she can muster.  I venture to ask her if she remembers that sunny 
summer day.  She cannot.  She chuckles, “Well what did I say?”  I answer, “You yelled back 
honky.” “Honky? What does that mean?” And I am immediately stumped.  What does it mean? I 
think. “No, I don’t think I would have said that word.  I don’t even know that word.” So from 
whence did I learn this? George Jefferson?2 “Well, what would you have said?” I ask. “I 
probably would have said cracker.”3 Cracker?  Again, I am stumped.  My memory and my 
visceral knowledge tell me that my mother would have said honky, not cracker.  “I’m sure I said 
cracker.  I don’t even know the word honky.”4 In response to my dissertation topic she says, 
“Humph.  That’s interesting.” Although I don’t believe she thinks it is very interesting.  I know 
she doesn’t like the word, which she made extremely evident when I once texted a question 
about nigger to her.  Yes, my 83-year old mother texts, and uses Marco Polo and What’s App as 
 
2 While I sit writing this introduction my husband sits across from me reading the news.  I ask him, “What back in 
the day rapper or comedian said nigga?  Did Flip Wilson say it?”  This sends him on a Youtube search f or sitcoms in 
which nigga is expressed.  He, like my father, loves Sanford and Son and immediately pulls up episodes of Esther, 
Fred Sanford’s sister-in-law, liberally sprinkling her retorts with nigga.  Then he goes to The Jeffersons.  He laughs, 
these were episodes from his childhood (and mine).  “This is when comedy was funny,” he quips.  I think, of current 
comedic skits which are meant to poke fun at nigga, namely Chris Rock’s Niggaz v. Black people or the scene with 
Jackie Chan and Chris Tucker in Rush Hour.  In both cases nigga is explicitly defined as belonging to African 
Americans and this rationale is parallel to my husband’s idea of the comedic viability of nigga.  But in what 
instances can we move beyond comedy and/or rap?  Why is it only “allowable” within these particular discourses of 
comedy, entertainment and irony; albeit, with limitations?  Why is nigga censored in other contexts (Spears, 1998) 
and treated as a universal concept meant to cause derision? Why, for example , are we counting the number of times 
nigger has been written in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn or the film Django Unchained? Why are institutions 
punishing professors for reading the word nigger in a text by James Baldwin?  In this manner I refer to Dr. Andre 
Perry’s (2018) statement in The Hechinger Report, “There is no escaping the fact that teachers must use the N-
Word.  But how they use it makes all the difference.  Pretending the word doesn’t exist because it makes you 
uncomfortable is like believing that Trump isn’t racist: an act of delusion.” 
3 Somehow I feel that cracker arrived later in the African American English lexicon and upon further research learn 
that honky was first used in the pejorative in 1946 while cracker, although used pejorativ ely among whites in 1783, 
was not used derogatorily by black people until Malcolm X referenced it in a speech in 1964.This same term 
sparked a CNN debate when it appeared in the trial of George Zimmerman, found not guilty of murdering Trayvon 
Martin who apparently said, “this creepy ass cracker is following me” on the phone prior to the shooting.  I still 
adhere to my version that my mother said honky. Born in 1936, I recall that my mother often used language dating 
to an earlier timeframe than current usage.   
4 In a subsequent conversation my mother indicated that she remembered the word honky, although she is still 
unsure about her response that particular day.  
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well, but on this particular day she did not respond via text.  She called me, immediately, and 
said, “What’s this about?” in a very irate voice.  Before I could answer she continued, “I don’t 
like that word.  I don’t even like to see it.” She is proud of me, my accomplishments, my 
determination, my intellect; but I don’t know if she is proud of my topic—regardless of its 
significance to race, language, the teaching of literature and English education.  
Butler (1997) asks the questions for me: “Does the power of language to injure follow its 
interpellative power?  And how, if at all, does linguistic agency emerge from this scene of 
enabling vulnerability?” (p. 2)  My mother was vulnerable, no doubt.  So Judy,5 is there a space 
in which my mom was (is) able to agentially emerge? Joyce, she answers keep reading, “…the 
injurious address may appear to fix or paralyze the one it hails, but it may also produce an 
unexpected and enabling response… the offensive call runs the risk of inaugurating a subject  in 
speech who comes to use language to counter the offensive call.” (p. 4) So why didn’t I feel, 
don’t I feel, continue to not feel, that my mother’s response enabled agency?  Judith always has 
an answer (which I will attend to later); she labels it a “performative contradiction” (p. 89).6  
Maybe the word itself doesn’t matter, maybe what matters is that my mother’s speech brought 
her into existence in its ability to counter the offensive.  
  
Some forty-odd years later, during these troubling times of media and government, this 
memory shocks me into existence.  It shocks me because it appears as if nigger-nigga is spilling 
forth from everyone’s lips, overtly and covertly. Thus, my fascination with language, with 
 
5 I do not use Judy to be disrespectful.  I use Judy as she uses it in the beginning of her text, Bodies that Matter. 
6 Butler (1997) defines a performative contradiction as a kind of speech in which the disenfranchised appropriates 
the language of the dominant group, claiming it as their own and in doing so challenges the original standard. She 
contends that in doing so a performative contradiction revises historical standards and is key in future undertakings 
of democracy.  
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words, with the langue and the parole7 (Saussure, 1971) draws me particularly to this word, 
nigga, and the paradoxical ways in which it is using and being used. It is usually expected of 
me—as black, as female, as English professor—to have a fully articulated, well-informed  
opinion about nigga (even prior to this research). Yet what do I say to students when I hear them 
rap, shout, declare nigga  in the hallway, in the cafeteria, in my classroom while I, too, listen to 
Kendrick Lamar, Lil’ Wayne, Dre and Snoop, Paul Mooney, Richard Pryor, Chris Rock, Esther 
from Sanford and Son, George Jefferson? What conversations should I have with colleagues 
about recent disciplinary actions against professors who, in their History, Literature, American 
Studies and Philosophy classes, read from texts, spark discussion, ask critical questions about 
“the N-Word”?  How should I feel when, without trigger warning, my colleague vociferously 
reads nigger while teaching Mark Twain’s The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn? What should 
my response be to a student who questions Junot Diaz’s usage in Drown or This is How You Lose 
Her? How do I engage my friend who comments, “I think they’re right for taking the N Word 
out of Huck Finn” or “Did you hear that the Department of Education in FILL-IN-THE-BLANK 
school district banned teaching Huck Finn?”   
Herein lay yet another paradox: I exist in many spaces; therefore, I have many 
sometimes-complementary, sometimes-contradictory, and oftentimes shifting opinions about 
nigga.  For example, the raunchy language of the 83-year old Caribbean matriarch living next 
door to me causes a smile to play across my lips, while the 20-something year old bopping down 
the hall towards class spitting lyrics causes me to cringe; my white male colleague can 
effortlessly read nigger in Huck Finn in my presence, while another white-American colleague 
wouldn’t dare. My African American colleague-friends can freely punctuate our conversation, 
 
7 I will take up a discussion of these terms in the next chapter.  
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while my son better not even think about it. But hear me out—I am not proposing an argument 
based on binary configurations in which one group can use nigga while another group cannot, 
nor am I contending that there is a seamless, straightforward, fixed subject/object relationship 
when nigga is uttered.  Instead, unlike its predecessor nigger I am interested in the Signifyin(g)8 
(Gates, 1988/2014) capacity of nigga, the ways in which it exhibits its own linguistic power and 
agency, and which causes effects not the same as the [Signifyin(g)] speech act itself (Butler, 
1997, p. 3).   More to the theoretical point, I am interested in how one particularized, 
historicized, socio-culturally relevant Word has become Undone, is Undoing, and is always, ever 
in the process of performatively contradicting, Signifyin(g), floating. 
I begin with  Patricia J. Williams’ allegory because her parable, her text overall, critically 
examines the paradoxical nature of language and its overshadowing, universalizing, 
essentializing but also complicated force with respect to Subject position.   For me, it is the 
Undoing of the Word, the fleeting, fluid complexity of the Word, and the floating Signification9 
(Gates, 1988/2014) of the Word, nigga, that is the foundation of this research. I am interested in 
how nigga performs, enacts, acts, injures while it paradoxically heals, inaugurates, tropes, 
parodies.  I am interested in how its agency impacts Subject position so that its speaker and its 
listener might have a good or bad day or some other type of day that conjures multiple feelings 
and positionalities.  I am interested in understanding how it flattens and constructs absolutes, 
 
8 In Henry Louis Gates’ (1988/2014) text The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African American Literary Criticism  
he distinguishes between the bracketed (g) to indicate the distinction between the rhetorical construction of black 
language and the semantic construction of white language  indicating that “the bracketed or aurally erased g… stands 
as the trace of black difference in a remarkably sophisticated and fascinating (re)naming ritual graphically in 
evidence...” (p. 51).  For Gates, this referential form of agnomintio is based upon the ways in which the African  
American community developed particularized speech patterns in response to a “parallel discursive universe” (p. 
50).  As he notes, “…black vernacular discourse proffer[s] its critique of the sign as the difference that blackness 
makes within the larger political culture and its historical unconscious” (p. 51).  Gates defines the relationship 
between these terms as a paradoxical relation of difference inscribed within a relation of identity (p. 50).  
9 I purposely capitalize Signification as per Henry Louis Gates’ distinction between the syntagmatic signification 
and the paradigmatic Signification.  I will employ the same distinction throughout the text.  
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while simultaneously splintering into a million pieces, fragmenting those same assumed 
absolutes. I am interested in how the sting of its lash turns the spotlight away and shines not on 
the object of degradation but on its creator (Morrison, 2017).  I am interested in how its work to 
injure and flatten the Other, the slave, the black as inhuman, turned itself inside out and upside 
down so that the dying and drowning mortals are now the priests-turned-gods. I want to explore 
it, examine it, turn it over and over and over again in an attempt to unlock its combination.  It is 
the Word used both inside and outside of the Celestial City of academia, by both priests-turned-
gods (professors) and dying, drowning mortals (everyone else), while I, the gatekeeper-priest-
god-mortal, simultaneously hold onto the gate and reach downward, wondering about this Word 
and its meaning(s) and its relation to other signifiers, contexts, history(ies), and Subject 
positions.  
It is my assumption that nigga exists in a range of discursive practices and that an 
examination of these practices and how they exist within overlapping discourses is necessary to 
understand present day knowledge productions and shifts in power. If in language there are 
competing discourses with competing ways of giving meaning to the world, discourses that are 
historically, socially and politically situated (Weedon, 1997), then there is an endless process of 
shifting meanings of nigga, which is constantly producing and produced by a range of 
historicized sociocultural and sociopolitical contexts. By unpacking the multiple ways in which 
nigga constitutes the Subject, a host of shifting meanings and shifting subjectivities can be 
explored.  Hence, when my European-born, Rwandan student who identifies as black raises her 
hand in my Comp Lit class and indicates she is shocked and offended by Dominican born 
Pulitzer prize winner Junot Diaz’s use of nigga in his Harvard Book Store talk, “I mean, he’s a 
professor… and a Jersey Dominican… that’s unacceptable for a professor,” understanding the 
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complexity of this two-syllable word is at work. Foucault’s (2010) Introduction in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, discusses the discontinuity of a history of ideas, in which attention 
must turn from the “long period” of a stable, traditional continuous understanding of the 
underlying shifts and changes to the ways that social institutions, customs and mental attitudes 
are effects and affected.  I want to search for these incomplete, elusive discontinuities with 
respect to the usage of nigga. I want to interrogate “usage,” in one, singular, incomplete attempt 
to  explore how nigga uses us, and in doing so, detangle my own ambivalences based on my 
multiply conflicting subjectivities as professor, daughter, mother, self-identifying female of 
color, comrade in the struggle, friend.  
Similar to Williams’ critical inquiry about legal language, nigga, for me, continues to be 
discussed using a traditional humanist perspective in which the speaker is the center or the site of 
language. Scholarship focusing on nigga specifically, and racial slurs and epithets in general, are 
theorized based upon the premise (or humanist assumption) that the word itself transmutes the 
Subject and carries with it the idea that meaning is a ‘portable property’ and that language can 
transport meaning unmediated from one unified subject to another (St. Pierre, 2008).  Arguments 
conceptualizing the appropriateness or inappropriateness of usage create static categories and 
dichotomies that result from and help to construct essentialist understandings of racially-imbued 
language. Legal scholar Randall Kennedy (2003), in his text Nigger: The Strange Career of a 
Troublesome Word  argues that context must be taken into consideration when discussing the use 
of nigger,  “the race line… is a specious divide. There is nothing necessarily wrong with a white 
person sayin ‘nigger’ just as there is nothing necessarily wrong with a black person saying it.  
What should matter is the context in which the word is spoken—the speaker’s aims, effects, 
alternatives.  To condemn whites who use the N-word without regard to context is simply to 
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make a fetish of nigger” (p. 41). Hence, I want to explore what nigga, nigger, niggah, nizzle, 
nicca, neezy mean at any given moment, framed by the discursive relations within which it is 
located.  Just as the raced or racial Subject is socially constructed based on a range of discursive, 
cultural and material contexts and practices, so too is nigga, the meanings of which are constant 
sites of struggle over power (Weedon, 1997, p. 21). Traditional understandings of language itself 
have viewed it as the effect of the speaker’s experience; hence, specific words within a language 
have socially and culturally been placed within limited boundaries of meaning based upon a 
singular historical context or social practice with little wiggle room for transformation or 
recontextualization.  Currently, the socio-historical and socio-cultural power vested in nigga 
continues to uphold illusory qualities of language as a concrete artifact that concretizes 
experience, identity and most significantly, agency.10  My interest rests in the transformational 
power and agency of nigga  as a word that has the potential to expose “…the contradictory 
character… of the universal” (Butler, 1997, p. 89).  Hence, in order to interrogate the 
contradictory nature of nigga as well as what I will call the discontinuity of use I ask the 
following:  
● What processes and/or systems exist that allow particular forms of use of nigga in 
particular contexts  over others? 
● In what ways have discourses governing erudite knowledge come to regulate—or not—
local  subjugated knowledges with respect to nigga? 
 
10 It should be noted that for the purposes of this paper I am using agency in the way that it is referred  to by Toni 
Morrison (1993) in her Nobel Pulitzer prize address and in Butler’s (1997) Excitable Speech. In other words, agency 
is articulated through language. As linguistic and material subjects, who “do language,” notions of agency are 
expressed through speech.  I also refer to Mazzei’s (2013) critique of agency as a humanist concept in her essay, “A 
voice without organs: Interviewing in posthumanist research,” which critiques voice (and subsequently agency) as 
emanating from one essentialist subject.  Instead, she contends that it is an “enactment of researcher-data-
participants-theory-analysis” (p. 732).  Based on these conceptualizations, I view agency as emanating from 
language, but also an enactment of multiple subjectivities, articulations, histories, knowledges, and power(s).  
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● If the classroom is the potential space for critical intellectualism, then in what ways—if 
any—is it possible for nigger/nigga to participate in this process? 
If I were to explain this research to my mother, this is what I would say:  I can remember 
sneaking to listen to Richard Pryor on a .33 and quietly giggling, hand clapped over mouth, so 
my girlfriend’s parents didn’t catch us. I can remember my son at age seven walking into the 
kitchen, nigga rolling effortlessly off his tongue, couched between song lyrics. I can remember 
being brought into my own linguistic existence when, at the age of 18, you forbade me to date a 
white boy (I went on the date anyway), telling me the only thing a white boy could ever want 
from a black girl (me) is her (my) black pussy.  It was the only time I can vaguely recall you 
using the word nigger in my entire lifetime, I think, and if you don’t recall saying it, then it is the 
only time that I felt like nothing more than a nigger. I can remember when, on a sunny summer 
day, in the middle of a busy street, two Word magicians hailed you, and as a consequence, you 
let go my hand.   
Sometimes I can still feel that nanosecond of emptiness, my arm still extended upward 
reaching for her as her newly constituted subjecthood distanced itself from me.  It was the first 
time I saw her differently, through the linguistic “power” of those white boys, as she saw me, 
years later, through the eyes of yet another white boy who wanted to take me on a date.  It is that 
space, that fracture—the  condensed historicity (Butler, 1997) of a contestable past, an 
unpredictable present and unknowable future—that exists between my mother’s hand and my 
own, that I wish to address.  Of her own text Williams (1991)  states, “I want this book to occupy 
the gaps… what I hope will be filled in is connection; connection between my psyche and the 
readers’, between lived experience and social perception, and between an encompassing 
historicity and a jurisprudence of generosity.” (p. 8)  
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For myself, for this research, I want to explore the space, the expanse of forty years, 
between my mother’s hand and present day. I want this research to explore nigga’s evolution 
from inflammatory speech to insurrectionary speech (Butler, 1997). I want to examine nigga as 
an utterance (as speech and/or conduct), and what constitutes “use”—Hearing? Thinking? 
Viewing? Reading? Saying?—and what processes exist that allow for particular forms of use in 
particular contexts, i.e., in the street, in the hallways, in the cafeteria, over others, i.e., in the 
English literature classroom.  I am interested in knowing what magic the media, comedy, 
entertainment possess to demean and derogate but also inaugurate and institute 
knowledge/power.  I am interested in the historically situated socio-cultural context which makes 
certain usages permissible and desirable while others are not.  I am not only interested in why 
nigga is contained or constrained, I am interested in how it has come to be constitutive of the 
social body.  Examining “commonsense” societal articulations of whom can and cannot say 
nigga is not my primary concern as “the universal explains nothing—it is there to be explained” 
(Williams, 1999); however, as a local, daily practice, I am interested in the regulatory statements 
which dictate its usage and the ruptures and/or discontinuities which make certain statements 
“false”.  I am thinking of the ways that I, and students, and faculty are subject to and made 
subjects of institutionalized discursive practices which regulate one’s speech and/or conduct 
(Butler, 1997) so that a student can scream nigga in the hallway, disrupting class, but an 
esteemed professor is reprimanded and required to take sensitivity courses for reading nigger 
from The Fire Next Time aloud.  I am hoping to explore the systems at play both inside and 




In addition, I intend to explore this forty-year expanse of my own psyche in conjunction 
with the paradoxical (im)possibilities of nigga. Today I am professor, woman (not girl), African 
American (I prefer Black), but there was a sunny summer day when I was simply nigger, and in 
our present situation, media, the police, and certain governmental officials tell me that I, and my 
students, still am/are.  I want this research to be one of many multiply inflected, simultaneous 
conversations about the racialized Word (floating signifier) nigga within socio-cultural, 
educational, psychological and historical discourses, all of which impact the English classroom.   
Nigga is a curiosity for me, and much like collectors of the sixteenth and seventeenth century 
Europe (Pearce and MacLure, 2009), I want to construct a  cabinet of curiosities,11 in which I can 
place floating signifiers such as race, utterances such as nigga, multiple identities of presenting 
as hetero (but in actuality queer), and comparatively weigh, uphold, examine, and display them.  
My mother sent me a text, “What are you getting your PhD in?” I can visualize her at the 
senior center telling anyone who will listen, “My daughter is getting her PhD,” and updating 
them about my progress, “She’s no longer a student, she’s a doctoral candidate now.  She’s 
writing her dissertation.”  She will show pictures of me and her only grandson (I am an only 
child after all) and her voice will brim with pride about my (our) accomplishments.  I don’t text 
back, I call her.  “English Education,” I say.  “Oh… well… whatever that means,” she laughs. “I 
don’t even know what it is you’re doing. All I know is you’re getting your doctorate.” I chuckle 
as well; I am driving so I have a bit of time, all the while thinking to myself that time shouldn’t 
matter, she has sacrificed so much for me… Upon realizing that she dropped my hand she 
grabbed it, squeezed it tightly while hurrying me along; she whisked me out of that strange 
 
11 See C. Pearce and M. MacLure’s article titled “The wonder of method” in the International Journal of Research 
and Method in Education which takes up the discussion of the cabinet of curiosities. 
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neighborhood so as to protect me from any further linguistic assaults. “Mom… well… English 
education encompasses many things…you see the study of English is…” 
And so begins this journey with the elusive, inflammatory, insurrectionary, paradoxical 
utterance nigga. 
Please lean in close. 
1.1 Nigga Event #19022019: “Niggas Ain’t Shit”  
During our discussion of “The Pura Principle” D.12 says it, “Niggas ain’t shit.”  This is 
her second use of nigga in class, her second use in reference to the main character, Yunior, her 
second reference to men and the ways they disregard, humiliate, objectify women. Her 
statement, “niggas ain’t shit” is her summation of the mistreatment of women who place their 
faith, trust, honesty, commitment in a relationship that goes off the rails due to the male’s (in this 
case the main character Yunior of This Is How You Lose Her) infidelity, lies, misconduct, 
disregard and lack of compassion.  “Niggas ain’t shit” is meant to articulate the expectations and 
disappointments of a young Dominican (self-proclaimed) female who has possibly witnessed 
said abuse and dishonesty in her own relationships or those of her friends and family. “Niggas 
ain’t shit” is meant to criticize the Afro-Caribbean, diasporic, heteronormative patriarchal 
masculinity (Diaz, 2012) of a “typical” Dominican household, of Afro-Caribbean men, of men in 
general, who do not or cannot respect monogamy, intimacy, women, love. 
The first time she used nigga referring to Yunior’s mistreatment of Madga from the short 
story “The Sun, the Moon, the Stars,” I wondered why she felt comfortable using the word.  I 
 
12 It should be noted that all names of individuals and places are pseudonyms.  Additionally all permissions have 
been gathered and signed by participants.  This Dissertation has been approved by  the Institutional Review Board of 
Teachers College Columbia University and documentation can be found under IRB #19 -396.  It has also been 
approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Institutional Research Assessment, Planning and Research 
Committee at the site location of this research. 
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wondered if it was due to my opening of the semester with Flannery O’Connor’s “The Artificial 
Nigger” a story based in 1955 in which the main characters use nigger—the grandfather as a 
racial epithet towards Negroes and the grandson simply because he thought that’s what they 
were.  I was standing at the board, writing notes, and she muttered it… nigga… I turned, looked 
at her, wondered what I would or should say in this excessive moment—that which exceeds the 
norms proposed as proper and natural by those with social order (Orner, Miller & Ellsworth., 
2005, 111-112).  Were others offended? Startled? Indifferent? Was I? The room seemed not to 
shift.  I noticed no intake of breath, no glance in her direction (she always sits in the corner seat, 
far left, first aisle, last row).  I hesitate, not knowing whether or not to shift the conversation to 
the utterance nigga while asking myself, how would this, could this, disturb the current lesson?   
Standing in the front of the room, at the chalkboard, representing the one “in control,” I 
am met with “excess”—a spillage or slippage in which language oozes outside of the boundaries 
of what often are assumed as “acceptable” utterances based on normative discourses of the 
college classroom—for which I must, we must respond response-ably (Miller, 2005).  A dialogic 
atemporal space potentially opens up in which author and text (Diaz and This is How You Lose 
Her) no longer exist in the realm of canonized historical artifact, spoken about as documents, 
which “in themselves, are often not verbal, or which say in silence something other than what 
they actually say…” (Foucault, 2010, p. 7).  Instead, the literature becomes living, breathing 
texts of modern-day practices, meanings and knowledges, monuments “placed in relation to [the 
historical present to]… form totalities” (Foucault, 2010, p. 7).  D.’s comment is as much about 
the text as it is about her life or the lives of those around her.  For me, these spontaneous 
moments can be perceived as the historicized violent past of nigger  now ruptured based on the 
historical present of  daily language practices.  These are moments of excess, in which I must be 
25 
 
aware of my own positionality as professor, African American, teacher-educator, researcher, 
woman; these are moments in which I must “remain on the hook” and be “response-able” 
(Miller, 2005) for the ways in which I both articulate and encourage my students in “the sweaty 
fight for meaning” (Miller, 2005).    And yet, as excess, these moments are also ex-citable 
(Butler, 1997)  as the boundary between what is speakable and unspeakable is ruptured, “defying 
the conventions that govern our anticipatory imaginings” (Butler, 1997, p. 90-91) of what is 
sayable or unsayable within these particular social, cultural and historical moments and contexts 
within the English classroom (Orner, et al., 2005). Do I take this moment to explain the historical 
significance of nigga? Do I explain to her that, based on her ethnic background, many would say 
she has no rights to its use, (while Diaz himself uses it)? Do I critique her essentialist labelling of 
men? And could any or all of these abled responses silence her? How does one ably respond 
response-ably? 
I choose to say nothing and continue with the lesson, and it is this acquiescence, cloaked 
in the shroud of silence, that allows D. to say it again on this occasion, and this time she says it 
twice!  “Niggas ain’t shit.” And later, “See?  What I tell you? Niggas, man,”  she exclaims as we 
continue the discussion of Yunior.  What shapes D.’s “Niggas ain’t shit?”  Possibly her own 
experiences with Dominican men or men in general.  In addition to her own constituted 
experiences, there is the discourse of heteronormative monogamy; there is the discourse of 
Dominican masculinity “and the way that… Caribbean, African, Diasporic, heteronormative 
masculinity gets understood, the way it gets articulated, and the way it also gets expressed… 
and… practiced, and the failures of the people who are being… interpolated by it, the failures of 
them to live up to some of the expectations.” (Diaz, 2012) There is the intersectional discourse of 
Love and Sexual Intercourse, which meet at the crux of the text.  Yet there are other discursive 
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formations that, while disparate, integrate in this excessively excite-able moment. There is the 
enunciative modality (Foucault, 2010) of the classroom space, a space in which, as professor, 
educator, examiner, grader, gatekeeper, priest-turned-god, I am the authority, the intellectual 
superior, the knower of all things textual; I. Am. The. Text.  I am supposed to know the answers, 
know exactly what Diaz is thinking, why he thought it, why he wrote it.  And based on the 
current discursive construct of education, which ironically places me at the center of each 
student’s educational accomplishments, I am supposed to give them the answers so that these can 
be regurgitated in a comprehensive essay.  Somehow, I become Diaz, it is through my lips that 
Diaz speaks. 
So, when are such moments overly excessive?  Should the Teachers College Columbia 
University professor have been disciplined when she read nigger from James Baldwin’s The Fire 
Next Time? Should those graduate students, students studying to become teachers themselves, 
have complained, reported her, demanded that she take sensitivity courses, ultimately causing 
her to leave the institution?  Who, at the time, was speaking—the author or the professor?  When 
discussing a civil rights case with a student during his office hours, tenured Emory Law School 
professor Paul Zwier recollects a memory of his civil rights activism, telling said student that he 
was called a nigger lover by a white racist. The consequence of sharing this private moment 
resulted in a formal complaint by the student, being barred from teaching and termination.13 
While both examples are fraught with multiple meanings, the speaking subject is essentialized as 
racist, inappropriate, insensitive, unfit to teach.  In both moments, the utterance of nigger, while 
 
13 Since the writing of this dissertation Paul Zwier has been reinstated at Emory Law School.  For more on this case 
see the following links:  ABA Journal, The FIRE News desk, Inside Higher Ed, The Atlanta Journal Constitution, 
The Emory Wheel.  It should also be noted that Mr. Zwier apparently also said nigger in class when discussing a 




citational, is “…ineffective [in] capturing an original slur by whoever is being reported: whatever 
offense the report commits is endorsed only by the reporter.” (Anderson and Lepore, 2013, p. 
30).    “Use” is ruptured as the utterer is constituted on the basis of the insult, not the reporter of a 
past or embedded insult.  Anderson and Lepore (2013) continue, “slurring is non-displaceable: a 
current use of a slur cannot be employed to discuss a past or future use without incurring a 
current infraction.” (p. 30).  While these instances could easily be simplified to the unsayability 
of nigger based on the racial make-up of both professors, what is at stake is a form of 
governmentality (Foucault, 1978) in which conduct (and/or speech) is governed and governable 
within horizontal relationships between those classified, categorized and regulated within the 
institution of Higher Education.  The utterance nigger is constitutive of the subjects, the 
relationship between subjects, and the power relations embedded within the webwork of bodies-
subjects-classroom-institution. What does it mean to govern ourselves and others? Anderson and 
Lepore (2013) caution:  
   In academic discussions…, it’s easy to convince oneself… that particular uses of slurs 
are inoffensive… As a safeguard against such inurnment, we strongly urge you always 
ask yourself how a targeted member, perhaps accidentally overhearing you, would react 
to your usage.  You’ll find, as we have, that much of what seems suitable is definitely 
not. (p. 31)   
 
Thus, is the cautionary note to think before you speak?   
I fear that this form of governmentality has the potential to produce flattened hierarchies, 
essentialist subjectivities, and in the morass of governing ourselves and others we gain and/or 
lose historical perspective, the ability to be creative in our governability, and mimic the 
sovereign power we hope to dismantle.  Butler notes,  
…a politics that begins and ends with the policing function is a mistake… the question is 
how is that person… renewing and reinvigorating racist rituals of speech… how do we 
exploit their ritual function in order to undermine it in a more thorough-going way, rather 
than stopping it as its spoken.  What would it mean to restage it, take it, do something 
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else with the ritual so that its revivability as a speech act is really seriously called into 
question. (as cited in Bell, 1999, p. 166) 
 
Randall Kennedy (2019), in his disquiet about Philip Adamo, Augsburg University professor 
who, after a reading of Baldwin and subsequent discussion of ‘the N-Word,’ and who lost his 
teaching schedule and took a leave of absence, urges “this episode vividly illustrates the embrace 
of illiberal conformity that is sadly ascendant in academia.”  
Once, when my son was small, while playing with two action figures (dolls), he said to 
me: “This is the bad guy and this is the good guy.”  I asked, “What’s going to happen?”  And he 
answered, “The good guy is going to vanquish the bad guy.”  “So what happens to the bad guy?” 
I prodded. My son looked thoughtful. “Does he die? Does he go to jail?  What happens?” “He’s 
punished!” My son exclaimed, “He’s punished because he’s a bad guy.”  “Hmm,” I say, “but 
why can’t you teach the bad guy how to be a good guy? So, then he can also be a good guy.”  
The look on my son’s face was utter consternation, and while his furrowed brow brought forth 
laughter from me, it also spoke of how the comic book industry, cartoons and Marvel Universe 
mimic our Justice System—aiding in the construction of individual superheroes who roam the 
halls looking and listening for linguistic bad guys—better to punish, because they can never be 
good. So, what do we gain and lose when our willingness to govern becomes enmeshed in forms 
of sovereign power, disciplinary power, and governmentality (Foucault, 1978) that simply stop 
the speaker but not the spoken (which is the real goal here, right?). 
In that excessive, ex-citeable moment I wanted to say something to D., wanted to ask, 
“Why do you use that particular word?”  Wanted to turn to the class and begin a conversation 
about nigga, but my own confusion and uncertainty stopped me.  How does one intellectualize 
racist language?  How does one allow for such a vitriolic, hated word to become part of a larger 
discussion about language, gender, race?  How does one approach (im)possible speech (Butler, 
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1997)? And in this particular instance, why is the self-proclaimed cheater, Yunior (of Diaz’s 
work), the character who cannot, no matter how hard he tries, remain monogamous, be the 
representative of nigga?  Why does D.’s use cause me to pause in ways that Diaz’s does not?   
Ironically, while I have read past Diaz’s purposeful -er insertions many times, each time D. 
exclaimed nigga (with an -a) I was made to feel disconcerted. 
“Nigga’s ain’t shit” is not specific to the classroom setting, to the text, to Diaz or his 
characters, but is a particularized speech act within specific sociocultural spaces, an assemblage 
of practices and ways of thinking which converge on this excessive, in-the-making meaning-full 
(Miller, 2005) moment. “Nigga’s ain’t shit” is metaphorical, idiomatic, anachronistic. Yet, as 
part of what could potentially be considered subjugated knowledge, or in the words of Diaz 
(2012) a “local ecology,” in the classroom, this speech act ruptures academic discourse—it is not 
erudite knowledge.  However, its entry into the classroom reveals its interdiscursive context, i.e., 
‘nigga’s ain’t shit’ as a site of power is understood by the students of the classroom (myself 
included) as more than a critique of the text, but a critique of heteronormativity, Caribbean, 
African, Disaporic, Dominican masculinity as symbolized within the text.   While I am 
symbolically positioned as professor (standing in front of the class, imbued with the right to 
teach due to my educational background and employment at the college) ‘niggas ain’t shit’ 
subjugates me, constitutes me, so that I am on par with D. I understand the force of this speech 
act—can reflect upon my own past relationships and those of heartbroken friends.  I, too, am 
constituted within the discourses of monogamy, fidelity and marriage, blackness and femaleness, 
and what each of these mean in relation to the Diaspora.  In a classroom of seven men and nine 
women, “nigga’s ain’t shit” does not cause a flutter, a glance, a shrug.  When I turn to survey the 
classroom some of the women are nodding; E. is looking back at D., R. is smiling, J.’s look is 
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smug. None of the men respond; Y. doesn’t even look up from his phone.  Within the context of 
the story, the classroom, the social practices of these 20-something students, regardless of race, 
ethnicity, nationality or gender, “niggas ain’t shit” is understood not as a racial epithet or slur, 
but as a critique on conceptions of faithfulness, loyalty and honesty.  No one, myself included, 
responds to D. No one verbally questions her statement; no one expresses deep concern or relief. 
No one comes to the aid of Yunior, attempting to justify his infidelity, or Diaz.  Instead, each of 
us allows “nigga ain’t shit” to hold a certain amount of weight in the classroom. The paradox of 
nigger-nigga in the classroom is its allowability through literature, as long as it is not spoken by 
student or professor—James Baldwin, Zora Neale Hurston, Langston Hughes, Mark Twain, 
Willliam Shakespeare, Junot Diaz. Why do we teach texts without further discussions of 
language?  More significantly, why do we read texts but censor and govern speech?  
Class conversation continues and at some point an exasperated J., slamming her hand on 
the desk, “I don’t understand Yunior at all.” I smile half-heartedly, gesture towards D. and say, 
“Well, niggas ain’t shit.” D. smiles, nods, “I’m telling you!” Even Y. pipes up, “Well, you know 
his behavior just doesn’t make any sense.  I mean, dude, what is your problem?  He keeps getting 
caught because he doesn’t really understand or know how to maintain a healthy relationship.” 
And class discussion takes off.  I imagine that the spell is broken. But what is performative 
pedagogy14 if not also the failure to respond, the failure to be response-able, the choice to step 
away from the “sweaty fight” and the in-the-moment choices we make in attempting to construct 
meaning-full experiences (Miller, 2005). I can dream a million scenarios of what could or should 
 
14 I take this term from Miller’s (2005) Sounds of Silence Breaking: Women, Autobiography, Curriculum in which 
Orner et al. note that teaching becomes performative “…when educators teach in ways that exceed representation” 
(p.115), and these teaching events “leave no visible trace afterward” (p. 124).  Performative teaching is situated, 
unrepeatable, and contextual. Performative pedagogy cannot be universalized, categorized, or reproduced.   
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have happened… instead Patricia J. Williams’ parable is inverted; I am made mortal in-the-




Chapter 2: Signs, Signifiers & Signifyin(g) 
“Mom do you know what a real nigga is”?     –17-year old son 
 
White folks made up nigger and don’t want me to say it…I say nigger a hundred times every 
 
 morning, makes my teeth white… I say it, you think it; what a small white world. 
 –Paul Mooney   
 
 
Words empty out with age.  Die and rise again, accordingly invested with new meanings, and  
 
always equipped with a secondhand memory.    –Trinh T. Minh-ha 
 
Paul Mooney’s15 final quip “what a small white world” reveals the irony of his 
willingness…no… his freedom and choice to say nigger. While there are predictions that those 
classified racially as White will be in the minority by 2045, Mooney’s statement has more to do 
with linguistic sarcasm than population.  Critiquing usage, his final declaration asserts that 
thinking nigger and saying nigger both exist in the realm of usage, a usage which my seventeen-
year-old felt compelled to question after it filled the space of my car. “Mom, do you know what a 
real nigga is?”  I wondered if all my talk about nigga had negatively affected him, and all my 
theorizing—my ontological and epistemological orientations, my conceptual framework and 
theoretical lens, my pedagogy and methodology, my poststructural framings—did nothing for me 
in that moment.  “I'm not sure. Do you?”  He attempts an answer, first yes, then, “No I don't 
think I know what a real nigga is.  I'm going to look it up.”  He pulls out his phone.   
 
15 I will later explore the discourse of entertainment as a space through which the illocutionary and perlocutionary 
force of nigga satirizes and puns thus constructing multiple tensions between Mooney as entertainer and his 
audiences. However, I begin with his statement as a segue into “the word and the world,” a theoretical, albeit 
incomplete, exploration of the theoretical underpinnings of how I intend to explore nigga’s usage. 
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There is ambiguity based on how Mooney is “using” nigger, i.e., pun, epithet, slur, 
mimicry, and what meanings are taken up in his usage, just as there is ambiguity about one’s 
status as a real nigga.   Instead, multiple intersecting meanings exist, each of which contain a 
secondhand memory (Minh-ha) of a historicized past which cannot be erased nor constrained 
(Gates, 1988/2014). The contention that my son and Mooney share, which is also what Trinh T. 
Minh-ha explains, is that words can live and die, take on new meanings with an attached 
memory.  Hence, the possibility of language having a life of its own is not necessarily farfetched, 
even if one’s ability to reach beyond fixed conceptions of language continues to be the normative 
practice.  Morrison (1993b) too, likens language to a living breathing entity in her Nobel Prize 
for Literature address in which she uses the bird as a symbol for language, trapped in the hands 
of a young person who has the choice to free the bird or crush it.  These quotes, taken together, 
critique language as living, (en)acting and being in the world. 
My son reads:  
   Contrary to popular belief, a Real Nigga is someone who will always be ‘themselves’, 
not someone who goes on killing sprees and doesn’t care about anything. But, being a 
real nigga, being yourself means showing everything about yourself but your weaknesses, 
knowing them at the same time.  It's all about being real and true to yourself. The 
opposite of real is fake.  You don't have to be black to be a real nigga, but it helps. Being 
in the hood carrying a gun talkin shit is not being a real nigga, because when the police 
come you will be crying for your mom. Being a real nigga is doing whatever you do, 
doing it best, not pretending to be a wannabe thug like everybody else. Bruce Lee is a 
real nigga. Chuck Norris is a real nigga.  Most rappers (e.g. Lil Flip, G-unit, D4l, Gille da 
Kid) ain't  real niggas. (UrbanDictionary.com) 
 
After reading, he surmises, “So I think a real nigga is someone who is himself.  Doesn't follow 
others and go around carrying guns and stuff.”  I ask if that makes him a real nigga.  He says, “I 
don't know, I guess.  I don't carry a gun and I don't follow behind other people…”   
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My son’s interrogation of a real nigga parallels my own wonderings about nigga 
especially as these are “used” in the English language classroom.  While it can be argued that 
there are multiple complementary and contradictory “uses” for nigger in Mooney’s statement, 
when nigga is read from Baldwin, Hurston, Hughes or (in recent publication) Angie Thomas’ 
The Hate U Give by a racially-marked white reader, its secondhand memory has the potential to 
supersede multiply inflected understandings of use and usage, thus constituting the reader of the 
text as racist, insensitive, prejudice. But in such a case, I wonder, whose word is it, the reader or 
the writer?   And whose use?  One possible lens through which to interrogate the discontinuity of 
use is by exploring nigger, nigga, nigguh, niggaz through the contention that language (words) 
die and are reborn, and through rebirth new meanings are created which exceed the speaker 
(Butler, 1997).  Gates (1988/2014) points to this in his text The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of 
African American Literary Criticism, “a signifier [word] is never, ultimately, able to escape its 
received meanings, or concepts, no matter how dramatically such concepts might change through 
time” (p. 54).  Instead he contends that, especially within African American Vernacular English 
(AAVE) rhetorical troping of Standard (white) English takes place in which received meanings 
are turned upon by vertical substitution, i.e., Signifyin(g)16 (Gates, 1988/2014).  Using Gates’ 
argument, Mooney’s comedic portrayal of nigger acts as pun and irony, in effect Signifyin(g) 
upon its secondhand epithet; however, the allowability of nigger’s ironic Signification is not 
solely due to Mooney as speaker, but also because Mooney is a real nigga, doing what he does 
best, within the discursive realms of comedic entertainment, which constitutes him as sovereign 
speaking subject (Butler 1997), one of many identities he takes on, albeit incomplete.  I think of 
my Introduction to Literature student who would ask of Mooney the same question he posed in 
 
16 I will explain Gates’ definition of Signifyin(g) in subsequent paragraphs. 
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class in his critique of Junot Diaz’s short story “Nilda,” “but why would he use the -er instead of 
the -a?  Why would he use the white version instead of the black one?  Why is he talking like a 
white man?”  Others in the class agreed with him… vehemently. Much like my discussion with 
my son, I did not feel as if I had a plausible answer to his question; it was an excessive moment 
(Orner, Miller and Ellsworth, 2005), one in which my and my students’ subjectivities, 
knowledges, histories and power relations overflowed beyond the classroom discussion. In 
retrospect, I think of Mooney, “What a small white world.”  And I think of the definition read to 
me by my son—[INSERTING MY STUDENT HERE]  “Ade was a real nigga the day he asked 
that question in class.” 
So does part of usage dictate what Gates (1988/2014) identifies as agnominatio (or 
lexical derivation), in his own alteration of signifying to Signifyin(g)? 
   The bracketed g [in Signifyin(g)] enables me to connote the fact that this word is, more 
often than not, spoken by black people without the final g as “signifyin.”  This arbitrary 
and idiosyncratic convention also enables me to recall the fact that whatever historical 
community of Afro-Americans coined this usage did so in the vernacular spoken, in 
contradistinction to the literate written usages of the standard English “shadowed” term.  
The bracketed or aurally erased g… stands as the trace of black difference in a 
remarkably sophisticated and fascinating (re)naming ritual graphically in evidence here. 
(Gates, 2014, p. 51) 
 
Likewise, nigga aurally erases the -er of nigger in a (re)naming ritual in which the -er version is 
a secondhand memory (Minh-ha) shadowing the AAVE term.  Poet and playwright Jabari Asim 
(2007) attributes agnomination  (the dropping of the -er for the -a) to the late 1980’s rap group 
N.W.A. (Niggas Wit Attitude) and their debut album, and signature song of the same title, 
Straight Outta Compton.  Quoting rapper, actor and activist Mos Def, Asim writes,  
…when we call each other ‘nigga,’ we take a word that has been historically used by 
whites to degrade and oppress us… and turn it into something beautiful, something we 
can call our own… it truly becomes a ‘term of endearment’ (p. 223-4).  
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Although Asim acknowledges that N.W.A.’s exploitation of nigga is “…overtly self-
conscious… infused with macabre wit and…positively Ellisonian” (p. 222), he cautions against 
non-critical usage of nigga from those artists and laypersons who “mindlessly utter the epithet 
[as] a form of… shackl[ing] ourselves to those corrupt white delusions—and their attendant false 
story of our struggle in the United States” (p. 233).  In other words, outside the realm of what he 
determines as critically engaging art, Asim questions the legitimacy of nigga without its 
attendant historical narrative; he contends that gangsta rappers, “the henchmen of the white 
supremacist agenda” (p. 222), “…keep alive dangerous stereotypes linking African Americans to 
laziness, criminal violence, and sexual insatiability” (p. 222).  He surmises that gansta rap 
epitomizes its own “existential riddle… ‘What is a nigga’?” (p. 222).17   This is what W.E.B. Du 
Bois (1903/2003) has labeled the double consciousness:  
…no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the 
other world… a peculiar sensation… of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of 
others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of the world that looks on in amused 
contempt and pity (p. 16-17), 
 
 of the African American psyche, both black and American. For gangsta rap this double 
consciousness would be a commingling of slave, nigger (American), colored (American), Negro 
(American), black (American), African-[American], nigga (Black… American).  Asim (2007) 
contends that the answer to this question is fraught with struggle, irony, inconsistency, and 
contradiction, “striving for progress through the few legitimate channels available to 
them…[gangsta rappers] choose to embrace the absurdity of life by becoming a nigga” (p. 222).   
In a previous conversation, after listening to the lyrics of Kyrie Irving, I ask my son what  
nigga means.  He answers that it means a black person.  We are driving again, and much like Mr.  
 
17 And quite possibly this mirrors my consternation about my son’s rap -related existential question, “What’s a real 
nigga?” I am unsure of my (or his) existential connection to the word.   
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Petto’s defense when speaking about Riley in “The S Word” (McGruder, 2008), I wonder if I am  
affecting my son’s inside voice.  I decide to interrogate, knowing that at any moment the 
conversation can easily come to a close with a roll of the eye, a sigh, a shrug and decisive 
silence. 
“Who uses it?” 
“Blacks and Spanish.”  
He continues by explaining that he never heard a white person use it and I cannot call to 
mind any white rappers except for Eminem. I ask if anyone can use it, and he replies that they 
choose to.  Then I hit him with the depth of the conversation:  Do you use it?  He hesitates. 
“Yeah.” 
Miraculously he continues, “Blacks should be allowed to use it but whites, no.  That’s a 
word for a black man…I don’t know about a black woman, but a white man better not ever say it 
to me because he’s gonna get punched, socked, anything, on the face.  Blacks can say it.  Any 
race can say it except whites because they say nigger and it’s a racial term when they say it.” 
I don’t know if I taught him this or if the floating Signification of race has somehow 
“floated” into his psyche.  Instead, I respond with, “Mmmm.”   
He is silent.  He places his ear buds into his ears.  The conversation is over. 
 
If, as my son contends, nigga only belongs in the mouths of people of color, then, as 
Gates (1988/2014) theorizes, nigga is an example of Signification. In black vernacular 
Signification valorizes the signifier, stressing its materiality (sound) and devaluing the concept  
(signified).  This form of language play was a counter strategy during slavery, enabling slaves to 
send warnings, plan covert meetings, and satirize their masters; Gates theorizes these rhetorical 
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linguistic moves as existing within the structure of the language itself .  Hence, through his 
application of post-Enlightenment linguist Ferdinand de Saussure’s (1971) theory,18 Gates’ 
framing of Signification is based upon the theory that 
black vernacular is composed of arbitrary units, devoid 
of meaning, which acquired meaning based on the 
differences within the larger linguistic and social 
contexts of white English.   In order to conceptualize 
this, Gates provides  the reader with Saussure’s x-y axis, 
placing black vernacular (and Signification) on the 
rhetorical y-axis (See Fig. 1).  Signification serves as a 
“language of blackness” (p. 72), “coded dictionaries of 
black tropes” (p. 69), which defined their circumstances, 
served as a form of linguistic independence and communicated embedded meaning(s) in and 
about the world in which they survived.   
At age 14 my son tells me that his best friend’s sister laughingly calls him a black nigger.  
But it’s okay, mom, he tells me, we were just playing.  Again, we are driving. I grip the wheel, 
knuckles aching, as I visualize the scene I ask him to lay out before me:  We always play like 
 
18Gates draws upon theories from Freud, Saussure and Lacan, to show the interrelation of Signification and  
signification.  Saussure’s (1972) breakdown of the sign into the signifier (sound -image) and signified (concept) 
theorized that the relationship between the word a nd its meaning is arbitrary, “… actually has not natural connection 
with the signified…” (Saussure, as cited in Williams, 1999, p. 37); however, the speaker is bound to the language of 
that community.  Prior to Gates’ theorizing of the Saussurean sign, Lev i-Strauss (1950) extended this theory in his 
privileging of the signifier over the signified.  He contended that there is a gap between signifier and signified which 
resulted from a host of signifiers in society which contribute to the production of an inf inite number of new 
meanings (Williams, 1999).  Levi-Strauss terms this influx of signifiers over signifieds “floating signifiers” which 
“represent an undetermined value of signification, in itself devoid of sense and therefore susceptible to receive any 
sense” (Levi-Straus, as cited in Williams, 1999, p. 52).  Based on this, he argued that social reality is governed by 
the laws of language.  Again, I will not take up space going into the specifics of Levi-Strauss’ arguments, which 
moved the structuralist view further along the spectrum towards a poststructural theorizing of language (which is 
where we are headed!), but I bring up Saussure and Levi-Strauss in order to introduce some foundational aspects of 
floating signifiers, a  term Patricia J. Williams whispered to her sister in her opening chapter.  
y-axis: Signification/rhetorical 







x-y axis representative of Gates’ 
Structural linguistics 
 
Figure 1   
X-Y Saussurean Linguistic Axis 
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that.  I was chasing her up the steps.  At the time my son’s friend (best friend) was white, and, 
while I am off studying peace education in Uganda and Rwanda, he spends the two weeks of my 
absence at his house so that he can travel to and from the alternative-instruction, predominantly 
(almost all) white private school I had chosen for his K through 8th grade education.  During my 
trip, my husband phoned me, “Call DXXX,” he says.  I learn that, as per usual, my son has had a 
verbal altercation with his father.  DXXX apologized as she told me that she made the executive 
decision to allow my son to remain at her house on weekends (over the course of my trip there 
were two), rather than go to his father’s house (as I’d arranged).  Without going into details of 
the relationship between my son, his father and myself, I appreciated the fact that she was 
protecting him.  I was not home to act as buffer between my son and his father.  DXXX 
instinctively knew, without my telling, that the relationship was strained, and her motherly 
instinct overturned all pre-arranged plans—he was to remain at her home until I returned.    I 
knew he was well-taken care of.  So now, speeding down the highway, what do I say about 
nigger to my son, to his best friend, to his sister, to his best friends’s mother without reducing 
them to sum zero racists?  My next trip to Africa would have to wait.  
My son is braver than I. I can’t say at his age that I would have had the courage to ask (or 
tell) my mother what any form of nigger-nigga meant, and, if I am to go back to that bright 
sunny day of my childhood, it took me until well into adulthood (and this research) before I 
could develop the courage to ask her what exactly was meant by those two boys walking by us 
on the street.  This is what I mean by the atemporality of language and the ways in which its 
effects exceed not only us but also space and time.  My son heard nigger, knew what it meant, 
and because it came from a white girl’s lips who he deemed as friend, or at the very least, the 
sister of his best friend, he saw this as okay.  But ironically he asks, “Mom what’s a real 
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nigga?”—a reiteration of Gloria Naylor’s (1986) question when she heard it in her third-grade 
class from “…a small pair of lips that had already learned it could be a way to humiliate…” My 
son, too, had heard nigga countless times (in music, not from me), before he felt it necessary to 
interrogate its construction as it singed the air in my compact Honda Civic, yet his experience 
(his subjugation) with being called  a nigger by a pair of equally thin lips was different from that 
of Naylor. What then of use? 
There is a rippling that occurs with each reiteration, consequences that are not always 
visible and that can emerge in subsequent generations.  There is a rippling effect… a 
performativity, a contradiction, an inverted interpellation (Butler, 1997) in which the niggers are 
calling themselves niggas and justifying themselves as real.  Makes their teeth white (Mooney, 
2010). The struggle, irony, inconsistency, and contradiction of my son’s public vs. private 
hearings are situated in the absurdity of double-consciousness which Asim (2007) articulates  
through the words of Chester Himes:  
   Racism introduces absurdity into the human condition.  Not only does racism express 
the absurdity of the racists, but it generates absurdity in the victims… Racism creates 
absurdity among blacks as a defense mechanism. Absurdity to combat absurdity 
 (Himes, as cited in Asim, 2007, p. 219).  
 
(Gangsta) Rappers, then, combat this absurdity by embracing the very term that has been used to 
degrade them, labelling themselves, per Asim, as both targets and agents of their oppression (p. 
221).   As such, the “macabre wit” that Asim identifies in Niggaz Wit Attitudes (NWA) 
specifically illustrates Ralph Ellison’s contention that blacks have a heritage of responding to 
and coping with oppression with mirth, humor, irony and wit, defined by Gates (1988/2014) as 
Signifyin(g).  However, Asim cautions that descendants of gangsta rap have failed to produce art 
that critically engages and contextualizes nigga as a word with a tenuous racially-charged 
41 
 
history, the blueprint which has been adhered to since N.W.A.’s inception, which defines niggas 
as misogynistic, violent, hypersexualized, and homophobic.  
Unlike Naylor, my son does not have the luxury of climbing into my lap and listening to 
my answer.   His unconscious hearing is not based on private talk in his grandmother’s home full 
of extended family members who weigh in on community behaviors.  His listening is exclusively 
public, especially since my own renderings of nigga have rarely, if ever, been in his presence. 
Nigga, for him, derives from the latest rap song or hip hop video, broadcast on BET and/or 
MTV, a movie, a peer, a stranger even, but our small nuclear family has not employed our right 
to daily exercise/exorcise nigga.  Unlike Naylor, his question does not come from a place of 
confusion, upon hearing the word pass between foreign lips, a forked tongue with malice-laced 
intonations/intentions.  His question relates to subtext, to type of nigga, a real nigga, spoken by 
one of many nationally syndicated entertainers whose album he probably downloaded on iTunes.  
His question is less about the noun and more about the adjective and the ways in which it situates 
other usages of nigga, in his words, broke nigga, hood nigga, bitch nigga.  Ironically, any of 
these have constructed meanings, which he understands, but real? What exactly makes a nigga 
real?  Unlike Naylor, nigga has become so commonplace in public social practice that I’m sure 
he uses the word himself.    
Unlike Gloria Naylor, my son lives in an era where nigga is no longer the issue, instead 
the issue has become how real a nigga is.  What we have here is not an issue of who can and 
who cannot say nigger-nigga  (Mooney might argue that everyone in his audience says it or can 
say it) but in what discursive contexts is nigga sayable?  It is no secret that language 
construction, much like racialization, has historically been segregated in the United States, as 
Gates contends. However, while these segregated systems each contain particularized structures 
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based on their constitution of separate realities, they are intricately tied to and relational to one 
another.  While Gates identifies black vernacular as a “carefully structured system of rhetoric” 
(p. 49) and a “black (re)doubling” (p. 54) of standard white language, both systems “constitute 
social reality” (Weedon, 1997, p. 22).   Gates particularizes Ferdinand de Saussure’s (1971) 
structuralist theory of language that reframed Enlightenment theories of language, which 
contended that language came from within.  Instead Saussure argued that language does not 
belong to the rational, fully conscious subject, but is inherently its own system.  This Saussurean 
theory of language contends that meaning is not intrinsic but relational, in other words, 
“…meaning is produced within language rather than reflected by language” (Weedon, 1997, p. 
23); hence words (Saussure and Gates use the term signs) only acquire meaning through their 
relationship to other words (signs), what he terms a language system (Saussure, 1971).   This 
break from previous ideas about language meant that the idea of a fixed rational self with a 
consciousness that exists prior to language was no longer justifiable. For Saussure, there are no 
pre-existing ideas, and nothing is distinct before the appearance of language (as cited in 
Williams, 1999, p. 37); hence, “Without language (langue) thought is a vague, uncharted nebula” 
(Saussure, 1972). Gates’ departure from Saussure elaborates a black hermeneutical principle so 
as to present a “carefully structured system of rhetoric” (p. 49) specific to African American 
language systems. In presenting his theory of rhetoric and semantics, Gates turns to Saussure’s 
concept of the sign arguing that it is not the sign that has multiplied, but the signifier, which 
“…has been doubled and (re)doubled, a signifier in this instance that is silent, a ‘sound-image’… 
sans the sound.” (p. 50).  I contend that the doubling or (re)doubling that Gates identifies is 
synonymous with the linguistic term reduplication, in which a word or part of a word is repeated 
for grammatical or figurative intensification.  In this case, the (re)doubling emphasizes the play 
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on differences between nigger and nigga which mirrors Gates’ assertion, “the relationship that 
black ‘Signification’ bears to the English ‘signification’ is paradoxically, a relation of difference 
inscribed within a relation of identity.” (p. 50). What I argue then is that nigga, while 
paradoxically different (and oppositional) to nigger, is inscribed within its relational identity.  
But again, what then of use?   This (re)doubling is both a method of lexical derivation, 
the process of forming a new word from an existing word, and a mode of figurative 
intensification, the rhetorical troping which is the heart of Signifyin(g).  Gesturing towards 
Derrida’s differance and its suspended relationship with the verbs differ and defer, Gates 
continues with an explanation of this (re)naming, reconfiguring Saussure’s theory, where a sign 
is made up of the signifier and the signified. Instead, spoken black vernacular which has 
Signified upon formal English use and convention has occurred at the level of the conceptual 
(signified) and at the level of the sound-image, the signifier.  “Black people vacated the signifier, 
then—incredibly—substituted as its concept a signified that stands for the system of rhetorical 
strategies peculiar to their own vernacular tradition” (p. 52).  In this way “rhetoric… has 
supplanted semantics in this most literal meta-confrontation within the structure of the sign” (p. 
52).   In other words, Saussure’s sign = signified (concept)/signifier (sound -image) which is 
representative of standard English signification is, in black vernacular, replaced with sign = 
rhetorical figures/signifier, i.e., Signification. 
Unlike a chain of signifiers that operate on a horizontal syntagmatic axis, black 
vernacular operates as vertical substitution; therefore, Saussure’s theory that the signifier is fixed 
and unchangeable  is fallacious.  Instead, Gates employs Bakhtin’s terminology of the double-
voiced word, “…a word or utterance… decolonized for the blacks’ purposes ‘by inserting a new 
semantic orientation into a word which already has—and retains—its own orientation’” (p. 55).  
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Hence, in black vernacular the signified is replaced with rhetorical meaning, essentially unfixing 
and simultaneously refixing the sign. This free range of play is meant to register both the 
condensed historicity of the utterance as well as its citationality and iterability (Butler, 1997), 
i.e., its performativity (Butler, 1997).  Nigga as the signifier usurps the sound-image nigger and 
as a result its concept is erased and replaced with rhetorical structure.  In other words, based on 
Gates’ arguments, hearing or seeing nigger invokes a specific concept, the racist ideology of a 
person of African descent, a slave, a black person regardless of context.  In opposition, nigga 
invokes a range of rhetorical possibilities potentially disconnected from racist ideology, while 
simultaneously (re)citing (Butler, 1997) its secondhand memory. Gates defines his theory of 
Signification as a counter-linguistic act, which incorporates both past and future meanings as 
well as immediate and consequential effects.  
So where did nigger and Signifyin(g) derive?  Gates (1988/2014) and Asim (2007)  
provide an explanation for this:  
2.1 The Transatlantic Passage of the Signifying Monkey 
Gates introduces the Yoruba cosmology of Ifa or Orunmila, focusing specifically 
on Esu-Elegbara,19 otherwise known as Esu (pronounced Ā shoo), a trickster figure of 
divine mediation and interpretation. As per Gates, the system of Ifa is a “system of 
interpretation… a marvelous combination of geomancy and textual exegesis…” (p. 11).  
Within this system Esu is positioned as divine interpreter, mediator, trickster and divine 
 
19 I am only focusing on Gates’ theory of oral black vernacular as paradigmatic, what Gates identifies as rhetorical 
troping of standard English.  Gates’ research on Esu within the cosmology of Ifa is meant to construct an inherently 
African foundation for his later discussion of African American literary criticism.  While I am highlighting the 
origins of Esu and his North American descendent, the Signifying Monkey, what is of import for this research is 
Gates’ theory of Signification or Signifyin(g), which he purposely capitalizes in order to distinguish it from the 
standard English term signification or signifying. For a fuller understanding of Ifa and the orisha Esu, please refer to 
Gates’ text.   
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linguist who is connected to both the heavens and the earth and therefore has the capacity 
to speak, interpret and translate the will and desire of both the gods and humans.  For as 
one oriki (a narrative praise poem) indicates, “’Collective mouths is the name by which 
Esu is called [since] each of the four hundred…deities gave segments of their mouths to 
Esu on the day that he became mediator… thereby [s/he] became the mouthpiece for 
all…” (p. 43).  Hence, it is through Esu that followers of Ifa can hope to understand and 
make sense of their life circumstances (their ori or destiny).  As such it is necessary to 
first pay homage and make sacrifices to Esu/Legba before making sacrifice to one’s 
individual orisha (personal god), for although each individual was born with a specific 
fate, it is through Esu that this fate is revealed and/or changed. Without sacrifice to Esu, 
who translates the divine language of Ifa, one’s fate can be withheld.  
The many characteristics and functions of Esu include, but are not limited to, 
individuality, satire, parody, irony, magic, indeterminancy, open-endedness, ambiguity, 
sexuality, chance, flux, mutability, process, displacement and deferral (Gates, 
1988/2014). Through these varied characteristics, and for Gates’ purpose, Esu serves as 
the orisha of the literary critic; he is symbolically the interpreter of the Gods, and, as 
such, is figuratively viewed by Gates as embodying the “methodological principals of 
interpretation itself” (p. 11). 
I will not take up space articulating the ways in which Gates explains the 
intricacies and complexities of Ifa; however it is of import to note that within the 
cosmology of Ifa, Gates views Esu as “…the figure of formal use and interpretation… a 
meta-linguistic principle…” (p. 40) who “reads” or interprets the oracles of Ifa (a 
phonocentric system that Gates classifies as vocal writing), as a method for which the 
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African American literary critic can adopt when interpreting a text.  He cites, “The 
language of the Ifa oracle is of the textual, or discursive, order, precisely because it is 
mediated, like writing” (p. 44).   Esu defines the conditions of all discourse, a function 
that Gates argues poststructural criticism ascribes to writing (p. 46). Esu’s importance is 
based on his relevance as the interpreter of the system of Ifa, without which the system 
would collapse.  Gates indicates that s/he is the “…dynamic of process, the dialectical 
element of the system” (p. 43); s/he is double-voiced; s/he is analogous to the ways that 
rhetoric is attached to speech; s/he is the liminal space which “’falls between intent and 
meaning, between utterance and understanding... [s/he is] the metadiscourse of the speech 
act of Ifa” (p. 47).  Gates provides the reader with this explanat ion of Esu/Legba in order 
to articulate a specifically black (African) hermeneutic tradition.  His articulation of 
Esu’s orgins as well the specific practices of Esu serve as a conceptual framework for his 
theory on African American literary criticism.   
However, it is ultimately not Esu that Gates believes acts as the conduit for 
African American literary criticism; instead, it is the Signifying Monkey, Esu’s distant 
cousin who survived the Middle Passage and migrated from the Caribbean to the United 
States. Esu’s North American descendent, the Signifying Monkey, became “through a 
displacement of African myths in the New World… a major character in the surviving 
oral variation in a New World black culture” (p. 17).  Gates notes that one possibility for 
the survival of the Monkey is due to the racially demeaning analogies drawn between 
African Americans and monkeys.  However, it is through the lyrical poetry and troping 
narrative of the Signifying Monkey that Gates offers his theory of Signification, counter 
to, and in opposition of signification.  Hence, before unpacking this theory and the ways 
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in which I am conceptualizing it in my study of nigga, it is necessary to provide a brief 
background of the Signifying Monkey.   
As per Gates, “If Esu-Elegbara stands as the central figure of the Ifa system of 
interpretation, then his Afro-American relative, the Signifying Monkey, stands as the 
rhetorical principle in Afro-American discourse” (p. 49).  The image of the monkey 
originates from a Yoruba myth of origin, which explains how Esu became the mediator 
of all languages.  In this myth, Esu receives sixteen palm nuts from monkeys in a tree.  
With these nuts and the counsel of the monkeys, Esu is able to travel the earth and learn 
from men.  With this newly acquired knowledge he returns to the heavens and informs 
the gods.  In this way, Esu becomes mediator between heaven and earth.  In other West 
African tales the monkey is figured as Esu’s companion or, in the Fon of Benin, the 
monkey is Esu’s child.  While the myths concerning the relationship between Esu and the 
monkey vary, Gates’ research on spiritual practices in the Caribbean and southern United 
States reveal that the monkey traveled with Esu and survived the Transatlantic voyage 
from West Africa.   Specifically, the conflation of the monkey and Esu is significant in 
Afro-Cuban mythology, in which the monkey emerges from the water as Esu himself.  In 
any case whether the monkey and Esu merged or if the monkey “left [Esu’s] side at 
Havana and swam to New Orleans… the Signifying Monkey remains as the trace of Esu, 
the sole survivor of a disrupted partnership.  Both are tropes that serve as transferences in 
a system aware of the nature of language and its interpretation” (p. 25).  While Gates 
identifies Esu as the interpreter of written text, the Signifying Monkey represents what 
Gates identifies as the “trope of tropes,” a representation of the troping nature and 
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rhetorical strategies specific to African American discourse; while Esu is text based, the 
Signfying Monkey is a symbol for orality.  
Why is this Transatlantic legacy significant?  While Gates’ process is to explicate 
a black hermeneutical tradition and thereafter move to rhetoric and semantics, the 
history(ies) of Esu and the Signifying Monkey open up the possibility for exploration of 
how and why, in spite of a legacy of theft, chattel slavery, bondage, oppression, linguistic 
erasure and linguistic violence, a specific African American linguistic identity 
has/had/does have and continues to have the possibility to emerge and with it the 
potential to inflect speaking practices and teaching practices of the English language. In 
many ways, while African American vernacular can potentially be viewed as a truly 
“American phenomenon,” it is modulated internally by, as Gates posits, the English 
practices of the dominant white community and externally by a symbolic, possibly 
visceral, connection to cosmological practices from the African continent.   
Although Gates provides a thorough explanation of Esu and  the Signifying 
Monkey for the purposes of laying out his theory for interpreting African American 
literary texts, my overview, albeit brief, of Esu and the Signifying Monkey is my 
truncated attempt to present background for  Gates’ theory of Signifyin(g) with respect to 
contemporary language practice.  Much like the bond between Esu of West African 
cosmology and the Signifying Monkey of African American narrative, nigger and nigga 
share a genetic code, both of which have an etymological connection to the Latin word 
for black, niger (Asim, 2007, p. 10).  Asim (2007) indicates, “Some [lexicographers]… 
contend that ‘nigger’ was intended initially as a neutral term. Citing the presence of 
‘nigers’ in the ‘learned discourse’ of the seventeenth-century anti-slavery activist Samuel 
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Sewall, they suggest that the word acquired a derogatory character over time, picking up 
various spellings along the way” (p 10).  This transoceanic and transformational aspect of 
niger runs parallel to Gates’ theory of the Signifying Monkey.  His voyage and survival 
are a metaphor for the transatlantic passage of niger, which can be traced back to John 
Rolfe’s 1619 diary in which he wrote “’twenty negars’ had arrived on a Dutch man-of-
war.” (Asim, 2007, p. 10). Hence, the body of the African and nigger are intimately 
conjoined, making the arduous journey to the New World simultaneously.  Additionally, 
the transformation from the African-centered Esu to the African American Signifying 
Monkey can potentially be viewed as representational of the transformation of niger  to 
“…any form—nigger, niger, negur, negar—especially since ‘Negro’ (as a term for black 
Africans) had been part of the English vocabulary as far back as 1555” (Asim, 2007, p. 
11). As the Signifying Monkey stands as the brother, companion, friend, descendant to 
Esu, nigga serves the same function to nigger.   Gates contends that Esu made the 
transatlantic passage to the Americas, but what stepped off the boat was the Signifying 
Monkey; likewise negar, niger, nigger also traversed the Atlantic from Africa and 
Europe to the Americas landing in the Southern ports of the first colonies, ultimately 
transforming, like Esu to Signifying Monkey, to nigga. 
Through the lens of black vernacular, Gates is able to push the limits of structural 
linguistics, opening up Saussure’s concepts of signification to the linguistically 
segregated African American community, whose language, ironically, is constructed as 
vernacular (even by Gates). For Gates, the agency of Signifyin(g) and Signification stems 
from the ways in which black vernacular acted as a counter language to white standard 
English. As Gates contends, “Some black genius or a community of witty and sensitive 
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speakers emptied the signifier… and filled this empty signifier with their own 
concepts…I tend to think, or I wish to believe, that this guerilla action occurred 
intentionally…” (p. 51-52).  
 
What, then, is the guerilla action inherent in real nigga? Because I am unable to respond 
to his question, bodily, I feel threatened .  The question “What’s a real nigga?” inaugurates a new 
reality, one that exceeds both my son and myself.  While real nigga is punning, parodying, 
satirizing, Signifyin(g) much like Mooney’s “nigger 100 times a day,” it is open to multiple 
interpretations; it is contestable based on who says it, when it is said, where it is said and how it 
is said. Real nigga then, is always already20 incomplete, yet how do I convey this in a meaningful 
way to my son?  How are my competing selves—researcher, educator, historian, black, 
American, woman, mother—at work with my understanding of real nigga?   Real nigga, situated 
within the discourse of rap and hip hop music, constitutes the subject far differently than real 
nigga within the discourse of comedy, within the prison system, or in the classroom, which are 
dissimilar to Barack Obama as a real nigga or Frederick Douglass as a real nigga, both of whom 
my male Dominican student announced as such one day in class after reading an excerpt from 
Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass. “Yo that’s a real nigga!” he exclaimed after learning 
how Douglass taught himself to read and write and escaped to the North. “Him and Obama, real 
niggas!”  Real niggas and the requisite gansta niggas are the characters Othello (who murdered 
his white wife) and El Hadji (who was impotent with three wives) as characterized by my black 
American female student in my Comp Literature classroom.  Real niggas are altered and 
 
20 Meaning givenness, this phrase is often used in structural and poststructural theory giving priority and 




alterable, constituting each subject who is hailed as a real nigga in competing and contradictory 
ways.  
Gates’ argument about Signification and Signifyin(g) allows me to think about how an 
utterance like nigga enacts as an embedded trope, particular to the speech of black Americans.  It 
also provides a foundation for the historical origins of a black discursive universe which exists 
autonomously within a larger discursive field of Standard English with an internal coherence that 
is based on substitution rather than co-occurrence.  Essentially Gates verifies that Saussure’s 
“initial idea of the sign as a simple bond between signifier and signified has been displaced by a 
far more complicated mechanism wherein the sign summons up an infinite chain of 
associations.” (Gadet, as cited in Williams, 1999, p. 44).  Gates’ argument reveals “the difference 
that blackness makes within the larger political culture and its historical unconsciousness.” (p. 
51).  The vertigo, chaos and ambiguity presented through the empty signifier is left open to “all 
of the rhetorical play” (p.59). It is the same vertigo, chaos and ambiguity I experience when I 
attempt to articulate an answer for my son. I think Asim would tell my son that it is the absurdity 
of racism that constructs terms like real nigga.  But absurdity itself is an ambiguous term. 
 Hence, rather than ask, is or should or why is nigga sayable, the question becomes how 
has nigga become sayable in specific historical contexts over others? And based on this, in what 
ways is nigga, as sayable (and allowable) acting/performing/existing when said?  Randall 
Kennedy (2003) acknowledges “there is much to be gained by allowing people of all 
backgrounds to yank nigger away from the white supremacists, to subvert its ugliest denotation, 
and to convert the N-word from a negative into a positive appellation.” (p. 139).  But what is to 
be gained in the moment when my 14-, 16-,17-year old son interrogates his own identity through 
the lens of nigger or real nigga?  
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Age 20, again in the car (he won’t drive and this drives me crazy), now home from his 
second full year of college. He tells me that a lot of the white boys on the soccer team use the 
word nigga amongst themselves. By this time I have heard him say the word and asked him to 
stop, by this time he knows my dissertation topic, although I am not sure if he understands the 
premise.  He is telling me this within the context of his friend, E., who will not be returning to 
the school.  “Yo E was funny.  I mean funny.  I’m really gonna miss him.” “Well,” I suggest. 
“You can always keep in touch.  And isn’t he from Philly?  You can visit.”  “Yeah, E was a cool 
ass white boy.  The only thing is… he said nigga a lot.” “Really?”  “Yeah, he never said it to me 
though.  He knew not to do that.  But with other white guys he said it.”  “But not on the team?” 
“Nah, we don’t do it in rugby.  It’s not our thing. But the soccer guys, they say it amongst 
themselves, like in the caf and stuff, never to anyone else.  Never to us.  They better not say it to 
me.  If they did I would…” he punches the air.  I wonder if he remembers being called a black 
nigger in jest during his 8th grade year by a petite white girl, one that he was chasing.  “Yeah but 
even though we’re mad cool, like mom, E is so funny, he knows he can’t say that word to me.” 
In retrospect I did not answer my son’s question at all, Google did, and this is 
problematic for me.  But even after years of data collection, reading, research, writing and 
analysis, I do not have one answer, I have many. I think of a comment by Dr. Ernest Morrell 
when speaking of his own son, “How far do we go back to teach him what this means today?  Do 
we start with the 16th Century or the 18th Century?” I have lived so intimately with nigga that I 
have become simultaneously overly sensitized and desensitized.  All along I thought that I had 
all but destroyed the barrier between researcher and researched . It was not until my son asked, 
“What’s a real nigga?” that my research became personal, really real. There is no authentically 
real nigga, because what is deemed as real today, can easily change tomorrow; what nigga is 
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perceived as today is not necessarily what nigga was yesterday, nor could it be what nigga is 
tomorrow.  In all actuality, a real nigga can change from minute to minute because a real nigga 
is only as “real” as the moment in which it articulates a reality.  A real nigga is only “real, 
authentic, legitimate” based on the ways that it Signifies in a particular moment, particular 
context, and based on particular discourses, and even that lasts for maybe a nanosecond. Yet, 
much like my practice of Nichiren Buddhism in which three thousand lifetimes exist within a 
single moment, within that nanosecond a million realities exist.  I must admit that I am relieved 
my son does not consider himself a real nigga, and as much as I have tried to unpack the 
complexity of nigga, as much as I have attempted to argue for the disjuncture between insult and 
injury, or the ways in which nigga is Signifyin(g), I realize when the word is located in the 
mouth of my only child, I cannot accept it. How’s that for reality? I cannot subordinate my 
experiences, histories, memories.  I cannot forget my mother’s face.  I hear it, on one or two 
occasions within the company of a specific audience and within a specific context I’ve said it ; I 
listen to others say it and use it, but I cannot think of my son’s linguistic beingness (Butler, 1997) 
tied in any way to nigga.  I would hope, like my student M.’s statement, “replace the word nigga 
with King because how easy is it for us to say ‘We gonna kill that king.’? It’s easy to say ‘I’m 
gonna kill that nigga,’ but it’s not easy to say ‘I’m gonna kill that king’”—that my son won’t 




2.2 Nigger artifact 1957/2018: Nigger v. nigger, Signifyin(g) at work  
The distinction between the two parallel universes of signification and Signification can 
be made by examining past and present usage of nigger. The 1957 black and white photograph 
of the Woodlawn High School boycott shows white male students who refused to go to school 
due to integration of schools in Birmingham, Alabama (Link to Image of Woodlawn Boycott, 
1957) In contrast, a second image shows Nasir bin Olu Dara Jones, aka Nas, and his then wife 
Kelis Rogers on the red carpet at the Grammy Awards in 2008 (Link to Image of Nas and Kelis, 
2016). While within both images the sign nigger is on display, the Grammy image Signifies 
upon the Woodlawn boycott; the 2008 image carries the semantic meaning of its secondhand 
memory nigger, and could potentially be read as a counter-linguistic act to the 1957 display of 
nigger. 
The Nas-Kelis scene opens up multiple readings of nigger that are ambiguous, fluid, 
unfixed, and partial. However, if I am to apply a Saussurean lens, the individual speech act 
(parole) in both images conveys the social practice of specific historical contexts.  The students 
of the Woodlawn boycott are individually and collectively representing the rule-bound langue, 
“a storehouse filled by the members of a given community through their active use of parole…” 
(Saussure, as cited in Williams, 1999, p. 42) of their time period.  Syntagmatically, nigger on the 
placard of the male students in Woodlawn is a fixed sign relational to the whiteness of the boys 
themselves.  Based on the collective and individual language practices of the 50s, niggers is a 
“two-sided psychological entity” in which the sound-image, a “psychological imprint of the 
sound… on [the senses]” is intimately tied to a concept, a “mental representation of the 
meaning” (Williams, 1999, p. 35),which invokes the sign (black people) of which the boys hate. 
The image itself, along with the placard, conveys the social phenomenon of the 1950s, and 
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while, without context, it is unclear what the boys are boycotting for/against in a material sense, 
what is clear is that they are psychically (and in many ways through material action, i.e., the 
boycott itself) boycotting niggers. Thus, as evidenced in the image of the boycotting students, 
racism, segregation, discrimination and prejudice are normative social practices; therefore, “We 
hate niggers” conveys the relationship between thought and language and constructs the reality 
of this specific time period.  However one critique of Saussurean linguistics also insists that 
langue places constraints on individual freedom due to its normative nature (Williams, 1999).  
There is no evidence in this image of a non-normative opinion about the psychological impact or 
linguistic use of niggers.  The image itself is a constraint, literally and figuratively, in that it 
limits the boys’ and the photographer’s (we should assume that the photographer is also white)  
freedom to express anything other than hating niggers.  
As Williams (1999) contends, however, due to the arbitrariness of the sign, over a period 
of time a sign can mutate.  Although “the sign is a legacy of a prior epoch [in which it] is 
resistant to deliberate modification” (p. 37), the relationship between signified and signifier can 
be modified due to shifts in the normative nature of language and reality.  As an example, Nas 
and Kelis have chosen to don the word nigger exposing it in placard-fashion on their bodies 
while standing on the red carpet of the Grammy’s.  While ironically, they wear the word nigger 
as opposed to the more contemporary nigga it is interesting to consider how the relationship 
between signifier and signified has mutated.  While I have intentionally placed these images next 
to one another, as an isolated image, Nas and Kelis’ visual statement acts as a (re)doubling of the 
utterance (Gates, 1988/2014).   It is through the lens of Gates, that I point to the Signifyin(g) 
tropes of antanaclasis,21 pun, play, and irony. Nas and Kelis psychically, psychologically and 
 
21 Antanaclasis (/æntəˈnækləsɪs, ˌæntænəˈklæsɪs/; from the Greek: ἀντανάκλασις, antanáklasis, meaning 
"reflection", from ἀντί anti, "against", ἀνά ana, "up" and κλάσις klásis "breaking"): in rhetoric it is a  literary device 
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physically satirize themselves as niggers. Wearing nigger symbolizes labeling and naming, 
invoking the psychological and mental imprint of its historicized meaning. Nas and Kelis’ nigger 
exists within: 
a particular language-state… always the product of historical forces, and these forces 
explain why the sign is unchangeable… the double-voiced relation of the two terms 
under analysis here argues forcefully that ‘the masses’, especially in a multiethnic society 
draw on ‘arbitrary substitution’ freely, to disrupt the signifier by displacing its signified 
in an intentional act of will… repetition, with a signal difference, is fundamental to the 
nature of Signifyin(g)… (Gates, 2014, p. 56) 
 
Additionally, through antanaclasis, the mimetic representation of nigger functions as an 
absent present in which the “…shadowy revision of the white term…demonstrate[s]… that a 
simultaneous, but negated, parallel discursive (ontological, political) universe exists within the 
larger white discursive universe.” (Gates, 2014, p. 54).    By positioning these images side by 
side, the simultaneity of these parallel discursive universes allows for a (re)doubling based on the 
irony with which nigger is deployed.  Are Nas and Kelis stating “We are niggers?” Are they 
labeling others as nigger?22 And in what context is nigger being articulated based on their 
participation in the Grammys and the red carpet tradition? Is, for example, nigger sayable (and 
allowable) in this moment?   Possibly they are critiquing the relationship between artists and the 
music industry as one of tension, prejudice and segregation. Possibly they are promoting Nas’ 
soon to be released album of the same name.  Regardless of my assumptions, what is clear is the 
citationality and iterability of nigger, reiteratively introduced as a new reality in a specific time 
and place, as counter-language on the paradigmatic y-axis of African American vernacular 
(Gates, 1988/2014).  
 
in which a word is repeated but with a different meaning or its repetition is used in two or more senses.  As a pun it 
is often used in slogans (such as above) or advertising.  
22 As background, Nas and Kelis were promoting Nas’ forthcoming album titled Nigger.  Their choice in clothing 
caused a mixture of responses by viewers ranging from shock, to concern and disgust.  Subsequently, Nas’ album 
was released with the title N as opposed to his original plan.   
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Context and audience are also at play—the red carpet, the import of the Grammys, the 
entertainment industry and the media are each discursive regimes that bump up against nigger.  
In contrast to the Woodlawn boys, which is representative of the social phenomena of the 1950s, 
what audience is nigger meant for at the Grammys?  It can be assumed that the image of the 
Woodlawn boys is meant for the collective society of Alabama, those who do not like niggers 
and those who are niggers. Multiple assessments of this message can be made of the Grammy 
nigger.  What’s more, while nigger in Alabama can be surmised as hate speech, most evident 
from the subject-predicate “we hate,” is this a memesis of hate speech when the speakers are 
black American?  Is meaning deferred due to the contradictions and disruptions between act and 
comprehension?   As Gates suggests, does this fail to be hate speech because it is rhetorical? 
What I postulate, as I hope to expansively explore and interrogate through this text, is the non-
voiced interpellation of nigger as performative primarily because it is unconstrained, breaking 
from both its origin as well as the context in which it is situated.  Paradoxically, Nas and Kelis 
are both the addressers and the addressed (addressed to/by whom?) revealing the disconnect 
between parole and langue.  It is through these multiple possibilities of nigger that Nas and 
Kellis are implicated.  
Hence, while nigger retains its secondhand memory reminiscent of the 1950s, it 
simultaneously produces new meanings and realities, disrupting the relationship between 
signified and signifier.  As per Gates, nigger in this image is rhetorical; the signifier has been 
emptied out and the signified is replaced with rhetorical devices.  Nas and Kelis’ nigger is parole 
(individual speech); however, due to its rhetorical structure, it is unclear as to how this represents 
the rule-bound langue of African Americans, or rather, there are multiple ways to interpret this 
representation. Also ambiguous is the relationship between language and reality. Whose reality is 
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being represented?  What does this reality consist of?  What has occurred between 1957 and 
2008 that makes this new reality of nigger allowable or not?  And yet, nigger (circa 2008) 
constitutes all of the historical, social and political effects attached to nigger (circa 1957).  The 
2008 nigger is taunting and goading the 1957 nigger while simultaneously reinscribing it.  
Concurrently, are Nas and Kelis Signifyin(g) the Grammy’s? the music/entertainment industry? 
race/racism? nigger itself? themselves? and/or the Woodlawn boys who in turn are mocking the 
Federal government, the Supreme Court, Brown v. Board of Education, the State of Alabama, 
education, schooling, desegregation through their act of signification.   










Hoodie (a haiku interlude) 
 
black males in hoodies 
are criminals, white males in 





Chapter 3: from Signifyin(g) to post-Signifyin(g), the DimenSions of 
Language 
’Read it,’ my grandfather said. ‘Out loud.’ ‘To Whom It May Concern,’ I intoned. ‘Keep this 
 
nigger-boy running.’ I awoke with the old man’s laughter ringing in my ears. 
—Ralph Ellison, Invisible man 
 
My cell phone lights up.  It’s my son. 
Before I can say hello, “Mom… I hate this school.” 
He is at the college I did not want him to attend.  We battled, but his insistence on 
playing football at the collegiate level superseded my cajoling, pleading, insisting, demanding, 
that he attend a different institution. 
“What’s up?” I brace myself for one of his usual diatribes—the food, the classes, the 
team... 
“Mom, this school is racist.” 
“Really….” I semi-drawl, and I flashback to Convocation.  I sat in the audience and 
attempted to count the number of faculty of color on the campus, not black, just faculty of color 
(notice I said “attempted”).  I flashback to a conversation I had with a very lovely African 
American student during same Convocation, ‘How many people do you have working in 
administration who are black?’ She hesitates, thinks, ‘Oh!  There’s the lady in the Bursar’s 
Office.’ ‘Oh?’ ‘Yeah, the one who takes our payments.’  I smile sweetly.23 I flashback to the 
 
23 The irony of this young lady’s response was that I’d had a phone conversation about the same woman about a 
week prior.  Through six degrees of separation my mother had procured the phone number of an African American 
woman who lived in the community.  My mother too was concerned about the racial demographics  of the campus 
and community and wanted to ensure her grandson’s protection. After I said hello and explained the purpose of my 
call, her first words  were, ‘Yeah, there’s not too many of us up here.’ It was through this same conversation that I 
learned of the one mother-figure on campus who counseled and nurtured many of the African American students 
who felt isolated and ostracized, often inviting them to the church she attended. She worked in the bursar’s office.    
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auditorium, in which the incoming freshman class was required to assemble; I noted the majority 
of black and brown men and women, ‘but there are no faculty of color,’ I thought.  I flashback to 
the first day of drop off for football practice, the field was teeming with muscular men of color.  
At convocation the president announced that unlike the national trend of American universities, 
their male student population exceeded the female student population with a ratio of 51% to 
49%.   I wondered the ratio of student-athlete to student-non-athlete or the demographics of race.   
“Yeah mom, when you look at the pictures on the walls, you know, in the Athletic Hall of 
Fame… they’re all white.  Everyone is white.” 
“Okay.” I flashback to one of our many arguments over school selection, and my 
husband’s comments about the school.  He laughs, “It’s whiiite.  I mean It. Is. White. And it’s in 
the mountains.  It’s gone be colder than a muthafucka.” 
“So?” my son counters. “I grew up around white people. I went to school with white 
people.” 
My husband interjects, “Yeah but not these white people.  They’re a different kind of 
white.” 
I recall thinking of The Stepford Wives when I first stepped onto campus.  Everyone was 
khakily dressed, with navy blue collared shirts.  
My son had only been exposed to a certain type of white person, the type that allowed 
him to live with them for two weeks while his mother was off galivanting through central Africa, 
the type that would call him a black nigger in jest while horseplaying.  My son’s only concern 
was with the physical size of the team.  It was not his first choice, but it was the cheapest choice, 
since I did not helicopter mom him and force him to attend the school of my choice.   Learning 
also occurs through experience.  
62 
 
“Rea-a-l-l-y.” I respond to my son’s latest phone call. 
“Yeah, and guess what else.” 
“What?” 
“I was at this party…” I sit up—up until this point I was half-listening.  These calls had 
become consistent.   
“Yeah…” 
“So… after the party I’m standing outside and this white girl comes up to me and starts 
talking to me.” 
“Okay…” 
“She’s drunk and talking and I’m like, Okay, what does this girl want?” 
My son (and forgive me for my bias): Athletic. Handsome. Black. 
“The next thing you know this security guard runs up and he’s like, ‘Miss, are you okay?’ 
And I’m like is she okay, she started talking to me!” His voice raises, his tone heightened.  I 
know he didn’t say it, I know he thought it.  All parents claim to know their children, I will not 
claim this in its essentializing totality, but I will say I can predict certain characteristics about 
him.   
“So she’s like, oh I’m fine, and then he turns to me and says, ‘You need to go back to 
your room.’ Mom I didn’t do anything!  I was just standing there!  She walked up to me!” He is 
insistent. 
“So what did you do?” 




“Mommm, what was I supposed to do? I walked back to my room. But I didn’t do 
anything! Mom this place is so racist.  I don’t mess with white girls… not these white girls.”  
And the lesson, through experience, had been learned—“what could be truer, after all, 
than a subject’s own account of what he or she has lived through?” (Scott, 1991).  
I knew he would walk back to his room.  I knew he was fuming, and angry, and 
muttering, but I also knew my son would listen, not make waves.  It is his experience.  It is his 
choice. I can only pray that he always comes home to me.  I can only pray that whatever his 
choice, he is able to live with his choice… and come home to me.  I can only pray that he has the 
“freedom” and the opportunity to call me and recount his experience from his dorm room, not 
the inside of a police station… or not at all.   
 
Asim (2007), in his interrogation of the use of nigga, parallels the macabre wit of rap 
group N.W.A. to that of Ralph Ellison who installs ironic, dark humor to underscore the psychic 
reality of black lives.  In his critique, Asim notes that it is the absurdity of racism that causes 
African Americans to “embrace the derogatory language that has long accompanied and abetted 
our systematic dehumanization” (p. 234). However, while he likens N.W.A. to Ellison, he 
cautions against public consumption, contending that “out in public… we depend on polite 
speech…” (p. 230) to serve as a unifying societal force.  Asim, therefore, only supports the “use” 
of nigger-nigga among lay folk in the privacy of one’s own home.  Paradoxically, he points to 
the absurd paradox of nigger, citing examples of private usage which contradict public 
personas—Abraham Lincoln is reported to have told nigger jokes in private, while publicly he 
issued the Emancipation Proclamation; Robert Parker’s memoir Capitol Hill in Black and White 
details his employment under President Lyndon B. Johnson, who regularly used the word nigger 
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in private conversation and directed it to Parker—yet Johnson was key in transforming the racial 
landscape of America through the passage of three Civil Rights acts; ironically, it is alleged that 
even Malcolm X has used the word nigger in private, while publicly standing for equality and 
social justice for all African Americans (Asim, 2007).  Asim’s point here is to highlight that 
regardless of one’s usage privately, public decorum insists that everyone should conduct 
themselves based on those attributes which would serve the betterment of society writ large.   
However, while he admits to private usage, Asim questions the utility of nigger-nigga 
within black people’s language, public or private, excepting the realms of critical art, 
scholarship, journalism and history. Likening the use of nigga to the ways in which slaves were 
forced to create meals from scraps, e.g., chitterlings from the discarded entrails of pigs, he cites 
“…now, in the twenty-first century, to subsist on our former master’s cast-off language—even in 
the name of revising it—strikes me as the opposite of resourcefulness.  Our modern vocabularies, 
unlike the empty larders of slaves, are well stocked” (p. 231). In his final pages, Asim’s 
poeticism is evident.  He dreams of a world where nigger is no longer an epithet, a joke, a sign of 
camaraderie, a trend, gimmick or hyperbole. Likening history to god-like status, he cautions that 
to take an ahistorical approach to nigga is “blasphemous [and] counterproductive” (p. 232). In 
terms of public consumption for African Americans, Asim urges black folk to dismantle white 
corruption and determine new and inventive language practices that could ultimately construct “a 
new and invigorating reality” (p. 234).    
What is missing for me in Asim’s (2007) criticism of “usage” is an interrogation of the 
psychic life of the subject,24 and how the subject is both formed in and dependent upon language 
 
24 While I will return to a larger explanation of the term subject in subsequent passages, to be clear, I here use the 
term subject as defined through the poststructural theorizing of Judith Butler.  Specifically, I highlight Judith 
Butler’s (1997b) explanation of the subject in her text The Psychic Life of Power. As Butler notes, the subject is a  
“linguistic category;” hence it is not interchangeable with terms such as person, individual or self.  Instead, the 
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and multiple discourse(s) for existence (Butler, 1997). I liken Asim’s (2007) acknowledgment of 
a “new invigorating reality” with respect to Butler’s (1997) interrogation of injurious speech in 
her text Excitable Speech, in which she revisits her notion of performativity through the lenses of 
J.L. Austin (1975) and Louis Althusser (1970). For Butler injurious speech can undergo a “new 
invigorating reality” (p. 212) in which “there are any number of subversive and radical ways of 
turning around and responding to the call” (p. 212), what Althusser (1970) identifies in his 
theory of Ideology as a hailing.  The tenuousness, vulnerability and/or unpredictability (Bell, 
1999) of said speech makes it excitable.  “…‘Excitable’ speech is ‘ex-citable’ [because] it may 
be wrested from its prior contexts and cited so that it Signifies (my edit) against its utterer’s 
original (my addition) intentions and expectations” (Bell, 1999, p. 212, 214).   For Gates the 
excitability of which Butler theorizes is embedded within the rhetorical troping known as 
Signifyin(g); however, although this speaks to the rhetorical structure (or rhetorical substitution) 
of nigger-nigga within the linguistic structure of African American vernacular, it does not 
account for “a theory of the psyche… the vulnerability or the unpredictability of subject 
constitution” (Bell, 1999, p. 164).  One way of interrogating this psychic life is by situating 
injurious speech within the domains of performativity and interpellation because it provides the 
means for examining both the discursive acts which constitute subjects and the speech acts of 
subjects (Butler, as cited in Bell, 1999).  
In order to further this argument, it is first necessary to return to Gates’ reconfiguration of 
Saussure’s x-y axis and his conceptualization of the distinctions between black and white speech.  
Gates concedes that, while he initially introduces the idea of a collision or parallel universe, this 
 
subject, as a linguistic category, is a  site whereby the individual is able to “achieve and reproduce intelligibility, the 
linguistic condition of its existence and agency” (p. 11).  In other words, the individual only becomes an individual 
through its “subjecthood,” i.e., by being brought into existence as a subject through language.   
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distinction is more cogently representative of a perpendicular universe (p. 54). Gates places  
black vernacular on the paradigmatic y-axis (Fig. 2) as such because “Signfiyin(g) concerns itself 
with that which is suspended, vertically: the chaos 
of what Saussure calls ‘associative relations,’… 
which a speaker draws on for figurative 
substitutions” (p. 54-55).  Gates insists that 
Signification is inclusive of all “…the free play 
of… associative rhetorical and semantic 
relations” (p. 55) which signification quite often 
excludes. He also posits that the black vernacular 
of Signification cannot exist without its white 
counterpart signification.  Signification, he 
suggests, is the slave’s trope which incorporates 
all other rhetorical tropes, “…including metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony (the master 
tropes)… hyperbole, litotes and metalepsis (Bloom’s supplement to Burke) [and] aporia, 
chiasmus, and catechresis…” (p. 57).  He adds to this list, tropes specific to black vernacular, 
e.g., rapping, dissing, cracking, jiving, and testifying, (Smitherman, 1977, 2000). Yet, while 
Gates identifies this perpendicular relationship as a mode of formal revision, interrogating the 
multi-dimensionality of language reveals this “relational-ship” as a form of revisitation—the 
inclusion of both its citation and its revision. 
y-axis: Black Vernacular 
Paradigmatic relationship: every item has a 
relationship with every other item.  Vertical 
substitution of terms can take place. 
Signification/Signifyin(g) (rhetorical) 
    
 
 Signification (semantic) 
 
x-axis: Standard American English  
Syntagmatic Relationship consists of terms with 
the same construction 
Figure 2   
Visual Explanation of Gates' XY axis 
67 
 
To begin, a move from the structural to the poststructural25 is one way (although not the 
only way) to reconceptualize Gates’ discussion of Signification and black American vernacular. 
By paralleling Butlerean theorizing of the performativity of excitable speech, my focus is on the 
discursive construction of subjectivity, i.e., the ways that language constitutes the subject’s 
interiorization of normative discourse(s) as well as the ways the subject articulates that 
interiorization for her own existence, and the role of social institutions and forms of power that 
govern social relations (Weedon, 1997). While in Chapter II  I highlighted Gates’ 
(re)configuration of the Saussurean x-y axis, this theory is further complicated through Lacan’s 
decoupling of the signifier/signified relationship in which he argued that the signifier belongs to 
the realm of langue, which is synchronic, while the signified belongs to the realm of parole, 
which is diachronic (Williams, 1999, p. 56). “Meaning is now produced, not by the signifier 
indicating the signified, but in the production of other meanings through the metaphoric and 
metonymic relations of the signifiers with other signifiers” (Williams, 1999, p. 57).  This idea of 
the sliding or floating signifier, much like Gates’ (2014) theory, reorders the signifier/signified 
construction based on substitution, thus allowing for the production of new (multiple), and I 
would contend incomplete, meanings.   Through a poststructural lens rhetorical modes of 
Signifyin(g) discursively perform in multiple ways as speech acts while simultaneously 
constituting the subject.  In order to bridge this fissure, I will begin my analysis and 
reconfiguration of Gates’ theory with Jacques Lacan’s26 interpretation of Saussurean linguistics, 
 
25 To be clear this I am not identifying the move from the structural to the poststructural as linear, nor am I 
conjecturing this move as a commonsense notion of progress in which one theory is better than the other; instead 
this move is meant to further complicate understandings of language beyond the foundational theory of Saussure.  
26 I in no way intend to produce a psychoanalytic analysis of nigga.  However, I contend that there needs to be 
research and scholarship on the psychoanalytic processes involved in the use of nigga by African Americans.   
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as it is through a brief, partial “nod” towards Lacan that I hope to begin to make sense of subject 
constitution.   
Lacanian theory (1997) posits that a child is born an unconscious slate and is then made 
into a human subject through language, “language does not reflect reality, it creates it… 
language is thought… is the world of words (my emphasis) which creates the world of things…” 
(Lacan, as cited in Williams, 1999, p. 57, 60).  Lacan’s contention is that the 
construction/constitution of the subject is only made possible through language, external to the 
subject as the subject is born with no language, no identity, no consciousness.  Lacan’s 
psychoanalytic theory of subject constitution contends that words give permanence and 
regularity to human perceptions; therefore, language allows an object to be present even when it 
is not. Language also unifies people even when signifiers shift, and language only “lives” based 
on people’s agreement. The paradox of this is the arbitrariness of language; hence, different 
groups of people agree differently about the meanings and use of words. However, all laws are 
embodied in language, including ideas about identities, roles, relationships etc.(Williams, 1999, 
p. 58-59).  Per Lacan, these premises reveal that the consciousness of the subject cannot exist 
external to, outside of or separate from language.  It is only through the “symbolic order of 
language and society” (Williams, 1999, p. 55) that the conscious can exist.  
For the African American, this consciousness is doubled (Du Bois, 1903/2003).  
Scholars, particularly Du Bois, argue that due to the socialization, historicization and 
politicization of African Americans, as a people we consciously, subconsciously and 
unconsciously operate psycho-socially as both American and black, a double consciousness or 
two-ness in which the person must view herself through the eyes of both Self and Other while 
ironically being “othered.”  Gates’ theory of Signification would therefore contend that in order 
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for this consciousness to be reflected through rhetorical troping, the language must also be 
doubled. Gates employs Bakhtin’s notion of the double-voiced word, a word that is “half 
someone else’s [and] exists in other people’s mouths, in other people’s contexts, serving other 
people’s intentions” (Bakhtin, 1975, as cited in 
Gates, 1988/2014, p. 1) until it is reappropriated 
and populated (Gates would say decolonized) “by 
inserting a new semantic orientation into a word 
which already has—and retains—its own 
orientation” (Gates, 1988/2014, p. 55).  This two-
dimensionality of language reflects the double 
consciousness of black Americans, both black 
and American, both nigger and nigga.  Gates’ 
representation of Black English on the 
Saussurean semantic axis is a two-dimensional representation of the intersection between 
Standard English and African American vernacular.   
However, in order to provide a more distinct representation of subject constitution of the 
black American subject as made through language, a reconfiguration of this diagram only would 
require a two-dimensional plane which potentially (and partially) represents the double-
consciousness of black American subject(hood).  In contradistinction, Figure 3 (See QR below) 
shows, a two-dimensional plane perpendicular to the one-dimensional plane of Standard 
American English creating a three-dimensional27 representation. The three-dimensional model  
(see Figure 3 QR code) represents the two-dimensionality of Black English (Standard Black 
 
27 I would like to acknowledge and thank Dr. Vincent Wrice, Senior Professor of Computer Science at Union 
County College for his critical theorizing and discussions with regard to this theory. 
y-axis: Standard Black American English  
  Signification/Signifyin(g) 










z-axis: BlackVernacular  
English 
 
Figure 3   
3D Axis for Black Language, Maxwell 2020 
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American English intersecting Black Vernacular English) based on the theory of double-
consciousness, which is then placed perpendicular to Standard American English (SAE).  While 
the x-axis represents semantic SAE, the y-axis represents Standard Black English (SBAE) and 
the z-axis represents Black Vernacular English (BVE).28 Thus, lifting Gates’ theory from a two-
dimensional representation to a three-dimensional configuration represents the multiplicity of 
blackness: American, black American and black [but also, American].  The language structure of 
the African American subject is constituted along these three axes and, in various disciplines has 
been labeled in a myriad of ways, including code-switching, Ebonics, translanguaging.  
However, for the purposes of my theorizing I have labeled these as SAE (Standard American 
English), SBAE (Standard Black American English) and BVE (Black Vernacular English) to 
initially postulate Signifyin(g) as a mode that is more than rhetorical substitution, but also as its 
own mode of subject constitution that exists within the discursive practices of the subject. 
Through the lens of Gates’ structuralist theory, the y-axis of SBAE is the fine line between BVE 
and SAE. SBAE is both syntagmatic and paradigmatic; it is a combination of both signification 
and Signification and represents the linguistic duality of the African American.  By way of 
example, it is use of the word nigger by Nas and Kelis on the red carpet at the Grammys, a 
speech act which exists within yet also exceeds multiple linguistic universes. While Gates 
proffers rhetorical substitution as one facet of the discursive universe of SBAE and BVE at the 
structural level of the language itself, through a poststructural lens there are multiple, intersecting 
ways in which language and discourse(s) constitute the subject. Through a Butlerean lens nigger-
 
28 While I have labelled these axes as such, the instability of language allows for movement and substitution in 
terms of how these axes are identified.  For example, based on Jamila Lysicott’s (2014) TEDSalon NY performance 
about trilingualism, potential identifiers of each axis would be Standard English, Patois, and Black English. 
Additionally, while I label the z-axis Black Vernacular English (BVE) it could also be identified as the more 
“traditional” usage of African American Vernacular English (AAVE). 
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nigga constitutes the subject as a “…a ‘belated metalepsis’, i.e., a substitution which doesn’t 
precede discourse, but which is the effect of discourses which precede it” (Butler, as cited in 
Salih, 2004, p. 212). 
***** 
On an uneventful evening, my son was the effect of both contemporary and historicized 
discourses which continue to play out through the psyche of others and thus also construct the 
discourses of United States history. My son was not called a nigger on this uneventful evening, 
but he was made vulnerable (Othered) by the speech acts of others. My son, standing alone, 
minding his own business was doubly hailed, first by the young white coed who felt it necessary 
to talk to him and thereafter by the security guard who felt it necessary to act as her protector.  
Prior to their hailing, my son “did not exist,” but through their speech acts he was brought into 
being. A new form of consciousness took hold as he wondered  why she was talking to him, why 
the guard ran up, why he (and not her) must leave. My son’s subjectivity was what Butler (2004) 
identifies as a belated metalepsis.  Unlike the rhetorical substitution within the structure of 
language of which Gates (1988/2014) refers, as Subject my son became an effect of the 
discourses which precede him, which precede too, the white female and the guard.  
During Jim Crow it was unlawful for whites and blacks to purchase and consume alcohol 
on the same premises (the mandatory fine was two years’ imprisonment).  According to my son, 
this woman was drunk, and it can be conjectured that my son was drunk (or at the very least, had 
been drinking) on the same campus, at the same party.  The College’s Standard of Conduct 
allows for the proper use (I assume consumption) of alcohol on campus in accordance with the 
law;29 however, the College encourages abstinence and responsible behavior and does not 
 
29 The Standard of Conduct does not specify the jurisdiction of this law, i.e., municipality, county, local, or state.  
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tolerate disruptive behavior.  Additionally, the college’s code of conduct places the following 
restrictions on alcohol usage—students must be over the age of 21; no alcoholic beverages in the 
freshman residence halls; no sale or furnishings of alcohol to students under 21 years of age; no 
grain alcohol, illegal use of alcohol or disruptive behavior under the influence; no open 
containers in public places or use of products used for excessive consumption such as funnels, 
kegs or beer bongs; and finally, no excessive alcohol usage (there is no indication of what 
excessive means). I do not know if the coed was 21; I do know my son was not, yet regardless of 
age, or in conjunction with age, my son was constructed as not in accordance with the law.  Was 
he being disruptive? Was he holding an open container? Had he (or possibly she) consumed an 
excessive amount?  Or, were they both guilty of the Mississippi Vagrancy Law of 1866,  
Section 2:  
Be it further enacted, that all freedmen, free Negroes… in this state over the age of 
eighteen years found on the second Monday in January 1866, or thereafter… unlawfully 
assembling themselves together either in the day- or nighttime, and all white persons so 
assembling with freedmen, free Negroes… or usually associating with freedmen, free 
Negroes… on terms of equality… shall be deemed vagrants…  
 
 During Reconstruction the need to protect the virtue of white women caused a rise in 
lynch law, and laws prohibiting intimacy between black men and white women became known 
as antimiscegenation laws.  These laws governed much of the South (and parts of the North) 
until the Civil Rights Act of 1964, yet in 2017 the assumption that this woman was ‘not alright,’ 
or possibly that in some way her virtue was in need of protection reveals the ways in which these 
historicized legal discourses continue to subjugate black men.  Williams (1991), as well, 
highlights the 1857 Supreme Court decision of Dred Scott v. Sandford in which blacks were 
determined “unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations” (p. 162). 
In Excitable Speech, Butler (1997a) examines the ways that the subject, through the process of 
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hailing, can find agency by reciting the very same utterance in which s/he was originally hailed, 
but for a different purpose. I wonder if by returning to his room my son found agency.   
In conversation about the incident, my husband says, “Them people up there where he at, 
they whiiite.”30 When my son initially attempted to counter this statement, my husband 
responded, “There’s different kinds of white people, and those you grew up with were liberal 
white people.”  Later, he comments, “You know up there where he was at (my son left after his 
first semester, well… was asked to leave, but that’s another story), they call it God’s country. He 
had to see it for himself.  In a situation like that he did the right thing, just shut the fuck up and 
take it back to your dorm.” My husband speaks on the y-z axis.  A graduate of an HBCI31 that 
was geographically located in the same area as my son’s college in the mountains of 
Pennsylvania, he uses specific ways of speaking to articulate his double consciousness.  My 
husband speaks in metaphor, narrative, story, intertwined with humor, irony, parody; it is an 
interlacing of BVE and SBAE; it is Signifyin(g).  “They whiiite” is part of the three-dimensional 
space which makes up the linguistic universe of SAE, SBAE and BVE. “They whiiite,” and I 
immediately understand his meaning, while my son, according to my husband, “had to see it for 
himself.”   
“Mom I’m not fuckin’ with white chicks.  I’m just going to stay away.  Not say nothin’.” 
“Good idea Son,” my husband inserts, “just stay away. You know suspicion is the 
modern-day vagrancy law.”  
 
30 My emphasis of the triple letter “I” and the italics is meant to convey my husband’s use of antiphonal structure to 
exaggerate and emphasize meaning.  Gates (2014)  highlights the use of antiphonal structures as a form of 
Signifyin(g) used during slavery to send encoded messages.  Similarly, the almost song-like quality of whiiite is 
meant to send a coded message about the political, cultural, social and racial attitudes of the people living in the area 
in which my son would be attending college through the linguistic universes of SBAE and BVE. 
31 Historically Black Correctional Institution.  This term was created by my husband, J.G., as a play on the acronym 
HBCU (Historically Black Colleges and Universities), which I attended as an undergraduate. The running joke 
between us is we were “undergrads” at the same time.  My husband did not return for Grad School, and, as he jokes, 
“I’m part of the largest black fraternity nationwide.”   
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He walks away.  
For my husband, that is the conversation.  
But are we in 1866 or 2017? 
My son was racialized through the discursive acts of others (who are also subjugated 
within speech), but these speech acts are fluid and fragmentary, inflected by the contemporary 
and historical discourses that shape the consciousness of the subject. It is through the 
intersecting, complimentary and conflicting discourses of law and policy, the State and the 
Panopticon (Foucault, 1995) which define, govern, and regulate the bodies of my son, the female 
student, the security guard.  The regulation of the psyche of each subject must include  
an account of subjection… [that] must be traced in the turns of psychic life… it must be 
traced in the peculiar turning of a subject against itself… in acts of self-reproach, 
conscience and melancholia that work in tandem with processes of social regulation 
(Butler, 1997b, p. 18-19).  
 
Citing Freud, Butler (1997b) identifies melancholia as a heightened conscience, a 
condition of which is an incomplete, irresolvable grief (p. 23).  Tracing the subjection of the 
racialized subject,32 therefore, requires a tracing of both social regulatory processes and “the 
turns of psychic life” that constitute irresolvable grief. Through a Du Boisean lens the double 
consciousness of the African American is the psychic internalization (Butler, 1997b) of one’s 
subject(hood), which is constituted through social regulation and regulatory practice, as well as 
an incomplete, unknowable, unfinishable, irresolvable grieving, a grieving which, when 
articulated through language, can potentially manifest itself as Signifyin(g), and/or anger, 
and/or... a multitude of varying and competing effects.  Add to Gates’ (1997) list of tropes, 
comedy (Paul Mooney, Richard Pryor, Chris Rock) and/or dark humor (NWA, Ellison). 
 
32 While the category subject in poststructural theory is a linguistic category, I specifically use the term racialized 
subject because, I contend, it is through subject constitution that racialization occurs.   
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As Butler (1997b) à la Foucault (1980) cautions, however, the binary external/internal 
conception of power as something that oppresses one from the outside is false. Through a 
Foucauldian lens, power produces ‘knowledge of the body’; “power would be a fragile thing if 
its only function were to repress” (Foucault, 1980, p. 59).  Thus, as linguistic beings, vulnerable 
to and existing in language, the psyche, as part of the body, is simultaneously subjected to and 
formed with/in the conditions of power and regulatory practices.  As per Foucault (1980),  
   If it has been possible to constitute a knowledge of the body, this has been by way of an 
ensemble of military and educational disciplines.  It was on the basis of power over the 
body that a physiological, organic knowledge of [the body] became possible (p. 59).   
In other words, my son is only made a student because of the conditions by which student as a 
linguistic category is defined, understood, and constituted through the discourse of Education, 
and it is through this discourse that he psychically understands and accepts his subjugation and 
subjectivity as student.  Yet on an uneventful evening, the regulatory processes governing one 
situated, contextual interaction between a white female student and a black male student 
psychically altered my son’s understanding and/or acceptance of himself.  He was no longer just 
a student; he was no longer just a student at a party; he was no longer just ‘minding his business.’ 
Through the speech acts of both the female coed and the security guard, new (different, 
alternative) competing and conflicting linguistic categories brought him into existence; 
categories he neither desired, nor rejected, nor accepted but which simultaneously initiated a new 
psychic reality for him (thus his simultaneous acceptance and rejection).   
My son’s  (as subject) new knowledge of himself (his double consciousness) was 
constituted through a simultaneous process of  
…becoming subordinated by power as well as the process of becoming a subject… [yet] 
power that first appears as external, pressed upon the subject, pressing the subject into 
subordination, assumes a psychic form that constitutes the subject’s self-identity (Butler, 




Double consciousness as defined by Du Bois (1903/2003), i.e., the psyche of the racialized  
subject, or in Butler’s (1997b) words, psychic power, takes up the three-dimensional space of 
SAE, SBAE and BVE.  My son was not called a nigger on this uneventful evening, on campus, 
after a party, while he was just a student ‘minding his business;’ however, through the regulatory 
processes of competing, conflicting and intersecting discourses as well as the speech acts of 
others, he was constituted as vagrant, dangerous, suspicious, unlawful.   
Translation (in the language of Signifyin(g)): a nigger.  
3.1 Nigga artifact 04302016: The Intersection(s) of BVE/SBAE/SAE 
On April 30, 2016, comedian Larry Wilmore ended his speech at the annual White House 
Correspondents’ Association dinner with “So Mr. President, if I’m going to keep it 100: Yo 
Barry! You did it, my nigga!” 33  Ironically, the illocutionary effect of Wilmore’s speech act 
resulted in a chest pound, handshake and bro hug from then President Obama.  Obama’s physical 
response to Wilmore’s address indicates that the men shared a private moment on the public 
stage through a speech act that constituted both of them.  However, the audience, composed of 
(mostly white) media pundits, celebrities, politicians and those affording the $300 ticket to what 
has been affectionately dubbed the “nerd prom,” responded with a mix of guffaws, shocked 
exclamations and chagrin.  Additionally, subsequent critiques and criticisms of Wilmore’s final 
words ranged from awestruck to castration. In response to the criticism Wilmore (2016) 
contended,  
… for me to be able to turn it on its head and have almost a private moment with the 
president on stage, kind of like a public solitude, where he knew what I was talking 
about.  Usually that’s something we only do behind closed doors.  But to do it in public, I 
thought, would be a strong way to end. And I knew it would be controversial and I was 
ready to accept the fallout from it. [my emphasis] (as cited in Sage, 2016, para. 3) 
 





While it appears as if both Wilmore and Obama understood the literal and figurative significance 
of his statement, one possible examination of Wilmore’s final words and Obama’s final White 
House Correspondents’ address is through my reconfiguration of Gates’ (1988/2014) theory of 
Signifyin(g). While, indeed, both Obama and Wilmore Signify throughout their speeches, both 
men do so through a mix of SAE, SBAE, and BVE and in so doing articulate the double 
consciousness/psychic reality of being black and American. This public/private moment, 
sharable and disallowable, subjectivates and empowers; it is a moment in which the sovereign 
power of the injurious utterance is inverted.  As a performative, nigga’s production of 
metaphoric and metonymic relations (Williams, 1999) exist syntagmatically, paradigmatically 
and as Signifyin(g) along the three-dimensional x-y-z axes.  Yet it is through this 3D enactment 
of nigga, an utterance which precedes and exceeds the utterer, that inaugurates a psychic space, 
partial, fragmentary and incomplete, yet specific to the black American subject.    
The irony of the media response to Wilmore’s utterance is that nigger has been expressed 
far more frequently in White House political conversations, the Oval office, on the great lawn, in 
the master suite, than on this particular day, in this situated moment.  I would dare to say that 
nigger has been used far more frequently by previous presidents (and possibly our 45th 
president), comedians, and White House correspondents in relation to the syntagmatic x-axis of 
white Standard English (as an epithet) rather than as a rhetorical trope more times than I care to 
know or think about.  However, Wilmore’s utterance is one arbitrary form of agential speech in 
which the sovereign performative is conveyed in the inverse as an act with consequences (Butler, 
1997a). Wilmore’s conscious decision to utter nigga at Obama’s final White House 
Correspondents’ Dinner, as his final statement of the evening, and more to the point as the final 
statement of the evening reveals, in that constitutive moment, the ex-citability of nigga as an 
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“…utterance deemed to be beyond [the] speaker’s control, [which] take[s] place within 
discursive contexts which precede and exceed the utterer” (Butler, as cited in Salih, 2004, p. 
212).  However solely focusing on Wilmore’s decision to utter nigga misses the entirety of the 
discursive event that occurred on this particular evening, one which reflects Wilmore’s decision 
to utter nigga in the first place and reveals the constitutive effects of this decision.    
As parallel (and because, after all, my foundation is literary) Toni Morrison’s (1993b) 
parable in her Nobel Prize for Literature speech explores language as a living, breathing entity 
which enacts upon the speaker.  In the parable children enter the home of a blind woman 
determined to disprove her clairvoyance by asking a question that rides solely on her difference 
from them: her blindness (Butler, 1997a, p 8). They allegedly have captured a small bird, and 
bringing it to her, ask is the bird dead or alive. Her answer to them is “I don’t know… but what I  
do know is that it is in your hands.  It is in your hands.” (Morrison, 1993b). Similarly, Wilmore 
must make a decision: is nigga as the bird, interpreted as language in Morrison’s parable, dead or 
alive, dying or living, going to die or going to live?  Ultimately, it is in his hands.  
In this exchange between Wilmore and Obama, I liken Wilmore to the children, standing 
before an audience, demanding attention to the unanswerable; yet, on the other hand, in many 
ways Obama is like the blind woman.  He exists both in the center and at the margins of society; 
“in all fairness my middle name is Hussein,” he quips (of his alleged Islamic terrorist 
background) when commenting on the Koch brothers’ financial support of presidential 
nominees. He has been accused of being a foreigner, reflected in his goad at Ted Cruz, “Ted had 
a tough week. He went to Indiana. Hoosier country. Stood on a basketball court and called the 
hoop a basketball ring. What else is in his lexicon. Baseball sticks. Football hats. But sure, I’m 
the foreign one” (Obama, 2016). New York real estate mogul, reality TV star and past president 
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Donald Trump demanded a copy of Obama’s “real” birth certificate (while we have yet to 
receive copies of his taxes), insinuating that he is not American born—“it’s real” Obama tells the 
clerk at the Department of Motor Vehicles when she requests his birth certificate.34  He’s been 
accused of not being black enough or not black at all, to which he ironically declares, “I do 
apologize. I know I was a little late tonight. I was running on CPT,35 which stands for jokes that 
white people should not make” as well as not white enough or conversely too white, “while in 
England I did have lunch with her Majesty the Queen, took in a performance of Shakespeare, hit 
the links with David Cameron. Just in case anyone was debating whether I am black enough…,” 
he jests.   
Obama is/was/will always be the consummate Other.  While he was respected globally, 
he was often disrespected in his own home.  
   Congress now will flat out reject my authority, and Republican leaders won’t take my 
phone calls. And this is going to take some getting used to. It’s really gonna… of 
course… for four months now congressional Republicans have been saying there are 
things I cannot do in my final year. Unfortunately, this dinner was not one of them.  
 
In many ways he is looked upon as the children look upon the blind woman: he is challenged 
politically, racially and socially, tested to answer the unanswerable.  Someone is always 
knocking on his door, entering his home and calling him out, attempting to dupe him, embarrass 
him, challenge him.  Both the national and international stage endlessly tried to prove he is not as 
smart or wise as he is made out to be.  Obama’s jabs at conservative media, the GOP, Dems and 
“the Donald,” his euphemism for Trump, reveal his “mastery of White mainstream English ways 
 
34 See White House Correspondents’ Dinner video of Obama figuring out what to do once he leaves the White 
House, 2016. 
35 CPT is a colloquialism for Colored People Time.  It is a  pejorative declaration meaning people of color 
(specifically African Americans) can never be on time.  
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of speaking, or ‘standard’ English [and] his mastery of Black Culture’s modes of discourse…” 
(Alim and Smitherman, 2012, p. 29).  
The rhetorical play of Signification had already begun with Obama’s address before 
Wilmore spoke. Riddled with self-deprecating humor, metaphor, irony and pun, Obama disses, 
cracks, marks and caps (Gates, 1988/2014). Yet he also uses synecdoche, dysphemism,36 
sarcasm and wit. Walking up to the podium the song “You’re Gonna Miss me When I’m Gone” 
plays in the background, and as it fades away, Obama’s first statement to his audience is: “You 
can’t say it, but you know it’s true.”  His final mic drop, complete with the statement “Obama 
out” and a two finger farewell kiss ironically puns “Peace, nigga!” at the end of an especially 
wicked lyrical presentation reminiscent of Nas’ Memory Lane (Sittin in da Park) or Eric B. & 
Rakim’s My Melody. This final speech act serves as the trope of tropes (Gates, 1988/2014) in 
which he displays “…his ability to speak across different segments with the same racial groups 
(‘very high intellectuals’ and ‘street kids that love hip-hop’)” (Alim and Smitherman, 2012, p. 
27).37 Obama Signifies upon his entire Signifyin(g) speech by ending with gestures which exist 
on the z-axis of BVE.38 
As an utterance the literal and rhetorical significance of “Obama out!” exists within the 
intersections of the y-z axis.  His double-voiced exit rhetorically mocks his racialization, 
ridicules his opposition, announces his departure, and triumphs his victory.  Existing within the 
 
36 In his self-berating way, Obama employs dysphemism, the opposite of euphemism, which is description that is 
explicitly offensive.  Racial epithets are recognized as such.  In Obama’s case, his reference to CPT and other 
cracks, jokes, puns that targeted his race were examples of dysphemism. 
37 See endnote 12 in ar·tic·u·late while black: Barack Obama, Language and Race in the U.S. by H. Samy Alim and 
Geneva Smitherman (2012). 
38 In ar·tic·u·late while black: Barack Obama, Language and Race in the U.S., H. Samy Alim and Geneva 
Smitherman critique white culture’s misreading of a pound, a greeting in many African American communities, 
when Michelle and Obama perform this gesture on stage.  In their chapter titled “The Fist Bump Heard ‘Rou nd the 
World” they discuss the ways in which this commonly known gesture in the African American community is 
misnamed and, as a result, racialized and othered as terroristic, fanatical and exotic.  Likewise, Obama’s mic drop 
speaks to a “commonly known” gesture in the hip-hop community as an exit off stage.   
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linguistic space of both SBAE and BVE, he parodies a gesture understood as a mic d rop, the 
action a performer (usually a rapper) performs before leaving the stage, often done to indicate 
that “the mic is broke;”39 it is the last and best performance and no subsequent rapper is allowed 
to follow his/her performance.  Obama artfully performs the lines of famous rapper Rakim 
(1987):  
I ain’t no joke, I used to let the mic smoke/Now I slam it when I'm done and make sure 
it's broke/ When I'm gone/no one gets on/'cause I won't let/Nobody press up and mess up 
the scene I set… No interruptions and the mic is broke/When I'm gone, then you can 
joke.  
 
In other words, he killed it (BVE). Obama exemplifies the Signifyin(g) Monkey through African 
American ritual and performance; hence, Wilmore’s discerning comment “I have to admit it’s 
not easy to follow the president” reveals his awareness of Obama’s actions and his need to 
respond in the cultural motif of call and response found in both hip hop and African American 
churches across the country. Along the socio-cultural linguistic axes of BVE-SBAE, Wilmore is 
not meant to follow Obama—the symbolic mic drop serves as the end to any future comments, 
obviously, because the mic is broke. Wilmore also understands Obama’s final speech act to 
represent his blackness, psychically, materially, literally and figuratively; he must respond, 
acknowledge, participate in the call and response of the public/private sanctity of the black 
church, of hip hop aesthetics. Yet Obama’s performance occurs within the socio-cultural, 
historical and political discursive universe of SAE, and Wilmore is expected to follow—he 
knows, it is in his hands, it is in his hands.40   
To return to Morrison’s (1993) parable: there apparently is no bird in the children’s 
hands.  Instead, they desire more from the blind woman than a simple answer to their mundane 
 
39 As an example see Eric B. & Rakim’s I Ain’t No Joke lyrics 
40 I purposely repeat this line as Morrison does in her Nobel Prize for Literature speech; this is defined as a type of 
literary device of repetition known as epimone—repetition of a phrase to stress a point. 
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question.  They demand of her the answers about words, about words and how these shape, exist 
in, create the world, 
…tell us your particularized world… narrative is radical, creating us at the very moment 
it is being created… tell us what the world has been to you in the dark places and in the 
light…speak the language that tells us what only language can: how to see without 
pictures (Morrison, 1993).  
 
But because there is no bird, because the children are able to say, ask, beg, plead, demand their 
needs, in return the old woman is able to finally trust them. Obama’s mirth, his deprecating 
humor, his puns and jabs “tell us his world in the dark and light places.”  Reminiscent of the dark 
humor of Ellison, the irony of Mooney, the hard lines of NWA, Obama responds to the narrative 
that created him at the moment it was created. He has been allowed into the Celestial City, yet he 
is constantly reminded that he is a dying, drowning mortal. Now, upon his departure, his 
subsequent two-finger kiss and mic drop is the Undoing of Words (Williams, 1991). Graciously, 
gladly, adamantly, Wilmore responds to Obama. In his hands he has decided to release the bird 
because as he admits, “…he knew what I was talking about” (as cited in Sage, 2016).  Wilmore’s 
decision represents the survivability of language and the unlimited possibilities created through 
language.   Morrison (1993) goes on to say,  
   The vitality of language lies in its ability to limn the actual, imagined and possible lives 
of its speakers, readers, writers.  Although its poise is sometimes in displacing experience 
it is not a substitute for it.  It arcs toward the place where meaning may lie… its felicity is 
in its reach toward the ineffable.” 
   
Obama and Wilmore’s language limns the possibility of the real, imagined  and possible life of 
themselves as well as their audience. 
As the actual, Obama’s mic drop Signifies the finality of that performance.  There are no 
more words; it is the place Beyond the Power of Words (Williams, 1991).  Yet there is also the 
imagined. Much like my son who was imagined as potentially hurting a white female, Obama’s 
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entire presidency was met with imagined constructions of his race (as both or neither black and 
white), religion (as not enough or too much Christian or Muslim), nationality (as both or neither 
American or Kenyan or…).  Obama’s mic drop and Wilmore’s act to follow is the unknowable, 
imaginable yet unimaginable, consisting of multiple futural possibilities. Obama’s metaphorical, 
ironic, paradoxical, unspoken “Peace nigga” through his spoken “Obama out” is acknowledged 
by Wilmore who in BVE lingo Signifies, “Awright, nigga, I got your back.”  Their psychic 
constructions articulated through language arc to a place of meaning (Morrison, 1993) to a place 
Beyond the Power of Words to the Undoing of Words (Williams, 1991)—significant, holy, 
intimate.  It is comedic, yet it is righteous; it is spoofing, and sanctifying.  It is punning, while 
also divine.  It is the world that exists in the dark and the light; it is seeing without pictures; it is 
the invisible made visible; it is the radicalization of the manifold narratives that have constructed 
Obama over the years. Wilmore reSignifies upon Obama’s original Signification by rhetorically 
picking up the mic and re/dropping it. There is no physical bird, yet there is an ineffable bird, 
and Wilmore chooses to release it, allow it to take flight and live through the Power of Words 
(Williams, 1991). Wilmore’s decision not to censure, or erase, or deaden nigga acts as the trope 
of tropes (Gates, 1988/2014) converging on and crossing the axes of SAE, SBAE and BVE. 
Nigga’s constitutive power expresses “the vitality of language… its felicity is in its reach toward 
the ineffable” (Morrison, 1993). 
Thus, nigga’s constitutive power installs multiple, contradictory and complementary new 
meanings into the ongoing historicity of a past sovereign performative, one which is 
simultaneously communicated privately and performed publicly.   Because “…we do language 
[which is] the measure of our lives” (Morrison, as cited in Butler, 1997a, p. 7) our survival is 
central to the question of how language is used (Butler, 1997a, p. 9), as well as how language 
84 
 
uses us.  Wilmore’s use, therefore, requires an interrogation of the agency of the speaker and the 
agency of nigga as well.  In her excavation of Morrison’s parable, Butler (1997a) distinguishes 
between the agency of the subject and the agency of language itself, articulating that Morrison’s 
metaphor for language as a living thing (that can also die) is a figural substitution in which the 
act of thinking about language as agency in itself makes the agency of language possible.  In 
other words, it is only through language that agency can be articulated.  Wilmore’s response 
entered into a linguistic life not solely based on his ability to originate and/or (re)cite nigga but 
also based on its iterability and citationality as an utterance, one that simultaneously precedes 
and exceeds the racialized subject thus producing its own effects. In this intimate-holy-public-
private moment Wilmore and Obama are (re)made as linguistic beings—made vulnerable by 
language, beholden to language, but also bound within language’s articulation.  Hence, within 
the moment of the “doing of nigga” (Wilmore’s agency) nigga’s agency, distinct from the 
agency of Wilmore, is also enacted.  Through a Butlerean lens nigga acts as a performative 
contradiction.41  Articulating Butler vis-à-vis Morrison’s metaphor for agency distinguishes 
between the agency of Wilmore as the individual “doing language” and the agency of language 
itself, as something that “…produce[s] effects” (Butler, 1997a, p. 8). By doing language 
Wilmore uses nigga both rhetorically and semantically along the SAE, SBAE and BVE axes.  
And while I can contend that Wilmore is Signifyin(g) in multiple ways by articulating a private-
public moment, as an utterance nigga agentially Signifies upon its linguistic counterpart, nigger.  
In this sense the double(d) Signification of Wilmore and nigga articulates the felicity of 
 
41Performative contradiction is one possible discursive strategy for those “who have no entitlement to occupy the 
place of ‘who,’ but who, nevertheless, demand that the universal as such ought to be inclusive of them” (Butler, 
1997a, p. 90) 
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language— the expression of the consciousness of the racialized subject, i.e., the three-
dimensional space constructed by the intersection of SAE, SBAE and BVE.   
Hence, Wilmore’s use can potentially be positioned as “…resistance within the terms of 
reiteration” (Butler, 1997a, p. 12). While Gates (1988/2014) acknowledges that “a signifier is 
never, ultimately, able to escape its received meanings, or concepts…” (p. 54), to only theorize 
about the ways that nigga is counter-speech to nigger potentially forecloses the utterance, 
framing its opacity and fixity “by the tightening of that link…” (Butler, 1997a, p. 15), and it is 
through the tightening of this link that agency is restored as “…sovereign autonomy in speech, a 
replication of conventional notions of mastery” (Butler, as cited in Salih 2007, p. 15). Rather, as 
a performative contradiction, the linguistic agency of Wilmore as speaker and nigga as speech 
act contemplates, “…how things work at the level of on-going subjugation” (Foucault, 1980, p. 
97); hence, nigga (and Wilmore’s use of it) enacts multiple relationships of power which 
constitute the entirety of the social body (not just Obama but the audience as well).  This form of 
power (both material and psychic) can only exist and circulate through the “production, 
accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse,” (Foucault, 1980, p. 93), in this case 
the already multiply inflected (and infected) discourses which Obama himself acknowledged —
race, religion, nationality, partisanship...   
Wilmore’s “My nigga!” is part of a continuous and continual process in which its 
operations are not based upon a top-down linearity, i.e., Gates’ paradigmatic x-axis; instead, its 
multi-directionality allows for the discovery of “…how it is that subjects are gradually, 
progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, 
energies, materials, desires, thoughts, etc.” (Foucault, 1977, p. 97).  Nigga is ex-citable precisely 
because, “…the utterance performs meanings that are not precisely the ones that are stated or, 
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indeed, capable of being stated at all” (Butler, 1997a, p. 10); hence its reversal, reappropriation 
and rearticulation become a “…repetition of an originary subordination for another purpose, one 
whose future is partially open” (Butler, 1997a, p. 38).   
While “My nigga!” intersects the axes of BVE, SBAE and SAE inaugurating a new 
reality which crosses discursive boundaries, it simultaneously ruptures the discursive context(s) 
framed within this particular linguistic event, the WHC dinner. Nigga speaks to and for those 
who have said it or thought it in their small white worlds (Mooney).  Yet  as a double-voiced 
word, “…decolonized for [Wilmore’s] purpose…” (Gates, 1988/2014, p. 55), nigga articulates 
the double(d), tripled, multi-consciousness of the racialized subject, in which the vulnerability of 
the subject is formed through psychic, social and historical phenomenon (Butler, 1997b).  
Wilmore’s use of nigga exceeds its originary subordination as hate speech, although it ironically 
contains within its connotation the shadow of its original meaning.  Nigga places the subject 
(both speaker and receiver[s]) in subjugation, yet rather than interpellating as hate speech, nigga 
acts as a performative contradiction, in which “…agency begins where sovereignty wanes…” 
(Butler, 1997a, p. 16).  Hence nigga ruptures the conceptualization of sovereign autonomy by 
hinging upon the ways that it has the potential to exist as both agency of/for/with(in) the 
speaking subject while also producing its own innumerable consequences.  
The power of nigga as a performative, much like Michel Foucault’s (1980) argument 
about power as “exercised” in his text Power/Knowledge, “must be analysed as something which 
circulates…” (p. 98).  Gates’ discussion of black vernacular, and his requisite two-dimensional 
representation, simply shifts sovereign forms of power from one linguistic domain to an 
alternative linguistic domain, albeit one that is intersecting, complementary, contrasting, 
combative and oppositional.  However, by reading agency as circulatory it potentially allows for 
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a complicating of Gates’ rhetorical structure as something that is in constant motion42 rather than 
existing on a conceptually linear paradigmatic y-axis, i.e., three-dimensional space.  By shifting 
the conceptualization of Signification from rhetorical linear structure of substitution to a 
circulatory interactivity, which “…function[s] outside, below and alongside… on a much more 
minute everyday level…” (Foucault, 1980, p. 60), then it is possible to attempt to understand 
Signifyin(g) as it manifests itself in multiple domains, practices and discourses in conflicting and 
complementary ways.  Hence, while Gates introduces Signification as a form of counter-speech, 
organized and constructed within the black community as a means of communication 
independent of yet intersecting white speech, this same form of linguistic play can, through a 
Foucauldian lens, be understood as a micro-power that is exercised at the level of daily life (p. 
59) operating on the very bodies of individuals (Foucault, 1980, p. 97) themselves. As such, the 
intersecting x-y axis that Gates proffers can be reimagined. 
The shift from the ideological framework of sovereign power to practices of power— 
“power at its extremities… where it becomes capillary… where it installs itself and produces its 
real effects” (Foucault, 1980, p. 97), is evidenced through Wilmore’s private-public speech act.   
Butler asserts that she takes the Foucauldian notion that contemporary power is not sovereign in 
contemporary discourse (p. 74); instead, it is a set of practices actualized at all levels and should 
be studied, per Foucault, at the level “of ongoing subjugation… at the level of those continuous 
and uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our 
behaviours…” (p. 97).  Nigga’s use was at the level of ongoing subjugation, of which it 
constituted the subjectivity of the entire audience of the WH dinner, as well those who viewed, 
streamed, followed this particular usage during this particular historic event.  Not only are 
 
42 A discussion of this is in the next chapter 
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Obama and Wilmore constituted as subjects, but society is made vulnerable through this usage 
while simultaneously participating in and rejecting this ongoing subjugation, one which is 
materially and psychically recognized as part and parcel of the consciousness of America.   
Wilmore’s final statement, “So Mr. President, if I’m going to keep it 100: Yo Barry! You 
did it, my nigga!” intertwines SAE, SBAE and BVE structurally.  As speaker, Wilmore conveys 
Morrison’s (1993) contention that, “what [becomes] transparent [are] the self-evident ways that 
Americans choose to talk about themselves through and within a sometimes allegorical, 
sometimes metaphorical, but always choked representation of an Africanist presence” (p. 17).   
“Nigga!” enacts as a performative contradiction that subjects, subjectifies and subjectivates as it 
also globally and historically inaugurates; it articulates the 
…denotative and connotative blackness that African peoples have come to signify, as 
well as the entire range of views, assumptions, readings, and misreadings that accompany 
Eurocentric [imaginations as]… both a way of talking about and a way of policing 
matters of class, sexual license, and representation, formations and exercises of power, 
and meditations on ethics and accountability… [it] makes it possible to say and not say, 
to inscribe and erase, to escape and engage, to act out and act on, to historicize and render 
timeless.  It provides a way of contemplating chaos and civilization, desire and fear, and a 
mechanism for testing the problems and blessings of freedom (Morrison, 1993, p. 6-7).  
 
Wilmore’s agency is not a replica of previous forms of sovereign power that consist of a 
‘mastery over’; instead , agency consists of the multiple unknown possibilities of linguistic 
beingness, i.e., being bound in language.  Additionally, nigga’s agency highlights Kennedy’s 
arguments about the complexity of nigger as a truly American word, “…its linguistic richness… 
has insinuated itself—for bad but also for good—across the wide expanse of the American 
cultural landscape” (p. 91).  Nigger, while known globally, is a uniquely “American” word; 
nigga, also known globally, is uniquely African American.  Hence, it is through Wilmore’s use 
that nigga is able “…to limn the actual, imagined and possible lives of its speakers [and 
listeners]… [nigga] arcs toward the place where meaning may lie… its felicity is in its reach 
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toward the ineffable.” (Morrison, 1993). As both felicitous and ineffable Wilmore’s nigga 
articulates socio-cultural and historical conceptualizations of power, identity, race, and 
knowledge. Nigga inaugurates a new reality between two racially marked black men, both astute 
in their own right, and through a chest pound (BVE), a handshake (SAE) and a bro hug (SBAE), 
they communicate privately and publicly their social, physical, political worlds, their psychic 
identities as racialized Subjects, as well as the psychically imagined reality of a highly historical 
racialized society (Morrison, 1993).  Wilmore’s “My nigga!” interpellates Obama who turns and 
responds, and in that holy-intimate-public-private moment their communication arcs to a place of 
Refined Understanding called Superstanding (Williams, 1991)… “’Look. How lovely it is, this 
thing we have done together’43… my nigga.” 
******** 
When I was a child I had a toy kaleidoscope.  It was about the size of a paper towel ring, 
blue in color, and when I looked inside and turned the eyepiece the multi-fragmented, 
multicolored pieces would shift creating a moving set of snowflake-like designs.  I liken this 
kaleidoscope to the shifting constitutive power(s) of nigger-nigga—ever-moving, ever-
transforming, made up of a million pieces, situations, contexts, histories and events in which 
each piece individually contains within it multiple possibilities, yet together construct new and 
varying meanings which rupture and change with each turn, each inverse interpellation, each 
performative contradiction (Butler, 1997a). Hence, while Gates allows me to think about a black 
discursive universe, one in which Standard American English, Standard Black English and  
Black vernacular English exist in complementary and competing ways, what is missing for me 
vis-à-vis Gates is the relationship between language and consciousness, language and subject 
 
43 Taken from Morrison’s Nobel Prize speech  
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formation, and one’s dependency on and vulnerability to language. And while I acknowledge 
that Gates’ focus on Signification is for the purpose of introducing and explicating a theory of 
African American literary criticism,  as a discursive act Signifyin(g) is one of many possible 
ways to contemplate the speech act of the subject as an articulation of and about the racialized 
subject’s psyche.  Put another way, Signifyin(g) agentially performs the psychic ambivalence 
and melancholia44 of the African American  It is at this juncture that I would like to contemplate 
the discursive agency of nigger-nigga as constitutive of the subject as well as the ways that its 
subjectivating nature is shaped by surrounding discourses.   
  
 
44 In Chapter 4 I will explore Judith Butler’s theory of psychic power and melancholia.  
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Chapter 4: from post-Signifyin(g) to poststructural Signifyin(g): 
Ruptures, Disruptions and Semantic Looping 
White people invented him [nigger]… I am not a nigger… and if it’s true that your invention 
reveals you… You’re the nigger baby, it isn’t me.      —James Baldwin 
 
In Take this Hammer45 James Baldwin reSignifies nigger by inverting its possibilities and 
placing these upon white society.  He contends that nigger is an invention of the white psyche, a 
word, utterance, performative that white Americans created based on their internalization of fear. 
Ultimately Baldwin tells his audience that he gives them nigger back stating, “I gather that 
nigger is necessary where it’s unnecessary to me so it must be necessary to you. So I give you 
your problem back… ” Baldwin’s logic critiques the processes of subjection and internalization 
within the psyche, a process that Butler (1997b) discusses in The Psychic Power of Life.  
Baldwin, pre-dating Mooney’s comedic play on the word nigger, places the burden of nigger on 
white society, contesting that nigger has been constructed and necessitated through their psyche. 
Hence, Baldwin’s discursively symbolic gesture performs the inverse of the intended illocution.  
His discursive play of detachment and reattachment of the epithet onto the  psyche of white 
America invokes Butler’s (1997b) contention that power, originally viewed as external, 
“assumes a psychic form that constitutes the subject’s self-identity” (p. 3)  In other words, as per 
Baldwin, the psychic power of nigger is internal not external, its power is exerted from within 
not without;  thus, the invention of nigger reveals something about the psyche of the inventor 
(the speaking subject) not the invented.  Baldwin’s discursive act brings to the fore a component 
of Butler’s (1997a) argument, “if hate speech acts in an illocutionary way, injuring in and 
through the moment of speech, and constituting the subject through that injury, then hate speech 
 
45 See excerpt:  Who is the Nigger, excerpt from Take this Hammer by James Baldwin 
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exercises an interpellative function” (p. 24).  Yet she interrogates this reasoning by asking what 
occurs when an interpellation fails, or in the words of Austin (1975) misfires?  More precisely, 
she asks what are the effects when the intended interpellated subject fails to turn, fails to 
acknowledge the interpellation, or responds in a different, unintended way? (Butler, 1997a)  I 
add to this these questions: if the interpellated subject is able to discursively rupture the 
interpellative act of the illocution nigger by discursively reassigning it to the psyche of the 
speaking subject, its inventor, then what is the consequence of reinvention, i.e., nigga?46  
In order to interrogate nigga as an utterance, one that exists and Signifies within the 
domains of BVE, SBAE, and SAE, it is necessary to examine its iterability as an agnomination 
of nigger (Asim, 2008).  As has been argued by scholars, entertainers, intellectuals and the 
general public, nigga (unlike nigger) is an African American word, for use only within the 
African American discursive universe, and while this “general rule” holds water, its “use”, even 
within the African American community is fluid, fluctuating, ambiguous and incomplete.  My 
focus on nigga as reinvention is not founded in discerning its historical origins. Instead, much 
like Butler’s (1997a) link between Austin’s speech act theory and Althusser’s interpellation, my 
intention is to bridge Signifyin(g) as the speech act of the subject and performativity as a 
discursive act which constitutes subjects. In so doing, I would like to further complicate Gates’ 
Signification by examining it more thoroughly as a failed interpellation, through which the 
 
46It should be noted, that while I previously linked nigger-nigga contending that nigga is the cousin to its originator 
nigger, moving forward I will delink these utterances in my attempt to interrogate the performative aspect of each.  
And, while I partially subscribe to one (of many) commonly held beliefs within the African American community 
(and possibly external to that community) that nigga is a  reinvention, reconstruction, and/or linguistic counter 
strategy to nigger in which African Americans took a derogatory term and reconfigured it for their own purposes 
(Asim, 2008; Gates, 2014; Greene, 2014; Harriot, 2018; Kennedy, 2000, 2003; Smitherman, 1977, 2000), my 
intentions in deinking these terms is to examine the each utterance as a performative speech a ct, each with its own 
consequences, which while acting distinctly, also intersect, complement and contradict.   
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illocutionary force of nigger is subsumed within the perlocutionary force of the performative 
nigga. 
4.1 The Speaker is not the Doer of the Deed: Butler’s Critique of J.L. Austin 
To begin, I briefly highlight Butler’s (1997a) interrogation of Austinian and Althusserean 
theory in order to further my argument about the performative force and failure of nigger and 
nigga. If as per Butler (1997a) an illocutionary performative is one which produces immediate 
effects and produces what it names, then it stands to reason that nigger’s illocutionary 
consequence is immediate injury; hence its effects also produce what it names.  In other words, 
in the process of naming nigger’s intent is to produce injury.  In her interrogation Butler (1997a) 
notes that Austin’s (1962/1975) illocutionary speech act privileges the speaker, thus constructing 
a stable speaking subject analogous with an actor who, through his/her speech act, enacts what 
she names.  For Austin (1962/1975), even in cases where the speech act is not fulfilled based on 
the speaker’s intention, the speech act itself is not deprived of its performative nature. Hence 
nigger as illocutionary speech carries the weight of the injury even in cases where the injury is 
not fulfilled, such as in the case of Baldwin’s linguistic counter speech act or Mooney’s comedic 
performance.  Austinean theory would label Baldwin’s turn and delinking of himself from 
nigger, placing it back into the discursive and psychic realm of white Americans, as infelicitous, 
a failure due to situation and speaker but fulfilling the definition of performative nonetheless.   It 
should be noted as well that Austin categorizes speech acts, specifically those of an illocutionary 
nature, according to first person present indicative tense (Butler, 1997a).  In this way, Austin 
attaches the performative nature of the speech act to the speaker and in doing so the speaker is 
the doer of the deed.  However Butler (1990), in her analysis of gender, reconfigures the idea of 
the fixed subject who agentially prefigures language.  Instead, quoting Nietzsche from On the 
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Genealogy of Morals, “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is 
merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything” (as cited in Butler, 1990, p. 33).  
 In her reflections about speech act theory Butler clarifies that many scholars privilege the 
speaker over the act, “they think that the speech act is something performed by a subject, 
performed on another subject, or part of an address that one subject makes to another” (Butler, as 
cited in Bell, 1999, p. 165).  However, for Butler, complicating Austin’s theory requires 
examining the ways in which the constituted subject then comes to speak using the same 
discursive utterances for a different purpose.   
…the question [is] how to find agency the moment of that recitation or that replay of 
discourse that is the conditions of one’s own emergence… Althusser gives me 
interpellation, the discursive act by which subjects are constituted, and Austin gives me a 
way of understanding the speech acts of that subject” (Butler, as cited in Bell, 1999, p. 
165).  
 
Hence through Butler’s rearticulation of the performative speech act, hate speech especially 
exercises an interpellative function and it is through Althusser that we can examine the 
performative function of racist and sexist slurs. In this way Butler is exploring both the speaking 
subject and the constituted subject of said speech. While Austin’s primary focus is the 
conventional procedure of the performative—  
that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain 
circumstances…[in which] the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must 
be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked (Austin, 1975, p. 
26),  
 
and whose illocutionary effect still exists even in cases where the speech act is not fulfilled, i.e., 
felicitous, for Butler this conventional procedure is a ritual that acts in accordance with 
Althusser’s interpellation.  Butler articulates the ritualization of convention by noting that 
Austin’s speaking subject  “speaks in a voice that is never fully singular” (Butler, 1997a, p. 25).  
In other words, Austin’s speaker is reiterating a previous linguistic convention, a formula, as 
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Butler (1997a) notes, in which, “the ritual dimension of convention implies that the moment of 
utterance is informed by the prior and, indeed, future moments that are occluded by the moment 
itself…(p. 25). In Baldwin’s example, he is the doer, although he is not the inventor of nigger, 
thus his speech act is citational. Ironically, the power of nigger to injure is so ideationally strict 
that even in cases where the doer’s usage of the performative is infelicitious and/or unhappy 
(Austin, 1975), i.e., the speaker of the said performative does not carry out, intend or conduct 
him/herself in the manner of the performative, the speaker is held accountable for the injurious 
language.   
Yet, if the illocutionary effect of nigger as epithet is injury, the question remains: Does 
Baldwin, as speaker, as doer of the deed, injure the receivers of his speech act?  Does nigger as 
illocution produce immediate effects of injury? Is it possible to think of nigger as also effecting 
perlocutionary effects, those effects which follow, over a course of time, but only when other 
conditions are in place (Butler, 1997a)? I think here of critics of Quentin Tarantino’s Django 
who felt that Tarantino’s deployment of nigger was excessive, even though Django is a period-
film based during the time of slavery and our ex-slave protagonist killed all the slave-holding, 
racist southern whites, murdered Samuel L. Jackson’s antagonistic and subversive character, 
burned down the symbolic representation of slavery (the big house), witnessed the murder of his 
white liberator and Savior (which means he would not live a life of indebtedness or ingratiating 
gratitude) and rode off with the girl in the end.  So too, Samuel Langhorne Clemens also known 
as Mark Twain, friend of Booker T. Washington and avid abolitionist, continues to be criticized 
over a century after his death about his use of nigger in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. 
Condemnation has varied but typically comes in the form of censorship and/or removing the text 
from curriculum or, more recently, sanitizing the text by removing nigger for a more palatable 
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word. In both cases, who is the doer of the deed—Tarantino, the characters of his film, or the 
actor hired to play the character? Likewise, should we apply first person present indicative tense 
to Twain as speaker, the characters of the text, or the person (professor or student) who reads the 
text in class? Who then is the interpellated subject—the intended receiver of the epithet, the 
audience, the readers?  I cannot with utmost certainty define Twain’s or Tarantino’s intentions to 
injure; however, with respect to nigger I will venture to contend that in both instances, use of 
nigger while producing the immediate effect of injury is also infelicitous.47  Yet both Twain and 
Tarantino are treated by critics as a belated metalepsis, “a subject-effect… retroactively installed 
by the law at the scene of the crime…” (Butler, as cited in Salih, 2002, p. 105).  In other words, 
as Salih notes, in order for a disciplinary measure to take place, someone (or something) must be 
constructed as the site of injurious and obscene speech. In both cases Twain and Tarantino are 
the site of injury without consideration for the ways in which historical and contemporary 
discourses shaped each narrative.  Butler asks “does tracing the injury to the act of a subject… 
 
47 Austin (1975) categorizes two primary types of infelicities—misfires and abuses—which he categorizes even 
further according to the intended or unintended cause of the failed performative.  For Austin, even in cases where 
the speaker had every intention of carrying out a particular speech act, specific conditions must be met.  Under the 
category of misfire, one could say that the subcategory misa pplications applies to both Twain’s and Huck’s use of 
nigger.  Both author and his character use nigger according to convention, however, based on their intention, their 
use of nigger is infelicitious as its intended purpose is not injury.  Within the category of abuse, it could be argued 
that both Twain and Huck perform an insincerity.  Huck, through Twain, utters the performative nigger; however, he 
is not properly oriented towards the convention of the utterance.  In other words, while he uses the uttera nce 
conventionally, his actions throughout the text, as well as Twain’s overall message do not support the intended and 
unintended meaning of the word.  Tarantino’s usage, ironically, fulfills the illocutionary intent to injure within the 
film yet this is disrupted based on the speaker of the utterance.  While nigger is deployed with the intent to injure, it 
is equitably used by both whites and blacks; hence injury is based on a range of meanings. Even in the final scene in 
which Django has maimed the antagonist Stephen, a slave who has benefitted from his position in the big house, the 
dialogue which passes between them is riddled with nigger and for even more ironic effect, the final line of the film, 
stated by the captured Rodney is “Who was that nigger?” a  rhetorical question directed at the heroicism of Django.  
How then to “classify” the performative nigger as used by Tarantino?  To some extent it could be contended that, 
while nigger is used within the historical framing of U.S. slavery, within context  of the speech act Tarantino, 
through his characters, is Signifyin(g).  Each individual utterance takes on a range of meanings which do not 
necessarily produce what it names, i.e., the intention to injure based on racial division. From the Austinian 
perspective this would be a misexecution in which the context allows for a performative speech act to complete 




not unwittingly stall the analysis of how precisely discourse produces injury by taking the subject 
and its spoken deed as the proper place of departure?” (Butler, as cited in Salih, 2002, p. 105).  
Placing Twain and Tarantino as the site of social injury establishes the transitory and fluctuating 
indeterminancy of nigger as performative. It is nigger’s ability to subjectivate and subjugate as 
both an illocution with immediate effects and as perlocution from which consequences occur 
over a period of time that call into question the privileging of the subject as the site of injury.  
In terms of illocution, Butler critiques Austin’s definition of  the “total speech situation,” 
arguing that this is uncapturable based on space and time. According to Austinean (1975) speech 
act theory, the effects of the illocution are immediate and its force known once the total speech 
situation is identified.  However Butler (1997a) interrogates this by contending that “the 
temporality of linguistic convention… exceeds the instance of the utterance…” (p. 3).  As such, 
the speech situation is not contained solely within the moment of execution.  Instead, “the 
‘moment’… is a condensed historicity…” (p. 3); it is a speech situation that includes past and 
future evocations, undefinable based on space and time.  Critics of the canonical Huck Finn, for 
example, claim that students of color should not be required to read racist language in a setting 
where learning is meant to be or perceived as equal; “our kids don’t need to read the ‘N’ word in 
school… they deal with that every day out in the community and in their life. Racism still exists 
in a very big way,” contends Stephan Witherspoon, president of the local NAACP chapter in 
Duluth County, Georgia (as cited in Louwagie, 2018, para. 7) about the recent decision of Duluth 
County School district to remove To Kill a Mockingbird  and Huckleberry Finn from the 
curriculum. Possibly, Duluth County’s move to censor literary texts is an example of a ‘stuck 
place’ (Miller, 2005), a space which, due to the limiting effects of educational discourses, 
establishes a control over the utterance which paradoxically and contradictorily proliferates what 
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it seeks to constrain. (Butler, 199a7). Possibly, in an attempt to “standardize us all” (Miller, 
2005), the Duluth County schools have removed literature from the curriculum rather than view 
the teacher and student as a “postmodern subject—a dynamic subject that changes over time… 
situated historically in the world and positioned in multiple discourses” (Bergland, 1994, as cited 
in Miller, 2005, p. 234).  This eradication of the canon immediately constrains and contains any 
opportunity to  
formulate questions and practices that enable us to challenge the ‘stuck places’ in our 
work as teachers, students, administrators and researchers with questions that, in the very 
process of their construction and articulation, move and change our learning, teaching 
and research (Miller, 2005, p. 239).  
 
Hence, Twain’s text becomes the site on which the “law” (in this case educational law 
endowed with the privilege of “…juridical domain as the site to negotiate social injury” (Butler, 
as cited in Salih, 2002, p. 105) must place blame. In so doing, the “total speech situation” is 
condensed to the moment in which nigger is read or spoken in the English classroom rather than 
the condensed historicity of past and future locutions. In the case of Twain’s Huck Finn, the 
power of nigger to injure is so ideationally strict that even in cases where the doer (Huck) does 
not carry out what could be perceived as racist conduct (he not only helps Jim hide and travel 
down the Mississippi so as not be sold down South by his mistress, but also strategizes to help 
Jim escape when he is subsequently caputured) the text and Twain, and to some extent the 
teacher, school district, and school board are held accountable for the injurious language    As a 
consequence nigger is treated as an immediate injury in which the students are the interpellated 
subjects who, protected by the law, are prevented from turning to or from the utterance.  Yet the 
teacher, school and/or school district are constructed as the belated metalepsis, i.e., site of injury, 
“…retroactively installed by the law at the scene of the crime” (Butler, 1997a, p. 105). Yet I ask: 
What crime has been committed? What would it mean to construct nigger and Huck Finn in the 
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inverse?  In other words, like Baldwin, Mooney, nay even Morrison’s contention that it is the 
master, not the slave, who is savage, what would it mean to understand the utterance nigger not 
as the injury of the victim, but as the psychic workings of its inventor? And how might we 
construct such meanings through a contemplation of the discourses surrounding both the 
construction of Huck Finn as well as contemporary society? What would it look like to “create 
space” for nigger in the classroom with an understanding that its construction is a function of the 
American psyche?  
Peter Messent (2011), author of the Cambridge Introduction to Mark Twain, writes in 
The Guardian, that Twain himself was ant-racist and a friend of Booker T. Washington in the 
midst of a community which was staunchly racist. He also highlights that Twain played an 
integral role in the funding of Tuskeegee Institute and helped fund the first African American to 
attend Yale Law School.  Messent’s (2011) concern with the sanitization and censorship of Huck 
Finn is based upon Alan Gribben’s (senior Twain scholar) newly released versions of Huck Finn 
and Tom Sawyer which have substituted words for nigger and Injun. While Messent agrees that 
nigger is one of the most vitriolic words in the English language, one that can cause anger and 
humiliation in parents and children who hear that word spoken and/or read a sum total of 219 
times (as is the number of times that nigger appears in Huck Finn) he contends that this “…is not  
necessarily a reason for replacing it with a gentler (bowdlerized) term” (para. 3).  The author 
continues with a quote from Twain:  "The difference between the almost right word and the right 
word is really a large matter – it's the difference between the lightning bug and the lightning" 
(para. 4). 
While I agree with Messent’s position about the sanitization of Twain’s texts, I think, to 
some extent, his privileging of Twain as antiracist misses the point about nigger.  Whether 
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Twain was racist or not, his text is a canonical literary work which, through a specific lens and 
discourse, constructs the historical, social and cultural fabric of the United States, a country, I 
would contend, which needs not be sanitized for 21st Century sensibilities. In response to 
NAACP chapter president Witherspoon, I proffer the words of Talib Kweli Greene (2014)  who 
argues  that nigga is a symptom which, at least in the present, cannot and should not be censored. 
“It’s not the word nigga that should die, it’s racism.  You don’t cure an ailment by attacking the 
symptom, and black people who call each other nigga is most definitely the symptom, not the 
cause of racism” (para. 16). While Greene is arguing for the freedom and right of African 
Americans to use nigga (not nigger) I highlight his point as a means of identifying the root vs. 
the symptom.  Likewise, Huck Finn is not the cause of racism; hence, its censorship does not 
fend off the racist speech and/or conduct that students of color are subjected to or made subjects 
of in their daily lives.  However, placing the text (and nigger) within the historical context of the 
discourses surrounding its inception as well as critically examining the historical present with 
respect to both nigger and nigga as performative utterances begins to paint a different story 
about nigger and, possibly, will bring pause to those students who gleefully sing nigga out in 
their communities while listening to the latest rap song. 
 
4.2 A Failed Interpellation: Butler’s Critique of  Louis Althusser 
As Butler notes, “for Austin, the subject who speaks precedes the speech in question.  For 
Althusser, the speech act that brings the subject into linguistic existence precedes the subject in 
question” (Butler, 1997a, p. 24). Again, to be clear, as hate speech the immediate effects of 
nigger is injury, but what of the (re)invention nigga whose immediate effects are not necessarily 
of an injurious nature?  It is through the Althusserean model that Butler (1997a) continues her 
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interrogation of sovereign speech and questions the “force and faultlines” (Butler, 1997a) of 
inflammatory turned insurrectionary speech.  Butler (1997a) admits that she is reading Austin 
through Althusser in which she complicates Austin’s theory by examining the ways in which the 
constituted subject then comes to speak using the same discursive utterances for a different 
purpose. Butler asks in what ways can the subject, previously interpellated by past meanings 
“…become then a subject capable of addressing others who is neither a sovereign agent with a 
purely instrumental relation to language, nor a mere effect whose agency is pure complicity with 
prior operations of power” (Butler, 1997a, p. 25). It is through Althusser that Butler critiques 
sovereign speech noting that interpellation only accounts for the “…authoritative voice, the voice 
of sanction…” (Butler, 1997b, p. 6).  By challenging the sovereign power of the injurious 
utterance Butler contends that “it is possible to effect linguistic and semantic breaks with prior 
histories and contexts” (as cited in Salih, 2000, p. 214).  For Althusser (1970) the repeatability of 
conventional actions and practices, even at the level of ideas, is governed by and inscribed in 
ritual. Althusser uses the example of the policeman yelling at the passerby who turns and 
acknowledges the policeman.  Butler (1997a) notes that the moment of recognition by the 
passerby, who may or may not be the individual being hailed, is also the moment of constitution, 
yet she wonders what unknown possibilities exist within that moment of turning.  What could 
potentially occur if the passerby did not turn, or in turning, performed a response not in 
accordance with the ritual of interpellation?  Butler contends that while Austin’s primary focus is 
the conventional procedure of the performative, this conventional procedure is a ritual that acts 
in accordance with Althusser’s interpellation.  She articulates the ritualization of convention by 
noting that Austin’s speaking subject  “speaks in a voice that is never fully singular” (Butler, 
1997a, p. 25). In  other words Austin’s speaker is reiterating a previous linguistic convention, a 
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formula in which the ritual dimension of convention is (at the moment of utterance) “in some 
sense… an inherited set of voices, an echo of others who speak as the I” (p. 25).   
The threat of hailing, then, is based on a ritual previously performed  by a sovereign 
subject; yet, within the moment of interpellation, the constituted subject has the potential to elicit 
a response that is yet unknowable/unknown, and in doing so, the sovereignty of interpellation is 
breached.  Butler (1997a) complicates Althusser’s interpellation by noting that he proposes the 
possibility of “bad subjects” but does not consider the levels of “disobedience” that can ensue in 
response to the interpellation of the law (p. 82).  She argues that rather than a refusal, there is 
possibility of rupture,  
where the uniformity of the subject is expected, where the behavioral conformity of the 
subject is commanded, there might be produced the refusal of the law in the form of the 
parodic inhabiting of conformity that subtly calls into question the legitimacy of the 
command…” (p. 82).   
 
Butler (1997a) contends that the intention of the law to produce a lawful subject instead produces 
something more; this results in a failure of the performative, which in turn “… creates more than 
it ever meant to, Signifyin(g) (my edit) in excess of any intended referent” (p. 82).  Hence it is 
the ritualization of the speech act in accordance with its interpellation through which, “specific 
psychic and social workings” (Butler, 1997b, p. 6) have already been inculcated into the 
conscience of the subject; yet a breach of ritualization opens up the possibility for other forms of 
speech, i.e., ex-citable speech.   
Butler (1997b) furthers this argument in The Psychic Life of Power in which she attends 
to an analysis of subjection—the ways in which the subject is simultaneously subordinated and 
initiated by performative power. It is through her interrogation of the psyche that she calls into 
question Althusser’s interpellation stating that it only accounts for “the performative power of 
the authoritative voice [as] figured speech” (p. 7) without taking into account discourses that do 
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not privilege the spoken word or a model of discourse which has the potential to counter 
Althusser’s sovereign model.   
Through her interrogation Butler thus is questioning the “…vulnerability or the 
unpredictability of subject constitution” (Bell, 1999, p.164). In the case of nigger the rupture of 
both the illocutionary force as well as its interpellative power can occur in multiple ways.  The 
infelicitious failure of interpellation can be in the form of sarcasm and comedy such as in the 
case of Mooney who chooses to say the word 100 times a day or dark humor such as Ellison’s 
mirthful laughter, which fills the protagonist’s dreams.  It can be returned to its inventor, such as 
in the case of Baldwin’s psychic inversion, or fashioned into an ambiguous statement as in the 
example of Nas and Kelis.  Finally, it can be Signified as in Larry Wilmore’s statement at the 
White House Correspondents’ Dinner.   
As a reinvention of nigger, nigga exhibits illocutionary and perlocutionary effects and 
constitutive elements separate from those of its counterpart.  As an utterance which takes on 
renewed meanings while also maintaining its originary illocution, nigga Signifies (Jacobs, 2002) 
upon nigger.  Signifyin(g) then, is not solely a structural counter-punchers’ strategy of rhetorical 
associations, it is also a reconfiguration of interpellative power in which the constituted subject 
as non-sovereign speaker turns in a way that ruptures the ritualization of the authoritative voice 
as figured speech.  Signifyin(g) is one of many forms of disobedience in which the “bad (or 
oppressed) subject” refuses the interpellative call or responds in a manner that ruptures the call 
creating a failed performative.   Hence while nigga retains some of its illocutionary force to 
injure based on its secondhand memory (Minh-ha), nigga’s perlocutionary force (which 
ironically is also its faultline) is its constitutive act as a Signifyin(g) performative, a type of 
performative that constitutes the subject in multiple, rhetorical, unknowable ways.  Signifyin(g) 
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performativity establishes itself on the x-y-z axis of speech, itself ex-citable because it contains 
within it a condensed historicity and an unknowable future.   It serves as the link between the 
discursive acts which constitute the subject and the speech act of the subject.  
An example of a Signifyin(g) performative act which disrupts the performative power of 
interpellation is parody.  In the article “Appropriating a slur: Semantic looping in the African-
American usage of nigga,” Andrew T. Jacobs (2002) contends that by mimicking the 
policeman’s actions behind his/her back, the interpellated subject is Signifyin(g) disrespect, 
which can be open to a range of possibilities as it ruptures the expectation of interpellation.  As 
explained by Jacobs (2002), 
it is helpful to think of the former term as 'Signifyin(g) on' (or critiquing) something 
whereas the latter word 'signifies' (or means) something but does not inherently involve a 
critique. Thus, to parody the motions of a police officer behind his or her back 'Signifies 
on' the officer and 'signifies' one's disrespect… [it is] a counter-puncher's strategy, an act 
of resistance against an oppressive force. 
 
This interpellative aspect of Signification articulated by Jacobs with respect to Gates’ theory is 
also taken up by Butler—parody is also citational; it is an  “…act that recalls prior acts, requiring 
a future repetition to endure” (Butler, 1997a, p. 20).   
The citational performance of parody disrupts Althusser’s conventional procedure (as 
well as Austin’s illocutionary speech act) because the subject is repeating the actions of the 
policeman for the purpose of entertainment, amusement, resistance, agency as well as citing 
previous forms of parody, thus articulating “all of the associations that a signifier carries from 
other contexts” (Gates, 1988/2014, p. 55).  This “counter” performative (known as a 
performative contradiction or inverse interpellation in Butlerean terms) is ritualized as a 
rhetorical trope, (re)citing the original purpose of the interpellation while also disrupting it.   This 
speech act is not based on the sovereign agency of the authoritative speaker; instead,  
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untethering the speech act from the sovereign subject founds an alternative notion of 
agency and, ultimately, of responsibility, one that more fully acknowledges the way in 
which the subject is constituted in language, how what it creates is also what it derives 
from elsewhere (Butler, 1997, p. 15-16).    
 
As a failed interpellation, delinked from the sovereign subject, the constituted Other 
(re)cites, (in)cites and ex-cites, i.e., Signifyin(g); hence, the previously hailed (constituted) 
subject of Althusser’s example has ruptured the hailing, refusing ritualized and conventional 
acknowledgment by returning it to its originator in a new manner.  This is much like Baldwin’s 
refusal to accept the utterance nigger. Additionally, the agency of the language of parody itself 
can potentially be distinguished from the agency of the constituted subject.  If, as Butler (1997a) 
posits, language has the ability to injure, then it also has the ability to disrespect, entertain, 
humor, and amuse.  Quoting Paul de Man, Butler indicates, “…a trope is… animated at the 
moment when we claim that language ‘acts’…language posits itself in a series of distinct acts… 
its primary function might be understood as this kind of periodic acting” (p. 45).  The trope of 
parody therefore is an act in which there is a “continuous present of ‘a doing’” (Butler, 1997a) 
that exceeds the constituted doer.  Yet once the hailed subject, the interpellated ‘doer’ parodies 
the police, the act of parody itself is the doing of language in which the trope is animated at the 
moment in which “the speech act… is performed bodily…the simultaneity of the production and 
delivery of the expression communicates not merely what is said, but the bearing of the body as 
the rhetorical instrument of expression” (Butler, 1997a, p. 152).  In terms of the racialized 
subject, this bodily performance is both literal and figurative, a speech act with its own effects.  
For Butler, interpellation produces the body both discursively and socially, a type of 
social performative that is “…ritualized and sedimented through time… central to the very 
process of subject-formation as well as the embodied, participatory habitus” (p. 153).  Quoting 
Bourdieu, she cites: “The body believes in what it plays at: it weeps if it mimes grief.  It does not 
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represent what it performs, it does not memorize the past, it enacts the past, bringing it back to 
life.’” (p. 154).  In the case of the police officer, parody is an enactment of a range of discursive 
moments that are performed bodily.  The bodily “performance” of parody, in its mimicry, 
exceeds the original interpellated subject in multiple directions, but in-the-moment of doing it is 
a miming of the sovereign power; it is a miming of Ideology as defined by Althusser, and, if I am 
to read the act of parody through Gates (1988/2014), it is a miming or Signifyin(g) of sovereign 
white power structures and the white discursive universe.  In this way, Gates’ subject -centered 
form of Signification can also be explored as a continuous line of reSignifications which are 
continually ritualized through rhetorical troping, revealing the ways in which we use language 
but are also used by language.  Hence, the discursive doing of parody in Jacobs’ (2002) example 
of Signification transitively animates the social subject who is inhabited by the ritualized act of 
troping. 
4.3 Semantic Looping48 and the Reinvention of nigga 
I introduce Jacobs (2002) because his discussion of semantic looping is one possible 
theory for understanding the purpose of the reinvention nigga.  He uses the example of parody in 
order to exemplify his discussion of Signifyin(g) with respect to nigga as a linguistic parodying 
of nigger. Citing three rhetorical modes—agnominatio, semantic inversion, and chiastic 
slaying—he contends that the racial epithet nigger has been transfigured to nigga as, “a positive 
term that carries with it a critique of racism.” Jacobs identifies this process as semantic looping, a 
process “in which a new term derives meaning by continual reference to an older, existing term.” 
It operates as a form of reSignification in which the appropriated epithet or slur is reinvented and 
 
48 See Jacob’s article for visual examples of semantic looping of semantic inversion, agnominatio and chiastic 
pattern. (link included in References) 
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renamed by the oppressed group as a form of reverse discourse (Foucault, as cited in Jacobs, 
2002).  Hence if one accepts Foucault’s postulation that  
‘discourse is not life; its time is not yours,’ it will be possible to appropriate and re-cite a 
word such as [nigga] in ways which will rob that word of its historic power to wound 
(this does not mean that subversive redeployment is a straightforward matter, or that all 
words may be resignified this way) (Salih, 2000, p. 214).   
 
According to Jacobs (2002), the semantic looping of nigga occurs based on three rhetorical 
devices which fall under Gates’ theory of Signifyin(g). Agnominatio, the alteration of one or 
more letters in a word, and semantic inversion, the reversal of meaning of a word, are evidenced 
by the dropping of the -er for the -a and the reversed meanings from insult to approval.  For 
Jacobs, these two tropes together enter nigga and nigger into a semantic loop as there exists a 
constant interplay between the two words which must occur for new meanings to arise.   Add to 
this Jacobs’ contention that chiastic slaying occurs through constant interplay in which nigga as a 
repetition of nigger reverses the positionality of African Americans from object to subject.  
Citing an example from Gates (1988/2014) Jacobs provides an example of chiasmus49 as used by 
Frederick Douglass: "You have seen how a man became a slave, you will see how a slave 
became a man.”  Like the slave-object which writes him/herself into subjective existence (a trope 
Jacobs contends is the foundation of the slave narrative), through “the semantic inversion of 
'nigger'/'nigga', dehumanized blacks speak themselves into human subjects through the act of 
speaking [and naming]” (Jacobs, 2002).  For Jacobs one cannot exist without the other and it is 
only through chiastic slaying that the repetition of nigga rests upon its constant Signification or 
parody of nigger in a continual semantic looping representative of “the context of continuing 
 
49 According to the Baldick’s Oxford Concise Dictionary of Literary Terms, chiasmus is a literary term in which the 
terms in the first of two parallel clauses are reversed in the second clause.  This can be in the reverse order of words 
or parallel ideas.  An example of chiasmus is John F. Kennedy’s infamous statement: “Ask not what your country 
can do for you but what you can do for your country.”   
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racism, [which] requires 'nigga' to recurrently signify on (i.e. assert the falsity of) the slur.” 
(Jacobs, 2002).   Jacobs illustrates the linear chiastic pattern as derived from Douglass’ text  by 
overlaying this with the semantic loop of nigger-nigga in order to express “the recurrent 
Signification” and continuous looping.    
 
It is Jacob’s (2002) discussion I turn to in order to make sense of the shift of interpellated 
speech acts with respect to nigger and nigga. Jacobs contends that nigga is emblematic of a 
uniquely African American consciousness, a double consciousness, and it is this double 
consciousness which aids in the survivability of the African American in the face of an acute, 
never ending racism. He calls to mind Du Bois’ infamous question, “How does it feel to be a 
problem?” by noting that the African American is constantly aware of his/her precariousness as a 
“problem” in U.S. society. Through Jacobs’ theory of semantic looping nigga Signifies on nigger 
in multiple ways —it puns, it parodies, it critiques, criticizes, and mimics. Through a Butlerean 
lens, it is in this moment that Gates’ Signifyin(g) subject can potentially “…find agency [in] that 
recitation or that replay of discourse that is the conditions of one’s own emergence” (as cited in 
Bell, 1999, p. 165).   Hence Signifyin(g) is both rhetorical and citational. Even in the materially 
discursive act of parody, the “…action echoes prior actions and accumulates the force of 
authority through the repetition of citation of a prior and authoritative set of practices” (Butler, 
1997a, p. 51).  The performative act of parody results in a redoubled action of the threat  of 
interpellation… turning one part of that speaking against the other” (Butler, 1997a, p. 12).    
It is through an examination of Jacobs (2002) theory of semantic looping that we can 
begin to imagine how the illocutionary force of nigger as inflammatory speech turns upon itself 
into the performative nigga with its requisite multiple, fragmentary, rhetorical and incomplete 
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meanings.  Jacobs’ (2002) theory is one possible lens through which we can comprehend the 
ironic capacity of nigga.  Hence, Butler’s (1997a) interrogation into the failed interpellation is 
made possible; nigger “fails”50 due to its parodic Signifyin(g) sidekick nigga—or does it? 
Perhaps this is the ironic agential nature of Signifyin(g).  Scholars, entertainers and activists have 
argued extensively for the allowability of nigga in contrast to the disallowability of nigger; for 
example, Michael Harriot (2018) contends in his article “Why it’s ok for Black People, but not 
White People, to use the N-Word, Explained (again),” “It’s our house. It’s our word.  But it is 
either disingenuous or stupid to pretend that double standards don’t exist . Words are supposed to 
have double standards.” As such, Signifyin(g) ruptures “the fantasy of sovereign power in 
speech” (Butler, as cited in Bell, 1999, p. 164) through a complex level of embedded tropes, 
figurative substitutions and language games in which language is being done and is itself the 
doing.  In that doing the subject is submerged, subsumed, unable to step out of language (Butler, 
1997a).   
In effect, the ritual of conventional procedure has the potential to be substituted with the 
ritual of troping in which the language itself acts, and the speaking-centered subject is potentially 
decentered, or at the very least speaks him/herself into existence as an object-turned-subject.  In 
this sense vulnerability, possibility, and ambiguity are part of the constitutive discursive act as 
well as the speech act itself.  In practice, Baldwin has enacted what Butler defines as a failed 
interpellation or performative contradiction.  However, I would conjecture that Baldwin’s 
performance is not a form of Signifyin(g), i.e., rhetorical troping.  In contrast to the language 
play of Paul Mooney, Nas and Kelis, Barack Obama and Larry Wilmore, Baldwin’s shift is not 
 
50 I purposely use the term fail here as Butler uses it to convey the ways in which through citationality, utterances 
exceed the speaker and take on new meanings. Fail is in no way indicative of a dismissal or diminished sense of the 
illocutionary force of the word nigger.  
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comedic, rhetorical or ambiguous, although it is sardonic, caustic, and paradoxical.  Instead 
Baldwin’s response enacts a loosening of the link between subject formation and the process of 
becoming a subject through a disruption of the interpellative illocution nigger.  This delinking is 
furthered through the semantic looping of nigga.  Nigga (re)cites the illocutionary force of 
nigger as injurious yet simultaneously disrupts Althusser’s (1970) interpellative in which the 
constituted subject must turn in recognition.  The subjectivated-objectified object-subject  
ultimately does not speak or speaks in such a way as to disrupt the convention.  In the interplay 
of doing and being done by language, nigga represents the “colonized subjectivities” (Diaz, 
2012) of the subject-turned-object-turned-subject through a rhetoric of chiasmus.  Nigga has 
become one of the confounding language games (Williams, 1991) in which the dying-drowning 
mortals have tricked the priests-turned-gods who continue(?) to float outside the Celestial City 
(that is, if global warming, oil spills, melting ice caps, and corporate pollution haven’t ruined the 
waters). 
 
4.4 The Tesseract-Effect: An Incomplete, (Im)Possible 4 th Dimension 
Yet in what way does nigga as Signifyin(g) performative constitute the subject? Butler 
(1994) explains,  
...the subject in speech is always both more than itself and less than itself in any given 
speech act…what it speaks is not simply its own speech but it speaks a life of discourse 
and it is installed, as it were, in a life of discourse that exceeds the subject’s own 
temporality (as cited in Bell, 1999, p. 166).  
 
While as utterance nigga Signifies on nigger, it also requires an interrogation of the ways 
in which the subject is formed within the power relations that oppress, regulate and suppress the 
subject (Butler, 1997a).  Butler (1997a, 1997b) contends that the subject must simultaneously 
accept and reject this power; without this submission and denial, the subject ceases to exist.  In 
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effect, Butler’s questioning of what makes the subject “turn” when hailed by authority, what 
theory of conscience is necessary to understand what and why this subject “…accept[s] the 
subordination and normalization effected by that voice… in inaugurating a social subject” (p. 6), 
can be one of many entry points for an exploration of the African American psyche, the “double 
consciousness” of which Du Bois (1903/2003) speaks.   
Butler (1997a) notes: 
the opening up of the foreclosed and the saying of the unspeakable become part of the 
very ‘offense’ that must be committed in order to expand the domain of linguistic 
survival.  The resigni-fication of speech requires opening new contexts, speaking in ways 
that have never yet been legitimated, and hence producing legitimation in new and future 
forms (p. 41). 
 
Butler (1997a) identifies the subject’s turning as “… a tropological inauguration of the 
subject… [which] remains permanently uncertain” (p. 3-4).  She comments that “… ‘turn’ is, 
rhetorically, performatively spectacular; ‘turn’ translates the Greek sense of ‘trope’ (p. 4).  
Hence, if we are to understand the subject’s turning in Althusser’s interpellation as a type of  
rhetorical troping, then in this instance, Gates’(1988/2014) theory of Signification potentially 
exemplifies the interrupted, disrupted, ruptured interpellative act and constitution of the African 
American subject. In this vein, Signifyin(g) is both a “turning towards” and “turning away from” 
Althusser’s authoritative voice; paradoxically, this form of rhetorical troping can also be 
explored, as per Butler (1997a,) as a “turning outward” and “turning inward ,” 
…the structure of self-incarceration… the ways in which the subject turns against itself 
by passionately attaching itself to the law that subjects it… the prohibitions instituted by 
the law… are constitutive of a subject that requires subjection in certain crucial senses” 
(Salih & Butler, 2004, p. 243-44).  
 
Hence Gates identifies black language as a form of independence, but this is also effected 
through “…the subject’s paradoxical dependence on a discourse it does not choose” (Salih & 
Butler, 2004, p. 243).   Much like Hegel’s master/slave in which “the master… reemerges as the 
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slave’s own conscience” (Butler, 1997a, p. 3) or Douglass’ (1845/2004) discovery of his own 
wretched condition upon learning to read, Signification can be explored as a discursive rhetorical 
troping of the very discourse that places one in subjection.  In this way, Signification can also be 
explored as a mode of contradiction, much like Jacobs’ (2002) example of the person who 
parodies the police, in which the paradoxical, yet simultaneous, turning inward and outward 
parallels the semantic looping of nigga and nigger.  
 
But still… if I am to consider how discourse acts and enacts upon the subject, much like 
my reconfiguration of Gates’ original two-dimensional construction of language, Jacobs’ 
semantic loop can be carried one step further. While the three-dimensional axes (Figure 3)  
visually represents the intersection of Standard American English (SAE), Black Standard 
American English (BSAE) and Black Vernacular English (BVE), how does this account for 
those social practices and power relations which inflect and infect subject constitution? Put 
another way, how might we account for the vulnerability of the subject constructed through the 
regulatory principles of discourse? As well, while Jacobs (2012) provides a theory for the way in 
which nigga Signifies upon nigger, how does this account for the constituted subject? The 
rotating tesseract51 also known as a hypercube is an extension of a three-dimensional cube which 
is meant to represent 4D space. As shown in the link, the tesseract is animated because through 
movement the tesseract as a visual 3D object depicted in two-dimensional space figuratively 
represents a fourth dimension.  It is this fourth dimension that I would like to interrogate as an 
(in)visible space in which discourse exists, one which the racialized subject both accepts and 
rejects, turns towards and away from. The movement of the tesseract is representational of the 
 
51 See the link for a visual representation of a  Tesseract. 
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ways in which, based on Foucault’s (2010) conceptions of knowledge/power, language is fluid, 
transmutable, and multi-directional.  It also represents the ways in which discourse, subject 
constitution and language practices interact, intersect, complement and contradict. It is through 
this animation that Jacobs’ (2002) conceptualization of semantic looping can be perceived as 
well. Hence, it is in one single utterance of nigga that multiple intersecting actions occur (on the 
BVE, SBAE, & SAE axes). As performative contradiction there is the Signifyin(g) of the word 
itself through a chiastic semantic loop which continuously interplays between nigga and nigger. 
Additionally, there is the speech act of the subject, i.e., the rhetorical troping or Signifiyin(g) 
(which includes both illocutionary and perlocutionary effects) in which the speaking subject 
articulates through nigga the multiply contested and competing dimensions of a racialized 
consciousness.  There is also the discursive act of performativity in which nigga and the 
discourses which surround it place the subject in subjection.  I posit, therefore, the tesseract as a 
representation of these fluctuating yet congruent aspects of nigga.  
While nigger and nigga have been analyzed as epithet, slur, insult, humor, irony, 
camaraderie and vindication, its contradictory, rhetorical troping, its citationality, ex-citability, 
and iterability recasts it as a  “contagious word,” one “that is meant in part to counter the force of 
that other contagion...” (Butler, 1997a, p. 124), racism.  As both Randall Kennedy (2003) and 
Jabari Asim (2007) acknowledge, “complete eradication of nigger-as-insult” (Kennedy, 2003, p. 
137) is impossible based on vestigial racism; conversely, scholars such as Arthur K. Spears 
(1997) and H. Samy Alim and Geneva Smitherman (2012) view positive connotations of nigga 
as a socio-cultural linguistic practice of reclamation, an example of “black people coloniz[ing] a 
white sign” (Gates, 1988/2014, p. 52).  However, in order for this contagion to take root, Butler 
(1997a) contends that it “can only be articulated in response to a challenge from (its own) 
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outside” (p. 90).  The irony of nigga as a linguistic tool within the African American ethos is also 
paradoxically the absurdity of its capacity for reSignification, i.e., troping, reversal, iterability, 
and ex-citability.   In response to Richard Delgado’s (1993) statement that words such as nigger 
and spic are degrading words that have no other connotation, Butler (1997a) writes,  
…these words become phenomenal; they become a kind of linguistic display that does 
not overcome their degrading meanings, but that reproduces them as public text and… in 
being reproduced, displays them as reproducible and resignifiable terms (p. 100).   
 
In essence, nigga’s reSignification, consists of the ways it works as a neutralized, 
normalized, generalized (Spears, 1997) performative contradiction.   Butler (1997a)continues 
that this “constitutes… an ironic hopefulness that the conventional relation between word and 
wound might become tenuous and even broken over time” (p. 100).  If we are to “dream” of this 
moment, as Asim (2007) laments, then the dream’s potential for reconfiguration and 
recontextualization is always, already an incomplete space in which nigga as a Signifyin(g) 
performative consists of the subject’s (un)willingness to turn in response to the call.  This dream 
must also account for “…the two-way nature of interpellation” (Salih & Butler, 2004, p. 245) 
especially within the situated and contingent psyche of the African American subject which, 
through the mask of double(d)-consciousness, both rejects and has a “passionate attachment” to 
the law, what Butler calls a “‘strange scene of love’” (Salih & Butler, 2004, p. 245).  
 
4.5 Nigga Event #03242015:  “Cuz I’m that Bigger” nigga as Signifyin(g) 
performative or “a strange scene of love”  
I mean… you know… this school is okay.  I’m here now because, to be honest, I 
fucked up.  My parents are cool with it.  I mean… as cool as they’re gonna be.  It’s not 
like I’m not going at all. I’m here to get my grades up. And it’s not like they can do 
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anything about it now.  School was never really my thing.  I was always about sports, 
sports, sports and making money.  My brothers and sisters all get good grades but me, I 
wanted sports, having a good time and making money.  So, when I messed up, I was 
going to quit altogether.  But my mom kept saying no, you gotta go.  You need that piece 
of paper to do what you wanna do in life.  I’m dealing with the consequences though.   
I was the only black freshman recruited on the squad. There was one or two of us 
here and there but like most of the black guys were upperclassmen. So… you know… I 
was the shit. I got caught up in partying and being the man on campus.  Once I get my 
grades up, I’m gonna transfer back and finish.  
Being the only black guy is like… well… it benefited me, and it was the opposite 
at the same time. 
I hooked up with a lot of white girls… that was the benefit.  It was like... they 
wanted something different.  I went to a lot of white parties and you know being the only 
black guy in the room is like… I don’t know… it’s like great cuz the chicks are like, oh 
you’re different than other black guys, let me try this out.  What’s up?  I mean I went to 
an integrated school, so I knew how to talk to white girls, black girls, Spanish girls, 
Asians.  I guess they liked how I carried myself.  I wasn’t trying to be like them and for 
them that was different.  But I was cool because I was with the football team. The 
football team had a bad rep cuz we came to the parties; we always had a bunch of drinks. 
Girls always migrated to us.  So other teams gave us looks.  We’d go to other sports 
teams’ parties, you know, like lacrosse or soccer, and recruit.  We’d be like come to the 
football house and they’d all leave cuz we threw the best parties. I was a part of the cool 
group, but I was the only black one in the freshman class.   
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So the white chicks kept coming, and coming, and coming, and coming back. 
They knew where my dorm room was… until I disappeared. But I got heat from some of 
the white boys cuz it was like, “Yo why she messing with you?  She one of the hottest 
chicks on campus so why is she fuckin with you?” 
And I’d be like, ‘I’m that nigga!’  That’s what I would say to them.  Word for 
word.  And they would be mad as hell and go about their day.   
They hated that shit.   
 
Had Richard Wright been writing in the 21st Century rather than the 1940s (early to mid 
20th Century), I imagine a newly historicized Bigger “Bigga”52 Thomas facing a linguistic lynch 
mob of white men who discursively place him on trial for the deflowering of white women 
across campus. The captured Bigger of Richard Wright’s 1940 novel Native Son has been 
accused with the double felonies of murder and rape of his employer—the smart, spunky, 
beautiful, upper class white Mary Dalton, and his girlfriend—the alcoholic, impoverished, blue 
collar, black Bessie Mears.  While Bigger is definitely guilty of the double murders, he is not 
guilty of the rape of Mary Dalton.53  This accusation is doubly ironic because Bigger actually 
does have nonconsensual sex with Bessie prior to killing her.  This subsequent act of violence 
against Bessie is more of an afterthought during his trial, yet the discovery of semen in Bessie 
leads the prosecutor to imagine a rape of Mary Dalton (I mean, if he raped his girlfriend, then it 
 
52 I use the pseudonym Bigga partially as a revision of the 1940s Bigger Thomas from Richard Wright’s Native Son 
but also in its more contemporary scope, as a reclamation of the late Biggie Smalls, aka The Notorious B.I.G. aka  
Christopher Wallace whose fame and lyrics as a rap icon of the 1990s continue to impact the hip hop community, 
and who freely employed nigga in his lyrics and boasted of the number of bodies he had (trans. BVE for number of 
women he has had intercourse with).  
53This is not, in any way, to denigrate, dismiss, diminish or compare the act of murder to the act of rape. Nor am I 
attempting to compare or dismiss the murder/rape of Bessie Mears. My intention is to interrogate the specific issue 
of sexual misconduct as a parallel to my interroga tion of the ironic use of nigga within the context of sexual 
proclivities.   
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stands to reason that this Afro-American “Sampson defiled a white Delilah” (Wells, 1892, as 
cited in Royster, 2016)).  And while these violent acts of Bigger deserve much more attention 
than I will provide, I point to Bigger’s imagined act of violation against Mary as a segue into 
Bigga’s imagined act of violation with (not against) young white coeds on a college campus. 
In Wright’s final chapter of “Fate” he initially chooses to silence the captured Bigger.  
Lying in his cell, he refuses food or communication while awaiting his trial.  Furthermore, when 
forced to face a sea of excited white faces and flashing bulbs, Bigger faints, yet another bodily 
manifestation of being silenced. Wright’s double silencing of Bigger parallels the double 
silencing of Mary and Bessie by Bigger’s hands, both of whom Bigger feared would talk and 
reveal him, but it also symbolizes the historical silencing of black male bodies (as well as 
women), and this silencing is as much linguistic as it is physical.  Bigger must be silenced (both 
literally and figuratively) due to the very real act of murder as well as the imagined act of being 
“criminally intimate” with Mary Dalton. Writing in 1940 (about 1930s Chicago, IL) it is ironic 
that Wright chose not to have Bigger hanged when he was pulled off the roof of the building he 
was hiding in, (a structure I assumed represented Bigger’s imminent lynching, since public 
lynchings were historically a part of the public discourse of the northern state of Illinois—in June 
of 1893 an angry mob in the state of Illinois hung one Samuel Bush after he was accused, sight 
unseen, of rape (Wells, 1892, as cited in Royster, 2016, p. 122). Yet in Native Son rather than 
being carried off by a crazed, violent mob, stabbed, dismembered, hung, castrated, or riddled 
with bullets, Bigger is granted the “civility” of a trial, legal counsel and representation, and 
forgiveness by the boyfriend of the now deceased Mary Dalton. Ironically, while Bigger is guilty 
of two murders and the rape of his ex-girlfriend, he knows that he is only being held accountable 
for one, that of Mary Dalton, while Bessie’s exposed body during the inquest is merely a prop:  
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   Bessie’s death had not been mentioned during the inquest… they were using his having 
killed Bessie to kill him for his having killed Mary… though he had killed a black girl 
and a white girl, he knew that it would be for the death of the white that he would be 
punished... he felt a deeper sympathy for Bessie… He knew that Bessie… would resent 
her dead body being used in this way.” (Wright, 1940/2005, p. 331).  
 
This comparison is in no way meant to diminish the murder of either woman in Wright’s 
text, but I am using the text in the way that Bessie’s body is being used—“The black girl was 
merely ‘evidence.’”(Wright, 1940/2005, p. 331).  In the modern-day Bigga’s inquest, the white 
male students who approach him on campus were no more interested in any nameless, faceless 
African American woman than the jurors cared for the body of Bessie Mears.  Instead, their 
confrontation focused solely on “defending the ‘honor’ of all white women, demi-monde 
included” (Wells, 1892, as cited in Royster, 2016, p. 52, emphasis in original). By the end of the 
text Bigger admits to what he surmises he is, a killer for good reason (Wright, 1940/2005, p. 
429).  He killed therefore he will be killed, but the killing of Bessie is meaningless, her life, 
much like the lives of the senseless lynchings of black Americans in the South, is not grievable.54  
It is the life of Mary Dalton that Bigger must atone for and 80+ years later, Bigga, another self -
proclaimed lady-killer (pun intended), must atone for his actions with countless white women; 
however, it is not the women who are at fault, it is Bigga who has committed “rank outrage” 
against the guardians who protect the honor of white women (Wells, 1892, as cited in Royster, 
2016).  As documented in the text Southern Horrors and other Writings: The Anti-lynching 
Campaign of Ida B. Wells, 1892-1900,  
…the miscegenation laws of the South only operate against the legitimate union of the 
races; … it is death to the colored man who yields to the… attraction in white women.  
White men lynch the offending Afro-American, not because he is a despoiler of virtue, 
but because he succumbs to the smiles of white women” (Wells,1892, as cited in Royster, 
2016, p. 50-51).   
 
 
54 I use this term in the way that Butler (2016) questions whose bodies are grievable in her text Frames of War: 
When is ?Life Grievable? 
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Wells (1892) articulates that the issue of the ‘race question’ with regards to the protection of 
white Southern women is illustrated through the methods used within religion, science, law and 
political power (as cited in Royster, 2016).  These methods justify false accusations, brutality, 
incarceration and lynchings by “honest white men [who] concede the necessity of intelligence… 
against government by ignorance” (p. 57). 
Over one hundred years later, it is the “intelligence” of these young men who demand an 
explanation of Bigga’s actions as a necessity against what they perceive, at best, as a quand ary, 
and at worst, a wrong. Yet while the discourses of religion, science, and law have been 
reconfigured by society and in the process transformed knowledge and social practices, the 
actions of these students reveal the historical impact of previous discourses on contemporary 
society.  Hence, landmark legislation such as the 14th Amendment (1868), Sweatt v. Painter 
(1950), Brown v. Board (1954), and Loving vs. Virginia (1967) serve as precedent for the 
overturning and eradication of many racist, discriminatory, segregationist and anti-miscegenation 
laws at the macro-social and macro-physical level of government and control; however, these 
transitions in legal discourse have not necessarily eradicated horizontal relationships between 
individuals and/or communities nor has it eradicated the management of bodies through the 
methods used in education, economics, collegiate sports, professional sporting organizations, 
media, entertainment, or the sciences of psychology and human anatomy.  The sedimentation of 
social and discursive tactics of governmentality (Foucault, 1978), which control, dictate, and 
manage the behaviors of both the individual and the collective, reveal a different complex 
institution of power and its effects. With respect to Bigga, modern conceptions of sexual prowess 
are emergent based on the ways in which it is discussed in media portrayals of African American 
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athletes, covert hypersexualized beliefs about black male heteronormativity, and overt imagery 
of black (hyper)masculinity as evidenced in hip hop culture.  
It is through Bigga’s own necessarily incomplete characterizations wherein constitutive 
elements of his as well as the coeds’ identities are evidenced. Bigga is “different” from the 
perceived linguistic and socio-cultural normativity of black men; while not “trying to be white” 
he is appropriate enough in demeanor, social behavior and dailyspeak to be deemed as “safe,” 
and cool to “try out” (i.e. engage in sexual intercourse, although this same term also means to 
engage in a sporting activity, ironically in some linguistic circles, I think here of Shakespeare’s 
Othello as well, sport is also known as sex). His membership as the “only black freshman” on the 
football team additionally constructs certain constitutive effects of Bigga as racialized subject 
and object of specific types of knowledge based on the discourses of collegiate sports, All-
American football, and the science of human anatomy.  Much like Jesse Owens, Arthur Ashe, 
Moses Fleetwood Walker, Jackie Robinson, Kenneth Washington, George Taliaferro, and Earl 
Lloyd (and at one point O.J. Simpson), Bigga is/was “safe” due to his inclusion in an exclusive 
organization in which he is materially marked as different, yet socially and culturally marked as 
belonging, acceptable, acculturated and/or assimilated. Coupled with historical discourses of 
scientific racism which employed physical anthropology, anthropometry, craniometry and 
eugenics to justify physical, intellectual and genetic differences between races, covert beliefs of 
black men’s intelligence, muscularity, strength and prowess can be traced to theories such as 
Carl Linneaus (1767) and his five varieties of human species, Benjamin Rush’s (1799) 
negroidism, a hereditary skin disease that could infect whites through sexual intercourse, Josiah 
Clark Nott and George Robins Gliddon’s (1854) categorization of the Negro as a creational rank 
between the Greeks and chimpanzees; Thomas Jefferson’s (1785) Notes on the State of Virginia; 
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Karl Vogt’s (1864) Lectures of Man that genetically linked blacks to apes; and Samuel George 
Morton’s (1839) craniometry data, which “proved” the inferiority of the Negro’s brain size and 
capacity. In conjunction with these historical discourses of “objective” science, the modern 
sports fanatic, intellectual, commentator, and fan continue to exhibit social and cultural beliefs 
and practices that uphold theories of superior strength, muscularity and athleticism. Taken 
together, these (re)cite the historically articulated pseudoscientific texts that served to uphold 
practices such as slavery, sharecropping, segregation and anti-miscegenation.   Bigga’s self-
proclaimed “I knew how to talk to white girls” civilizes his “faculties of memory, reason, and 
imagination” (Jefferson, 1785) so that he is viewed by himself and his female peers as “not like 
them,” i.e., not “in reason much inferior” (Jefferson, 1785).  At the same time, however, he is a 
“despoiler of virtue…because he succumbs to the smiles of white women” 
(Wells, 1892, as cited in Royster, 2016, p. 50-51). 
The discourse of scientific racism, however, is not solely evident in scientific texts and 
journals. The 2008 Vogue cover of Lebron James and Gisele Bundchen photographed by Annie 
Leibovitz (See link for Image of James Lebron and Gisele Bundchen, 2008 ) was criticized for 
its imagery reminiscent of a King Kong figure and victimized white woman.  Consequently (and 
ironically) this was the first time Vogue’s cover featured an African American male.  This cover, 
and subsequent discussion about the mirror images, further reifies African American athletes as 
beasts, superhuman, and overtly desirous of white women (paradoxically coined the OJ complex, 
yet another discursive play on words). One could conjecture from an initial reading of the 
headline of the original image, “Destroy this Mad Brute,” that brute refers to the brutish, black 
ape-like beast walking along the banks of the river, club in one hand and innocent woman 
fainted, distraught and possibly clubbed by the beast in the other.  However, upon closer 
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inspection (and after some research) one might come to realize that this image (though still 
questionable in its use of imagery) served as propaganda against the Germans during WWI 
stepping onto American shores with Lady Liberty in his grip. Hence, the fear of militarism, 
represented on the pickelhaube helmet is countered with the entreaty to enlist in the U.S. Army.   
However, this imagery is much less figurative in the 2008 version. Ms. Bundchen’s dress 
is of the same ochre as the Lady Liberty blue in the original image.  The wooden club labeled 
with the word kultur has been substituted with a modernized version of U.S. kultur, basketball, 
yet James sports all black and his muscularity mirrors that of the original image. As well, James’ 
countenance and posture mimics that of the German ape—while the sleeveless black pullover he 
dons accentuates his muscular arms, his facial expression is practically an exact replica of the 
1917 mad brute.  Finally (and/or ultimately) within James’ grasp is the beautiful Brazilian-born 
Gisele Bundchen (who is ironically of German descent).  The irony of Bundchen’s expression, 
much like the irony of the unnamed visitors to Bigga’s dorm room is reminiscent of statements 
by J. C. Duke:  
   There… is a growing appreciation of white Juliets for colored Romeos… there are 
many white women in the South who would marry colored men if such an act would not 
place them at once beyond the pale of society and within the clutches of the law.” (as 
cited in Royster, 2016, p. 50).   
 
The lovely Bundchen returns the camaraderie and affection to James—each has an arm 
wrapped around the other (although upon closer inspection it is not quite clear where Bundchen’s 
left arm is positioned, perhaps it was photoshopped out of the image altogether). Nonetheless, 
her countenance, posture and attitude negate the distress, angst, and fainting fear of her 
predecessor; instead she smiles and exudes confidence.  Rather than appearing captured and 
victimized in the clutches of James, Bundchen stands upright, her five foot eleven inches 
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appearing deceptively equal to that of James’ 6’8” frame. As a result, her persona shifts and 
reframes this original image from one of fear of the beast to mutuality.  
I highlight this revisitation of Harry Ryle Hopps’ 1917 WWI propaganda poster as yet 
another statement within a field of statements that underscores the positionality of African 
American men in society.  While scholars have criticized Leibowitz for her (dare I say obvious?) 
choice of framing,  positionality, color, and expression of James and Bundchen, much like the 
parallel images of the 1957 Woodlawn Boys’ boycott and Nas and Kelis on the red carpet at the 
Grammys, Leibowitz Signifies upon Hopps’ 1917 poster.  In her revisitation, she creates an ex-
citable moment, one in which the citational aspect of the contemporary image simultaneously 
presents the discursive power of the original image (which can never be fully delinked) as well 
as a new alternate discursive reality, one with its own effects.  Within this new reality, 
interactions between white women and black men are allowable; however, due to the historical 
discourse of anti-miscegenation—evidenced in legal discourse, pseudoscience, social practice, 
and media images—the allowability of interracial intercourse is simultaneously disallowable, 
inappropriate, obscene.  It is through this constitution that the young men approach Bigga.   
Hence, while his actions on a multi-raced, gendered, sexed campus are allowable and even 
permissible between consenting adults, the Tesseract-Effect55 is clear.  Allowability and 
permissibility are tenuous due to the shifting, intersecting, competing historical, social and 
cultural discourses about sexual interactions between black men and white women.  
In this present-day inquisition, Bigga  faces a linguistic mob of white men who seek to, 
dare I say protect?, the  purity (and I use this word ironically) of the “hottest white women” on 
campus.  In this present-day inquest Bigga speaks, thereby avoiding the linguistic death of his 
 
55 I use this term to highlight the fluid, continual impact of historical discourses that, while incrementally changing 
over time, continue to permeate present day knowledge/power.   
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predecessor Bigger. When Bigger finally is “given voice” (only in the privacy of his cell) it is an 
attempt to articulate the psychic power of the depressed, oppressed, repressed, colonized 
subjectivities of the racialized subject.  It is through these revelationary thoughts that the reader 
comes to understand the contradiction, chaos, ambiguity and incompleteness of the double(d) 
consciousness of the racialized subject:  
   ‘I don’t know.  She didn’t do nothing to me’… ‘She asked me a lot of questions.  She 
acted and talked in a way that made me hate her.’… ‘Mr. Max, you know what some 
white men say we blacks do? They say we rape white women when we got the clap and 
they say we do that because we believe that if we rape white women then we’ll get rid of 
the clap.  They say we do things like that and they say it to kill us.  They draw a line and 
say for you to stay on your side.  And then they say things like that about you and when 
you try to come from behind your line they kill you. They feel they ought to kill you…’ 
(p. 350-351). 
 
On campus, Bigga has figuratively and literally stepped from behind this line evident in 
his peers’ attempt at reminding him of his place. However, unlike Bigger, who chose silence in 
the public setting and only verbalizes his thoughts in the private sanctity of his cell with Mr. 
Max, Bigga literally evokes the “I say it, you think it, what a small white world” theory from 
Mooney’s performance. Through an act of Signifyin(g) that intersects the SAE, SBAE and BVE 
axes,  Bigga names himself— “I’m that nigga!” Through the rhetorical device of irony, the 
sardonic humor and biting sarcasm of that naming, inaugurates a new, unforeseeable reality that 
contains within it the historical past, the in-the-moment present and the unknowable future, in 
which both the speaking subject and the interpellated subject are made vulnerable by speech.  
However, as performative, nigga elides strict ideational usage; hence it is ex-cite-able due to its 
tenuousness, unpredictability, and ambiguity.  Wrested from its original meaning, while 
simultaneously reiterating this meaning, nigga’s ex-citability is its troping of nigger through a 
reversal of both meaning and context.   
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The irony of Bigga’s statement, produced through naming, reflects the mirthful language 
of  Ellison’s grandfather, the double(d) consciousness of the racialized subject who is the subject 
of, subject(ed) to, subject(ed) by and subject(ed) within language. Bigga, much like Bigger and 
the grandfather, cannot step outside of language (i.e., nigger-nigga) and it is through their 
individual acts of speech and/or conduct (naming, flight, laughter) that they simultaneously 
accept and reject the constitutive effects of nigger-nigga.  In Bigga’s case, during the moment of 
this linguistic lynching, he Signifies through his final speech act of naming; hence, “I’m that 
nigga!” inaugurates a semantic looping of a historical reality: white mob + black victim (labelled 
as victimizer) = nigger (and lynching).  Bigga’s self-naming loops back upon nigger yet 
simultaneously disrupts this hailing: white mob + black victim (self-named as vindicator) = 
nigga (and linguistic survival).  In doing so nigga acts as a performative contradiction.  The 
performative power of nigga erupts and disrupts the internalization of norms and subjection; 
hence as the racialized subject, previously interpellated by past meanings, Bigga challenges the 
sovereign power both of the injurious utterance and the sovereign power of interpellation 
through an ironic naming process.   
To be clear, as an insurrectionary speech act nigga serves as a counter-puncher’s strategy 
(Gates, 1988/2014), one in which the hailed subject fails to turn, fails to acknowledge, instead 
discursively rupturing the illocutionary effects of nigger by reassigning it to the psyche of the 
original speaking subject, its inventor. The consequence of this is a shift in sovereign power to 
“a set of practices in which power is actualized.” (Butler, 1997a, p. 79).  The shift occurs through 
the citationality of a naming process (a set of  practices) by the racialized subject, which usurps 
the sovereign model of power instigated by the community of white men. And while this 
community of men did not literally say nigger, their inquiry of Bigga’s relations can be read as a 
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symbolic courtroom in which Bigga is placed on trial for his skin color.  In other words, their 
questioning of why the hottest white women on campus would choose him can be translated to 
why would the hottest white women on campus choose a nigger.   
While Butler claims that the one who speaks hate speech deprives and subordinates, 
Bigga’s reinvented (re)use of the word ironically reinstates his “performative power, a 
performative power that some see as a linguistic condition of citizenship… [a] necessary 
condition… in the public domain.” (Butler, 1997a, p. 81).  It is through ironic (re)naming, i.e, 
Signifyin(g) that a sovereign trope, nigger, becomes a trope of tropes, nigga, (Gates, 1988/2014).  
Through the performance of Signifyin(g), Bigga frustrates the inquiry of his peers insinuated in 
that historical 4th Dimension of segregationist, racist, anti-miscegenation discourses that disallow 
interracial intercourse. Use of the utterance nigga neutralizes the (understood, invisible) 
illocutionary consequence of nigger.   In use nigga inaugurates the interpellated subject and 
creates a failed interpellation—while the subject is hailed through the imperative command 
(nigger is understood), it also “runs the risk” of a bringing that subject into language who 
counters with the very language used to subjugate. Simultaneously nigga as performative 
contradiction (with effects of its own) ruptures the historic injurious nature of nigger through its 
“reiteration of norms which precede, constrain, and exceed the performer” (Butler, 1997a, p. 
178).   In the process of reinventing nigger, Bigga not only names himself as nigga; he renames 
himself as that nigga, a specific type of nigga, one worthy of the love and attention of white 
coeds. This ironic renaming performs what Gates calls a reversal; hence, in the process of 
naming, that nigga is “…unmoored from prior context, and enter[s] into the labor of self-
definition” (Butler, 1997a, p. 163) while also (un)naming the now othered addressees.  
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That nigga creates a reversed injury, one in which the addressee [is] out of control, 
suffers a loss of context and suffers the disorientation of one’s situation (Butler, 1997a, p. 4).  
The addresser-turned-addressed is thus “put in one’s place… but such a place may be no place 
[at all]” (Butler, 1997a, p. 4).   That nigga names the other as not that nigga, the injurious effects 
of which are a racialized and sexualized constitution of the subject. In this Signifyin(g) Monkey 
“trickster” moment, relational difference is created between the racialized speaking Subject and 
the Other, thus constituting both within the discourses of masculinity, race, sexuality and 
heteronormativity. Bigga’s recognition and naming of himself constitutes the Other through 
emasculation, de-racialization, and de-sexualization, a reversal of  James Baldwin’s (1965) 
“Going to Meet the Man” in which the white male protagonist Jesse attains a symbolic 
sexualized manhood at a lynching he attends with his parents as a child.  In this scene, Jesse 
watches in horrific fascination as one member of the lynch mob castrates the offender (Klotman, 
1985). The injurious illocutionary force of that nigga is loose, in flux, and ambiguous. It is a 
linguistic “violence” absent of the physical violence that is often linked to inflammatory speech, 
such as in the title of Matsuda et al.’s (1993) Words that Wound. It is speech, not conduct, 
symbolically silencing the other through a process of disorientation and loss.  
Sovereign speech is no longer in play through the speech of “the white man,” a discourse 
which Bederman (1992) contends evolved in the late 19th Century as a response to the changing 
landscape post-slavery.   “The white man” as a discourse was rooted in traits purported to be 
internal to the white Anglo Saxon, industrious, adventuresome, strong-willed, tenacious and 
civilized, a racial trait inherited by Anglo Saxons and other “advanced” white races (Bederman, 
1992, p. 9).  Through a campaign of racialization, masculinity, civility, and sexualization “the 
white man” as discourse subsequently othered anyone considered not or non-white (this includes 
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those “ethnic” whites who immigrated to the United States).  As Bederman notes, woven within 
this discourse was the discourse of racial and gender hierarchy with respect to civilization. This 
linked white male supremacy to human evolution conflating the concept of civilization with “the 
white man.”  In so doing, ideologies such as protecting the white female became part of the 
psyche of white men who needed to not only uphold the virtue of white women but also the 
manliness of white men in contrast to the savagery and unmanliness of black men.  Bederman 
(1992), in her reading of Wells’ Southern Horrors, reveals how Wells invoked inversion in order 
to show that black men, imagined as savages and beasts, are the epitome of stoic, reserved 
manliness while the murderous white men were cowardly, unpassioned and savage.  Wells 
(1892) contends that black men fell subject to the carnality of white women; hence, it was the 
white women who were lustful and wicked, not the victimized (and often innocent) black men. 
She further points out the uncivilized manner of the white women who, upon discovery of their 
illicit but often agreed upon affairs or fearing the birth of an interracial child, claimed rape and in 
extreme cases watched their lovers burn, as quoted in the example of Edward Coy of Texarkana 
in January, 1892: “When she came to apply the match Coy asked her if she would burn him after 
they had ‘been sweethearting’ for so long” (Wells, 1892, as cited in Royster, 2016, p. 54). Since 
white women were by nature the weaker sex, frail in body, mind and spirit, then it “made sense” 
that they would succumb to the wily character of the black man.  Lynching, therefore, became 
institutionalized through the law, eugenics, psychology and the Christian church; hence, white 
men of the 1900’s were constructed as “patriarchs, avengers, righteous protectors” (Bederman, 
1992, p. 13). These historical regimes of truth continue to impact 21st Century sensibilities so 
much so that a group of white male college students felt it “their duty” to question Bigga’s 
relations with several white women on campus some one-hundred-plus years later.   
129 
 
Likewise, these modern-day, young, white men instituted the same mob mentality.  
Through the discourses of “the white man”56 solidified through cultural artifacts such as 
Chicago’s 1893 Columbian exposition (Bederman, 1992), racialized traits of superiority and 
inferiority were supported by scientific and biological journals, and legal discourse—all of which 
justified the lynching of any black man believed to have defiled a white woman.  The young 
white males who approach Bigga are justified in their questioning of him based on historical 
media discourse as well, which justified lynching as appropriate, necessary and manly.  Black 
men were fabricated as natural rapists who succumbed to their baser natures and natural 
passions.  Citing Wells, Bederman (1992) cites The New York Times and the Providence Journal 
as characterizing lynch mobs as maintaining a “quick and quiet demeanor… stern and firm 
behavior” (p. 14) thus characterizing the mob of white men as manly and in control.  As well the 
Evening Scimitar writes,  
…patience under such circumstances is not a virtue. If negroes themselves do not apply 
the remedy without delay it will be the duty of those whom he has attacked to tie the 
wretch… to a stake at the intersection of Main and Madison Sts., brand him in the 
forehead with a hot iron and perform upon him a surgical operation with a pair of tailor’s 
shears” (Wells, 1892, as cited in Royster, 2016, p. 49).  
  
Yet, in the year 2020, how might we account for the genealogy of race and more 
specifically racialized utterances in the ways that Foucault (1995) articulates: Western cultural 
practices which transitioned from sovereign power, e.g., institutions of slavery and Jim Crow 
which constructed particularized knowledges with respect to nigger; to disciplinary power, in 
which citizens (de)normalize race through insidious processes of “self-racialization,” race 
 
56 I find it ironic that the phrase “the white man” continues to be in use during the 21 st Century.  “The white man” 
has been colloquialized to represent “the government,” “the system,” or any social, legal, political, economic 
institution of which blacks (or people of color) feel disenfranchised, disempowered, or simply left out.  As 
Bederman (1992)  shows the phrase “the white man,” “…worked as a synecdoche…[it] simultaneously invoked the 
manly white males who were ‘civilized’ and ‘civilization’ itself.” (p. 8).      
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languaging and Othering, e.g., the influx of social media, rap culture, and educational practices 
with respect to nigga?  Based on historical discourses of the past, constructions of the racialized 
(white) subject57 place the white male students in the role of protector, questioner, judge and 
jury, and the racialized (black) subject as weak, unmanly, lecherous. However, present-day 
ideologies about athleticism and black male athletes, sexual prowess and sexual freedom, as well 
as competing views about liberal ethics and philosophical liberalism, individuality, liberty and 
rights constitute the racialized subject as an amalgamation of past and present (and unknowable 
future?)— simultaneously sovereign and subordinated, free and (un)free (as well as not free), 
actor and acted upon during particular, contingent moments.    
I’m that nigga! as speech act neutralizes centuries of oppression in one contingent 
moment as noted by Bigga, “They hated that shit!” Hence, the sovereignty of inflammatory 
speech is replaced by Signifyin(g) speech, an inversion much like Wells’(1892) use of inversion 
in her anti-lynching campaign. Wells’ argument maintained that lynching, used erroneously as a 
tool to contain/constrain the lustful nature of black men, instead satisfied the lustful nature of 
white men, who through their own rapes and murders allowed their savage natures to rei(g)n 
free.  Likewise, through Signifyin(g) Bigga is able to use the white mob’s language (and/or 
thinking) against them.   In the process of naming, nigga constitutes Bigga as the site of 
manliness, based on sexual prowess, hypermasculinity, and hyper-heterosexual behaviors58 
 
57 Recent scholars of whiteness studies have explored whiteness as racialized, a sociological, economic, and cultural 
turn from previous notions that race studies was inclusive of people of color and excluded whites. See Applebaum 
(2016), Alcoff (2015), Butler, (2010), Guess (2006), Frankenberg (1993), Morrison, (1992), Roediger (1991), Du 
Bois (1890, 1920), Baldwin, (1963).   
58 Scholarship surrounding this shift in the black man as defiant, sexualized, heteronormatized, and above all, 
manly, focuses on the blaxploitation films of the 1970s, such as Sweet Sweetback’s Baadasssss Song and The 
Legend of Nigger Charley.  As Asim (2007) notes, “Nigger Charley…like Sweetback… is shown having sex while 
whites watch with a mixture of resentment and admiration.” (p. 183).  These films of the early and mid -seventies 
reflected on the screen a new image of black men (and women, e.g., Cleopatra Jones) who were sexually 
provocative and promiscuous, heroic and unafraid, who stood up to “the man” (a term which solidified itself in the 
1890s according to Bederman, 1992). 
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thereby constituting the white mob as desexualized and emasculated; therefore, the inverse of 
Butler’s (1997a) original statement applies in this instance, “sovereignty wanes where agency 
begins.” Read yet another way “I’m that nigga” mirrors “(You) are not that (or this) nigga.”  It is 
through an examination of the usage of that in Bigga’s speech that the shifting modes of 
relational power can be located.  His declaration as that nigga versus a nigga, i.e., I’m a nigga, 
rejects the notion of epithet through the intersection of the y-z axes SBAE and BVE.  Had the 
indefinite pronoun a been used, the host of meanings attached to his statement would be situated 
in a different set of political and social realms.  However, it is strictly through the use of the 
demonstrative pronoun/determinate adverb that, which allows for the performativity of nigga.  
As determiner, that acts as a reference that is observed [or heard] by the speaker. If we are to 
apply the terminology of that as determiner, we must also contend that Bigga hears his own 
interpellative speech act.  To continue, as demonstrative pronoun, that also refers to a specific 
thing previously mentioned, known or understood. In this case the citationality and iterability of 
nigga semantically loops back to nigger thus invoking Mooney’s “I say it, you think it.” In 
usage, that also singles out and ascribes distinctive features. For Bigga, these distinctive features 
are racialized hypersexuality and hypermasculinity in contrast to the white mob’s (non)racialized 
hyposexuality and hypomasculinity.   That as reference is assumed to be understood or familiar 
to the audience being addressed based on the vernacularity of BVE and SBAE.  That nigga, as 
rhetorical substitution, is familiar to the audience, even in cases where this dislocates the 
addressed. Hence nigga’s satirical, ironic and loose dimensions ritualize a continuum of 
contexts. As adverb, that refers to degrees of looseness or openness, as in the example, I’m not 
that hungry.  In Bigga’s speech as well that as adverb refers to the degree that Bigga is a nigga 
and conversely the degree to which his addressees are not niggas.  Hence, nigga, with its 
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attached determiner, reveals a demonstration of Signifyin(g) which establishes multiple 
meanings; it breaks strict ideational usage of nigger through parody of the epithet while 
simultaneously supporting its usage as epithet.   
In this “strange scene of love” Signifyin(g) (the doing in language) enables linguistic 
agency and survival of the interpellated subject while the original sovereign speakers are 
subordinated.  Bigga’s  insurrectionary speech thus constructs the failed interpellation. Crossing 
the xyz axes of SAE, SBAE and BVE “I’m that nigga!” articulates the double(d) consciousness 
of Bigga as simultaneously recognizing and rejecting the unspoken, intended injury, one which 
he disrupts in an ongoing process of becoming through language.  Bigga linguistically survives 
because of the survivability, through semantic looping, of nigger. Psychically, Bigga both 
accepts and rejects (turns towards and away from) his subordination.  Yet his turn, read as the 
Greek word trope, disrupts the interpellation.  His social and linguistic presence as nigger is 
upended by his newly vocalized social and linguistic presence as nigga.  Read another way, “I’m 
that nigga” injures the addressee: “(You) are not that (or this) nigga.” Read this way, Bigga’s use 
of the first person present indicative tense makes this a statement of fact.  Through his own ironic 
discursive act, he invests his body as the “historically specific imaginary ideal” (Butler, 1997a, p. 
91) placing himself in subjectivation and thereby twisting the intended injury through his own 
recognition of his subject(hood) as the semantically looped nigger-nigga.  However, in so doing 
he places limits and exclusions on the white mob, the subjectivated (racialized) Other. While 
Bigga is subjugated as nigger based on the white mob’s repudiation of black male masculinity 
and heteronormativity in opposition to their white manly heteronormativity, the counterattack to 
this repudiation is an acceptance, dare I say acclamation, of discourses constructing black male 
sexualization. As early as the 1500s discourses in biology, psychology and religion, particularly 
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Christianity, determined that scantily clad non-Christianized, uncircumcised African men were 
promiscuous, sexually deviant, and lustful.  During slavery, this served as justification for 
purchasing men with large genitals who, it was believed, had the ability to produce robust 
offspring.59  This belief later became the justification for the lynching of innocent men who 
lusted after white women.60 As illocution nigger has been psychically internalized as part of the 
“social regulation of psychic life” (Butler, 1997b, p. 167) as normative and normalized; however, 
it is through the trope  (“turn”) that this melancholic ambivalence (Butler, 1997b) has become 
and continues to be threatened/threatening. Per Freud, Butler (1997b) identifies melancholia:  
“…precisely the effect of unavowable loss… A loss prior to speech and declaration” (p. 170). It 
is not my contention here that we do nigger, yet it is through utterances such as nigger that the 
constitutive force of race is done.  This unavowable loss is the consequence of being born into a 
discourse in which nigger as performative utterance always, already constitutes the subject. 
Signifying(g) as one of many possible responses/alternatives/substitutions to melancholia is the 
articulation of the psychic ambivalence of the African American who simultaneously accepts and 
rejects the performative nature of nigger, as well as its cousin nigga.  Due to Bigga’s discursive 
(re)construction of his body, sovereign power is no longer invested within the discursive act of 
the white mob. Much like Wells’ (1892) antilynching campaign in which she utilizes the 
discourse of civilization to show the inverse of white American behavior to that of black 
Americans, Bigga inverts the sovereign epithet using it against the white mob and reinvigorating 
it for future unknowable possibilities (Butler, 1997a).   
The psychical consequence of the racialized subject exists as a result of an (un)grievable 
loss which cannot be (re)captured (Butler, 1997b).  It is a loss which was conceived at birth and 
 
59 These discourses applied to the identities of black females as well. 
60 I point to Baldwin’s (1965) text “Going to Meet the Man” as an exam ple of this.   
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prior to.  Both Bigger and Bigga’s final words articulate what Homi Bhaba (1992) calls 
melancholic discourse, which is a response to the “…congealment of a history of loss…” (Butler, 
1997b, p. 169).  This congealment sediments as internalization (Butler, 1997b) and projective 
disincorporation (Bhaba, 1992). Bigger’s final epiphany is shared with Max, 
   ‘They wouldn’t let me live and I killed… Maybe it ain’t fair to kill… I didn’t want to 
kill! But what I killed for, I am!  What I killed for must’ve been good! I didn’t know I 
was really alive in this world until I felt things hard enough to kill for ‘em’ (Wright, 
1940/2005, p. 429).   
 
This ironic epiphany as well as Bigga’s Signifiyin(g) performative are both “psychic tropes of 
internality… a set of spatializing tropes for psychic life, domiciles of preservation and shelter as 
well as arenas for struggle and persecution… [these] constitute some of the fabular discursive 
effects [of melancholia]” (Butler, 1997b, p. 171).   
Hence melancholia draws the distinction between the psyche and external forces which 
press upon and regulate the psyche (Butler, 1997b).  However unlike Freud, Bhaba identifies 
melancholic loss as “a mental constellation of revolt” (p. 65).  Hence, while Freud explores 
melancholia as a psychic space in which the melancholic berates himself and/or grieves a loss 
viewed by state authority as ungrievable (Butler, 1997b), Bhaba (1992) contends that the 
“…address…in melancholic discourse—when it ‘incorporates the loss or lack in its own body, 
displaying its own weeping wounds—is also an act of ‘disincorporating’ the authority of the 
Master” (p. 65). Bigger’s final epiphany frightens Max so much so that he falls silent, averts his 
eyes, shifts nervously and leaves without looking back at Bigger, even when Bigger calls to him.  
Likewise the group of male students are enraged by Bigga’s final statement as they go about 
their day. In both cases, the addressed subject is silenced, and it is within this silence that we see 
a “new form of agency and identification… that contest[s]… the sententiousness of rationalist 
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agency (Bhaba, 1992, p. 59); the sovereign agency of the Master has been both usurped and 
surrendered.   “I’m that nigga!” is an open wound. “I’m that nigga…”   
…says: All these bits and pieces in which my history is fragmented, my culture  
piecemeal, my identifications fantasmatic and displaced; these splittings of wounds of my 
body are also a form of revolt. And they speak a terrible truth.  In their ellipses and 
silences they dismantle your authority: the vanity of your mimetic narratives and your 
monumental history… my revolt is to face the Life of literature and history with the 
scraps and fragments that constitute its double, which is living as surviving, meaning as 





Chapter 5: The Post-Colonial Nigger 
…it could be because her body trapped in a racial imaginary, trapped in disbelief—code for 
being black in America…      —Claudia Rankine 
July 2014, the post-colonial nigger: My friend and I are co-teaching a 
summer course at Teachers College.  We are planning an activity for the next 
day’s class in which we will model the telling of a moment of consciousness.  
My friend will explain the exercise and its purpose, and I will be the first to 
share a memory.  I tell my friend that I will be sharing a childhood memory—
the first time I heard and experienced the shock of the word nigger.  She is 
hesitant.  She needs to process it.  She is concerned that it will be too 
shocking? too off-putting for the students. I rebuff.  They’re adults.  It’s a 
graduate class.  It is my memory.  She tables the discussion, let’s talk tonight.  
Later, we talk, and I choose to tell the story anyway.  I am thanked by a student 
for sharing such a powerful “story.”  After class my colleague-friend says that 
at first she was concerned but the moment I began speaking she realized that 
she’d forgotten how good a storyteller I was.  But I wasn’t telling “story” as 
she defined it, I was witnessing memory. 
When I was young, elders would say “don’t tell stories;” my grandmother would scold, 
“It’s not nice to tell stories, Joyce.”  My father, when knowingly defending his friend’s ability to 
fabricate tall tales would comment, “Oh… he’s just tellin’ stories.” In our dailyspeak “don’t tell 
stories” translated to “don’t lie, don’t fib.”  As a child one also couldn’t say the word lie when 
one wanted to point out a falsehood of another child (never an adult), the appropriate 
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nomenclature was “telling stories. ” A storyteller was one who fabricated, manufactured a 
counterfeit truth, in essence, a liar.  It wasn’t until one was a teenager or young adult, in the 
company of one’s peers and far from the ears of parents, aunts, uncles, and neighbors, that one 
could use the accusatory, pejorative term lying. My friend, peer, colleague and co-instructor 
unknowingly called me a liar, a flashback to my eight-year-old self, the one taught not to “tell 
stories,” but I wasn’t tellin’ stories, I was witnessing memory.  
Morrison (1984) tells us, “Memory (the deliberate act of remembering) is a form of 
willed creation. It is not an effort to find out the way it really was—that is research.  The point is 
to dwell on the way it appeared and why it appeared in that particular way”  (p. 385).  For 
Morrison it is “the pieces (and only the pieces)… which demand… respect… attention… trust” 
(p. 386), and it is with these pieces that she is able to create.  In all actuality my piece is not the 
word nigger, a word I barely heard, would not have heard, had it not been for my mother’s hand. 
My piece is the hand itself, which opened suddenly, hung in mid-air, releasing its connection to 
me. It was not until then, in that moment when she let go my hand, that I heard or realized or 
ingested the word nigger. The “moment of consciousness,” the one which my friend was hoping 
to “model” to the class (although in hindsight I am not sure one can model consciousness), lay 
“…in medias res from in-between…” (Bhaba, 1991, p. 57) some forty-odd years later.  My 
“moment of consciousness” was not nigger itself, it was the shock of my mother’s sacrilegious 
betrayal. It was only for a second, maybe less, but it was just enough for my own realization to 
sink in—there was something out there greater than me, a simple word which altered my 
mother’s gait, the contours of her face, her hands. Realizing her own faux pas, she snatched at 
my fingers.  Her grip tightened, squeezed, suffocated. She yanked me forward, her hand now an 
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alien force commanding and imposing rather than guiding and leading.  It was and wasn’t my 
mother’s hand. This is the piece that motivates me, from which I can create.  
***** 
My intention throughout Part I is to present one theoretical paradigm of language practice 
through which I plan to interrogate nigger-nigga in use. Hence while Gates (1988/2014) 
develops his theory of Signifyin(g) for the purposes of constructing an African American literary 
analysis, Signifyin(g) allows me to think through a type of speech act specific to a community of 
speakers who have historically been constructed as the subject-object of white, Westernized 
discourses.  And while Signifyin(g) does not fall within the realm of speech act theory, I interpret 
it as  
…one of the salutary features of postmodern theory [which] suggest[s]… the disjunctive, 
fragmented, displaced agency of those who have suffered the sentence of history— 
subjugation, domination, diaspora, displacement—that forces one to think outside the 
certainty of the sententious” (Bhaba, 1991, p. 56). 
 
By placing Signifyin(g) in tandem with Butler’s (1997a) theorizing of excitable speech, I am 
conceptualizing it as both performance and performative, a type of reversed or contradictory 
interpellative enacted by the subject in subjugation. Through her marriage of Austin and 
Althusser, Butler gives me the language to discuss Signifyin(g) as a speech act in which a 
community of racially subjugated speakers might come to use the very same speech used to 
subjugate in a different way, for different purposes, possibly and/or potentially as a site of 
agency.  For Butler, it is necessary to locate hate speech within the first and second 
dimensions—how a speech act brings a subject into being and how, through speech, the subject 
reiterates its own discursive identity (as cited in Bell, 1999, p. 165).   
For me, the dimensionality of Signifyin(g) requires an examination of a possible third and 
fourth dimension.  Signifyin(g) as speech act is semantic, pragmatic, and rhetorical, specific to a 
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community of marginalized speakers which through its rhetorical reiteration brings the 
subjugated subject-object or object-subject (Bhaba would say postcolonial, Spivak would say 
subaltern61) into being in unimaginable, incomplete, conflicting ways, ways that do not 
necessarily replace and/or evacuate sovereign speech but instead lay “…outside the liberatory 
rhetoric of idealism and beyond the sovereign subject…” (Bhaba, 1991, p. 56).  Signifyin(g) 
expresses openness and ambiguity (i.e., its paradigmatic and rhetorical dimensions), as opposed 
to closure and certainty. Thus, my expansion of Gates’ (1988/2014) Signifyin(g) is meant to 
revisit his theory through the practices of language itself.  In doing so, my intention is to examine 
Signifyin(g) as more than a “counter-puncher’s strategy” in literary analysis; my intention is to 
examine Signifyin(g) in excess, as excitable, in order to disassemble binary configurations, 
which close off further interrogations of how, when, why and in what way an utterance such as 
nigga performatively acts rhetorically.   
Additionally, I wed Gates to Butler in order to reposition Gates’ sovereign speaking 
subject.  While Gates primarily focuses on the structure of language itself within a community of 
speakers, I am also thinking of the historical discourses which constitute the racialized subject, 
and more to the point, how these historical discourses have become internalized. Gates’s 
(1988/2014) Signifyin(g) places the speaker at the center, in which the “…speech act is 
performed by a subject, performed on another subject, or part of an address that one subject 
makes to another” (Butler, as cited in Bell, 1999, p. 165).  Hence, rather than sovereign subject, I 
 
61 For more on Homi Bhaba and Gayatri Spivak’s references see the following sources.  I will acknowledge these 
theories in later parts of the dissertation.  
Bhaba, H. K. (1991). Postcolonial authority and postmodern guilt. In L. Grossberg, C. Nelson & P. Treichler (Eds.) 
Cultural studies. (pp. 56 – 68). Taylor & Francis Group  
Spivak, G. C. (1988) Can the subaltern speak? In C. Nelson & L. Grossberg (Eds.) Marxism and the interpretation 




am grappling with Gates’ community of speakers as a “belated metalepsis,” i.e., the effect of a 
discourse that precedes them. As such Signifyin(g) signifies a failure to turn, a troping of the 
Ideological address (be it verbal, textual, aural or virtual) and, ultimately, it is an appropriation of 
the discourses in which one is constituted (Bell, 1999). 
I acknowledge that the very use of “subject” within poststructural theory potentially 
poses a problem for the racialized subject, as this term is fraught with the gaze of the West; 
hence the very act of becoming through speech is always, already inflected by the discourses of 
the authority, thus producing for the racialized subject what Gates identifies as a (re)doubling of 
speech, a speech representative of the double(d) consciousness of the racialized subject that is 
both of and counter to sovereign speech. Bhaba (1991) identifies this type of counter speech as a 
third space which “…does not simply revise or invert the dualities but revalues the ideological 
bases for division and difference.” (p. 58), yet this is a space from which the subaltern cannot 
escape (or can it? I continue to grapple with this).  I acknowledge as well, scholarship that 
contends that poststructural theory erases identity categories, dismantles critical engagement or 
action research, and disrupts theories specific to marginalized communities.  While I am 
essentially (re)defining Signifyin(g) through Butler’s articulation of the failed interpellative or 
the performative contradiction, I liken this to  
… a tremendous articulateness… syncopated with the African drumbeat into an 
American postmodernist product: there is no subject expressing originary anguish here, 
but a fragmented subject, pulling from past and present, innovatively producing a 
heterogenous product…” (West, as cited in Bhaba, 1991, p. 58).   
 
Marrying Signifyin(g) to poststructural theory parallels the semantic looping (Jacobs, 2012) of 
nigga and nigger. In the words of Kennedy (1999-2000) nigger (nigga) is a truly American 
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word; it is a word that traversed the Transatlantic Passage, only to arrive, take root and thrive on 
United States soil and in the U.S. psyche. 
In my transition from Signifyin(g) to post-Signifyin(g) to poststructural Signifyin(g) I am 
grappling with the Butlerean problem of how the racialized subject reiterates “the discursive 
conditions of its own emergence” (Butler, as cited in Bell, 1999, p. 165), cond itions, I contend, 
that are both material and linguistic.  Through a poststructural paradigm I question the ways in 
which Signifyin(g)  “…speaks from a moment in medias res, from in-between unequal and often 
antagonistic sites without the certainty of imagining what emerges or happens at the end” 
(Bhaba, 1991, p. 57).  In other words, what forces are at play when one (re)names oneself the 
very inflammatory term used to oppress, even when that term is used within different conditions 
and contexts? For me, Signifyin(g) potentially incorporates a fourth dimension, a dimension in 
which the subjugated subject has psychically internalized the historical discourses of the West, 
reiterating these unequal, antagonistic sites for one’s own materialization. Bhaba (1991) tells me 
that this process of social enunciation or “enunciative agency” emphasizes   
…the relation between temporality and meaning in the present of utterance, in the 
performativity of a history of the present…  a more dialogic process that attempts to track 
the processes of displacement and realignment that are already at work… (p. 57).  
 
Theorizing Gates’ Signifyin(g) through a Butlerean lens is meant to explore this dialogic process 
through rhetorical troping while also acknowledging the albeit incomplete specificity of the 
psyche of the marginalized, oppressed racialized subject, constituted and constituting through the 
very language meant to oppress. Ironically this is the language (and theory) which I also cannot 
step out of, the very language that Gates (1987) questions when he asks,  
…can we as critics escape a mockingbird relation to theory, one destined to be derivative, 
often to the point of parody… can we escape the supposed racism of so many theorists… 
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aren’t we justified in being suspicious of a discourse in which blacks are signs of 
absence?” (p. xviii). 
 
Bhaba (1991) tells me that “the strategic objective of being ‘outside’ is not to be outside 
theory but to be its exorbitant object, to overcome the pedagogical predictability of the 
sententious professor…” (p. 57). But what had I “overcome” if my memory was reduced to mere 
story? My friend’s “pedagogical predictability” rationalized and foreclosed my memory using 
traditional forms of knowledge; I was linguistically made as subject-object or object-subject.  
Yet my memory is what Bhaba (1991) identifies as a “time-lag,” a space outside of the 
sententious, outside of the need for closure, a liminal, “…iterative, interrogative space produced 
in the interruptive overlap between symbol and sign…” (p. 59).  Bhaba defines this time-lag as 
having a “descriptive history,” based on a “productive, hybrid ‘betweenness’ (p. 60).  
Hence, while my friend was focused on function and intention, my focus was on 
signification (Bhaba, 1991) and meaning. Rather than memory, I was articulating a rememory, a 
return to memory, a revisitation of memory (Morrison, 1984), an act which disrupted linearity, 
rationalization, and my friend’s Western, essentialist idea of modelling a moment of 
consciousness.  Rather than step outside theory, I attempted to relocate, reinscribe and 
reappropriate narrative theory (the purpose of the exercise was meant as a segue into narrative 
theory) through an affective experience of subjugation, domination and oppression, one that was 
non-sententious, one that I rememorize because of my mother’s hand. My psychic wound, the 
wound that I wear on the surface of my skin like an open sore (Fanon, as cited in Bhaba, 1991) is 
the discovery and loss of my own body, of the realization that out there in the world was 
something bigger than my own self-absorbed subjectivity, that out there in the world was 
something that could separate me from my mother, that could sever our bond.  One word… and 




In hindsight my friend was correct.  I am a good storyteller because that is what I told the 
class—"a story.”  My heightened consciousness or melancholic condition was not due to the loss 
of an object of identification (Freud, as cited in Butler, 1997). My irresolvable grief is/was the 
discovery that I am the lost object, the objectified subject—the nigger.  Hence, much like the 
melancholic of Bhaba (1991) and Fanon, my body is the loss, my “consciousness” was “at a 
loss;” it is a loss into which the racialized subject is born, through which the racialized subject 
becomes (Butler, 1997b).  There is no referent, no object, except for the racialized subject itself 
enmeshed in discursive fields of subjugation.  It is a loss for which Bhaba (1991) comments that 
the linear, rationality of sententious thought does not accommodate (although it is within this 
melancholic condition that revolt is possible).  But in my telling of story, my “witnessing of the 
past,” I told the class “what happened,”—that is, what I think I remember, not my rememory 
(Morrison, 1987/2004).  I told them the whole, not the piece, not the piece that I respect, attend 





Chapter 6: Mappings, or A Word about Methodology and Hands 
You can’t use an old map to explore a new world.   —Albert Einstein 
In the introduction of Part I, I indicated that I wanted to explore the 40-year expanse 
between my mother’s hand and my own; in other words, I want to explore the historically 
inflected discursive transformations that have caused an evolution of nigger as illocutionary 
epithet to nigga as insurrectionary, fluid, ambiguous speech with illocutionary and 
perlocutionary effects. As well, I am interrogating my own (in)abilities to hear nigga as it 
bounces around my English classroom, my workplace, my home life, and my community while I 
simultaneously rememory my first “hearing” of nigger. Throughout Part I, I weave the Origin of 
Words myth by Williams (1991), the theoretical perspectives of Gates (1988/2014) and Butler 
(1997a, 1997b) with rememory (Morrison, 1984, 1987/2004), experience (Scott, 1991), and 
narrativizing (Schaafsma & Vinz, 2011) in order to situate (as if this is ever fully achievable) and 
contextualize my theoretical framing while also exploring the shifting psychological and 
psychical impact of nigger-nigga contemporaneously.  It is Foucault (2010) who tells me that we 
must not refer to discourse solely based on its “…distant presence of origin, but treated as and 
when it occurs” (p. 25); hence, my “treatment” (interpretive analysis) of the utterance “as and 
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when it occurs” is reflected in the aside62 (St. Pierre, 2000), layered tellings63 (Schaafsma & 
Vinz, 2011), story-truth and happening-truth64 (O’Brien, 1990, as cited in Schaafsma and Vinz, 
2011, p. 74-5), pastiche65 (Schaafsma and Vinz, 2011) and writing stories66 (Richardson and St. 
Pierre, 2005).    Relationally, my rememory of  my mother’s hand serves as the metaphor for my 
hearing and not hearing nigger-nigga “as and when it occurs.” Her hand serves as the document 
of a personal, micro-history situated within a macro-history of racialized language, subjectivity, 
and power, which I entered (was born into, became conscious of) while holding (and 
 
62 St. Pierre (2000) defines the aside as a “centuries-old theatrical convention, as a textual space where… ‘part of the 
actor’s lines [are] supposedly not heard by others on the stage and intended only for the audience’” (p. 271). St.  
Pierre uses the aside to speak to the reader without the rest of the text hearing her.  For me, the aside works in 
conjunction with the other pieces in the text. The dual performance of the aside is its blurring of fictional reality and 
actual reality.  The actors who “do not hear” the speaker, ironically also “hear” the speaker as it is part of the actual 
reality of the performance.  Unlike St. Pierre’s interpretation, the aside works for me as a blurring of fictional reality 
and actual reality in which, while speaking to the reader, the text performs as if it does not hear (fictional reality) 
while actually knowing or hearing (actually reality).  I define the aside in this way for two reasons: 1) it works in 
conjunction with my observational methods, defined in this section as a mix of eavesdropping, overhearing and 
listening.  2) The historical reality of African Americans’ survival often depended on and continues to rely on “not 
hearing what was actually heard.” An example of this includes the “house nigger” who served, labored, slept in the 
plantation house and pretended not to hear conversations at the dinner table, in the bedroom and elsewhere in the 
house or on the plantation. In a material sense the house nigger is the physical manifestation of the aside —s/he is 
present absent, seen but not heard while also heard but not seen, simultaneously useful and useless as s/he is “cast 
aside.” Contemporary instances of this along the SBAE and BVE axes are labelled as ear hustling, bein’ nosy or (in 
Philly vernacular) newsy. 
63 Layered tellings are “a stitched together boundary between the explicit and the implicit, in the interstices of what 
is said and left unsaid, and certainly in the spaces of silence, in the assumed, in the unquestioned. One story 
generates further stories.” (Schaafsma and Vinz, 2011, p. 16).  I layer the telling of my first instance with nigger by 
revisiting and retelling the rememory through varying lenses and perspectives. 
64 Schaafsma and Vinz (2011) identify Tim O’Brien’s The Things They Carried as an example of metanarrative in 
which, through the narrator’s telling, O’Brien complicates observation, memory and the construction of “truth.” 
Quoting from the short story “Good Form” they highlight “…story -truth is truer sometimes than happening-truth…” 
(p. 75).  I use this terminology to represent the (in)ability to (re)create the past (or present) as it “occurred” based on 
the fragmentary, incomplete nature of language and its inability to present a static, universal Truth or reality in one 
clear, concise, linear form.   Given my Butlerean and Foucauldian influences, “truth” can only be partial based on 
the incompleteness of language, the shifting of subject position and the contingent nature of experience.  
65 I use the term pastiche as Schaafsma and Vinz (2011) def ine it, as an interaction of multiple data. “…pastiche is 
built on intertextuality.  ‘Each text acts on the other so that texture results.  The effect is kinetic, giving a dynamic 
quality and a sense of immediacy as the separate pieces deliver new meaning…” (p. 110) 
66 See Richardson, L. & St. Pierre, E.A. (2005) “Writing: A Method of Inquiry” which discusses the writing story as 
a space in which the writer-researcher incorporates and/or writes about one’s life outside of the qualitative research 
process and product as a way to contextualize qualitative inquiry, research and writing in what has often been 
legitimized as a separate activity of daily life.   
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subsequently not holding) her hand.  I ended Part I focusing on her hand, the piece from which I 
can create; this is where my methodology begins. 
 
In the Untitled photograph of my mother (see Supplemental Image), I want to imagine 
that my son, the photographer, captured her in rapture. Perhaps she is in thought or preparing to 
wash the neverending amass of dishes that somehow finds its way into my sink, or perhaps she is 
just resting, her 84-year old self taking a moment of reprieve from the chaos of the time.  What 
struck me initially was the beauty of the photo (while I simultaneously agonized over the pile of 
dishes, the dingy yellowed tile, the spot on the door), and my son’s eye in-the-moment as he 
documented the sanctity of an everyday woman in an everyday space.  When I showed my 
mother this image her first comment was “Oh my god, look at all the wrinkles in my hand.” But 
those wrinkles mark time, age, evolution, discontinuous histories.  Did she ever imagine using 
those hands to pull the lever for Barack Obama, only to witness Donald Trump in office eight 
years later? Born in 1936 what does it mean to (un)imagine not voting?  Did she ever think she’d 
be quarantined while also Zooming and texting with friends?  What are her worries when she 
sees images of young black males on TV? (I am reminded of a phone call we had when, after 
seeing the now infamous image of Trayvon Martin, she exclaimed, “He looks like Tsulu!”) Or 
maybe she is in supplication, in prayer; I often hear her praising the Lord, her hallelujahs 
reverberating through our non-religious home while she gives thanks for another day.  Yet, while 
she focuses on the wrinkles in this image, I focus on “the silent murmuring… the tiny, invisible 
text that runs between and sometimes collides… (Foucault, 2010, p. 27).   
I have found that traditional methods of inquiry do not necessarily “fit” the poststructural 
orientations I have presented in Part I, nor do these methods and theoretical frame necessarily 
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“complement” the study of one historically situated epithet such as nigger-nigga. The 
commonsense assumption that language is transparent and expresses already existing facts does 
not account for the “plurality of language and the impossibility of fixing meaning once and for 
all.” (Weedon, 1997, p. 82).  Through the lens of poststructural theory, language offers a range of 
meanings, outcomes, subjectivities and experiences that are “vulnerable at a particular moment 
depend[ing] on the discursive power relations within which they are located.” (Weedon, 1997, 
p.82); hence, it is through language that subjectivity is constructed as opposed to the 
commonsense belief that language erupts from a  “conscious, knowing, unified, rational subject” 
(Weedon, 1997, p. 21). Instead, poststructural theory contends that language   “…is not the 
expression of unique individuality’ [but the ways in which] it constructs the individual’s 
subjectivity in ways which are socially specific” (Weedon, 1997, p. 21).  As such subjectivity is 
“…a site of disunity and conflict, central to processes of political change and to preserving the 
status quo” (Weedon, 1997, p. 21).  This fluidity of subjectivity, according to Weedon, is 
constructed through language,  
… the place where actual and possible forms of social organization and their 
likely social and political consequences are defined and contested… it is also the 
place where our sense of ourselves, our subjectivity, is constructed (p. 21).  
 
The historical, cultural, political and social usage of nigger-nigga then is based on the situated, 
contextualized instance in which it is spoken and the multiple positions of the subjects(s) (both 
speaker and listener/hearer/audience).    
The plurality of language as a basic premise of poststructural theory as well as the 
temporary, unfixed, possibility of multiply shifting meanings call into question the potential 
rigidity of traditional qualitative research methods and subsequent presumptions about 
qualitative concepts such as authenticity and truth.  Through a poststructural lens, multiple 
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“truths” can exist simultaneously in one moment “specific to the discourses within which [these] 
are produced.” (Weedon, 1997, p. 82). Additionally, through a poststructural lens there are 
multiple “truths” which contradict, complement and intersect simultaneously.  “T/truth” is 
malleable, shifting, fragmentary (ironically if there were only one Truth, with a capital T, there 
would only be one definition, understanding and “use” of  nigga). Hence, I frame this research 
through a poststructural lens based on the fleeting, unfixed, plurality of the utterance nigga itself, 
and the ways that surrounding discourses and specific materialities of differing socio-cultural-
economic contexts construct varying meanings, interpretations and subject positions. My 
intentions in this dissertation are not solely based on commonsense articulations of nigga as an 
utterance which can only be “used” by a particular racialized group of individuals, as this situates 
nigga within the humanist construction of speaker-centered language ownership and practice.67  
Instead, I am thinking about “use” and in what historicized, situated contexts usage is allowable, 
permissible, desirable (or not) based on existing competing discourses and power relations.  Put 
another way: how do varying, competing, conflicting interpretations of “use” allow for particular 
forms of  speech in particular contexts over others? I am also interested in how nigga has come 
to be situated (or not situated) within particular discourses.  Examining “commonsense” societal 
articulations of whom can and cannot “say” and/or “use” nigga is not my primary concern as 
“the universal explains nothing—it is there to be explained” (Williams, 1999); however, as a 
local, daily practice, I am interested in the ruptures and/or discontinuities, which, in specific 
contexts, make certain statements “false.”  
 
67 It should be noted that I am in no way disavowing the commonsense notion that nigga is appropriate for particular 
groups over others, I am merely opening up the discussion for further analysis of nigga that moves (i.e., post-, as in 
poststructural and postcolonial) this conception. Moving beyond is specific to exploring new terrain in language and 
is not meant to be a temporal “moving past” or  a  quick fix as in “moving away from.” Instead, through a 
poststructural orientation, I am contending that there are multiple possibilities for exploring, discussing and 
understanding nigga and that through shifting subjectivities, multiple interpretations can (and should) exist.  
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The richness of nigger-nigga as a word that “acts” rhetorically and semantically, 
syntagmatically and paradigmatically in unimaginable ways was the premise for Part I as a 
means to expound upon speech act theory as a theoretical lens through which to examine nigger-
nigga. As reiterated in the conclusion to Part I, I have theoretically placed Gates (1988/2014) in 
tandem with Butler (1997a, 1997b) in order to establish my analysis of nigga as speech act of the 
subject as well as a discursive act with constitutive elements.  By analyzing nigger-nigga 
through the theoretical lens of Signifyin(g), performativity and semantic looping, my interests lie 
in opening up a space in which nigga can be examined based on its illocutionary and 
perlocutionary functions within/as part of American English. This in no way is meant to diminish 
or dismiss the explosive, volatile and violent aspect of nigga (i.e., nigger, as part of the semantic 
loop), nor is it my intention to argue for or against nigga as acceptable or unacceptable in natural 
language (this is based on my own shifting subjectivity). While I acknowledge the affective 
element of nigga as an utterance that elicits a plethora of emotional and/or physical responses, I 
also acknowledge that scholarship with/in Higher Education, including but not limited to 
pedagogy, policy, and curriculum/instruction is fraught with ambiguity about how and when 
nigger-nigga should be cited, quoted, read, discussed, addressed, or considered as sayable and/or 
unsayable; this is the “intention” of Part II. I do not offer answers. Given that I am 
acknowledging the poststructural rejections of “meanings” as universal (and thus able to be 
“found” based on the researcher’s “discovery”), my conclusion will not consist of a “findings” 
section, nor does my research allow for replication in any sense. My poststructural orientations 
suggest that there are multiple possibilities (not necessarily conclusions) which are unfixed, 
150 
 
malleable, and constructed based on the current discourses that “govern” a particular historicized 
moment.68  
The layered telling of my first experience69 with nigger infuses my dissertation because it 
is the starting point of my historical timeline.  It is one of many multiply fragmented silent 
murmurings beneath the continuity of historicized racial discourse which is predicated upon 
discourses of the (pseudo)Sciences and Social Sciences, such as Eugenics, Biology, Law, 
Psychology, Sociology… So what of the Humanities, such as Philosophy?  English? Art? And 
how do particular discourses impact the teaching of English? While the historical beginning of 
nigger is documented as 1619, for the purposes of this dissertation, I am primarily focusing on 
contemporary usage within the 20th and 21st Centuries, from my mother’s hand to my own.  My 
use of historical documents as indicated in Part I, such as the Mississippi Vagrancy Law of 1866 
or Ida B. Wells’ documentation in Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in all Its Phases and A Red 
Record: Tabulated Statistics and Alleged Causes of Lynchings in the United States, 1892-1893-
1894 (Royster, 2016), is meant to demonstrate the ways that historical discourses of the past 
continue to influence usage in the present.  However, I contextualize use through the Butlearean-
Gatesean intersections of performative Signifyin(g), subjectivity and the psyche through the 
Foucauldian-inspired lens of discourse analysis (I will return to this later in this section).  As 
evident in Part I, I am weaving together historical material, present day media imagery and texts, 
 
68 More than anything, this dissertation is a thought-experiment, but then again, what dissertation isn’t?  I continue 
to grapple with Foucault and his theories.  I continue to grapple with his language, thought -process, and 
conceptualizations.  With time my understandings of Foucault and his concepts will evolve; however, for the 
purposes of this dissertation I identify my interpretation of his theories as “Foucault -lite” and I primarily enter into 
and access Foucault through other writers, (see Chris Weedon, 1997; Glyn Williams, 1999;  Arriba -Allyon and 
Walkerdine, 2017). 
69 My conceptualization of experience derives from Joan Scott’s (1991) definition in “The Evidence of Experience.”  
For Scott, experience must be understood based on “the relationships between discourse, cognition and reality, the 
relevance of the position or situatedness of subjects to the knowledge they produce, and the effects of difference on 
knowledge.” (p. 783).  I will return to this concept later in the dissertation.  
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literature, observations, conversations and my own reflexive writings; thus, I have chosen a 
corpus of statements (Foucault, 2010) which both constitutes and problematizes use.   In so 
doing, I sought (am seeking) to conceptualize (rather attempt to conceptualize) an alternative 
relationship to use,70 particularly within the realm of contemporary speech practices and the 
teaching, production, and study of English as an academic discipline. In Part II  I offer my 
situated, biased interpretation(s) of an “archive” of documents, experiences, observations, and 
statements within a specific, local context in my attempt to interrogate, think about, probe (not 
necessarily answer) the following:71   
● What processes and/or systems exist that allow particular forms of use of nigga in 
particular contexts  over others? 
● In what ways have discourses governing erudite knowledge come to regulate—or not—
local  subjugated knowledges with respect to nigga? 
● If the classroom is the potential space for critical intellectualism, then in what ways—if 
any—is it possible for nigger/nigga to participate in this process? 
• How might we “create space” for nigger-nigga in the English-Literature classroom with 
an understanding that its construction is a function of the American psyche?   
• What systems are in play both inside and outside of the classroom which allow nigga to 
exist (or not) in specific historically contingent discourses and what forms of regulation 
dictate this?  
 
70 I define use/usage as: habitual or customary practice, especially as creating a right, obliga tion, or standard 
(Oxford English Dictionary)    
71As per the format of the traditional Qualitative-oriented researched and written dissertation I have placed these 
here as my “research questions;” however, because my dissertation is a thinking piece in which I am theorizing, 
conjecturing and interrogating possibilities in speech and language practices, these questions continue to shift.  
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• How might we account for a genealogy of statements which influence use in the ways 
that Foucault (2010) articulates: Western socio-cultural practices which transitioned from 
sovereign power (i.e., nigger) to fragmentary, fluid forms of disciplinary power, in which 
citizens (de)normalize racialized language through insidious processes of “self -
racialization,” race languaging and Othering, (e.g., social media, rap culture) while 
simultaneously appealing to “State-sanctioned” institutions in which concepts such as 
nigger were created?    
 
***** 
I began this section indicating my grapplings with methodology.  To add, I am also 
ambivalent about my research questions, those questions which I must adhere to as per 
conventional humanist qualitative research and that I must commit to with the goal of finding, 
uncovering or determining “answerable” conclusive evidence.  Instead, I perceive these as 
“thought-projections” rather than “research questions.” My research questions have proven 
problematic as my own subjectivity has shifted throughout this process, from proposal writing 
and rewriting (I could go back to my Research in Writing course), IRB, “data collection,”  
documenting and writing up “fieldnotes,” “data analysis” and now, dissertation writing. These 
questions were written prior to “data collection,” prior to the current issues of the year 2020, on 
different days, during different times, and thus they entered the project based on my differing 
subject positions.  I am somehow wedded to these (as well as others that are included in previous 
iterations), yet the appropriately trained qualitative-narrative-poststructural researcher knows that 
this (im)possibility overwhelms and complicates.  Some of these I strikethrough rather than 
delete.  I am interested in both process and product (Richardson and St. Pierre, 2005) in my 
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writing; hence, to delete would only be a focus on product (and what is the dissertation but a 
(by)product of a process?). These remain within this product in honor of the process—of the 
constant redirection in my thinking, my writing, my analysis and inquiry.  My ambivalence with 
my research questions stems from my difficulty in “specify[ing] the different concepts that 
enable us to conceive of discontinuity” (Foucault, 2010, p. 5).  Like Foucault (2010) (as well as 
many others) I admit to my own stumblings, insecurities, and confusions.  I open with these in 
Part I by introducing the child who witnessed the illocutionary power of nigger.  It is in Part I 
that I also weave in my multiple subject positions and how these impact the writing of this 
dissertation.  Yet there are integral parts of this dissertation that continue to confound me.  I am 
unsettled with these and as I move into Part II, I am grappling with how to “match my questions 
to my methods to my analysis.”  I turn to Foucault (2010) who tells me:  
’I am neither this nor that…I am no doubt not the only one who writes in order to have no 
face.  Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our 
bureaucrats and our police72 to see that our papers are in order.  At least spare us their 
morality73 when we write’ (p. 17).   
Writing is discovery; it is an act which allows me to think through, try out and discover my albeit 
incomplete and shifting interiority.  I turn now to my methods, through which I will construct my 
methodology. 
 
The vulnerability I felt in the moment when my mother released my hand is reminiscent 
of the vulnerability I feel in my grapplings with methodology. Foucault (2010) maintains that 
 
72 Based on the current climate in which I am writing, it frightens me “to leave it to our bureaucrats and our 
police…” considering that our bureaucrats and police are operating as if we live in a police state, one in which the 
“papers” of people of color are stamped with language such as “illegal,” “deportee,” “thug,” “criminal” and whose 
bodies and lives are not grievable (Butler, 2016). 
73 Again, I question the morality of our current bureaucrats and police.  I cannot subscribe to Foucault’s statement to 
“spare us their morality” as it is their subjective (im)morality that shapes and is shaped by discourses of racism, 
segregation, hate and violence—all of which impels me to write.  NOTE: While we have moved past the terror of 
the 45th president by electing our 46 th president, I do not “trust” that our newly elected bureaucratic leaders can end 
centuries of -isms, as evidenced by the recent deaths of unarmed individuals (especially children) by the police.   
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history is no longer a memorization of the past, in which the document served as “inert material” 
that reconstituted what men said or did (p. 7).  Instead he contends that “in our time, history is 
that which transforms documents into monuments… it now deploys a mass of elements that have 
to be grouped, made relevant, placed in relation to one another to form totalities.” (p. 7). 
Concurrent with the process of obtaining a graduate degree were/are the family hiccups, as well 
as local, national and international events, shifts and changes.  All of these occurrences were 
much like Foucault’s (2010) silent murmurings, which have shifted, altered, infiltrated my 
subject positions so much so that I have questioned my own research, my goals and intentions, 
my purpose, my program, myself. Yet while writing this section traditionally titled Methodology 
(which, through my poststructural orientations, is an impossible attempt to construct a viable 
framework or map of the procedures I used to “collect,” “identify,” “code and categorize,” 
process and analyze my “data”) the count for COVID cases in the United States had risen, then 
president Trump was tweeting White Power, and there were fires in the Artic region.  My 
monument, the metaphor that I place in relation to other documents to form a totality, is my 
son’s photo-documentation of my mother, a COVID photo (because we now live in a pre-
COVID and post-COVID era).  I begin with this situated event, placing it within the theory of 
Foucault’s The Archaeology of Knowledge because it is through the metaphorical inclusion of 
my mother’s hand (or hands in general for that matter) that I am able to construct my methods 
and methodology. Partially bent and wizened, fingernails a burnt burgundy color, silver and lapis 
lazuli as adornment, her fingers are the extensions, the limbs necessary for holding, gripping, 
latching, releasing.   It is through the hand that one accesses and writes the world. 
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6.1 Data: The Fingers 
Experience and Rememory 
My mother’s loosened grip caused me to “pay attention” to something I would not have 
attended to otherwise— the boys’ saunter, their smugness.  Yet in my rememory it is my 
mother’s hand, the blue of the sky, the width of the street, and (reflexively) my own shocked 
confusion that appear truer than actuality.  Similarly, qualitative research requires a type of focus 
and attention that goes beyond participant-observation and fieldnotes.  Attention (moving 
forward I will employ the qualitative terminology observation), like Scott’s (1991) discussion of 
experience, is both visual and visceral constituting “…a domain of ‘sensuous experience’ (a 
prediscursive reality directly felt, seen and known) that cannot be subsumed by language” 
(Stansell, cited in Scott, 1991, p. 786). My articulation of what I was seeing, hearing, noticing, 
feeling, sensing is only made possible through language, yet I am never fully able to articulate 
the sensuousness of this experience.  Instead, I am only able to make sense of the past through 
repetition, layering and story-truth.  Scott (1991) highlights the integral connection between 
discourse, history, language, subject constitution and experience, noting that 
subjects are constituted discursively and experience is a linguistic event (it doesn’t 
happen outside established meanings), but neither is it confined to a fixed order of 
meaning. Since discourse is by definition shared, experience is collective as well as 
individual… Experience is a subject’s history.  Language is the site of history’s 
enactment (p. 793).  
 
I include experience and rememory as “data points” in order to interrogate multiple 
possibilities—the vulnerability of the subject as constructed through language, my own subject 
positions as these shift and fluctuate, and discursive strands of history invisible to History’s 




In order to actually “hear,” I had to loosen my grip on what I found appropriate or 
acceptable as language and simply allow students (and colleagues) to speak in their voice, on 
their terms. I had to become the 8-year old child, curious and wondering, I had to resort to 
Williams (1991) portrayal of the mortal, rather than the priest-turned-god who, especially in 
education, corrects, educates, censors. Borrowing from Brinkmann (2014) I label these moments 
“instances,” “…a breakdown, a situation, people interacting, discourses mobilized, material 
structures… ‘phenomenon… that evidences the operation of a set of cultural understandings 
currently for use by cultural members’” (p. 723). As in Part I, Part II will include multiple 
instances in which nigger-nigga was uttered, mentioned, discussed, stated or implied, instances 
in which, through my loosened grip I paid attention to the linguistic and material effects as well 
as my own wonder (MacLure, 2013). MacLure (2013) offers alternative ways of entering into 
qualitative inquiry; hence, she articulates wonder as an 
entangled relation of data-and-researcher…which allows for both the discernment of 
order and pattern and is attuned to the lively excess that always exceeds capture by 
structure and representation, leaving openings where something new, or something else, 
might issue (p. 228- 229).   
 
While researchers, through the exercise of data collection and categorization, attempt to orderly 
categorize, label, and classify their diverse, unruly, chaotic “collection,” there are spaces for 
“…wonders and marvels that lie on the boundaries of knowledge…” (p. 229) so that we can 
“…experiment with order and disorder as new connections spark among words, bodies, objects, 
and ideas” (p. 229).   
As a “method,” data collection entailed paying attention to those unpredictable, 
excessive, in-the-making moments (Miller, 2005) when dailyspeak and language practice erupted 
around me.  These are those moments when nigger-nigga came up in “everyday episodes and 
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situations” in diverse, unruly ways.  I have provided examples of these instances in Part I 
identified as Nigga Events, those moments when nigga exists at the “margins of the classroom 
setting” (Morrell, 2019) and Nigga Artifacts, those silent murmurings of tiny, invisible texts 
(public events, occurrences and consumer objects) that intersect, overlap and collide in everyday 
situations.  While nigga events consist of specific instances in which I am  personally accosted 
by nigga (as participant, or observer, or both) either in the classroom, in literature, on campus or 
quite possibly in the sanctity of my own home, nigga artifacts consist of documented usage of 
nigga within public discourse, i.e., media, law, politics, education. Much like fingers, my “data” 
are disparate limbs, extensions, jointed digits of manipulation and sensation, which, joined 
together, work in conjunction with one another to access the sensations, objects, and tools of the 
world. Like fingers, I see my data as sensory probes used to ascertain properties of objects 
encountered in the world and in so doing those instances of stumble data facilitate in the 
construction of my methodology, the symbolic hand, which is used sensorially, functionally, 
purposefully in the world. 
Classroom Visits 
“Pay attention, Joyce!” Literally my mother was commanding me to watch where I was 
going, face forward, ignore the boys and their comment. Put simply, stop dawdling and walk!  
Yet within the command “pay attention!” exists a range of competing, complementary meanings. 
“Pay attention” also implied face forward as in stay focused, look to your future (not the past) 
and where you are headed, focus on your purpose in this moment, ignore the hatemongers and 
racists who want to impede your (our) progress. “Pay attention” meant be careful, be watchful, 
stay alert, protect yourself, know your surroundings.  Ultimately, “pay attention” imparted a 
lesson from Black mother to child—this is what they call us, but this is not who or what we are; 
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pay attention to me not them, I will teach you what it means to be a Black woman in this society.  
These biased interpretive revelations, only available to me as I make my current meanings of the 
past, parallel the observational methods of qualitative research in which we seek to use our 
senses to make meaning of our participants, the field, words, actions and expressions.   My 
methods therefore consist of observations within and outside of the classroom setting.  Over a 
three-week session, classroom visits to two Introduction to Literature courses taught by two 
different professors, one by a self-identified white female feminist and the other by a not self-
identified white male scholar of Mark Twain, allowed me to “pay attention” to the space74 
by/for/around the utterance nigger-nigga when it appears in a text. In both classes, the professors 
taught literature which included nigger-nigga.  Through these visits I wondered about systems, 
discourse, teaching as performance and performative (Miller, 2005) and the subjectivity of both 
the student and teacher (as well as myself sitting in the classroom) as “…dynamic… situated 
historically in the world and positioned in multiple discourses” (Miller, 2005, p. 232).  My 
purpose for incorporating classroom observations/visits as a “method” was to experience and 
observe (through my own biased lens) what I perceive as visible and invisible in the classroom 
(Orner, Miller, & Ellsworth, 2005); to “unsettle how meanings are made… how researcher, 
teacher, and student identities are constructed and manipulated” (Orner, Miller, & Ellsworth, 
2005, p. 118); and through Janet Miller’s (2005) theory of English Education-in-the-making 
“…take into account specific and thus often unrepeatable moments, contexts, situations, 
discourses, identities and social and cultural relations of similarity and difference…” (p. 238) (I 
realize the (im)possibility of this task even as I write it).  While visiting, I audio recorded class 
 
74 Later in this chapter I define space using Foucault‘s (2010) The Archaeology of Knowledge.  
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sessions and notated my observations although I am aware that my “fieldnotes,” like “paying 
attention,” are highly situated, partial, and incomplete.   
***** 
6.2 Methods: The Palm 
Writing as Method 
“…for me, writing is thinking, writing is analysis, writing is indeed a seductive and 
tangle method of discovery.” (St. Pierre, 2005, p. 967)  Richardson and St. Pierre (2005) 
introduce the concept of writing as a method of inquiry in which the qualitative researcher is able 
to write freely, incorporating various forms of writing, which allow the researcher to “tell and 
retell” with the purpose of accessing the unknowable, the unforeseeable, and unimaginable, not 
“’getting it right’ [but] ‘getting it’ differently contoured and nuanced” (p. 962-963).  It is through 
the strategy of writing as a method of inquiry that I am able to access writing as process and 
writing as product which “…cannot be separated from the producer, the mode of production, or 
the method of [not, never, un] knowing” (my addition) (Richardson, and St. Pierre, 2005, p. 
962). Hence it is through journaling, reflections, notations, memos, vignettes, and writing 
stories that I compile (“archive”) my stumble data, instances, observations, conversations and 
thoughts.  Within these “categories” I compose, play with language, think, discover, ramble, 
wonder.  It is through writing that I ask questions without answers and discover answers 
connected to no questions.  I, like St. Pierre (2005), assert that thought happened in the writing 
(p. 970).  Hence, writing served as a function of data collection and as a method of analysis.  St. 
Pierre highlights types of data that she collected in the writing—dream data, emotional data, 
sensual data, response data and memory data (p. 970)—all of which she contends could not 
occur in traditional data collection methods.  I discovered writing as process through layered 
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tellings in Ruth Vinz’s Writing Research in which I accessed and interrogated memories not 
possible to access through traditional data collection methods such as interviewing or focus 
groups.  Constructing positionality memos and pastiche in Randi Dickson’s Research Paper: The 
Teaching of English provided multiple lenses for examining my subject positions (student-
researcher-educator-black female/feminist-mother-daughter-wife, to name a few), alternative 
ways to explore and situate my “data”, as well as the intimate relationships I’d developed with 
my “data” (after all, this is a relationship like any other); and writing my own (un)Becoming 
vignettes in Janet Miller’s Narrative Research uncovered multiple perspectives, subjectivities, 
inquiries, and conceptualizations about the simultaneity of process and product.75   As well, 
through crystallization76 (Richardson and St. Pierre, 2005, p. 963) I draw from literature, 
entertainment, lyrics, and the arts in order to create a multidimensional product, one in which, 
based on the types of writing I have previously mentioned (the aside, layered tellings, story-truth 
and happening-truth, pastiche, and writing stories), interpretive analyses exceed the boundaries 
of coding, categorizing, analytic induction and deduction. 
A Comment on Reflexivity 
Quoting Daphne Patai (1994), Wanda S. Pillow (2003) enters into an 
interrogation of reflexivity as a methodological tool used to “explore and  expose the 
politics of representation.” (p. 176).  However, Patai (1994) asserts that “’people who 
stay up nights worrying about representation’… [are] privileged academics engaged in 
 
75 I think specifically of J. Miller’s (1992) “Mr. Brucker’s Good Girl,” L. Richardson’s (1997) “Louisa May’s Story 
of her Life,” and E. Tuck and C. Ree’s (2013) “A Glossary of Haunting.”  
76Richardson introduces the concept of crystallization as a poststructural “method” that deconstructs validity and 
provides for a multidimensional approach rather than the three-sided method of triangulation.  She states that in the 
postmodernist text the crystal “combines symmetry and substance with an infinite variety of shapes, substances, 
transmutations, multidimensionalities and angles of approach.” (p. 963).  It is through the crystal that the 
poststructural qualitative researcher can recognize multiple truths of which, “paradoxically, we know more and 
doubt what we know… we know there is always more to know.” (p. 963) 
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the erotics of their own language games” (as cited in Pillow, 2003, p. 176). Similarly, 
Audre Lorde (1984) contends you can’t dismantle the master’s house with the master’s 
tools.  The challenge with an anti-colonial identity is that if you are only using language 
and national identity to attempt to create an anti-colonial identity, then you’re in trouble 
because you are using the tools of the colonizer.  As Villenas (1996) argues, I am both 
the “colonizer, in her university cloak, and the colonized, as a member of the very 
community that is made ‘other’ in her research.” (p. 712). The tension for me here is that 
I am in a conflicted space of subjecthood—as subjected, subjugated and subjectified.   
While “wearing the university cloak,” and adopting the “master’s tools” I pass77 as a 
member of the linguistic community I am researching (or so I assume). As both priest -
turned-god and mortal I simultaneously participate in, accept, and perpetuate intricate 
Word games while also struggling to decipher the games of the Celestial Ivy.  Reflexivity 
as a conflicted space is one in which I ceaselessly question my role, purpose, goals, 
reasons for this research, and quite frankly, reasons for the doctorate.   
Monday, July 20, 2020: I overheard my mother talking about the pardoning of 
Roger Stone who, when questioned about his relationship with our current president by 
African American radio host Morris W. O’Kelly, is heard saying “I don’t feel like 
arguing with this Negro.” (Stone, as cited in Romero, 202, para. 9) When O’Kelly 
questioned his use of the word Negro, Stone’s denial was tinged with hostility, “I did not.  
You’re out of your mind.” (Romero, 2020, para. 10).  In a later response to this 
 
77 Pass: To pass oneself off as white; to live life as a European American.  Obviously only possible for very FAIR 
Blacks with hair and other physical features that are NEARER, MY GOD, TO THEE. (Smitherman, 2000, p. 225). I am 
Signifyin(g) on the utterance pass as I use the African American notion of passing in the inverse, in which my 
linguistic identity is a hybridization. However, through this research I have discovered multiple ways in which my 
linguistic identity severs me from particular local black linguistic communities, especially as it relates to my subject 
position as professor.  In effect, I am also expected to speak differently from my students. 
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accusation Stone states that Mr. O’Kelly needs “a good peroxide cleaning of the wax in 
his ears,” and “more time studying black history…” and ultimately “The word negro—
even though I did not use it—is far from a slur” (Weiner and Roig-Franzia, 2020, para. 
5).  To this, O’Kelly posted on his website that Negro is “the low-calorie version of the 
N-Word” (Weiner and Roig-Franzia, 2020, para. 6). Beyond the fact that I did not know 
this information because my head has been buried in this dissertation, this occurred days 
after Nancy Trump, niece to current president Donald Trump, indicated in her recently 
published book that she has heard him use the N-word on several occasions. When I 
place these incidents within the context of my research, these become more than data 
points, more than archivable, collectable, categorizable, codable bits of information. 
These relegate me back to my childhood, back to a state of wondering shock, confusion 
tinged with curiosity.  It is my affective, nonsententious response (Bhaba, 1991) that 
makes me turn, interpellated some forty-odd years later by two smug white men, one who 
insists on portraying a public “victory” stance reminiscent of another smug white man of 
yesteryear.78 
I define this as a moment of excess79—“it is as if the proper power of the state has 
been expropriated, delegated to its citizens, and the state reemerges as a [non]neutral 
 
78 I initially considered inserting an image of Roger Stone, arms lifted, fingers extended in the infamous V.  Then I 
considered a side by side photo of Stone and Nixon and also toyed with the idea of inserting the image of Stone’s 
naked back, revealing the face of a Nixon tattoo he proudly flaunts.  Instea d I decided to include this footnote which 
will point to an interesting article about Stone’s infatuation with Richard Nixon.  Not a necessary read, no doubt, but 
informative. Rotham, L. (2019, 25 January). How Roger Stone connects Donald Trump to Richard Nixon. Time. 
Retrieved from  https://time.com/5513051/roger-stone-richard-nixon-donald-trump/ 
79 There are several usages of excess throughout the dissertation.  J. Miller (2005) defines excess as “a spillage, a 
slippage occurs for which I must, we must respond response-ably.”  Additionally Orner, Miller and Ellsworth (2005) 
define an excessive moment as “…that which exceeds the norms proposed as proper and natural by those w ith social 
order.”  I contend that both definitions apply to Roger Stone’s comment.  However, I follow my statement about 
excess with a quote from Butler (1997a) because I argue that it applies to the current relationship between Stone (a 
citizen) and the State, which appears to be the intention of O’Kelly’s leading question in the first place.  
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instrument to which we seek recourse to protect us from other citizens, who have become 
revived emblems of a (lost)[is it?] sovereign power” (Butler, 1997a, p. 82).  At this 
moment, in this time, on this day (which may not be the same or even similar on another 
day, in a different hour, moment, instance) it means this: I wonder where those two boys 
are today.  In my estimation they could be about the age of Trump and Stone, younger 
than my mother but older than me. In my daydream (St. Pierre (1997) would contend that 
daydreams are a type of transgressive data), those two boys are a young Trump and 
Stone, arrogant and self-assured. I feel like those boys won that day, and I cannot shake 
this feeling.  It gnaws, tugs at my psyche, sits lump-like in the pit of my stomach.  I did 
not cry then, but the nagging belief that they somehow won a sick80 lyrical battle brings 
forth forty-something years of tears.  For me, the turn (Althusser, 1971; Butler, 1997a) in 
this particular, historicized moment is synonymous with a child who spins and spins until 
she is dizzy, laughingly tottering until she falls (but I am soon-to-be 50, at my age falling 
is no longer enjoyable). Instead, I spin until I vomit.  And while doing so I ask: what is 
meaningful about this research? What does it matter if Huck Finn is bowdlerized or 
censored?  What does it mean for a white professor to be disciplined for reading (citing, 
quoting, saying) nigga from a James Baldwin text?  I am spinning out of control (cliché, I 
know).  Just two weeks prior I sent a text “It’s emotional… I don’t know what I’m 
saying.  I don’t know what I believe anymore… 2020 is getting to me.” And my 
#callasisterindistress friend and writing coach responds: “Your aha may be that this is not 
 
80I use sick in this context as it is used along the BVE axis. In Black Talk: Words and Phrases from the Hood to the 
Amen Corner, Geneva Smitherman (2000) defines sick as a description of “a person who is very funny, gets lots of 
laughs from telling jokes, humorous commentary and acting CRAZY. Also ill” (p. 260)  While this is one definition 
of sick, another definition relates to being exceptionally skilled, for example a sick lyricist, sick DJ, or athlete, e.g., 
AI’s stop-go and change-of-direction speed was sick!  In my example sick is both nauseating and ill (in this case 
dope, amazing, exceptional [yet another example of BVE], although racism and racist language are also unwell). 
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the end.  This is a milepost in the journey and you may have to take a turn from your 
original path.” I call her… voice octaves higher than normal, face burning as I rub my 
eyes with the butt of my palm while sitting  unladylike fashion on the stoop of my home. 
“I can’t,” I whine. I am in tears… for myself, for my country, for my mother, for the 
rememory I wish I could erase. 
If, as Trinh Minh-ha (1996) contends, reflexivity characterizes the “’relationship 
that defines the subject written and the writing subject’” (as cited in Pillow, 2003, p. 189) 
then my relationship to the subject written is unpredictable, erratic, volatile, (in) & 
(un)stable, uncomfortable, uncontainable, incomplete.  As the writing subject (both 
subjected and a subject with agency), I (as in the Self, not the subject) cannot begin to 
predict, prepare for, predicate these unknowable, uncontainable moments, and it is often 
through my own writing that I (incompletely) trace my subjection.81 Elizabeth Chiseri-
Strater (1996) draws a distinction between reflection and reflexivity: “to be reflective 
does not demand an ‘other,’ while to be reflexive demands both an other and some self-
conscious awareness of the process of self-scrutiny” (as cited in Pillow, 2003, p. 179). 
My ‘other’ is nigger-nigga itself.   
Pillow’s (2003) articulation of reflexivities of discomfort alludes to the ‘other’ as 
participant, I am defining the other as the embodiment of an utterance.  Butler (1997a) 
suggests that as linguistic beings, “to be named… brings me into a linguistic world in 
which I might then begin to exercise agency [if] (my addition) at all” (p. 38).  But as 
Bhaba (1991) highlights, for the postcolonial, s/he must tap into her affective experience 
and participate in what he labels affective writing, a form of theoretical discourse that is 
 
81 For a fuller discussion of subjection see Chapter 3. 
165 
 
“commensurate with historical conjunctures” (p. 57).  The illocutionary and 
perlocutionary power of nigger-nigga constitutes an affective experience which is not 
solely of the psyche but also bodily, “…calling someone ‘nigger’ or ‘fag’ is doing 
something, i.e., insulting them so that there is only a difference of degree rather than kind 
between such verbal abuse and… hitting someone…” (Salih, 2002, p. 100).  Hence, 
through reflexive affective writing82 I am attempting to trace the relationship between the 
subject written and the writing subject, to step in medias res of antagonistic, unequal 
sites; to exist at the edge, not the end (Bhaba, 1991).  As such, my own tracings of 
reflexivities of discomfort are not “…a positioning of… clarity, honesty, or humility, but 
as practices of confounding disruptions—at times even a failure of our language and 
practice.” (Pillow, 2003, p. 193).  Ever on the edge, I fear I might step, fall, jump off.  
Excavation of Nigga Artifacts  
My mother worries about her wrinkled skin. In her vanity she concerns herself with her 
withering hands, the flesh around her neck, the grays peeking out on her chin; however, I see her 
material body as history, and much like Caroline Randall Williams’ (2020) New York Times 
opinion piece, “You Want a Confederate Monument? My Body is a Confederate Monument,” I 
wonder what histories her body could tell, what secrets lay deep between her bosom, what scars 
she has attempted to erase with cocoa butter (or Oil of Olay) or cover with makeup. Each fold 
marks time, tells a story, connects the past with the future. If I could excavate each crease, I 
believe I could find the scar from that historically random exchange on an unknown street in 
Philadelphia.  Maybe there are many scars keyloided over to protect the flesh underneath. My 
 
82 Pillow (2003) contends “Most researchers use reflexivity without defining how they are using it, as if it is 
something we all commonly understand and accept as standard methodological practice for critical qualitative 
research’” (p. 176); hence, reflexive affective writing is how I am defining my use of reflexivity in writing as a 
method of inquiry.  
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mother’s body, her skin, is a document of flesh, blood and  bone (Williams, 2020) which “…was 
always treated as the language of a voice since reduced to silence”83 (Foucault, 2010, p. 6).  
Foucault (2010) tells me that the document is no longer inert material modified based on a 
unified continuous totality of the past (constructed by the consciousness of [white, 
heteronormative, heterosexual, Christian] men) but is now being analyzed based on what it says.  
   History now organizes the document, divides it up, distributes it, orders it, arranges it in 
levels, establishes series, distinguishes between what is relevant and what is not, 
discovers elements, defines unities, describes relations… deploys a mass of elements 
placed in relation to one another to form [new, different, alternative] totalities” (p. 6-7; 
my addition). 
 
  My mother’s fingers, skin, palmer flexion creases, adorning ring, nail polish 
individually tell a story that forms an always shifting, morphing, “totality.”  As parallel, through 
an excavation of nigga artifacts I am attempting to trace the lines, explore the folds, traverse the 
creases which rupture, disrupt and interrupt use of nigga. In my excavation I focus on the 
material and affective responses of the body, discourses and statements constructed in literature 
and images, historical documents, legal briefs, rap lyrics and poetry, essays and articles.  Using 
these documents, I will “try to detect incidence[s] of interruptions” (Foucault, 2010, p. 4), those 
moments in which “displacements and transformations of concepts” (p. 4) occur.  Foucault 
defines these incidences as  
show[ing] that the history of a concept is not wholly and entirely that of its progressive 
refinement,… but that of its various fields of constitution and validity, that of its 
successive rules of use, that of the many theoretical contexts in which it developed and 
matured (p. 4).    
 
With nigga at the center of my unit of analysis, excavation entails examining, 
interpreting, and interrogating how particular discourses constitute, regulate, and instantiate 
 
83Interestingly, in discussions with a filmmaker friend about the terminology used for various age groups and 
generations we discovered via one Google search that my mother’s generation, those born between 1928 and 1945, 
is labelled the Silent Generation, and anyone from this time period is called a Silent.  
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subjects, dictate language use and construct particular forms of knowledge by allowing specific 
statements in particular settings, at particular historical conjunctures (Williams, 1999). Because 
all knowledge and perception are matters of perspective which change as perspective changes 
(Foucault, 1969, as cited in Williams, 1999), my concern is with the effects of discourse in the 
“historical present,” and while I am not attempting to “write a history of the present,” I am 
placing a question mark beside (Williams, 1999, p. 81) commonsense notions.  Excavation does 
not solely focus on nigga as object in use, but focuses on the particular discourses, settings and 
space which allowed nigga as an object in use to emerge. My method of excavation is based on 
Foucault’s theory that “the unity of a discourse is based not so much on the permanence and 
uniqueness of an object [nigga] as on the space in which various objects emerge and are 
continuously transformed  (Williams, 1999, p. 86).  For Foucault (2010), space means 
relationships among discourses, institutions, economic and social processes, behavior patterns, 
systems of norms, techniques, types of classification, and modes of characterization (Williams, 
1999); therefore, as evidenced in Part I, my method of excavation is meant to interrogate the 
spaces in which nigga emerges (and transforms). 
6.3 Methodology: The Hand 
Through the abovementioned methods I have highlighted, I propose a contemporary 
analysis of nigga, in which, using a Foucauldian-inspired methodology, I analyze the 
discourse(s) that inflect its use.  My focus in this interrogation is specific to the teaching and 
language practices at one community college84 located in the Northeastern region of New Jersey 
 
84 It is through commonsense notions of qualitative social science research in education that there must be an 
institutionalized “site;” as such my “primary site” are the two campuses of the community college where I teach. 
CCC (pseudonym) consists of four campuses; however, for the purposes of my research I will be focusing on the 
main campus of the college as well as one auxiliary campus. Demographically, the main campus of CCC is located 
in a predominantly white, upper middle-class neighborhood with a median household income of $76,338.  Its 
population is 93.7% white and 2.58% black.  However, the campus itself is predominantly populated by students of 
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and its relationship to public discourse.  Through these instances85 I am exploring 
knowledge/power and the historically situated socio-cultural contexts that make certain 
knowledges/practices permissible and/or desirable while other practices are not.  Based on my 
methodological choices, I am presenting a conceptually oriented dissertation, in which I will 
utilize interpretive “methods,”86 including a more current, “post” inflected version of “close 
reading” (Gallop, 2000), Foucauldian-inspired “mappings” of various “histories” and trajectories 
of the word.  
Woven into these “readings” are my own memories, interactions, and contemplations as I 
navigate the unpredictable terrain of language use.  As is evident in Part I, I have included 
situations, conversations, dialogue and commentary that include my mother, husband and son.87  
In so doing, I acknowledge the fictitious assumption of some qualitative research theories and 
methods that qualitative inquiry, research and writing exists in a vacuum as if the researcher-
scholar-writer is an “armchair ethnographer” made up of one stringent, stable identity, unaffected 
and/or unbiased by external influences.  I also acknowledge my own shifting subjectivities and 
 
color from surrounding urban areas.  In comparison, the auxiliary campus is located in the county seat. The city is 
predominantly Hispanic (59.5%) with a median household income of $43,831. Eighteen point five percent of the 
population is black and 18.2% of the total population is white. While core English c lasses—Introduction to 
Composition and Introduction to Literature—are offered on both campuses, the student population in the auxiliary 
campus is predominantly an immigrant population with the largest number of students living in Spanish -speaking 
households.  Additionally, the auxiliary campus houses the English as a Second Language courses and the 
Associates in Nursing degree, which draws a large immigrant population.  I have often heard full-time tenured 
faculty members indicating that they did not want to teach courses at the auxiliary campuses as these were “the 
black campuses.” In contrast, the main campus of CCC was termed “the white campus.”  This nomenclature had no 
connection to demographics but was a result of the surrounding neighborhoods in  which each campus was located.  I 
highlight this difference because I assume that differences in use will be distinguishable by campus. 
85 See Brinkmann, S. (2014). Doing without data. Qualitative Inquiry, 20,(6). 720-725.  ” 
86 Various methodologists have produced scholarship which poses questions, thoughts, musings about the fixed 
rigidity of qualitative research methods in which terms such as data, data collection, voice, authenticity, validity, 
coding, triangulation (and so forth…) are troubled through poststructuralist, feminist, post-humanist and materialist 
lenses.  I purposely include qualitative research terms in quotations to represent my own notions of the fluidity and 
variability of these concepts.  For some examples see P. Lather (2013, 2016); L. A. Mazzei (2013, 2016); E. A. St. 
Pierre (2014, 2016); St. Pierre & A. Y. Jackson (2014); Scheurich (2001). 
87 Like Richardson (2005) I “honor the location of the self” (p. 965) through writing stories, in which I situate the 
entirety of the PhD process and the writing of this dissertation within other parts of my life, specifically family and 
social ties and personal history. 
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in-the-moment meaning-full response-ability (Miller, 2005) as I too am made subject of 
circulating discourses and social practices.  My objective, then, is to explore nigger-nigga as an 
object/utterance in use but also to explore my own conflicted, shifting subjectivities and 
“interpretations” in relation to nigga.   
I align my methodological underpinnings with FDA, which allows for historical, socio-
cultural tracing(s) of the varying discourses that surround, inflect, and impact nigga and through 
which it has become situated. It is through Foucault’s discussion of discourse and the 
construction of the subject that I am thinking about Gates’ theory of Signifyin(g) coupled with 
Butler’s theory of excitable speech as these theories speak to “the phenomena of rupture, of 
discontinuity” (Foucault, 2010, p. 4).  As Foucault (2010) himself highlights in his introduction 
to The Archaeology of Knowledge, these “incidences of interruption” (p. 4) take several forms as 
underlying causalities heretofore unnoticed and/or unquestioned.   I have chosen an FDA-
inspired approach as well because discourse analysis is interested in the authorization of 
discourses which, beyond their immediate function, implies a relationship to fundamentals and 
rules (Williams, 1999, p. 83).  Arribas-Allyon and Walkerdine’s (2017) interpretation of FDA 
indicates that Foucault’s definition of discourse  
does not mean a particular instance of language use—a piece of text, an utterance or 
linguistic performance—but rules, division and systems of a particular body of 
knowledge… it specifies the kind of institutional partitioning of knowledge… it also 
refers to techniques and practices through which objects, concepts and strategies are 
formed (p. 114).   
 
For me, an FDA approach entails examining both the  
Anglo-American88 traditions where discourse is construed as an instance of linguistic 
usage…[as well as] historically contingent rules that render an expression (a phrase, a 
proposition, or a speech act) discursively meaningful (Arribas-Allyon & Walkerdine, 
2017, p. 115).   
 




Through an FDA-inspired methodology, I am thinking about the impact of various 
discourses on the usage of nigga as an object not external to discourse but… of discourse… 
constituted and transformed… in accordance with the rules of the particular discursive 
formations (Williams, 1999, p.86).  The “instances of interruption” through which I am 
interrogating use are Signifyin(g) (Gates, 1988/2014) and performative contradiction (Butler, 
1997), i.e., Signifyin(g) performativity.  In other words, by taking an FDA-inspired approach I 
analyze the ways in which, through Signifyin(g) performativity, nigga disrupts its own 
historicity, ruptures rules of use, and is or is not sayable and/or allowable in particular moments 
at particular times, not solely due to the race of the speaker, but due to the discourses that govern 
specific, situated social cond itions. Hence, I explore “the external conditions of its expression 
(the rules that govern a way of speaking)” (Arribas-Allyon and Walkerdine, 2017, p. 115).  
I title my methodology FDA-inspired because, while I employ a Foucauldian approach 
my hesitation in defining my methodology as FDA stems from the “…awkward tension when 
one attempts to do poststructural work…should one claim to be drawing on a Foucauldian 
framework there is a very real danger in one’s work being dismissed as unFoucauldian…” 
(Graham, 2005, p. 2).  Therefore, my methodological “decisions” are based on my particularized 
exploration of nigger-nigga as a speech act, i.e., Signifyin(g) performative, and the ways that the 
racialized Subject is constitutive of discursive practices which constrain and/or empower as 
regulated by larger surrounding historical socio-cultural discourses. As Butler notes however, 
Foucault’s discussion of the prisoner (subjectivity and subjectification) is too “unilateral” and 
“unnuanced.”  She argues that through Foucault the prisoner is simply “made… as if… the 
prisoner is constituted mechanistically” (as cited in Bell, 1999,  p. 164).  It is through Butler 
(1997b) that I also concern myself with the psyche, i.e., the vulnerability and unpredictability of 
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the subject, of subjectivity, of language itself.   Signifyin(g) is one, albeit incomplete, possibility 
for theoretically contextualizing this vulnerability and unpredictability, as it is through Gates that 
I am able to think about the ruptures, i.e., the turn (troping) and rhetorical associations. 
Through an FDA-inspired methodology I hope to disrupt current commonsense 
assumptions which situate nigga primarily in an oppositional binary of racialized speech based 
on the appropriateness or inappropriateness (and the varied assumptions regarding who and what 
is ‘appropriate’ or ‘inappropriate’) with which it is employed. As such, a contemporary 
overarching social discourse has developed that continues to support the premise that both 
meaning and usage are inherently fixed and thus erupt from a unified speaker who is the site of 
speech.  This concept relies upon the belief that the racialized subject has an inherently fixed 
subjectivity, in which language usage is exact, precise, unchanging, and representative of one’s 
one-dimensional, unified, authentic “truth.” However, my poststructurally inflected assumptions 
do not, as often contended by critiques of poststructural theory, equate with an erasing or 
eradication of identity categories.  Instead, because meanings change from one discursive 
formation to another, an FDA-inspired methodology highlights how  
discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, 
speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject 
and his discontinuity with himself may be determined (Foucault, 1969, p. 74 as cited in 
Williams, 1999, p. 85-6).   
 
By including my own shifting experiences and feelings about nigga, I explore the multiple 
subject positions that may exist, act and become simultaneously within an individual, positions 
that are constructed through an exteriorization of discourses as well as through an interiorization 
of subjectification. In other words, I point to the ways in which multiple subject positions 
intersect, conflict and complement so that no one unified subject position is necessarily primary 
or sovereign; hence,  
172 
 
the individual is both the site for a range of possible forms of subjectivity and, at any 
particular moment of thought or speech, a subject, subjected to the regime of meaning of 
a particular discourse and enabled to act accordingly (Weedon, 1997, p. 34).  
 
While I do contend that nigga derives from particular historical discursive practices 
governed by specific historical moments, through the lens of FDA it can be argued that within 
this history exists rupture and discontinuity.  By exploring contemporary institutionalized and 
normalized discourses and the ways these govern social practices and subject constitution, I am 
examining the consequences of nigga within competing discursive regimes, for “it is only by 
looking at a discourse in operation, in a specific historical context, that it is possible to see 
whose interests it serves at a particular moment” (Weedon, 1997, p. 108).  As a highly 
contestable utterance, nigga’s social and political specificity is based upon the discourses 
available and at work at the time of its usage. So I posit: Why is nigger-nigga allowable in 
certain public discourses but not allowable in educational discourses such as curriculum and 
classroom teaching? Why do “we” demand that white “other” teachers incorporate the African 
American canon but disallow a discussion of nigger?  To be clear, my methodological and 
theoretical choices are not meant to develop conclusionary evidence that supports or refutes 
usage. Instead through an FDA-inspired approach I seek to examine what Foucault (2010) 
identifies as problematizations, i.e., to study a statement “at the limit that separates [it] from 
what is not said, in the occurrence that allows [it] to emerge to the exclusion of all others.” (p. 
119). A la Foucault (2010), my objective is not to “give voice” to the silence, the not said, or 
never said, or not yet to be said; instead I am interested in the “distribution of gaps, voids, 
absences, limits, divisions” (p. 119) which make up the totality of use and the “entangled mass” 
of discourses that allow for (or don’t allow for) the sayable and unsayable. Hence, rather than 
pose the question of language analysis: “According to what rules has a particular statement been 
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made, and consequently according to what rules could other similar statements be made?” 
(Foucault, 2010, p. 27), I am methodologically structuring my argument based on Foucault’s 
(2010) question: “How is it  that one particular statement appeared rather than another?” (p. 27).  
In other words, what are the “conditions of possibility” (Butler, 1997a) that exist in terms of 
usage of nigga and how are these possibilities subject to and made subject of the existing and 
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Chapter 7: The Psychic Space of the Classroom: A Word [against, 
in, about, of] White Space 
The social subject does not exist independently or outside of discourse.  …that subject is the 
function of the statement. Statements position both the subject (originator) of the statement and 
the addressed in particular ways.      —Glyn Williams 
 
There are about 20 students in class.  It is cramped, to be cliché, like a slave ship.  The 
desks are packed in tightly with barely enough space to walk down the aisle towards a seat.  I sit 
in the back right corner.  There is no room on my desk for my notebook, phone (which I use to 
record), travel mug of tea/coffee, 20oz. bottle of water, bookbag, laptop and the 561-page 
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn book I carry for this observation.  The desks allow for a right-
handed person (there are no left-handed desks although there is a student who is left-handed) of 
average build with one laptop or book and notebook.  Extra cups, bottles of water, even coffee in 
spillable containers sit on the floor.  Confined to my corner I set my water bottle, travel mug and 
bag on the floor in the small space between myself and the seat to my left.  I put my phone on the 
edge of the desk diagonal from me since no one is sitting there.  I place my book on the desk and 
my notebook on my lap. I am in the last seat of the first row, legs jutting into the aisle.  Back 
against the wall, I am literally and figuratively cornered, behind me and to my right there is no 
air. I am wedged into a too tight space with sickly cream-colored walls encasing me.89 When 
 
89 The discomfort I describe in this opening passage appears to be the case overall. Students have coffee cups on 
floors and bags shoved under their desks. It is difficult to walk down the aisle due to student limbs and bags.   At 
one point Prof. C. discusses the importance of notetaking, although he does not provide notes by writing on the 
chalkboard or using any presentation software.  “Well you see writing them down is a much better learning 
technique than snapping a picture… Writing it down, considering it enough that you put in your own words on your 
note paper, not exactly what your teachers says but what you heard your teacher say… Taking what your instructor 
says, funneling it through your mind all the way down to your arm into your hand, and here I am being being 
handist…” (Prof C., 062019) He addresses the self -identified leftie in the room, “How uncomfortable you must be. 
(Student chuckles) Institutionally we have thoroughly disregarded and marginalized you because we don’t provide 
you with a left-handed desk. I don’t see any left-handed desks in this room, most of them have a t least two, which 




asked to introduce myself, I shimmy to the front of the room, stepping over bags, books, cups 
etc. Although Prof. C. has indicated that I am observing based on research about the N-Word (he 
says N-Word, not nigga), when I introduce myself and explain my research I say nigga and 
thereafter say N-Word.  An erect visibly black man sitting in the front center says, “Say that 
again?” I say, “nigga?” in a questioning tone and look at him.  He responds, “Okay, I just wanted 
to be sure I heard you right…” From my cramped corner I listen, jot, and record as my colleague 
teaches (well… actually lectures) The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Twice a week for a full 
three hour 45-minute class session (with one ten to fifteen minute break) students who have 
opted to spend part of their summer in an Introduction to Literature course listen to my colleague 
pontificate, and for the next few weeks that pontification will be about Huck Finn, Nigger Jim 
and Tom Sawyer.  When I review fieldnotes from these class sessions I can deduce that my 
change in handwriting from legible to completely illegible were the moments when even I drifted 
off or struggled in that densely packed, confined space.  Prof C., my colleague, was/is a 
traditional lecturer (although I can’t say he’d agree with this term). He once entered  the 
classroom, addressed the waiting class, “Children”90 and dropped his version of Huck Finn onto 
the desk with an authorial THUD.     
On alternate days I visit a completely different classroom space. This classroom is in the 
same hallway as the first, two doors down, but the difference in space and light and air is 
alarming.  While Prof. C.’s cramped conditions (no fault of his own) metaphorically reflect the 
 
90 I do not believe Prof. C. intended to be demeaning to a classroom of adults and no one visibly appeared offended 
by his address.  However, as a community college, the population at CCC is largely “non -traditional” (essentialist 
labelling at its best) attracting career adults, working parents, and degreed immigrants who must obtain licensure 
based on U.S. standards. Again, while no one appeared visibly offended, I wondered about the 30-something black 
(not necessarily African American) man who always sat centerstage, erect and prepared, who simply stared at Prof. 
C. after this comment (I learned later that he owned his home and was married with children). 
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content and structure of a novel like Huck Finn, in this classroom space Dr. C.91 and her class of 
eight are discussing Zora Neale Hurston and Langston Hughes and the empty brightness of the 
room reflects Dr. C.’s pedagogical style as much as the texts reveal movement and transition in 
literature.  In this class, I have choice.  No one sits on the front row.  I choose the back row, 
corner seat on the far left, next to the classroom’s picture window.  Of the eight (which dwindled 
down to six by the end of the summer session), most sit in the middle or on the far right. I am the 
only person in the entire row.  I spread out.  To my left, under the window, is a large white ledge 
which stretches the entire wall, wide enough to sit on.  The window allows us to see out into the 
interior courtyard of the college. I use this ledge for my water bottle, travel mug, additional 
books.  I am able to place my bag in the seat in front of me.  I even have the luxury of pulling the 
desk to my right closer if I so desire. Although I am in a corner desk, there is about five inches 
between the desk and the back wall, painted of the same cream-colored hue as every classroom 
in this hallway, including Prof. C’s classroom.  There is ample space in the aisles to the left and 
right of the row of desks, allowing for ease of passage.  Due to the brilliant brightness of the 
room, I wonder if these two classrooms, located in the wing of Humanities, configured in the 
same manner—sturdy, wood desk at the front of the classroom, tech pod to the right, entrance to 
the left; five rows of six desks each—are the same size and dimension.  During my introduction, 
on the first day, I say I’m conducting research on the N-Word and then as follow up I mutter 
nigga.92 A very vocal Nigerian Muslim woman asks, “Which one are we talking about?”  I 
 
91 The use of Prof. C. and Dr. C. is purposeful.  While I chose the same letter C as pseudonyms for both professors, 
distinguishing characteristics are based on pedagogical style, curriculum and classroom space.  This section is meant 
to focus on the psychic space of the classroom and its effects, not individualized names or identities, although this 
will also be highlighted in the Chapter as it relates to psychic space. 
92 For purposes of research, I typically do not say N-Word unless prompted by someone else.  In the first narrative 
above I indicate that I used the N-Word after initially saying nigga based on my colleague’s usage.  However, I 
typically say nigga, often explaining that I am purposefully using the word when discussing m y research.  I am not 
sure why but in this moment I chose to say ‘N-Word’ (possibly because there were fewer students so I felt more 
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respond, “Do you mean the -er or the -a?” and this is followed by, “What about the -o?”93 from a 
Latinx student.  Before I can answer the vocal Nigerian woman, who will heretofore be known as 
K., exclaims, “O? What o?”  In order to make this excessive moment meaning-full (Miller, 2005) 
my colleague, Dr. C., begins a discussion about language use and the right to language, with a 
diagram on the board which focuses on the binaries of Structuralism and the attack of these 
binaries in poststructuralism.  She uses this as a segue into the lesson for the day, Zora Neale 
Hurston’s essay “How it Feels to be Colored Me” and her short story “Sweat.” From my open-
space window seat, I note the readiness of the students to talk, engage, ruminate while Dr. C. 
positions herself behind the tech pod, the window ledge utilized as her leaning/sitting post.  
“Hurston chooses to write in colloquial Southern Black English.  This is the conf lict in contrast 
to Hughes or other authors who argue for writing in Standard English based on appealing to a 
white readership and audience.” (Dr. C, Obs. 062019).   
These descriptions are not meant to compare the pedagogical styles of Prof. C. and Dr. 
C., although I realize that a few of the adjectives I have littered these descriptions with create 
images of a cramped and congested lecture and an open discussion-based classroom. Nor am I 
attempting to focus on the ways in which the identities of the students and/or professors (as well 
as their learning and/or teaching style)94 construct specific intellectual experiences of freedom or 
 
vulnerable and exposed, possibly because the class was majority female, or possibly due to the fact that the class 
was noticeably and predominantly immigrant).   
TO THE READER: Placement of these narrative-observations is not based on chronological order.  I bring up this 
minute (yet significant) point to highlight that responses from one class did not reflect my decisions in the other.  
Additionally, as per my methodology, I use the methods of layered tellings and pastiche by interweaving data into a 
textual narrative, based on significance of metaphor, themes and tropes, not chronology.  
93 This student’s question has had a revelationary effect on me since she was most likely referring to the Spanish 
term negro whereas in U.S. English Negro (usually written with an uppercase N) has a completely different 
connotation. Future research on hybridized language use and variations in spelling and meaning is necessary.   
94 I recognize that these factors affect the teaching/learning experience; however, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, my analysis is meant to explore the psychic space of the cla ssroom as an ironic contested space in 
which the use of nigger-nigga is part of contestable language.   
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constraint.  Instead, I am interested in what Connellan (2013) describes as the “self -contained 
opposite” (Clair, 1998, cited  in Connellan, 2013, p. 1543) “where authority and freedom sit side 
by side.” (Connellan, 2013, p. 1543). Connellan (2013) links psychic energy to the spatial 
properties of white, thus exposing the tensions between freedom and conformity in the university 
setting (Connellan, 2013) and, by default, the classroom.   
Connellan’s analysis can be traced back to Derrida’s (1980) “Mochlos; or, the Conflict of 
the Faculties” in which he speaks to Kant’s (1978) Conflict of the Faculties, which contend that 
the university is not natural; instead, it is a “theatrical representation” (p. 3) in which the 
university is a simulacrum of the social order authorized by the state where “…knowledge [is] a 
little like an industry… professors [are] as trustees… (original emphasis)” (p. 3).  Echoing this, 
Connellan (2013) cites Foucault stating that the  “’disciplinarization of knowledges’ became a 
process that allowed ‘State apparatuses to centralize knowledges’ (p. 1544). Using Foucault’s 
(2004) theories of the panopticon and power, Clair’s (1998) aesthetic theory, and Butler’s (1997) 
discussion of the psychic life of power, Connellan (2013) interrogates the architectural and 
institutional use of the color white as a material which creates institutional order and controls 
subjects.  This space, both literally and figuratively, is constructed based on an invisible 
‘superimposed grid of order’ “the lines of [which] are rendered invisible because the 
psychological colour of the grid and therefore also of institutional power is white on white” (p. 
1531).  White, as an “absent-present” that is both visible and invisible (Connellan, 2013), 
generates a “white space” that psychologically and psychically institutionalizes bodies within the 
grid; bodies are made into subjects through the discursive function of naming—student, 
professor, staff, administration—and it is through this discursive process that the subject is able 
to exist. For Connellan (2006, 2013), white, as well as the bland, neutral shades, flat lines and 
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surfaces of the physical space perform a type of “…whitewashing… [which]…coerces people 
(of whatever race or ability) to clone themselves accordingly” (p. 1545).  As subjects, these 
bodies adhere to an invisible grid of whiteness that renders them and the institution normatively 
white (Connellan, 2013); a white which overflows from the walls and enters a psychic space. To 
answer Butler’s (1997b) question, “What is the psychic form that power takes?” Connellan 
(2013) contends that if power is discursive and has no recognizable singular form, its energy can 
exist in the bland, neutral form of white; as such, it has the physical and psychical ability to 
control bodies in space (p. 1545).  Hence,  
…the subject who actually enjoys the white space is superficially uplifted by it and feels 
important as well as superficially free and secure, and… offers no resistance to the white 
space, to which in fact s/he is enslaved.  This type of… unconscious subjection is, 
according to Butler (1997b), a ‘fundamental dependency on a discourse we never chose’ 
(Connellan, 2013, p. 1546).   
 
The spatial and temporal power of whiteness is both everywhere and nowhere 
(Connellan, 2013).   At the literal level, white illuminates the classroom space, allowing for 
clarity and focus in its everywhere-ness while it simultaneously creates silence, order, and 
discipline existing as negative space “…the space in design that has ‘nothing’ in it, but… that 
allows for unseen action” (p. 1547). As mentioned previously, the walls of these two classrooms 
are cream painted sheetrock and unadorned cinderblocks. If not for the color (or possibly in spite 
of), the undecorated and featureless barriers would resemble the institutional walls of a prison. 
Those walls constructed of sheetrock consist of the same yellowish white of an unkempt 
hospital. The flooring consists of a similar neutralizing creamish-white tile and beyond the 
garish, neon light fixtures the ceiling is of the same creamy white as the walls.  The boundaries 
between wall, ceiling and floor blur at the edges due to the lack of variation in color.   
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Further, each desk is constructed of chrome with a neutral, bland beige desktop and chair.  
Left-handed students do not have the privilege of a desk conducive to their occupational needs 
with the armrest situated on the right of the chair, not the left. The size of the desktop allows for 
no more than one device and the chairs (with their attached desktops) are unforgiveable—any 
rotund person would be unable to slide (from the left opening) into a desk. The institutional 
message here: there is focus in discomfort, as long as that discomfort controls the body and the 
eye of the student-subject. The aesthetic design of the classroom space is the consequence of 
what Connellan (2013) describes as a “homogenization of space [which] operates in parallel with 
the homogenization of knowledges in the university, a site where, since the early 19 th century 
knowledges could be disciplined.” (Foucault, 2004, cited in Connellan, 2013, p. 1543-1544).   
The campus itself also embodies the ambiguity of freedom and constraint.  Ironically, 
while there is a county park located on the East side of the campus, no classrooms face this park.  
Instead, the administrative building which houses the President and Vice President stands 
between the park and the campus, acting as a boundary between the external world and the 
building(s) of the campus.  Much like Connellan’s (2013) description of Pollsmoor Prison in 
Cape Town, South Africa,95 CCC’s gaze is inward. The windows located on the left side of the 
rooms face the interior courtyard, which while somewhat aesthetically pleasing are meant to be 
part of students’ peripheral vision. Desks “face front,” thus positioning the professor ‘as trustee’ 
(Derrida, 1980, p. 3) and sovereign. This promotes “visibility [as] a condition of stay here” 
(Connellan, 2013, p. 1541). In other words, students’ attention must remain in the classroom, in 
their books, on the professor.  Also like Pollsmoor Prison, the low-rise, non-descript buildings of 
CCC are meant to portray “ordinariness… [and] normativity in appearance.” (p.1538).  The 
 
95 See Connellan’s (2013) discussion of Pollsmoor Prison in her article “The Psychic Life of White.”  
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exterior racially white, economically affluent, residential community in which CCC is 
geographically located has prohibited any structure higher than three stories.  In contrast, the 
auxiliary campus, located in a predominantly immigrant, Latinx and Black, working class, 
commercial area boasts of high rise structures of five and seven stories which command an entire 
city block.  
The operation of power/knowledge as a psychic white space in the Composition-
Literature (Comp-Lit) classroom at CCC is both a consequence and a source of the physical 
space of the classroom itself.  While I have introduced the ways in which the physicality of the 
space is inhabited by the power of white, creating the conflicting yet complementary “self-
contained opposites” of freedom and conformity, the absent-present of psychical whiteness exists 
based on historical and social discourses surrounding the educability of bodies, homogenization 
of knowledge, and a belief in American “white”96 ideals. The operations of power in the invisible 
white space of CCC’s Comp-Lit classroom reflect historical discourses and materializations (in 
both the literal and figurative senses) of standardization as a means of social control.  Hence, it is 
through an explanation of Connellan’s (2013) discussion of the psychic space of white that one 
can interrogate use of nigger-nigga in the classroom.  
 
96 As clarification I am making a distinction between psychic whiteness, racial whiteness and the color white.  As 
Connellan posits it is through the color white that specific forms of power have the ability to take shape and 
construct specific types of knowledge.  For the purposes of this chapter I am defin ing psychic whiteness as a type of 
power-knowledge that is infused within the literal and figurative college classroom space and is assumed by the 
subjects of that space.  Critical theories such as Critical Race Theory would identify this as a form of whit e privilege 
or white racialization that exists externally to the individual and oppresses the student in various ways.  However, I 
contend that the power of psychic whiteness is “essential to the formation, persistence and continuity of the subject” 
(Butler, 1997b, p. 3).  In other words, while power, in the form of whiteness, presses on the subject, in its psychic 
form it is simultaneously taken up by the subject which in turn constitutes the subject’s identity.  
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7.1 Psychic Whiteness in the Comp-Lit Classroom 
…I agreed, no… volunteered to read excerpts of “Sweat” for the class after being invited 
by Dr. C. to participate in the discussion.  When Dr. C. begins reading from “Sweat” and 
attempts to read the first lines of dialogue from Delia, she admits that she won’t read the 
dialogue “…efficiently ‘an’ you knows how skeered Ah is of snakes’ (Hurston, 1926) because 
[she] sounds ridiculous saying it.” (Obs. 062019)  There is general laughter in the classroom. 
“But look at the words and note that she is writing in the language of the rural South.  As we 
said, this is the language we’re going to see in Their Eyes Were Watching God.” (Dr. C, 062019).  
It is at this point that I volunteer to read; however, I become aware that I sound equally 
ridiculous reading the dialogue between Delia and Sykes.  In essence, in my eagerness to 
volunteer, I did not consider my own essentialist viewpoint. Was I a better reader, interpreter or 
orator of Black rural Southern language?  Would I sound ‘less ridiculous’ or more authentic 
simply based on the color of my skin? Did I assume that my blackness somehow connected me 
to the language of the characters?   This innocuous belief (adhered to by everyone in the 
classroom based on their laughter and overall agreement that I should read) that  I could 
somehow read the text “efficiently without sounding ridiculous” exposes the  hidden irony of 
whiteness as a psychic space.   
I am Northern born, having lived my entire life in an urban metropolis in the 
Northeastern region of the United States. When asked, “where your people from?” I can only 
refer to my father’s side.  My mother and my mother’s parents are Northerners.  Philadelphia 
born—my grandmother came into the world just shy of Du Bois’ research for The Philadelphia 
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Negro. My father, a migrant who worked as a chef on the Silver Meteor97 eventually settled in 
Philadelphia after meeting my mother. It is through his family lineage that I have had the 
opportunity to “visit” the South. Yet demographically Dr. C.’s life runs parallel to my father— 
born in Georgia, she grew up in South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia.  
   I heard lots of people talk this way growing up in the South, not just black people.  
Some of it’s a little more Southern [referring to Hurston’s dialogue] because my 
grandparents lived in Virginia… [but] in fact I became verbal in this.  I called my mother 
momma; I had a thick Southern accent when I moved up here… changed almost instantly 
as soon as people started saying ‘Eww you talk funny.’ I adapted. (Dr. C., Obs. 062019)  
 
Herein lay the hidden irony: as subjects immersed in the discourses of race and language, we 
were  subjectivated by and adherents of the assumption that I (as materially Black) could 
authenticate a Southern Black dialect whereas she (as materially White) could not.98  This hidden 
irony divulges normative ideas of whiteness (and by default blackness) that are linked to 
assumptions about who is authorized to speak (or read) as the voice of the author/character and 
who can rightfully appropriate authentic language pronunciation and articulation. Hence, Dr. C’s 
concern with “sounding ridiculous” and my belief that I would not sound ridiculous are based on 
historical discourses, which constitute Standard English as normatively white and Black English 
as normatively non-white… well, it is called “Black” English isn’t it?99—the consequence of 
which is a racialization of forms of English based on historical discourses about language use.  
 
97 For more information about the Silver Meteor and the Great Migration of black peoples from the South to 
Northern, Midwestern and Western cities from 1916 to 1970 see Isabel Wilkerson’s (2010) The Warmth of Other 
Suns: The Epic Story of America’s Great Migration. For additional reading about the positionality of black peoples 
in the United States also see Wilkerson’s (2020) Caste: The Origins of our Discontents. 
98 While I am aware that there are distinctions in variation, register, accent and dialect in the  southern region of the 
United States, my purpose here is not to conflate or essentialize these variations, but to point out the possibility of an 
“affected” Southern dialect by Dr. C. based on her lived experience. Additionally, I acknowledge that racial 
whiteness, like blackness, is not fixed.  
99 While writing, the paradoxical humor of the label “Black English” became apparent to me, much like Ralph 
Ellison’s dark humor in Invisible Man.   
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7.2 The Racialization of English 
This racialization dates back to the 19th Century in which the social philosophy of early 
America bound the education discourses surrounding literacy to social unity and cultural 
hegemony. Christian values, industrialization, urbanization and economics discursively 
constructed the new America as independent, exceptional, and the Promised Land.  This 
embodied an American ideal of progress and national culture and the English curriculum was 
constructed to reflect these ideals. From 1812 to the early 1900s the English curriculum was 
based on Christian morals, vocational training, civic training, and citizenship, the goal of which 
was to produce “a new type of national culture” (Chubb, 1902). Of key importance was the 
influx of an immigrant population, viewed as intellectually and economically inferior, but  
needing to be assimilated into the American ideal (Brass, 2012). The standardization of a specific 
form of English instruction, initially vocational in its orientation and later focused on cultural 
norms, was constructed based on the ideals of a highly literate population of white, wealthy men 
and landowners already in existence (Graff, 2001). Due to this highly literate population, it has 
been argued that America was essentially “born modern;” literacy was an instrument meant to 
create a national standard for conformity (Brass, 2009, 2016); as such, a literate society dispelled 
criminality, poverty, and instability and led to progress, economic survival and improved class 
status (Applebee, 1974, Brass, 2016, Graff, 1979). Labeled “the literacy myth” (Graff , 1979), 
English was meant to bring “everyone” i.e., immigrants and impoverished groups, nonstandard 
dialects and regional forms of English, into “…a common tradition of culture and government, a 
common spirit of responsible republican citizenship,  [and] a common language that would 
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transcend regional dialects.” (Applebee, 1974, p. 3).100 Literacy myth, common tradition, 
American ideal—statements which continue to exist (albeit distinctively different) within 21st 
century pedagogical discourses—link the inculcation of knowledge, i.e., the teaching of English, 
to discursive practices which shape how English participates in the governing of bodies for the 
wealth, health and future of America. In the past, the teaching of literacy, literature and 
composition inscribed the State’s need for social control, civic engagement and responsibility, 
and the belief in a unified individualism (now termed hybridity(s), identities, subjectivities).  
This form of discipline, based on a sovereignty of whiteness, has become naturalized in 
the contemporary English classroom.  Twenty-first century discourses about progress, social 
change (often now labelled social justice), inclusion (embedded within notions of diversity and 
multiculturalism), and citizenship (linked to personal, hybridized identities and subjectivities) 
reinscribe 19th century pedagogical ideas of  socialization, inclusion, “republican citizenship” 
and cultural norming. It is through the continuous history of these pedagogical practices that the 
ethics of “wealthy, white, literate males” have become naturalized in the contemporary 
classroom.  Masked within the discourses of Diversity and Inclusion, multiculturalism, and 
social justice education (to name a few), whiteness remains an absent presence,101 a hidden 
irony, a reality within realities (Connellan, 2013) existing as psychic power in the classroom. 
“Why do I impose formal English on you? Well I have to.  It’s my job—literally.  But also it’s 
the expectation that once you’re educated you will speak Standard English. (my emphasis)” (Dr. 
 
100 For a fuller history of the teaching of English and English Education as a discipline/field in the United States see 
Arthur N. Applebee’s (1974) Tradition and reform in the teaching of English: A history , the articles of Jory Brass 
(2009, 2010, 2012, 2016) Miles Myers (1996) Changing our minds: Negotiating English and literacy and Robert 
Scholes’ (1998) The rise and fall of English. While these are not the only texts which provide an encapsulated 
history of the teaching of English, these are the texts to which I refer. 
101 I use this term in the way Connellan uses it.  The presence of white is meant to be both visible and psychic, literal 
and non-literal, “capable of creating divisions and hierarchies” (p. 1530). Connellan tells us that the physical 
presence of white affects the social and political design of public spaces, while it also acts as a signifier of racial 
dominance. (p. 1530) 
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C. Obs. 062019).102  In the Comp-Lit classroom of CCC the pedagogical transmission of formal 
English subjects both students and professors.  Hence, even when studying, reading or writing 
about a text that breaks, opposes or disrupts the syntagmatic x-axis of SAE, subjects internalize 
operations of psychic whiteness through an acceptance of and adherence to the normative and 
regulatory power (Butler, 1997b) of formal English.    
The authenticity of dialect, language, and culture is de facto standardized, homogenized 
and universalized through a lens of ‘formal English’. Within this psychic space Dr. C. did not 
read for fear of “sounding ridiculous,” i.e., not Southern, not rural, not Black, while I volunteered 
to read with the confidence that I “sounded authentic,” i.e., rural, Southern and Black. Connellan 
(2013) warns of the deceptive power of white to control, indoctrinate and manipulate. 
Universalizing ideas about the authority of language—who speaks, in what voice, with what 
level of freedom or constraint—placed us in ‘unconscious subjection’ (Butler, 1997b).  As 
subjects our ‘dependency on a discourse we never chose’ (cited in Connellan, 2013, p. 1546) 
initiated and sustained our “agential choices” to read or not read, to sound ridiculous or not 
sound ridiculous.  This simultaneity of freedom and repression is constituted by the invisible grid 
of whiteness that instigated feelings of intellectual freedom, discussion and laughter (we all 
giggled when Dr. C. admitted to her shortcomings with the language), but simultaneously 
perpetuated the oppressive “rules of whiteness” (Connellan, 2013)—the subject racially marked 
 
102 This statement is taken from a larger discussion about Black English, Standard English and “…the creativity… 
the regional deeply felt dialect” (Dr. C., Obs. 062019) in Hurston’s Their Eyes were Watching God.  While the 
students are reading early 20 th Century African American Southern dialect (many said they did not understand it). 
Dr. C’s statement is inculcated within the sanction and institutionalization of “formal English” as normative within 
the discourse of Higher Education.  In this discussion, Dr. C. points to Richard Rodriquez’s Hunger of Memory and 
David Wallace Foster’s essay “Tense Present” as two authors who voice their opinions about appropriate use of 
formal and/or (non/in)formal English.  The comment above is a partial response to Foster’s contention that white 
professors should not ‘impose’ Standard English (a formal language) on students of color because in the 21 st century 




as Black as the authentic speaker of Black, rural, Southern dialect while the subject racially 
marked as White is silenced, made silent, self-regulates and conducts oneself in a space of 
silence. Thus, psychic whiteness regulated “the stories inside the squares…the lives and 
creativity of individuals who, because of the invisible parameters around them, [could not] reach 
their full creative potential…” (p. 1532).   
Connellan (2013), citing Clair (1998), tells me that “invisibility is accompanied by 
silence, and silence can be organized” (p. 1532).  In Prof. C.’s classroom the condensed white 
space emits silence. While the organization of the classroom does not differentiate from Dr. C’s 
classroom, the oppressive silence and space constrictions create, for me, feelings of 
claustrophobia, which Connellan (2013) notes can be a response to the color white as well.  
Bodies in this space are silent, unmoving, immobile, lethargic while the authorial drone of the 
sovereign speaking subject lulls everyone to incapacity.  The paradox is that the sovereign Gaze 
of the professor, situated at the front of the classroom, simultaneously sees and does not see.  
Their complacent silence intermingles with their silent insurrectionary acts. On my left is the 
young man who constantly scrolled through his social media.  On occasion he would ask me, 
“What page?” turn to said page in his book and return to scrolling.  Two seats ahead, a male 
student appears to be playing a game on his computer.  Three seats ahead in the next row, a 
student is writing her paper. I can see the MLA-format heading with Prof. C’s name and the title 
Huck Finn. On the far left, a student appears to be paying attention until I realize that she is 
staring at her phone not her book. Another student comes in late, sits, drops her bag, reaches 
inside and pulls out her Math book.  Herein lay the ambiguity of freedom and repression within 
the psychic space of whiteness. Do these silent subjects freely choose silence?  Or are they 
subjectivated within silence?  Is there agency in their silence? Are they splitting their attention 
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between Prof. C.’s lectures and math or are they passive subjects silently accepting of their 
oppression?   
Within the grid of whiteness the students’ inertness reveals not only their subjection to 
transmission pedagogies (Brass, 2010) but also their complicity in the operational powers of 
psychic whiteness that orients silence.  As Connellan (2013) notes, “the creator of the grid 
becomes every one of us as we all reinforce its structure by adhering to its constraints.  The 
combination of white and grid ensures that the structure remains whilst the content is repressed.” 
(p, 1532). There is no reading by me or the students in Prof. C.’s course.  As a matter of fact, 
there is very little discussion or student participation.  Occasionally, rarely actually, there is a 
comment, usually by the same racially marked white male student, Z., who sits in the front of the 
room, his desk situated across from Prof. C’s desk.  Had it not been for the 20-something 
students in the classroom, it would appear to be a discussion between two people, better 
described as a lecture for one.  I do not know students’ names, I do not speak to anyone except 
for the young lady seated in front of me, and these conversations usually have nothing to do with 
Huck Finn, especially since she did not even purchase the book. “Did you watch When They See 
Us?” she turns and asks at the end of one class.  “NO…  not yet… I can’t.”  “Oh my god, I was 
watching it and I had to turn it off.  I’m on the last episode and I didn’t want to start crying in 
class.” (Obs. 062019) It never occurs to her that Prof. C. and I might be friends or that I’m a 
snitch; possibly because I initially helped her figure out how to improve her grade on her 
previous paper, or possibly because as Black women we adhere to the adage, “Snitches get 
stitches.” While their actions can be perceived as agential, i.e., stepping outside of the grid of 
whiteness, the student-subjects simultaneously adhere to unified, organized (and oppressive) 
silence, maintaining their individualized invisibility through surreptitious acts which fit into the 
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superimposed grid of silent naturalized whiteness. As such, Prof. C’s teaching-style as lecturer 
and orator (a form of transmission pedagogy) discursively and psychically constructs the 
professor as sovereign intellect and keeper of knowledge and the student as the receiver or 
receptable of that knowledge.  While this can be superficially viewed as a top down approach to 
power, through a Butlerean/Foucauldian lens, the students as subjects are complicit and 
accepting of as well as participant in this power relation, which works in and through their 
subjectivity as silent, inactive listening.   
Hence, the structure of the course as lecture-based and teacher-centered superimposed 
with historical discourses of rhetoric or oratory and belles lettres (Scholes, 1998) represses the 
interpellated subject who “turns” or acknowledges his/her discursive category as student through 
the passive consumption of texts and the passive production of  student work.  Scholes (1998) 
highlights that in Higher Education the studies we now call literature and composition began to 
evolve in the late 1800s and what was formerly known as composition for oratory became 
strictly composition.  The results of this included a shift in student work from producers of texts 
to passive consumers of texts… and ultimately a split between composition and literature in 
which composition is considered low brow and literature became highbrow (p. 10 - 11).  
Subjection occurs as each member-subject of the class adheres to and upholds the constraining 
white structure of active-passive lecturing103 and (in)active-passive listening.  
   We talked a little bit about close reading and we’re going to do that with the first couple 
of chapters today… close reading is a skill… it doesn’t only exist in English class…  
Many of you will become businesspeople and you’ll have to read communications from 
your boss and you’ll try to, the word I guess would be, read between the lines. Some of 
 
103 I define Prof. C’s lectures as active-passive because on many occasions he would ask a question and, receiving 
no answer from the students, would answer the question himself or fill the silent space with his own humor.  To be 
clear, there was one significant moment when students responded as a group to his request to “give it up for S.” who 
answered a question correctly.  After cheering, applauding and clapping Prof C. followed up with another question 
to which no one responded.   
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you might even go to law school… lawyers close read all the time (Prof. C. Obs. 
062019).   
 
However, ironically, there is no ‘we,’ there is very little talking and virtually no discussion, so 
how are students learning, discussing, reading, doing close reading without possessing or looking 
at the text? As subjugated subjects, complicit in their subjectivation, they have been 
institutionalized based on socio-economic discourses that frame education (particularly Higher 
Education), completion of a degree, and the university itself as a path to social and political 
respectability, middle-class society, and economic stability.  Evidently, and unfortunately, close 
reading (or any reading for that matter) has nothing to do with this. 
As a text Huck Finn itself is an aesthetic portrayal of the Great American literary canon, 
part of an “ English curriculum that came into being around the turn of the nineteenth century 
[which] is still the same English curriculum… [with] adjustments… and many additions…” 
(Scholes, 1998, p. 80). This curriculum, debated nationally in contemporary classrooms, is 
inflected by the historical continuity of universal themes and beliefs about literature as indicative 
of a national (and natural) culture and a transmission of traditional values as an “agent of social 
control” (Applebee, 1974).  The teaching of Huck Finn is believed to be reflective of the culture 
and ideals of a unified yet modern, subjective, mixture in American society. Embedded in this 
belief is the conception of the student as benefitting from the value of “cultural education” 
(Chubb, 1902; Applebee, 1974), history as progress (Scholes, 1998), functionality of and 
connection to the State (Myers, 1996), transactions with the text (Rosenblatt, 1978) and most 
importantly in the modern English classroom, a larger perspective and understanding of oneself 
and others in relationship to the world (Freire, 1970/2001; Hill, 2011; Gee, 1999; Gutiérrez, 
2008; Sealy-Ruiz, 2013; Street, 2003). These historical yet modern concepts are reiterated in the 
contemporary English lit classroom:  
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   The main character is you… the reader. You who is going to interpret the events and 
the things that we hear about and which are thought about, what the narrator tells us… as 
interpreters, as I said the other day, a work of satire holds a mirror up to us. . And maybe 
we don’t like what we see… Does it matter…? Yes, of course it does. Because the 
characters expressed are universals… (Prof. C. Obs. 062019).   
 
Yet while the “gift of literature…[has] little or nothing to do with the actual condition[s] 
of [the students’] live[s]” (Scholes, 1998, p. 79), the continuous history(ies) of these discourses, 
naturalized in the contemporary Comp-Lit classroom is predicated on a psychic grid of 
whiteness.  Based on linguistic categories, student and professor are symbolically visible as 
bodies in the classroom, discursively situated within enunciative modalities which carry their 
own subject positions (Williams, 1999).  Each occupies a particular position; in this case, the 
discursive activity of the professor is viewed as normative and sovereign; he is the producer of 
statements (such as above) based on the complex interaction of educational discourse, discourses 
concerning the teaching of writing, literacy and literature, status as professor, and positionality 
within the Academy itself. The subject position of the student is complicit in this accepting of 
his/her subject position as addressee of Prof. C’s “truth statements” (Williams, 1999). Both are 
institutionalized based on normative constructions of Higher Ed, Comp-Lit and the English 
classroom handed down through the ever-evolving historical discourses that shaped and continue 
to shape English. At the same time, student and professor are invisible—lectures fall on deaf ears 
and speech is likened to the teacher in a Charlie Brown cartoon—both are ‘formed in 
subordination’ (Butler, 1997b) as a consequence of the psycho-social and historical layers of 
psychic power.  Whether a consequence of Christian morals, progressive ideologies, or critical 
theories, a normativity of whiteness as psychic power persists.  The absent-present of 
indoctrination, discipline, social control and order, self-regulation, and the American ideal of a 
literate and literary American citizenship transmutates as psychic whiteness. The subject exists 
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within/occupies/participates in this psychic space through the simultaneity of visibility and 
invisibility and it is in this fluid and fluctuating psychic space that silence (in the form of 
acquiescence) subsists. 
The spatial, temporal and historical construction of the English classroom organized 
around the “literary history of England and America” (Scholes, 1998, p. 145), continues to affect 
and effect an “American” ideal in contemporary times.  Naturalized in the present-day Comp-Lit 
classroom, subjects adhere to a unifying normativity historically construed as American, formal, 
and Standard, ‘regardless of one’s racial markings or ability’ in which the tension of freedom and 
authority persist (Connellan, 2013). It is through the absent-present naturalization of psychic 
white space, however, that the subject is subjugated—simultaneously institutionalized and 
institutionalizing, i.e., submitting to and being repressed by the multiply competing yet 
complementary discourses that both effect and affect the Comp-Lit classroom. Hence, while 
English as a subject and the teaching of English have undergone shifts based on social, political, 
economic, philosophical and psychological changes, in the 21st century the “American ideals” of 
two centuries ago continue to permeate academic institutions, naturalized in the classroom and 
normalized for its subjects.   
My intention in this chapter was to tease out my poststructurally informed theory of the 
psychic power of whiteness in the classroom as a means to discuss the constitutive effects of the 
Signifyin(g) performative contradiction nigger-nigga when in use in and outside of the 
classroom space.  My focus on psychic whiteness specifically concerns the complexity of nigger-
nigga as both inflammatory (marked racially white) and insurrectionary (marked racially Black) 
speech. “The tyranny of the white wall imposes its own regime of power” (Connellan, 2013, p. 
1541), a power that instills itself as psychic whiteness within the architectural design as well as 
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within the bodies that inhabit the space. What happens then, when the linguistic black spot of 
American English stands in direct contrast within this space? 
7.3 Critical Conversation #17032014: An excessive nigga moment in-the-making: 
The disruption of psychic whiteness 
We are in my office, G. and I.  The door is closed for privacy, but I am wishing that I 
could leave it open. There is something about his presence; his demeanor puts me on edge.  He is 
ex-military, Marines, and he carries an air of stoic confidence, aggressive masculinity and 
controlled authority that I can only attribute to years of discipline, training and defense, and 
possibly… age.  Now, in his forties, he has returned to college believing that matriculating in 
higher education ensures social and financial security for black men.  His gaze is direct; he does 
not look away, or rather he rarely looks away.  He does not smile, nor paradoxically, does he 
frown. “I’m a Marine, I don’t smile” he indicated at one point during our conversation. On the 
rare occasion when he does smile (I understood his intent to smile) it resembles a slight sneer.  
His eyes did not “smile” and his mouth only turned upwards at the tiniest portion of the corners 
of his mouth.  The smile appeared more sinister than friendly.   His face, imperceptibly immobile 
is settled into a sort of statuesque superiority, as if sculpted by Kara Walker104 herself.  G. puts 
me in the mind of Othello the Moor.  Much like the Shakespearean version his demeanor, 
stoicism and speech are like that of a General (he was a Marine, after all).  His presence fills the 
air with a tension, as if he is always prepared for “war.” Add to this his uncompromising 
chivalry, “As long as you’re in my presence you will carry nothing.  No woman will,” he 
commanded while taking all of my belongings from me at the door of my office.  
 
104 See images of Kara Walker’s (2014) infamous  “A Subtlety, or the Marvelous Sugar Baby.”  
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During our conference, he tells me about an experience he had with a young male of 
color in his math class.  The student consistently used ‘the N word’ (G. was adamant that he does 
not say the word) and because of this young man’s disrespect, G.  had to threaten to “bust his 
ass.”  He begins,  
   ‘This dude, he comes in and he wants to be black… The first few times I let it pass… 
Finally, one day I just got fed up. I said, ‘Look man do me a favor don’t use that word 
around me.’ He goes, ‘I wasn’t talking to you.’  I said, ‘I understand that but don’t use 
that word around me.  That’s all I’m saying.  I respect you wanna talk, you go head but 
just don’t use that one word.’  You know, now he wants to pop, ‘You can’t control what 
comes out of my mouth.’ I said, ‘I tell you what, you say it one more fuckin time right—’  
and the class just got SHHHUPPP.’(G., Critical Conversation (CC), 17032014) 
 
(He makes a sucking sound that resembles someone noisily slurping or sucking in from a 
straw.) 
 
“The professor stopped.” 
We both start laughing.105  
 
G.’s transition from stoic composure to “angry black man” can be indicative of a “Nigga 
Moment” (McGruder, 2005). In “Grandad’s Fight” (Link to Image of a Nigga Moment, 2005) 
 the character Huey provides viewers with a definition of a nigga moment, “A moment where 
ignorance overwhelms the mind of an otherwise logical Negro man causing him to act in an 
illogical, self-destructive manner, i.e., like a nigga” (McGruder, 2005).  McGruder’s definition 
locates a nigga moment within the discursive and material world of violence.  Based on this 
particular episode and subsequent episodes, nigga moment constitutes the racialized, materially 
 
105 I bring to your attention G.’s and my reaction to this conversation because it is indicative of the ways in which 
laughter is often a response of black Americans in situations which are not , in actuality, funny. Scholarship about 
laughing barrels on plantations (barrels in which slaves stuck their head in order to laugh out of sight or sound of the 
master or overseer) is currently in its infancy.  Ironic humor, slapstick, clowning, and jokes are all forms of humor 
that black Americans have used in opposition to their oppression.  Signifying in the form of wordplay, throwing 
shade, bussin, cappin, markin’ also mix derision, degradation, or trauma with humor.  Hence, I would conjecture 
that our laughter was our response to the silence, fear and shock caused by G.’s statement, but also our knowledge 
that this was a dangerous moment for him and the student.  
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black, male Subject as aggressive, potentially violent and illogical—all of which cross age, 
economics or social class; hence, much like the character Grandad, who unfortunately finds 
himself in an altercation over a parking space (you know, some stupid nigga shit),106 G. 
succumbs to what “most nigga moments revolve around… anger” (EE, Critical Conversation 
(CC), 20032015).  EE’s description of the causes of a nigga moment can be further 
contextualized in the discursive origins of this event.  McGruder’s definition posits two 
utterances which performatively construct the racialized subject—negro and nigga.   Negro 
constitutes the racialized black subject as logical, rational and peaceful, nigga constitutes the 
black male subject as illogical, irrational and (self)destructive.   
Paradoxically, the episode further explains that white men do not have nigga moments 
because they avoid potential altercations and are not irrational, violent beings. Yet while 
McGruder’s commentary is meant to be comedic, searing and sardonic, it is situated within the 
discourses of political thought, scientific racism and racial demography.    The violent 
irrationality believed to be materially located in the body of the Negro as a “real distinction 
which nature has made,” (Jefferson, 1785) is a consequence of early pseudoscientific 
postulations and political ideologies about the differences in physical, mental and moral 
characteristics of both whites and blacks. As a respected thinker and politician of his time, 
Thomas Jefferson in his Notes on the State of Virginia (1785) and his Autobiography (1822)107 
merged “biology and politics, science and morals, fact and values, ethics and aesthetics” 
 
106 While I am using irony to cite McGruder (2005) in this conversational aside, it must also be noted that while I 
label the verbal disagreement between G. and his classmate as a nigga moment and use this as a lens through which I 
am analyzing nigga as a Signifyin(g) moment of excess in the classroom, it is also ironic that the disagreement was 
specifically about the utterance nigga.  I will return to this contradiction later in the analysis.   
107 Later Jefferson writes letters to Benjamin Banneker (1791) and Henri Grégoire (1808) commending both on their 
talents and intellect and admitting his own hesitation about the intellectual inferiority of the black race. See Thomas 
Jefferson Letter to Benjamin Banneker, Philadelphia, August 30, 1791 and Letter to Henri Grégoire J. Mss., 
Washington, February 25, 1808. 
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(Appiah, 1996). His contention that the negro “proceed[s] from a want of forethought, which 
prevent their seeing a danger til it be present [which] when present, they do not go through… 
with more coolness or steadiness than the whites,” (Jefferson, 1785) shaped political and social 
discourse about physical, intellectual and emotional distinctions between whites and blacks.  
Likewise, within the discourse of racial anthropology, writers such as Arthur de Gobineau (1853) 
contended that there were distinct physical and intellectual differences between the three 
dominant groups—white, black, and yellow (p. 146)—owing to geographical location, cultural 
development, and religious practices. Based on these distinctions, de Gobineau (1853) contends 
that any intellectual, cultural, artistic, moral or civilized advancement of the negro is individual 
in nature (not group related) and is due to his admixture with a superior European society: “there 
is a great difference between imitation and conviction.  Imitation does not necessarily imply a 
serious breach with hereditary instincts…” (p. 74).  These attributes of the racialized (black 
male) subject, constructed by scientific, anthropological, social, political, physical and 
psychological discourses (Appiah, 1996) during the socio-political climate of the late 18th  and 
mid-19th centuries, are reiterated in the biting social critique of McGruder’s 20th century 
comparison between white men and black men.  
Nigga moment as excitable speech is an example of what Butler (1997a) defines as a 
condensed historicity, simultaneously including past and future invocations that exceed the 
utterance (and/or the utterer) itself.  Through a continuity of use nigga moment links historical 
discourses of biological and genetic racism, i.e., white men and black men inherently behave 
differently due to their blood and color, to a contemporary nonempirical belief system,  
   Nigga moments are like when you’re at the grocery store and someone’s checking out 
and they know good and well they don’t have enough money to pay for their groceries 
but they put em on the belt anyway… and… now they wanna stop the line and hold up 
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traffic at the grocery store because they can’t pay for it.  That’s something that we would 
call a nigga moment. (EE, CC, 20032015)   
 
However, as a performative contradiction, nigga moment is a parody of its discursive 
history.  As an utterance it rhetorically loops back to the historical discourses that constitute the 
binary negro/nigga (not as an individual but as a linguistic category) which in turn subjectivates 
the racialized (black) subject.  As a speech act, McGruder’s nigga moment Signifies on these 
historical discourses through the use of parody and humor. As Signification nigga moment is the 
rhetorical trope of metonymy (Gates, 1988/2014). It is a substitution for a range of discursively 
and socially constructed behaviors applicable to “the behavior of black men who act like 
niggas.”  However, within this metonymical relationship exists metalepsis.  The phrase “acting 
like a nigga” is metalepsis for “acting in an illogical, self-destructive manner” (McGruder, 2005) 
or (as in comedian Chris Rock’s (1996) Bring the Pain) to respond to mundane issues 
nonsensically. Within this metalepsis however, the metonymical use of nigga must be 
understood.  Metonymically nigga is being used as an ethnophaulism which conceptually (and 
literally, I might add) refers to black peoples.  Hence, there is an immediate discursive 
association between responding in an illogical manner to mundane issues and blackness. The 
person who “acts like a nigga” is responding with less steadiness than a white man (Jefferson, 
1785). Thus, the illogical behavior is linked to material color and the racialized (black) subject is 
performatively constructed as nigga. As a metonymical association, nigga moment is understood 
as a particular raced (and gendered) social practice of the nigga (or the negro who inherently has 
aspects of the nigga in him).  While use of the contemporary phrase nigga moment citationally 
refers to constructions of black subjects during the 18th and 19th centuries, as linguisitic practice 
it is delinked due to its “ownership” within a community of racially-marked black speakers.  
Therefore, as speech act, there is a shift in the racist/racialized formation and transmission of 
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knowledge/power. The Signifyin(g) force of nigga moment is its contradictory, performative 
power. 
“In my community if you say nigga you more than likely been through… a few nigga 
moments. Black people just realize it’s a nigga moment and identify with it” (EE, CC, 
20032015). EE’s theory of usage may be one lens through which G.’s anger can be understood.  
G.’s desire to “bust [his classmate’s] ass” was based on his classmate’s response when asked to 
refrain from saying the word nigga108 in class. “You’re not even of my persuasion but you’re 
trying to act, walk and talk like me....”109 (G., CC, 17032014). When I ask G. to articulate what 
‘wants to be black’ means, he rebuffs, “You know what I’m talking about.” Within the midst of 
his telling, “You know he tries to have this swagger.  Tries to wear his pants down around his 
ass.  You know the whole stereotypical black thing.  Baseball cap, hoodie, you know all the stuff 
that you see young black men wearing. That’s what he wanted to wear.” (G., CC, 17032014).  
Ironically, G. does not wear hoodies, baseball caps or sag his pants (at least not on campus),110 
nor does he say (use) the word nigga, indicating that the word takes him back to an earlier time 
when “we were repressed, we did not have a say… we have worked so hard to try to get out of 
that… and when I hear that word it brings all of that back to me.” (G., CC, 17032014).  G.’s 
 
108 While I analyzed this by labelling it a nigga moment, I am in no way diminishing G’s response or his emotional 
value.  I also am not making a claim that his response was illogical, without merit or unnecessary due to the 
mundanity of the situation.  
109 G’s definition of blackness is based upon specific cultural and racialized connotations.  In his comment he 
indicates that someone who “acts, walks and talks like him” (my emphasis) in a specific way is acting black.  The 
irony of this is that G. does not act, walk or talk in the ways that he describes as black.  Yet he includes himself as a 
representative of specific cultural and social norms related to “acting black.” When I challenge G. on these 
conceptualizations, he explains that there are certain things that are black and that black people do . “Every race has 
its own idiosyncracies.”  For G., when a person takes on the characteristics of another race, that is being fake. He 
continues to argue that whites and blacks have specific behavioral differences and that according to one’s race 
people need to “be who you are” even if they live in a neighborhood of a different race.  His argument is that when 
people take on the characteristics of another race, they are not proud of “being who they are.” When “you take on 
the characteristics of another race then you’re being fake and that’s what I don’t like.”  
110 Part of G.’s dress may be due to his military background, but his attire is also reflective of his age.  Having 
chosen to attend college later in life, G. would be categorized as a “non -traditional” student,.  While this was never 
discussed, I suspect that G. is in his mid- to late forties.  
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conflation of his classmate’s desire to be black based on his dress, mannerisms and dailyspeak 
with (in his opinion) the inappropriate usage of nigga in the classroom reveals the paradox and 
absurdity111 of usage itself.  On the one hand, G. abhors the utterance, stating that it is 
unacceptable in the classroom setting and in public spaces (he indicated  he or the person 
would/should remove themselves in a public setting). This is an approach that resonates with 
Asim’s (2007) contention that public decorum requires a politics of respectability 
(Higginbotham, 1992) for the betterment of society writ large, yet through his description of his 
classmate’s decorum, G. also links usage to a material and psychic blackness.  
   ‘You are not black, be who you are… I can’t tolerate that  and I don’t care if it’s a 
negative accent112… don’t try to perpetuate something that you don’t know anything 
about.  You’re not a part of it… I went to a predominantly white high school but that 
doesn’t mean I tried to act white. I am who I am. I’m a black man in a white school. I’m 
not gonna walk like you; I’m not gonna talk like you and I’m proud of that…I don’t 
wanna be like you.’   (G., 03172014)113 
 
G.’s nigga moment-in-the-making is based upon the absurdity of racism (Asim, 2007) in 
the classroom setting. For G., nigga as a semantic loop of nigger, is a racist epithet. To add to the 
absurdity of the epithet is the absurdity of the student’s caricature of blackness, in which his 
attitude, walk, talk, demeanor can be potentially read as a mimicry of blackness, i.e., a type of 
 
111 I use absurdity here in the ways that Jabari Asim (2007) uses it when discussing the absurdity of race.  See Part I, 
Chapter 2 
112 In his tirade G. says, “This little Indian kid… he was Arabic.  Some form of Arab.” It is unknown as to whether 
or not the student is ethnically Indian or Arab, and I do not correct G. and tell him that Indian and Arab are different 
nationalities/ethnicities. 
113 There is much to be said about G.’s explanation of racialized identity; (un)fortunately, my intentions are to 
explore how usage of the utterance nigga constitutes the subject positions of the students (and professor) in this 
moment.  However, G’s ideas about race reveal a continuity with early conceptualizations of race as biological and 
genetic.  In our conversation G. connected ethnic-racial identity to behaviors, dress, decorum, speech patterns and 
language use; hence, this unknown Indian-Arab-Middle Eastern student was not being true to his ethnicity.  As he 
states, “First, you have no concept of the struggle that we went through… based on his ethnicity. Secondly don’t 
come at me like you’re part of my race, cuz you’re not.” G. indicates what he cannot tolerate disrespect, espec ially a 
“kid disrespecting an adult” and what “pisses him off” (his emphasis) is someone who pretends to be something s/he 
is not, i.e., part of a race that s/he has no claim to. He even questions the role of the parents and contends that he [the 
student] probably “acts black” to fit in with his peers; however, for G. social environment does not determine one’s 
authentic ethnic or racial behaviors, “be who you are, don’t pretend to be something you’re not.”  
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blackface.114 Paradoxically, due to the perceived racial makeup of the speaking subject, use of 
nigga in the classroom constitutes the speaker/user as “fakin’ the funk” or “pretending,” a 
characteristic that G. detests. G.’s articulation of his classmate’s appropriation of blackness 
through the articulation of nigga coincidentally reveals the incongruous belief that if nigga is to 
be expressed, it should be expressed by someone who is materially black, “there are certain 
things that are Black and that Black people do.” (G., CC, 17032014).  He indicates that even 
when someone of a different ethnic or racial background lives in a predominantly black 
neighborhood and has lived experience with urban dress or language, that person should not 
assume the “persona” of that racial group. “Every race has its own idiosyncrasies.” (G., CC, 
17032014). 
The irony of this supposed essentialist thinking is particularly reminiscent of the 
polygenists of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries who maintained that distinct racial differences 
existed that determined discrete variations in intellect, genetics, physicality and ultimately social 
order.  As such, the historical discourses of racial and physical anthropology, polygenism, 
eugenics, and racial determinism exist prior to the subject position of G. through which his 
subjectivity is constituted.  I highlight this observation because, in combination, these elements 
constitute the speaking subject as superficially racist,115 which, as Asim (2007) contends, 
“expresses the absurdity of the racists and generates absurdity in the victim,” thus creating in 
 
114 Dating back to as early as Othello, the theatrical caricature of blacks by white actors in early America theater 
began in the 18th century but took root in the 19 th with the infamous Jim Crow characters of the early 1800’s.  This 
practice entailed painting one’s face and hands black with grease paint, burnt cork or shoe polish, enlarging one’s 
lips and exaggerating one’s speech patterns, walk, dress and overall “swagger.” To be clear, I am not accusing this 
student of enacting the historically racist trope of blackface; however, I am placing this within the context of G.’s 
perceptions in order to interrogate my argument of usage in the classroom. 
115 I am also not accusing this student of overt racist behavior; I am merely interrogating the ways in which, through 
my interpretation of G., the student’s language and actions can be potentially perceived as a caricature of Black 
cultural and social norms.  Through this lens, the student’s language, dress and behavior can be perceived as that of 
the minstrel who exaggerates characteristics of Black speech and dress for the purpose of racist humor, for example. 
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blacks a defense mechanism, ‘absurdity to combat absurdity’ (p. 219).  G.’s nigga moment, then, 
can be understood as a defense mechanism meant to combat the absurdity of the constitutive 
effects of racist language and racist behavior.  Through this lens, nigga moment as illogical act 
(McGruder, 2005) instead can be viewed as an act of absurdity,116 as self-defense and/or 
agential. “When you’re in a class with someone for an hour and it’s like ‘hey nigga this,’ ‘my 
nigga that,’ c’mon man, chill wit that.” (G., CC, 17032014). 
It is in this excessive moment that bodies, subjectivities, pleasures, fears, histories and 
power relations overflow the protocols, norms, and forms of the ‘psychically white’ classroom 
space due to the historical and political discourses of race and racism (Orner, Miller and 
Ellsworth, 2005, p. 113). While the speaking subject is not materially marked as white, within 
the white space of the classroom, nigga becomes unsayable and disallowable due to its 
interpellative power as racist speech.  What’s more, while the speaker of nigga is not directly 
addressing (i.e., hailing) G. (nor does he appear to be using nigga as hate speech), the 
performative power of nigga places both speaker and listener in subjection, creating a scene of 
enabling vulnerability (Butler, 1997a).  It is in this vulnerable space that the subject psychically 
experiences melancholia, an irresolvable grief of the historical past that cannot be contained 
within the protocols and norms of the Math class.  This condensed historicity paradoxically 
creates a contradiction in which the utterer’s intended meaning is circumvented, the consequence 
of which is an excessive nigga moment-in-the-making—a moment in which the overflow of 
bodies, subjectivities, pleasures, fears, histories and power relations is due to the absurdity of 
racism.  It is in this excessive moment that Signifyin(g) occurs.  As witness to the speech act of 
the subject, the subject who is symbolically hailed performs an inverted interpellation, 
 
116 I use absurdity based on its connotation within the philosophy of language as something of a paradox that can be 
true, is logically consistent yet contains contradiction, much like Asim’s (2007) argument a bout racism.    
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inaugurated in speech to counter the offensive call (Butler, 1997a).  In this instance the speaking 
subject is dissed or in the words of G. himself, “I actually had to punk him.”  Hence it is through 
the Signifyin(g) speech act of putting down and sounding117 that the event known as a nigga 
moment118 occurs.  It is through these rhetorical strategies that the melancholic subject 
disincorporates the sovereign authority (Bhaba, 1992) of nigga, thus establishing a “new form of 
agency” (Bhaba, 1992), i.e., the nigga moment-in-the-making.  
As noted in the footnotes below, a nigga moment is both discursive act and rhetorical 
trope. As rhetorical trope (Signification) it identifies specific characteristics of a designated event 
within Black speech.  As discursive act (performative) it constitutes the subject in partial and 
incomplete ways based on context, situation and perspective. Yet within the psychic white space 
of the classroom, specifically the situated, contingent space of G.’s math class, both nigga and 
nigga moment are excessive, disrupting the normative grid of whiteness that contains and 
constrains.   G.’s confrontation (his word) with his classmate causes the entire class to 
psychically shift—everyone, including the professor, stops and waits in shocked silence for G.’s 
(and his antagonist’s) next move.  “The professor stopped. He looked and I said, ‘Excuse me 
professor, no disrespect, but I’m about ready to buss his ass and I’m telling you right now’” (G., 
CC,17032014). As a Signifyin(g) performative, nigga disrupts the psychic space of the semantic 
x-axis known as Standard American English. ‘Yo my nigga,’ located on the y-z axis of Black 
Vernacular English is disallowable in this space based on its disruption of the syntagmatic chain 
 
117 Dissing, punking, putting down and sounding (sounding off in some linguistic circles) are listed as figures of 
Signification by Gates (1988/2014).  Citing Roger D. Abrahams text Talking Black, Gates contends that 
“Signifyin(g) is primarily a term for rhetorical strategies… often called by other names depending on which… form 
it takes… ‘signifying… [is]… a term not only for a way of speaking but for a rhetorical strategy that may be 
characteristic of a number of other designated events.’” (p. 84 -85) On the y-z axis of SBAE and BVE these figures 
of Signification are both syntagmatic and paradigmatic, both speech acts and linguistic conduct.    
118 Paradoxically, nigga moment is also a figure of Signification.  It is a  rhetorical speech event that encapsulates 
figures of rhetoric in black speech as well.  
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(Easthope, 1983, cited in Gates, 2014, p. 65) of SAE.  As stated previously, G. is not being 
directly addressed (as said student indicated by his statement “I wasn’t talking to you” when G. 
asked him to stop saying nigga); therefore, much like Gates’(1988/2014) literary argument about 
disruption as rhetorical substitution, within the classroom space of semantics (a psychically 
white space), nigga offers no fixed position of the receiver as subject of the discursive act. 
Nigga’s location on the rhetorical y-z axis of Black English as well as the opacity of the speech 
event disrupts linguistic whiteness, thus establishing an excessive moment-in-the-making in the 
classroom.    
As well, within the discursive act of disruption, nigga’s condensed historicity places the 
racialized (Black) subject in melancholic subjection.  For G., nigga is a sign of disrespect and 
nonconformity operating within the classroom, “we all conformed to the rules of the 
classroom…” (G., CC, 17032014).  Hence, the indoctrination of discipline, self-regulation and 
social control was disrupted by the speech act of the speaker. In order to regain or reassert 
conformity in the face of the absurdity of racism (from both the utterance and the speaker) the 
melancholic subject must turn in a moment of recognition.119 Yet in turning, the melancholic 
subject ruptures the rhetorical ritualization of disruption and substitution. Through rhetorical 
disciplining, i.e., punkin’, dissin’ and soundin’, which also exceeds the grid of the classroom, the 
melancholic wrests nigga from the classroom space and agentially Siginifies through the creation 
 
119 It should be noted that G. felt as though his professor was not “man enough” to handle the situation so he had to. 
According to G. the professor appeared “non-confrontational;” however, it is the responsibility of the professor “to 
keep control (my emphasis) of his students and to ensure that nothing is said or done that would infringe on the 
liberties or freedoms of any other student…There’s certain things that as men you just don’t do, or you can’t accept. 
If you’re a teacher, any kind of teacher, if you’re in a position of authority you can’t allow your authority to be 
jeopardized for any reason regardless of the situation.  I feel that because I am an older black man even though you 
are my teacher, especially with this professor, you weren’t man enough to handle this situation, so I had to.  Now 
does that mean that I disrespect you?  No.  I respect your authority as a teacher.  But as a man, that’s something 
totally different” (G., CC, 17032014). I believe that further theorization of the categories “pro fessor” and “man” 
need to be attended to in further inquiry. 
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of a nigga moment-in-the-making, one in which the racialized (black) subject articulates his 
psychic ambivalence by simultaneously accepting and rejecting (i.e., disrupting and conforming 
to) the psychic space of the classroom.  This form of discipline and disruption is indicative of 
horizontal power relationships in which students manage themselves and their peers, a form of 
governmentality (Foucault, 1978) in which bodies internalize forms of social control within the 
institutionalization of the classroom and govern themselves and others accordingly.  
G.’s choice to manage his classmate is based upon institutional norms of what is sayable 
and acceptable within the classroom space. He does this through his own use of Signifyin(g) 
rhetoric: “So I squared on him and I said, ‘What?! Do you still have beef!?!’” (G., 
CC,17032014). Within the situated, contingent classroom space of G.’s math class, nigga as 
Signifyin(g) performative disrupted the syntagmatic x-axis of SAE and its constitutive elements 
as Black speech, consequently disrupting the psychic white space of the classroom.  In turn the 
rhetorical response of G. enabled a type of classroom agency in which the normative behaviors 
of conformity and regulation reasserted itself, for as G. admitted, after that interaction the student 
“calmed down.”120  I label this a nigga moment based on the complexity, irony, and 
contradictions at play in language use within a discursively constructed “reality” as well as based 
on McGruder’s satirical construction of the racialized black male subject as always already 
irrational and violent.  While Negro constitutes the racialized black male as logical, rational and 
composed (G. as retired marine and older student), nigga constitutes the black male subject as 
illogical, irrational and self-destructive (G. ready to ‘bust his ass’). However, while I label this 
 
120 G. admits that the student’s behavior did not completely change.  After this incident the class began to complain 
and the professor managed the situation by asking the student to leave.  This solution however was temporary in that 
the student would hand in his assignments, leave the class, only to return the next day with a quieter version of the 




interaction a nigga moment, unlike McGruder, I think of this moment as defined by EE (CC, 
2015): 
   It’s something that’s trivial that gets blown out of proportion in a negative light... but 
there’s a purpose behind it, so there’s a reason behind you having those feelings and even 
though they might not necessarily be what you think of as positive feelings they actually 
do come from a positive place… like outrage and things like that… its vanity, its pride, 
those are the basis for feelings in nigga moments. 
 
While nigga moment as defined by McGruder connotes a negative effect, which is the 
linguistic construction of a particular event designated to those events, spaces, contexts in which 
illogical acts between black men occur, the nigga moment in-the-making that I describe can be 
interpreted as a discursive representation of experience (Scott, 1991). It constitutes a racialized 
subjection of the materially black subject only because black people recognize a nigga moment. 
Yet, nigga moment is fluid, unstable, unfixed, evident in conflicting articulations and divergent 
constructions of situated contexts. EE’s elucidation of a nigga moment as an event that 
potentially comes from a “positive place” acts as a metacitation that reveals limitless 
interpretations and contestations.   
If I may provide an alternative definition then, a nigga moment is a discursively 
constructed experience, event, occurrence based on multiply intersecting context(s), audience(s), 
power, social and individual practice(s) impacted by competing, contested discourses.  However, 
even this definition is limited.  A nigga moment is only possible through continual repetition and 
reiteration.  Both nigga and its moments are in excess, including past and future connotations 
that are multiple, complicated, unstable and unlimited.  It  is a construction of knowledge of a 
particular social practice as well as an exercise in language precisely because it brings into 
existence a particular (racialized) experience.  It precedes the event it both names and describes.  
It is a moment where ‘the absurdity of the victim combats the absurdity of the racist.’ It is a 
208 
 
moment of disruption, substitution, and Signification.  It is a moment of irrational and absurd 
agency, a “mental constellation of revolt” (Bhaba, 1992, p.65).  It is an in-the-making moment… 
in-the-making because it is a situated moment, specific and unrepeatable, and fraught with 
context, discourses, identities and social and cultural relations of similarity and difference 





Chapter 8: To Teach or not to Teach… A Truly American Word in 
a Truly American Institution 
What, one wants to ask, are Americans alienated from? What are Americans always so 
insistently innocent of? Different from? As for absolute power, over whom is the power held, 
from whom withheld, to whom distributed?     —Toni Morrison 
 
I read: “You sho is one aggravatin’ nigger woman!” (Hurston, 1926).  There is a ‘whoa’ 
and a few murmured exclamations from the female students in the room. “Um…so there we are, 
dealing with the N-Word121 in our class.” (Dr. C., Observation, (Obs.) 062019). It is the 
inaugural performance of nigger in the classroom, spoken by Sykes to his wife Delia, spoken by 
me to a class of students and their professor. In my mouth, nigger as slur is sayable, as it is also 
sayable by the character Sykes, a Black husband speaking to his also Black wife. In Dr. C’s 
mouth, nigger is translated to ‘the N-Word.’  At the level of utterance, Dr. C’s metonymic 
substitution is still a type of use. While Dr. C. “will never allow herself to say it,” it is Killer 
Mike who claims saying the N word is like saying nigga—everyone knows what you’re 
thinking, everyone is thinking the same thing.  Even within the confines of the text, Dr. C. will 
not read  the word nigger.  
   ‘So de white man throw down de load and tell de N man tuh pick it up. He pick it up 
because he has to, but he don’t tote it. He hand it to his womenfolks… what Hurston says 
is… the black woman has to pick up that burden because it has to be picked up… I 
think… one of the most profound things she ever said was the idea that the N woman is 
the mule of the world” (Dr. C., OBS 17062019).122 
  
 
121 Dr. C. does not say nigger or any derivative of nigger. At one point she read niggardly in Hurston’s work and prior to its 
reading said, “I’m gonna say it,” as a trigger warning for a word that sounded like nigger but has no connection to the racial 
epithet.   She has made this crystal clear by apologizing profusely each time she is met by nigga in the text. In contrast, I am free 
to say nigger and nigguh as an observer and visitor to her classroom.   
122 It should be noted that I read this same passage to the class verbatim. 
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For Dr. C. the utterance nigger-nigguh123 is unsayable and disallowable, even within the 
context of the literary text or as part of an academic discussion. Syntagmatically the N-word 
replaces nigger-nigga on the x-axis of SAE; while not rhetorical it substitutes as an allowable 
euphemism. This substitution, however, is only semantic replacing nigga within the structure of 
the sentence and within the discursive universe of standard (white) English. Unlike the 
Signifyin(g) performative nigga itself “the N-word” does not trope, nor is it part of the discursive 
universe of SBAE or BVE.  Instead, its use as substitution is the effect of a racist discourse 
which precedes the speaking subject, i.e., a belated metalepsis (Butler, 1997a), a discourse which 
the speaking subject discursively refutes.  This refutation is based on the installation of the 
speaking subject as the site of injury. Use is ruptured as the utterer is constituted on the basis of 
the insult as opposed to the citationality of the original slur or usage. Dr. C’s (non)use usage is 
based on her belief that she will commit an infraction which would then fall into a regulatory 
domain and disciplining of the speaking subject by the sovereign power of the State, in this case 
the Administration and/or Board and/or Hearing and Appeals Committee of the college.  
However, while I contend that use is ruptured due to the possibility of a future (un)knowable 
infraction, nigger-nigga is still in use through the euphemistic substitution of the N-word.  
Hence, while Dr. C. says the N-word, like Paul Mooney and Killer Mike contend the receiver 
thinks and/or knows and/or accepts this euphemism as nigger or nigga. In use the N-word 
ensures that speech is not prosecuted as conduct124 and that the site of injury remains within the 
text itself, attributable instead to the characters of Hurston’s text. Conversely, I can read nigger 
 
123 While I have used the -a ending of nigger up until this point, I purposely use the -uh ending as Hurston does in 
her text.  
124 Throughout the chapter, my use of the word conduct is based on Butler’s (1997a) definition:  a  “…kind of 
speech that acts, but it is also referred to as a kind of speech that acts… hate speech may be a saying that is a  kind of 
doing or a kind of conduct, it can be established as such only through a language that authoritatively describes this 
doing for us…” (p. 96).   
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while Dr. C. cannot because in the psychic space of the classroom, my usage is not interpreted as 
conduct. Ironically, while my speech is protected in a myriad of ways, both on and off campus, 
my skin is not.  
“Miss Watson kept pecking at me and it got tiresome and lonesome. By and by they 
fetched the niggers in and had prayers, and then everybody was off to bed.” (Prof. C., Obs., 
17062019)  In Prof. C’s class there was no trigger warning, no apology, no hesitation, or stutter. I 
am following along, appreciating Prof. C.’s affected Missourean drawl of 14-year old Huck, until 
such time when I simultaneously read and hear nigger (not nigga which I hear much more often).  
I look up expectantly, shocked actually, searching for an intake of breath, an uncomfortable seat 
shift, an “ahem,” or at the very least a glance in my direction (one much like the Latinx student 
does in Dr. C’s class every time nigger, nigguh, niggah or any other conversation about Black 
Americanisms comes up in class). He stops. His voice changes; it drops in register and takes on 
the authorial voice of professor.  He is Prof. C., not Huck. “That’s the first time we see the word. 
The first time it appears in the text. And notice it’s not used in anger. It’s not used as a deliberate 
insult.” (Obs. 17062019) Without apology or announcement Prof. C. has read the text verbatim, 
a white man, reading a text by a white male author about a white male character who literally 
says nigger in reference to the Black characters (slaves) in the story.  No student in the class 
seems to be affronted by Prof. C.’s interpretation of Huck’s usage, actually there appears to be 
little if any movement at all.  Instead, I note the stoic pose and intense stare of the one racially 
marked Black man who sits with arms crossed, book open two rows from the front, and I 
interpret his intensity as disbelief. Prof. C.’s reading of nigger  (not even nigga) receives little 
comment:  
   ‘And this would have been the practice. Let’s get everybody together for a prayer. Now 
again the idea is nominally at least, that the slave holder believes that his slave is not as 
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human as he is and I’m not a hundred percent certain that that slave holder would see one 
of the family slaves as having a redeemable soul. As being eligible for sanctification or 
salvation for that matter.’  
 
“So why pray with them?”  
“Yeah exactly, why pray? Maybe it saves their Christian conscious.”  
“Yeah” 
 “So why wouldn’t he use the word slave instead?” a black male student asks. 
   “Because the N-word as we try to euthanize it was a common word in common speech 
by people in Huck Finn’s social class and certainly in Tom Sawyer’s social class. 
Sometimes it can be used insultingly. Sometimes it can be used in anger. But for the most 
part the way Clemens uses it throughout the book is a simple description, and you know I 
don’t mean to undercut the horror of the word. I don’t even try to undercut the horror of 
the word, it’s a simple description” (Obs. 17062019).  
 
It is through this example we see a distinction in use.  In conversation Prof. C. says the 
N-word; however, when reading, Prof. C. says nigger, citing verbatim what is on the page.  In 
this case the argument that nigger should not be said, cited, or read by a white professor under 
any circumstances125 is vacuous. Prof. C., who has been teaching at the college for over thirty 
years, reads nigger through the eyes of Huck, Jim, Tom and ultimately Mark Twain (Samuel 
Langhorne Clemens126) himself.  Why then is Prof. C. an exception to the norm?  More to the 
 
125 While I cannot contend that this argument is supported by all African Americans, there is a general consensus 
among people of color that nigga “belongs” to African Americans and nigger, its distant cousin,  should never be 
spoken except in rare cases by African Americans.  While this is a  general belief, I have observed that many Latinx 
youth and youth of color also say nigga.  However, I have found that this commonsense notion of use is the 
predominant theme and/or topic of conversation; nigger and nigga are primarily discussed based on who can or 
cannot say it, with the dominant reason being that one’s physical markings (skin color) determine this.  
126 Born Samuel Langhorn Clemens, Mark Twain was a pen name that he invented first to shield his identity while 
writing some sketches about the Nevada territorial legislature. Through this name he developed a reputation and 
became known as Mark Twain.  Prof. C. indicates that when talking about the man he calls him Clemens; however 
he calls him Mark Twain when talking about the creation of Mark Twain as a persona, as a literary character. 
According to Prof. C. Clemens referred to himself as Mark Twain. “In fact in anecdote in the 1890’s, the late 1890’s 
the entire Clemens family was staying in Austria for the about 20 months. Listed under name he would write Samuel 
L Clemens, under home he writes Hartford, Connecticut and under occupa tion he writes Mark Twain. Being Mark 
Twain became what he did. Mark Twain was very definitely a public figure. That’s essentially what Samuel 
Clemens does; Mark Twain is his twin status, Samuel Langhorn Clemens cut in two and sharing himself with this 
character he called Mark Twain.” (OBS. 062019) 
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point, what other exceptions exist across university campuses, exceptions which receive no local, 
state or national coverage in Higher Education magazines?  It is no coincidence that public 
discourse about nigger in Higher Education focuses on those cases in which the professor is 
reprimanded or disciplined due to his/her saying of nigger-nigga in the classroom setting.  Yet 
what of those examples where a white professor says nigger-nigga and no action by students or 
the “State” is taken? Or those cases in which a Higher Education committee takes no recourse? 
Kennedy (2003) contends that appropriateness or inappropriateness should not be the crux of an 
exploration of nigger/a/ah.  Instead, nigger-nigga represents a “rhetoric of complexity” (p. 138),  
which “emerges as a postulated and open-ended ideal that has not been adequately encoded by 
any given set of legal convention” (Butler, 1997a, p. 90).  Unfortunately, evidence of these cases 
is limited, excepting my observation of it in Prof. C.’s class.  Hence, if the sum total of sayability 
and allowability has boiled down to the racial markings of the speaking subject,127 why has Prof. 
C.  been allowed to read nigger for the 30-something years he has taught at the college without 
any disciplinary action? “Every time I walk by his classroom I cringe.  And then I look inside 
and see brothas sitting there looking pissed as shit,” confided one colleague.  Yet this colleague 
(or those students) never felt the need to have a discussion with Prof. C. or to complain about his 
vociferous reading of the text.128   
Based on my observations Prof. C.’s reading of nigger is allowable since, as a Twain 
scholar, Huck Finn is a seminal text in his literature classes, and his teaching /lecturing of the 
text is historical knowledge at the college.   Yet his discrimination between reading the text (i.e., 
nigger)  and teaching the text (i.e., the N-word) are significant.  Prof. C. does not address the 
 
127 To be clear, I am in no way justifying or opposing the sayability of nigger-nigga by persons of color or not of 
color, nor am I contending that this word should or should not be part of American English parlanc e.  However, I 
arguing for a much more nuanced assessment, argument and analysis of use, especially in the college classroom. 
128 Also of note, Prof. C. rarely, if ever, closes his classroom door.  Anyone walking down the hall can hear him. 
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class or anyone in the class with the utterance nigger, thus avoiding a possible infraction as the 
site of injury.  However in reading the utterance, Prof. C. in voice, cadence, and accent attempts 
to mimic the dialect of the characters of the time thus performing the text. This aural move by 
Prof. C. highlights much of the discussion surrounding Twain’s stylistic choices. While Twain’s 
choices for distinctions in dialect have been condemned as “…a low grade of morality; it is 
couched in the language of a rough, ignorant dialect…systematic use of bad grammar and an 
employment of rough coarse, inelegant expressions” (Fischer et al., 2003, p. xxiv), the same 
dialects have also been lauded due to Twain’s portrayal of “…riverside people who ‘do not have 
the air of being invented, but of being found.’” (p. xxv).  Twain is commended for his ability to 
write “actual speech” and in so doing nigger is deployed by Prof. C. as it would have been 
spoken by the people of this time period, fear of present-day infraction aside.  Clemmons even 
introduces the text with an explanatory note to the reader, one that Prof. C. capitalizes on through 
his alterations in voice, accent and register: 
   In this book a number of dialects are used, to wit: the Missouri negro dialect, the 
extremest form of the backwoods South-Western dialect; the ordinary “Pike-County” 
dialect; and four modified varieties of this last. The shadings have not been done in a 
hap-hazard fashion, or by guess-work; but pains-takingly, and with the trustworthy 
guidance and support of personal familiarity with these several forms of speech.  
   I make this explanation for the reason that without it many readers would suppose that 
all these characters were trying to talk alike and not succeeding. –The Author. (Twain, 
1884/2010, n.p.) 
 
While Prof. C. admits that he is not “an expert of dialects,” he has written an article based 
on the theories of experts of Twain’s dialects who have taken apart the narrative and note that 
Clemens’ characters do speak differently.129  Specifically, the three main characters— Huck, Jim 
 
129 Prof C. notes,  “…you start to notice that the Duke and the Kings speaks differently, and they too speak differently from 
Huck, and that Silas Phelps in Arkansas speaks differently than a Missouri native… [Clemens] creates a little joke. Questioning 
as always with every attempt at humor, there’s a serious undertone. The idea that most readers won’t really get [is] how hard 
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and Tom—occupy three distinct social classes which determine their distinct speech patterns. 
“What dialect they use. What words they use. Often social class determines education which 
determines the size of individuals’ vocabulary [and] affects how [they] speak as well.” (Prof. C., 
Obs., 062019).  While Clemens painstakingly worked to reproduce an oral tradition based on 
geographic location, social class and race, nigger is a term that crosses all class and racial 
boundaries in the text. This includes Jim’s use of nigger which is evidence of Twain’s 
construction of parlance of the early 1800s. “You know dat one-laigged nigger dat b’longs to ole 
Misto Brandish?... all de niggers went in… en I said, ‘f I didn’ git it I’d start a bank 
myself…o’course dat nigger want to keep me out…” (Twain, 1884/2010, p. 55).  While the elite 
black middle-class sought to suppress the use of nigger as a form of linguistic repression and 
hate, nigger was frequently used by laborers, and prior to Emancipation, slaves used the word 
self-referentially and in conversation with and about others. 
   …the word became virulent precisely because black laborers integrated it into their 
own vocabularies… the label carried so much discursive weight because black laborers 
spoke it, self-identified as such, and by so doing, subverted notions of race and class 
identity in the United States.  In turn, whites disavowed the words traceable European 
origins, and by the 1820s largely used it to mock black speech.  They placed the onus of 
black subordination on black people themselves, using African American vernacular to 
make inequality appear both logical and natural (Pryor, 2016, p. 206) 
 
Nigger took on slanderous proportions by whites who not only used the utterance against 
blacks, but also misappropriated it as part of black speech. Yet slaves and laborers’ early use of 
nigger reveals forms of Signifyin(g) by those who troped racist usage by laying claim to it within 
their own dailyspeak.  In doing so nigger as slur took on new rhetorical meanings based on 
specific speech events within a black community of speakers. Twain’s invocation of nigger as 
 
Mark Twain worked, how hard Clemens worked. [This is] the genius at reproducing orality [and] the oral tradition. And his 




actual speech of the character Jim (as well as Huck and others) reveals a complexity of usage and 
rhetorical strategies that exceed one-dimensional slurring.   
In early parlance, nigger in all of its varied spellings—negar, nigur, niger, or negre—was 
used as a term synonymous with black.130 Later it was used as a distinction amongst classes 
serving as nomenclature for the specific labor class known as slaves. Yet the “neutral” 
denotation of niger took on derogatory connotations and became the go-to term for 
institutionalized racism by 1775 (Pryor, 2016). As Pryor (2016) contends the transition of nigger 
from descriptor to category to pejorative is based on several factors.131  Of course, racism existed 
prior to nigger as epithet; however the transition from nig[g]er as descriptor/category to nigger 
as degradation reveals the shift in the discourses which governed the body politic of both blacks 
and whites.  Hence, while slavery allowed for sharp demarcation between the master and slave, 
during which time the slave, viewed as subhuman, was identified/catalogued/inventoried as 
nigger similar to other necessary commodities for production such as a horse, dog, cow, or pig, 
nigger as epithet was a response to a later shift in discourses surrounding freedom, citizenship, 
and “inalienable rights,” which now included the previously enslaved and their descendants.  
Writing about the “approbrious” usage of nigger in the North as a way to humiliate colored 
 
130 Contemporary spellings derive from the Latin niger and in Spanish and Portuguese negro, a common term used 
as a descriptor for a black person.  According to Roberto Carlos Garica (2018) in his essay “black/Maybe.” “What 
you mean when you say the word Negro depends heavily on the modifier because Latinos call each other Negro  all 
the time: Negrito lindo (black and pretty), mi Negro (my black friend/brother), or maldito Negro (damned black 
guy)… slurs like cocolo, and monokiquillo (basically monkey) [were used] when referring to African Americans or 
other people with strong African features.” (p. 57).   
131As Pryor (2016) notes, “by the 1820s blackness, not slavery, marked people of color as occupying a fixed social 
class… the word nigger became a slur in conversation with black social aspiration ” (p. 205). H er focus on nigger in 
the antebellum North highlights whites’ desire to contain and constrain the movements of free blacks through a 
process of linguistic castration.   Nigger as descriptor turned epithet terrorized individuals as blacks sought and acted 
upon civil liberties and freedoms of the country they were born in and felt they had a right to.  Serving as an 
umbrella term, nigger expressed the sum total derision of white society at the time. Pilgrim and Middleton (2001) 
write that nigger served as shorthand for the caricatures of the Coon, Brute, Tom and Mammy; hence, while each 
possessed different attributes—from the slovenly, lazy character of Stepin Fetchit to the violent, ape-like Bigger 
Thomas and the childlike inferiority of Uncle Tom and Aunt Chloe—all were viewed as having debased “moral, 
intellectual, social and physical characteristics.”  (Pilgrim and Middleton, 2001). 
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people132 and “impose contempt upon them as an inferior race” (p. 38) Hosea Easton (1837) 
reveals that from infancy nigger was embedded in the disciplinary and socialization tactics 
taught to children by parents and teachers,133 through which, embedded in their psyche, it 
became a function of their discursive reality.  As a disciplinary technique, nigger was used by 
parents and teachers to control behavior, inculcate morals, teach lessons, and impart values. 
Ranging from scare tactics such as “the old nigger will care you off…the old nigger’s coming” 
(Easton, 1837, p. 41) to chastisement “you are worse than a little nigger” (p. 41) to moral 
instruction, which if not followed will result in becoming poor like a nigger, ignorant like a 
nigger or resembling a nigger, this form of instruction served to construct colored people 
(collectively) as base and immoral, frightening and grotesque.  As Pryor (2016) observes, 
“children absorbed their racial lessons and reacted with open hostility when they saw real black 
people.” (p. 204).  This is illustrated in fictional texts such as Flannery O’Connor’s (1955) “The 
Artificial Nigger,”134 a story about a grandfather, Mr. Head, who takes his grandson, Nelson, on 
 
132 I use this term as Easton himself uses it during the 19 th Century. 
133 See Pryor, E. S. (2016) The etymology of nigger: Resistance, language and the politics of freedom in the 
Antebellum North. Journal of the Early Republic, 36(2), 203-245. 
134 O’Connor inserts two symbolic representations of racial discourse during the 1950’s which reiterates the 
arguments of Easton (1837) and the research of Pryor (2016). The first of these is the image of the black lawn 
jockey statue dressed in a brightly colored horse jockey uniform. The statue could be a metaphor for the lawn jockey 
statue often placed on the lawns of white middle class suburba n homes during the first half of the 19 th Century.  
Various origin stories of the lawn jockey range from the “myth” of Jocko Graves, a  loyal slave of George 
Washington during the Revolutionary War to markers of safe houses along the Underground Railroad.  For more 
information on the black lawn jockey see the website for the Jim Crow Museum of Racist Memorabilia, Ferris State 
University, (www.ferris.edu).  The second is the watermelon held by the lawn jockey. The watermelon fruit as a 
racist stereotype linked to free blacks in the mid- to late- 19th Century, continues to conjure racist stereotypes about 
African Americans in the 21st Century. For example, in a 2014 satire about a fence jumper in the White House, the  
Boston Herald featured a cartoon in which the intruder is in the WH bathtub asking Obama if he tried the 
watermelon toothpaste. During slavery enslaved blacks were given license to grow and sell watermelons by their 
master who saw this as a benevolent act bestowed upon children.  However, post-Civil War the watermelon became 
a cash crop for free black Americans who grew, ate and sold these as a source of economic freedom and stability.  
Hence, the watermelon became a symbol for freedom (Black, 2014).  For white Southerners however, the 
watermelon became a symbol of their fear and hatred of the black emancipated body.  As a result, whites used the 
imagery of watermelon against blacks by constructing it as a symbol of black slovenliness, laziness and 
childishness.   See Black, W. R. (2014, December 8) “How watermelons became a racist trope: Before its subversion 
in the Jim Crow era, the fruit symbolized black self -sufficiency”. The Atlantic. 
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a trip from their rural area of Georgia to the urban sprawl of Atlanta in order to see a nigger, 
“’You ain’t ever seen a nigger…’ ‘There hasn’t been one in this county since we run that one out 
twelve years ago…’” (O’Connor, 1955, p. 261). Mr. Head’s slurring, as both speech and 
conduct, is meant to parallel anti-black sentiment exhibited by whites in both the North and 
South who deployed nigger in order to prevent social mobility, construct rigid boundaries for 
whiteness, and police/cleanse public space (Pryor, 2016).    
In contrast, Huck’s expedition and relationship with the escaped slave Jim reveals the 
complex relationship between speech and conduct.  Having been taught about niggers from his 
father, Pap, “…prowling, thieving, infernal, white-shirted… nigger” (Twain, 1884/2010, p. 34) 
Huck develops a relationship with Jim antithetical to his teaching and upbringing by the adults 
around him. Instead, his relationship impels him to lie and manipulate the (usually white) people 
they meet enroute to the convergence of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers and eventual 
freedom.135 In order to do so, Huck must speak the language of the time (including the utterance 
nigger). Hence, while in speech Huck says nigger, in conduct this young white boy acts as an 
early abolitionist, remaining near Jim even after he is captured and devising a plan to free him 
from captivity.  Prof. C.’s comment “it’s a simple description” while potentially dismissive of 
the complexitites of nigger (he admits that his intention is not to undercut the horror of the word) 
is situated within the discursive reality of the text.  And while this discursive reality is a 
construction of knowledge/power in 1834 Missouri, it is a metaphorical reality situated  within 
the literal reality of 21st century sensibilities.  Prof. C.’s ability to read nigger, even as descriptor, 
 
135 While there is much to dissect in the relationship between Huck and  Jim, my superficial analysis of this 
relationship is meant to show how Huck’s intentions do not cohere with his use of the word nigger.  
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disrupts current discourse about the ownership of nigger-nigga, allowability and sayability by 
white professors in Higher Education, and the current efforts to sanitize Huck Finn.136 
In recent years, there has been much debate about appropriate usage in the university 
classroom.  Shannon Dea’s (2020) article “Academic Freedom and the N-word” highlights the 
complexities of this issue.  In response to the recent anti-racism movement in the United States, 
St. Jerome’s University at University of Waterloo in Ontario, CN issued a statement that read, 
“The University of Waterloo unequivocally believes that there is no place for the use of the n-
word in class, on campus or in our community” (Dea, 2020, para. 4).  While on its surface this 
statement reveals the administration’s strategy for controlling potential violations of hate speech, 
particularly in the classroom, the statement produced an altering effect.  Black professors 
criticized administration for their universalizing approach to what could on the surface be 
considered censorship.  Apparently, many Black professors such as Vershawn Ashanti Young 
(2007), author of Your Average Nigga, incorporate the N-word in their classes as part of their 
focus on antiracist scholarship, research and pedagogy. For these professors, St. Jerome’s policy 
marginalizes them and their scholarship at an institution where they are already in the minority 
and calls into question the psychically white concept of academic freedom.  The complexity of 
this issue reveals Butler’s (1997a) articulation about the regulation of hate speech (or speech that 
is received as racist, hateful, derogatory or degrading) in the public domain.  Butler (1997a) 
contends that while rights activists of the past focused on physical and concrete forms of 
discrimination (i.e., direct and structural discrimination), present day concerns are located within 
 
136 See John H. Wallace’s (1992) “The Case against Huck Finn” in Satire or Evasion? Black Perspectives on Huckleberry Finn.  
Wallace was one of the first to count the number of times nigger appeared in the novel.  He claimed that Huckleberry Finn is not 
a book which should be used in middle schools and high schools. “I found myself agreeing with him 100%… I mean it’s going to 
take extraordinary complex narrative that describes essentially a simple allegory… It is a book which is just loaded with examples  




the linguistic sphere where “we are no longer considering what constitutes hate speech, but, 
rather, the broader category of what constitutes a reasonable criteria by which protected speech is 
distinguishable from unprotected speech” (p. 88).  
At Central Michigan University (CMU) the contradictory power of speech vs. conduct 
arises when one examines the case of journalism professor Tim Boudreau who was released after 
“saying the n-word twice… in a 2017 media law lecture on ‘Hate Speech and Speech Codes at 
Universities’” (Ruf, 2020, para. 3-4). A student in class posted footage on her Instagram with the 
caption “Why does he say things like this” (Ruf, 2020, para. 3) as well as an image of Boudreau 
standing next to a PowerPoint which had two additional slurs on it.  Ironically in his lesson 
Boudreau was using the example from former CMU basketball coach Keith Dambrot who was 
released in 1993 for racial slurring.  Dambrot later sued the college indicating that his First 
Amendment rights had been violated (Ruf, 2020). In the case of Boudreau, it is the State,137 
based on the evidence of the Instagram post and video, which determined that his lesson about 
hate speech was in fact conduct in which he expressed hate speech, yet his subsequent dismissal 
contradicts The Professional Standard of the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom 
and Tenure as written by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and 
adopted by colleges and universities nationwide. While part of the tenets of academic freedom 
entails that “College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned profession, and 
officers of an educational institution. When they speak or write as citizens, they should be free 
from institutional censorship or discipline…” (as cited in Euben, 2020). Boudreau’s subsequent 
dismissal highlights Anderson and Lepore’s (2013) argument that, “slurring is non-displaceable: 
 
137 In terms of my analysis, State refers to those governing bodies established and operating within Higher Ed 
institutions which develop and enforce policies and procedures with regards to speech and conduct for faculty, staff 
and students on campus. 
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a current use of a slur cannot be employed to discuss a past or future use without incurring a 
current infraction.” (p. 30).  The State is only able to prosecute an infraction through modern-day 
versions of governmentality (Foucault, 1978) through which the utterer is surveilled by the very 
subjects who are indoctrinated into the psychic white space of the university as well.   
This is not a justification for saying, reading or quoting nigger-nigga. Instead I am 
pointing to the ways in which the citizenry (students) of the State (academic institution) seek 
redress to an authority which historically constructed racist discourses that created the discursive 
reality of nigger. While Anderson and Lepore (2013) contend that “in academic discussions… 
much of what seems suitable is definitely not,” (p. 31) what this allows for are interpretations of 
nigger-nigga as a type of conduct (i.e., racial slurring) through the eyes and ears of its citizens 
who then appeal to the State for disciplinary action.  Speech as conduct is now governed and 
governable within horizontal relationships between those classified, categorized and regulated 
within the institutions of Higher Ed (the State).  The contradiction in this, then, is twofold: 1) the 
State is always, already linguistically privileged with the power of determining what constitutes 
hate speech, and 2) the citizen of such speech is always, already positioned as the site of such 
speech. Paradoxically, this form of governmentality mimics sovereign power and sovereign 
agency, with citizens thus enforcing and supporting the indoctrination of control through 
methods ironically constructed by the State Apparatus in the first place.    
Contradictory policies and regulations do not end here.   Under the Second Amendment 
of the United States Constitution there is currently no regulation of hate speech.  The categories 
listed under unprotected speech are obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, fighting words, true 
threats, speech integral to criminal conduct and child pornography (Congressional Research 
Service).  Nigger was initially used by wealthy, educated, white men (the slave trader, the 
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plantation owner, the Founding Fathers, the segregationists, the politicians, the judges, lawyers 
and academics), the same men who crafted the Constitution and established the Rule of Law in 
the United States.  Hence, while nigger (or other racial slurs) performatively acted as hate speech 
and thus as conduct of the speaker, historically it was not prosecuted as hate speech.  As well, 
under the fighting words doctrine there are no clear-cut laws pertaining to hate speech, racist 
speech, or racial slurs.  The fighting words doctrine, established in 1942 in Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, is defined by the United States Supreme Court as “certain...classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional 
problem.” (Kennedy, 2003, p. 54).  Fighting words are those words that "by their very utterance 
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace” (Kennedy, 2003, p. 54).  
Under this doctrine then, Boudreau’s utterance could be classified as fighting words. 
Fighting words could also be applied to the case of Eric Triffin, Southern Connecticut State 
University (SCSU) adjunct professor of public health, who was suspended after singing along to 
a song played by a student in class; the song included the N-word. While Triffin’s singing and 
dancing was common practice (he often began his class by asking a student to play a song to 
which they sang and danced), on this particular occasion Triffin’s singing was met with concern 
by students who asked the university to punish him (Flaherty, 2018). In response to student 
demands that his singing of the word was offensive and a FaceBook post by the president of the 
Black Student Union decrying racial slurring in the classroom by professors and faculty, the 
university issued this statement, “as a public institution dedicated to the values of social justice, 
our university abhors the use of racist or hateful words and actions and we will confront these 
incidents if and when they occur…” (Bertolino, as cited in Flaherty, 2018, para. 11). Should 
Triffin be held accountable for a song he did not choose? Was he caught up in the music and 
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simply “forgot”?  Was the class having a time of it up until such point as he sang nigga? Did the 
student purposely choose this song to trip Triffin up?   I think here of Trevor Noah’s argument 
on The Breakfast Club morning radio show when he contended that rappers need to make a non-
black version of their songs if they don’t want white people singing nigga.  The breach of peace, 
then, is not due to Triffin’s singing (there is no indication that he was in blackface—which 
would really be offensive) but due to the uproar that the posted video of his singing created. Yet 
while Triffin did not create the song nor did he choose the song for class on this particular day, 
as speaking subject he becomes the site of the injury. While Boudreau and Triffin suffered the 
same fate at two separate institutions, the interpretation of academic freedom in these incidents 
varies. According to the 1940 Statement “Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in 
discussing their subject, but they should be careful not to introduce into their teaching 
controversial matter that has no relation to their subject.” (as cited in Euben, 2002) While it 
could be argued that Triffin, a public health adjunct, should not be singing and dancing in the 
classroom as it has no relation to public health, Boudreau, a journalism professor, was teaching a 
media law class about hate speech and speech codes.  Paradoxically, even the language in the 
1940 Statement draws questions.  It states,  
 As scholars and educational officers, they should remember that the public may judge 
their profession and their institution by their utterances. Hence they should at all times 
be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of 
others, and should make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the 
institution (my emphasis) (AAUP Policy Documents & Reports, 2001, as cited in Euben, 
2002).  
 
It appears as if the judgment of the public, then, dictates that nigger-nigga (and racialized 
language) is not suitable in academic discussions and, when uttered, is both non-displaceable and 
causes a breach of peace. Thereafter, it is the State’s duty to act on public judgement.  
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Kennedy (2003) continues that African Americans have objected most strongly to nigger, 
as opposed to other degrading epithets; however, this form of public protest is formulaic and 
vitriolic and misses the intricacies of context and situation.  He argues that the situational aspects 
of nigger-nigga must be explored and considered, not the overly generalized attitudes and 
aspects. If we are to take up Kennedy's assertions theoretically, then Butler's (1997a) argument 
that "hate speech is produced by the law" (p. 97) and as such "...becomes the legal instrument 
through which to produce and further a discourse on race...under the rubric of combatting 
racism..." (p. 97) potentially opens up a space in which to examine the efficacy of nigger-nigga 
as a performative contradiction.  The supposition that hate speech precedes the court's decision, 
she argues, is in actuality a consequence of it; hence, the court determines what is and is not 
legally constructed as socially injurious speech or conduct, ironically holding responsible the 
speaker of such speech. Placing Kennedy (1993) in conversation with Butler, it would seem that 
seeking redress in the judiciary branch only serves to further a formulaic process of fetishization 
of nigger-nigga.  In other words, "this faith in the reSignifying (my edit) capacities of legal 
discourse" (Butler, 1997a, p. 98) is itself a contradiction in that it is the law that was formed in 
racism (Matsuda, 1993, as cited in Butler, 1997c) and that historically upheld the 
constitutionality of injurious words. What is equally ironic is that those who seek redress uphold 
the faith in the neutrality of the State and (re)confirm the festishization of hate speech by seeking 
redress through legal discourse which held (and holds) them in subjugation.  The variety of uses 
and meanings would, a là Butler, expose the performative contradiction, for when spoken, it 
exposes “the contradictory character of previous conventional formulations of the universal” (p. 
89). However, in exposing this contradiction, new boundaries and limits are set, and thus, new 
challenges “…emerge for those who are not covered by it, who have no entitlement to occupy 
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the place of ‘who’, but who, nevertheless, demand that the universal as such ought to be 
inclusive of them” (Butler, 1997a, p. 90).   In the case of St. Jerome’s, the now retracted 
statement creates a prohibitory effect which in its attempt to curtail hate speech simultaneously 
censors and contradicts the illustrious ethical code of academic freedom.138 Yet in the cases of 
Boudreau and Triffin the State’s decisions supersede their ‘freedom in the classroom’.  Butler 
(1997a) proffers that by allowing the State to determine whether the speech of a citizen is 
protected or unprotected, part of speech or part of conduct, the site of the injury is located with 
the utterer and the State becomes a neutral body whose purpose is to protect citizens from those 
speakers who are then (re)imagined as the dis/mis/re-placed sovereign power. However, the State 
is never neutral; as the sovereign body it is simultaneously the source and the consequence which 
enforces and/or refutes the injury.   
It is Kennedy (2003) who questions the constitutionality of the fighting words doctrine 
with respect to First Amendment protections, citing that its basis rests in the fact that the 
"immediate breach of peace" is established based on the receiver's violent response.  He contends 
that the doctrine privileges the potentially violent victim so that, "rather than insisting that the 
target of the speech control himself, the doctrine tells the offensive speaker to shut up" (p. 55). 
For Kennedy (2003) the fighting-words doctrine is problematic in that speech is regulated when 
 
138 According to Inside Higher Ed “Academic freedom means that both faculty members and students can engage in 
intellectual debate without fear of censorship or retaliation” (Nelson, 2010, para. 2).  Counsel for the AAUP outline 
the specific scope of academic freedom as a subtext of the First Amendment. Of key import is that academic 
freedom does not have the same scope as First Amendment rights although it can be argued that there is a 
relationship between the two.  The First Amendment was initially created to regulate the exercise of governmental 
power only; therefore, the constitutionality of academic freedom and free speech apply only to public employers, 
such as state colleges and universities.  While there are exceptions to this, Euben (2002) notes that while “…the U.S. 
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that academic freedom is a First Amendment right, the scope of the First 
Amendment right of academic freedom for professors remains unclear” (para. 11). Individual rights of professors are  
influenced by contractual rights and academic custom and usage (unwritten common law and shared community 
norms) of the institution, and in many cases tensions exist between individual academic freedom and institutional 
autonomy.  For more on the legal code of aca demic freedom see Euben, D.R. (2002) “Academic Freedom of 




the target of an epithet responds with violence, whereas hate speech is less regulated when the 
receiver tends to be non-violent (as far as I can tell there was no violent response by CMU 
alumna Skyler Mills who posted a nine second video of Professor Boudreau; however in the case 
of Triffin, there was outrage by students of the class and the president of the Black Students 
Union who demanded his punishment). Paradoxically, while the Supreme Court continues to use 
the fighting words doctrine as a prohibition again particular kinds of speech, it has not tried a 
case since Chaplinsky (1942) and in the case of Snyder vs. Phelps (2011), the Court ruled that 
“speech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.” (Congressional 
Research Service).   Kennedy also notes that the doctrine of fighting words weakens the mere-
words doctrine in criminal law, which insists that mere words alone "...no matter how insulting, 
offensive, or abusive" (p. 55) are not justified as provocation for violent retribution. While 
Kennedy (2003) highlights several cases that call into question the legitimacy of both the 
fighting-words and mere-words doctrines, ultimately, he notes that "reported court opinions are 
hardly a perfect mirror of social life in America; they are merely an opaque reflection that poses 
real difficulties of interpretation.  The social meaning of litigation is ambiguous" (p. 26).   
The contradictions implicit in Higher Education institutions’ policies about speech reflect 
the ambiguity of legal precedent itself.  The original infraction and subsequent dismissal of Keith 
Dambrot at CMU in 1993 (the case Boudreau was citing in his lesson) resulted in the ex-coach 
later suing CMU based on the infringement of his First Amendment Rights.  In Dambrot v. 
Central Michigan University, 839 F. Supp 477 (E.D. Mich.1993)139 the U.S. District Court for 
 
139 As background, Dambrot admitted to using nigger in his closed door discussions with the team and coaching 
staff, of which one assistant coach and the entire team was African American.  Dambrot also addressed individual 
players directly who admitted to addressing one another in the same fashion.  When Dambrot’s use became known 
outside of the basketball team, the athletic director interviewed players, all of whom indicated they were not 
offended by Dambrot’s address. This became a campus-wide issue when one member who left the team a year prior 
complained to CMU’s affirmative action office.  While initially, in lieu of a more formal investigation, Dambrot was 
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the Eastern District of Michigan granted a partial summary judgment on behalf of the plaintiff’s 
claims. The court ruled in favor of Dambrot with respect to his challenge to “the facial 
unconstitutionality of the CMU discriminatory harassment policy”  stating that the policy was 
“constitutionally overbroad, limited in content and viewpoint, and vague.” (Dambrot v. Central 
Michigan University, 1993 ).The court permanently “enjoined the defendant university from 
further enforcement of such policy” (Dambrot v. Central Michigan University, 1993 ).  The 
District Court ruled against the plaintiff’s claims of violation of his First Amendment and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Hence, while Dambrot proved the unconstitutionality of the CMU 
discriminatory harassment policy, he was unable to prove that his constitutional rights were 
violated (Justia US Law). Yet, based on this legal precedent, is CMU in violation of the district 
court’s mandate that the institution cannot enforce its discriminatory harassment policy based on 
its dismissal of Boudreau?  Unlike Dambrot, is Boudreau’s speech protected under his right to 
academic freedom in the classroom?  
The contradiction in policy and procedure in Higher Education institutions is most 
evident in the varied authoritative responses to use of nigger-nigga in the classroom. To be clear, 
I am not positing a universalized practice of discipline to professors (of all racial backgrounds) 
who utter, read, sing, or quote nigger-nigga. Instead I am interrogating the institutional practices 
within Higher Education decisions based on the contradictory interpretation of use as speech 
and/or conduct as well as “what constitutes reasonable criteria” of academic freedom as 
distinguishable from unprotected speech. At Princeton, Professor of Anthropology Lawrence 
 
suspended for five days without pay, his subsequent dismissal was a consequence of campus wide protests and 
student demonstrations and news coverage at the local, state and national level. CMU contended that Dambrot’s 
language was in violation of the university's "discriminatory harassment policy." Based on this, Dambrot’s lawsuit 
alleged that his “termination violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and academic freedom.” He also 
alleged that there was violation of his due process rights, violation of the Elliott -Larsen Civil Rights Act and for 
defamation. Interestingly, several members of the basketball team joined Dambrot’s lawsuit and also alleged 
violations of their First Amendment rights as well (Justia US Law). 
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Rosen began his Cultural Freedoms: Hate Speech, Blasphemy and Pornography class by asking 
which is worse, a white man who punches a black man in the face or one that calls a black man a 
nigger? When asked if he was going to continue saying the word (he apparently repeated the 
word several times) Rosen replied ‘yes, if necessary.’  This resulted in several students walking 
out of class (Flaherty, 2018). Princeton University issued a statement asserting that 
“conversations and disagreements that took place in the seminar are part of the vigorous 
engagement and robust debate that are central to what we do… we will continue to look for ways 
to encourage discussions about free speech and inclusivity” (Hotchkiss, as cited in Flaherty, 
2018, para. 6). As a consequence of his speech/conduct, no action was brought against Rosen.  
Instead, Carolyn Rouse, chair of Princeton’s Anthropology department (and an African 
American female) defended Rosen stating,  
[he] started the class by breaking a number of taboos in order to get the students to 
recognize their emotional response to cultural symbols… students will be able to argue 
why hate speech should or should not be protected using an argument other than ‘because 
it made me feel bad’… I feel bad for the students who left the class not trusting the 
process. Rosen was fighting battles for women, Native Americans, and African 
Americans before these students were born. He grew up a Jew in anti-Semitic America 
and recognizes how law has afforded him rights he would not otherwise have (cited in 
Flaherty, 2018, paras. 23, 27).  
 
A similar circumstance occurred in a virtual education class at Duquesne University 
when Professor Gary Shank said the n-word three times and gave students permission to say it as 
well.  His intention was “to demonstrate a point”140 (Luciew, 2020, para. 1).  As a consequence, 
Professor Shank was suspended and subsequently fired.  However, Shank is filing a grievance 
against the university and supported by the campus civil liberties group Foundation for 
Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), which issued the statement, “By firing Gary Shank for 
 
140 The article does not provide details about the point that Professor Shank was attempting to ma ke. 
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discussing a tough topic in his class, Duquesne betrays any commitment it purports to have to 
academic freedom, which protects the rights of faculty to choose whether and how to approach 
difficult subjects” (Luciew, 2020, para. 3).  However, Duquesne’s Interim Dean of the School of 
Education, Gretchen Generett, in her apology response to students, classified Shank’s behavior 
as creating a ‘hostile learning environment’ (Luciew, 2020, para. 6).   
Quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Kennedy (2003) attributes the contradictions in 
how nigger-nigga is litigated to the instability of language: “…‘a word is not a crystal, 
transparent and unchanged’ but is instead ‘the skin of a living thought [that] may vary greatly in 
color and content according to the circumstances and time in which is it used.’” (p. xviii). 
Holmes’ words are significant in that it is not only the hate speech itself that is unstable, but also 
the ways in which hate speech is established …only through a language that authoritatively 
describes (Butler, 1997a, p. 96) and that, ironically, is also unstable. The ambiguity in the social 
meaning of litigation to which Kennedy refers is a consequence of the incompleteness of 
language, and it is this dubiousness that Kennedy (2003) is pointing out with respects to nigger-
nigga, a dubiousness, I might add, that defines us as we define it. He contends, "if nigger 
represented only an insulting slur and was associated with racial animus, this book would not 
exist... nigger is fascinating precisely because it has been put to a variety of uses and can radiate 
a wide array of meanings" (p. 27).  
Thus, exploring nigga as speech act and the discourses which govern its use provide 
opportunities to examine the circulatory power which governs subjects within a social field.  
Within the present moment, there are similarities, ruptures, contradictions and variations based 
on the appropriateness or inappropriateness of use. These similarities and breaks, however, are 
not solely predicated on a historiographic excavation of nigger-nigga from its earliest 
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documentation located in the diary of John Rolfe in 1619 to present day rappers such as Killer 
Mike in 2021. Tensions about the use and appropriateness of the utterance nigger-nigga have 
arisen in the 21st century due to the intersections of present-day anti-Black racism and  antiracist 
pedagogies, scholarship about whiteness and white privilege, and the influx of canonical 
literatures and technologies141 that focus on multiculturalism, multiracialism and 
multigenerationalism of which nigger-nigga as performative, as Signification and as utterance is 
included. While normative sayability and allowability of nigger-nigga is predominantly based on 
the speaking subject’s racial makeup, even when use is citational, this superficial argument does 
not account for those instances when nigger-nigga is allowable either by the institution or the 
student-subject, as in the case of Princeton professor Lawrence Rosen or CMU’s ex-basketball 
coach Keith Dambrot, or like Prof. C’s continual reading of nigger in Mark Twain. Nor does it 
account for usage by youth of color who are not African American.   
Yet while it is easy enough to say these are exceptions, possibly even anomalies, to the 
rule, my question is: What exactly is the rule (for usage)? And why is there only one (sovereign) 
rule?  Does the rule change? Can there be multiple rules, if we need rules at all? These questions 
reveal the complexities of governance and the tensions that the institutionalization of 
accountability have created. Kennedy (2003) acknowledges  
there is much to be gained by allowing people of all backgrounds to yank nigger away 
from the white supremacists, to subvert its ugliest denotation, and to convert the N-word 
from a negative into a positive appellation… the race line… is a specious divide. There is 
nothing necessarily wrong with a white person sayin ‘nigger’ just as there is nothing 
necessarily wrong with a black person saying it.  What should matter is the context in 
which the word is spoken—the speaker’s aims, effects, alternatives.  To condemn whites 
 
141 Within the college classroom the use of multimodal platforms has allowed for more access to texts in all 
disciplines.  Hence nigger-nigga is not just entering the classroom through literature. From the original writings of 
race purists to recordings of Blaxpoitation films or lectures to present day music, videos, memes, GIFS,  social 
media, and blogs, the influx of nigger-nigga as a truly American word (Kennedy, 2003) is normative in language 
use, social practice and discourse.  
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who use the N-word without regard to context is simply to make a fetish of nigger (p. 
139, 41). 
 
Because there is no law, policy or precedent that regulates hate speech; and because nigger 
became part of American parlance by those very same men who created and instituted the laws 
of our country, and because there are inconsistencies and contradictions in how the legal 
sanctions and university policies are applied.  
   The punishment or the admonishment of those who use or misuse nigger-nigga is 
determined by the learning institution.  Hate speech is all fair game because it falls under 
the First Amendment.  What academic institutions are doing to sanction or admonish hate 
speech is under their own volition (J.G. CC, 21022021).  
 
In the case of nigger-nigga, what is governable or (not)(un)governable is reasonable criteria by 
which speech, whether within the confines of private speech, the classroom setting, or citational, 
causes a breach of peace.  Hence in the case of the university governance system, issues of use 
are a tenuous balancing act.  While there is general consensus in the 21st century that African 
Americans retain academic, social, political and cultural license to “freely” say, articulate, cite, 
iterate, (sing, scream, shout) nigga, policies falling under the rubric of discrimination, 
harassment, or hate speech, as well as the illustrious moral and ethical codes of free speech and 
academic freedom, universalize and standardize what is sayable or unsayable in the college 
community.  The consequence of which is the essentialization and commodification of speech in 
the college classroom and on the college campus.   
This is not to say that all speech (especially nigger-nigga) should be allowable in every 
instance, but like Butler I contend that “a politics that begins and ends with the policing function 
is a mistake…” (as cited in Bell, 1999, p. 166). Instead, how can we be creative in our 
governability? How do we “exploit [the] ritual function [of hate speech and/or nigger-nigga] in 
order to undermine it in a more thorough-going way…?” (p. 166). How can we develop a more 
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thorough-going restaging of nigger-nigga so that its ritual function and “…its revivability as a 
speech act is really seriously called into question?” (Butler, as cited in Bell, 1999, p. 166).  How 
can we challenge the universal so that alternative constructions of ‘linguistic vindication’ (Alim 
and Smitherman, 2012, p. 116) is achieved? 
The classroom is an “…example of both metaphor and reality… a ‘place’ where ‘realities 
are woven into realities’” (Clair, 1998, cited in Connellan, 2013, p. 1532).  Interlaced into the 
reality of the classroom space is the metaphorical reality of the text itself, a reality that is 
simultaneously real and not real, temporal and atemporal. In both Dr. C.’s and Prof. C’s classes 
we enter into an earlier time period in which nigger-nigguh is sayable and allowable by both 
blacks and whites.142 Both Hurston and Twain include nigger-nigga in their text as part of the 
orality of speech of the communities in which the narrative takes place,143 situating the reader 
within the social practices of the mid-19th Century or the early 20th Century.  Yet this reality is 
overlayed by the reality of the classroom space and present-day beliefs and practices about the 
use of nigger-nigga in the 21st Century. It is in this ‘place’ or space that the professor and 
students (as subjects subjected by the text) enter.    As Prof. C. notes, “that’s where fiction comes 
in, ‘cause fiction can exaggerate what nonfiction can’t.” (Obs., 062019).  In both classrooms,  
teaching is also a performance in that it seeks to represent the world and ideas about the world, 
“mediated by and through language… not about truth and validity, but about what is visible and 
what is impossible in relation to a particular audience, in a particular situation”  (Orner et al., 
2005, p.129).  Necessarily, pedagogy is never able to perform a complete representation; instead 
it produces knowledges that are incomplete and never fully knowable.  Orner et al. (2005) also 
 
142Allowability in this case is not a justification of the slur.  It is allowable based on the discourses of the time. 
143 As an aside, while writing this I began wondering about the contemporary arguments which ban Huck Finn from 
classes and schools, remove it from reading lists a nd libraries, and bowdlerize it in the effort to create a more 
accessible text. Has a similar reaction occurred with reference to Hurston’s text?  
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highlight the necessary incompleteness of the educator.  They argue, s/he is “never in full 
possession of her/[him]self, of the student, or of the texts and meanings s/he works with.” (p. 
131); however, the “pedagogical relation” is enacted due to the indiscernable, undetectable 
effects of the ‘suspended performance’144 (p. 130).  Hence, both student and teacher are ”…in-
the-making… in the sense that our pedagogical, professional selves—our multiply inflected and 
constructed identities…are always ‘sites of disunity and conflict’, unfinished and incomplete…” 
(Miller, 2005, p.229).  However, the discursive performance(s) of the legal codes, policies and 
laws with respect to pedagogy and teaching “…expos[e] the contradictory character… of the 
universal” (Butler, 1997a, p. 89). The English (Journalism, Public Health, Anthro, Sports) 
educator-in-the-making attempts an awareness of excess and “excessive moments… that which 
exceeds the norms proposed as proper and natural by those with social order (Orner, Miller & 
Ellsworth, 2005, p. 11-112).   S/he attempts to practice situated pedagogy:  
pedagogy that both performs and is performative, recognizes and acknowledges 
‘excessive moments,’ those moments in which student and teacher identities as well as 
their practices overflow beyond ‘established’ policies and procedures that ‘…drive to 
categorize, predict, and control both students’ and teachers’ behavioral and curricular 
‘outcomes’…’ (p. 229).  
 
 It is the discourse of institutional autonomy, policy and procedure which institutionalizes 
subjects within the constraints of a psychically white space, “where [academic] authority and 
[academic] freedom sit side by side” (Connellan, 2013, p. 1543). However, based on an 
understanding of the ways in which knowledge is continually and continuously constructed, I 
would like to believe, I would like to imagine, that in the cases above, the professor/coach was 
challenging himself against fixed positions, framings, conceptions and standards which place 
students and teachers in rigid categorizations based on “commonsense” thinking about 
 
144 Orner et al. (2005) contend that pedagogy is a  “suspended performance” in that it is “constantly interrupted and 
deferred” (p. 130).   
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curriculum, pedagogy, academic standards, and teaching practices (Miller, 2005). To teach 
means to take risks, to hope, to imagine, to believe.  Like Miller (2005) I believe that teachers 
and students are “…dynamic subject[s] that change over time… situated historically in the world 
and positioned in multiple discourses” (p. 232), and as dynamic subjects we exist in language 
which also changes over time based on historically situated discourses. Nigger’s transition, 
evolution, and transformation to nigga is just one example of this. 
8.1 Critical Conversation #27022019: Homey in three parts “There’s a White Racist 
Inside of Me” 
Part 1 
We are in my Introduction to Composition course.  The Head Librarian, self-identified as 
white male, is leading the class in Library Instruction as students follow along on individual 
computers in the Library Instruction lab.  I am stationed in the back of the room listening, 
working, commenting when required, as the Head Librarian (HL) attempts to provide students 
with an introduction to the college databases so that they can begin research for their final 
research papers.  The students are a bit lost, and I fill in the gaps, quietly responding to quizzical 
expressions and comments.  We have virtually arrived in Academic Search Premier, 
EbscoHOST, one of the primary databases the students and librarians rely on to search for 
scholarly, academic peer-reviewed articles.   
“So, let’s enter a word into the Search bar and see what we get!” says our nervous, but 
excited guide.  “Does anyone have any ideas for something we can search?”  The class is quiet, 
not for lack of interest or rambunctiousness, (this particular class is quite talkative, confident in 
their opinions and comfortable with their peers) but for lack of clarity and comprehension—
many have not conducted research beyond “Siri what is…”.   
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“No? Okay, well I have something we can search.  Let’s look up homie.”  As my head 
jerks up from my computer, I see HL obliviously bent over his computer, while each keystroke 
projects on the overhead for the entire class. He says each letter as he types. “H” “O” “M” “E” 
“Y”.   
Students have completely swiveled towards me, necks strained to snapping point.  I 
cannot stumble to the front of the classroom quickly enough.  Rather than accost him at the front 
of the room while he bends to the task, I take a chair on the first row.145  “See!” he sounds 
excited, “there’s not much we can locate with the search term homie.”  I am trying to politely 
interject, And say what? I wonder.  I can feel my students’ eyes boring into me.  There is 
snickering, teeth sucking in both African American and Caribbean style, mumblings in English, 
Spanish, Creole, Spanglish.  “So since that didn’t work, what should we try next?”   
I am wondering about the purpose of that particular exercise; what was the pedagogical 
justification for homie?  In what Outcomes and Assessment rubric can we locate rationalization 
for the word homie?  “Any suggestions?” It is my vocal male student with the three phones—one 
for his main “chick,” and two burners for the extras—who speaks.  “Ummm how about beavers.” 
There is hushed laughter.  The sarcasm is clear to all of us except HL.  “Okay!” he gushes, 
“Beavers it is!” B-E-A- “I hope he spells it right,” I hear my adult returning-to-get-her-degree 
single-parent, football mom mutter. -V-E-R.  “Let’s see what we get!” <Enter>   
 
145Foucault’s Panopticon critiques the space of the classroom as mimicking that of the prison.  HL stands at the 
front of the room as all-seeing, all-knowing, yet oblivious to the classes’ indignance about homey. He is also blind 
to the inappropriateness of what he is currently entering as a search category. Miller (2005) discusses this as a 
“‘willful critical blindness’…where our [HL’s] pedagogical imaginations may have been sabotaged as well as 
sabotage, may have been polluted and pollute… visions of what it could mean to… teach and learn across social and 
cultural difference” (p. 228). I did not enter the space in which he occup ied; I could not bring myself to share his 




I enter the library looking for a student while simultaneously looking for an iPhone 
charger because I am on 9%.  Instead, I am greeted by HL at the front desk who greets me with, 
“Good Afternoon Professor Maxwell!  How can I help you today?”  His tone is almost shocking 
in its eagerness, its gleefulness, its cheer.  But I want to believe it is genuine… no… I do believe 
it is genuine. He is desperately trying to fit into his recently forced banishment to the mostly 
black, mostly Latinx, mostly immigrant campus.   
“Oh hey,” I reply.  “Actually I don’t need anything.  I was looking for a student.” 
HL is spunky, rides a motorcycle and a moped and sports a stylish bike jacket and 
helmet. HL also looks like he stepped out of the mountains of Pennsylvania circa Little House on 
the Prairie. Or a better description would be the Pennsylvania Amish man replete with a 
mustache-less beard,146 balding middle and glasses. As far as I know HL is not Amish.  As 
always HL begins talking and I am too considerate to stop him.  
“So do you need to sign your classes up for any library instruction? I was hoping you 
guys would come back so I can redeem myself.”  
I reply, “No not at this time, although, now that I think about it, we will be back in… a 
couple weeks.”  I have just realized that Monday is the first day of April. “I will probably sign up 
for library instruction… (I hesitate)… next week!”   
“Well… I can lead the instruction or get someone else.  I still think I didn’t do a terrible 
job.  I figure it was either that I didn’t do a terrible job and just didn’t deliver what you wanted, 
or I did a completely terrible job.”  I calculate in my head exactly how many people I told, “HL 
 
146 Upon googling the proper name of the Amish beard, I learned that Amish men do not wear the mustache because 
they are pacifists and associate the mustache with the military; hence, the removal of the mustache signifies their 
disassociation with anything military related.   
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was awful” and try to read in his eyes whether or not he knows, and who may have been the 
person to tell him.  At this point I can’t take it back and I refuse to apologize.  He really did do a 
terrible job. 
“Well HL… it was… well some of the students were offended.” 
The look of shock tells me no one recounted my vent (which was both oral and in email 
form to colleagues in the English department), and, of course, I know why.  I only shared the 
most terrible part of that fateful day in the library with my African American colleagues and 
peers (the email was a general concern about pedagogy, professionalized service and instruction 
on the satellite campus147).  The sharing was part vent, part humor, part astonishment, but while 
speaking with HL, I realized that I selectively told those people who I knew would “understand” 
and who of course would not relay this to HL himself.   
I wonder if I should continue. 
“Well HL, you shouldn’t have used homie.” 
Shock transforms to puzzled.  “I was trying to be relevant, up to date.” I wrinkle my 
brow. Up-to-date? Even I am not up-to-date, I think, and shake my head.  Before I can go into a 
lesson about slang and its ever-evolving usage, before I can explain that even as an African 
American, I am not versed in the current lingo of my students, before I can indicate that other 
 
147 HL is only at the satellite campus because he is hated by administration.  As indicated earlier, HL is spunky.  
The tension and rift between the administration and faculty on campus is fueled by fighters like HL who will stand 
up at a  board meetings and Assemblies and question their programs, motives and leadership.  He is one of the few 
left; the number of vocal ardent academics has dwindled considerably.  Unwilling to deal with a regime that is 
divisive, defensive and combative, most retired, their years of service maxed out anyway. Many others have found 
employment elsewhere.  And so, as punishment for his provocations, he has been relocated to the squatter camps, a 
forced removal to Palestine, Pakistan, Soweto. Much to HL’s chagrin , he could not protest, even though another 
librarian asked to be relocated to this campus. In all honesty as the librarian in charge of statistics and data, Front 
Desk Librarian, Reference Librarian, Library Instruction Librarian is not the space for HL, as he articulated when I 
asked for Library Instruction, “Well, I can do it.  But I don’t know how.  I’ve never done it before. You know I’m 




factors beyond color of one’s skin dictate local practices (such as age, sexual orientation, 
geographical location, geopolitical identity, gender, class, education, context, situatedness… I 
can go on), he drops his head in his hands.   
“Thank you for telling me… finally. I wish you’d told me sooner.”   
Part 3 
When I walk into the classroom, my students are silent, not their usual behavior.   
“What’s up?” I say, looking around the room. 
They glance at one another, my smart, spunky Latinx female is turned sideways, looking 
over at my single-mother, who begins, “Professor… what was that?” 
And the floodgate opens. 
“Nah see… I don’t know if I should be offended or not.” 
“Noooo… he’s just clueless. It was a mistake guys. I don’t think he meant anything by 
it.” 
“A mistake?  He meant something by it alright.” 
“He didn’t even spell it right!” Single mom is flabbergasted. 
I sit on the desk, partially at a loss for words.  “I’m sorry guys.  I didn’t know he was 
going to do that.” 
“I mean… homie? Why would he choose homie? Who even uses that word?” burner 
phone snarks. They laugh.148 Through their laughter they express their mirthful indignation—at 
 
148 In Mayo’s (2008) “Being in on the joke: Pedagogy, race, humor” she highlights the websites Black People Love 
Us and Rent-A-Negro which both use humor to critique race.  Using Gates (1988/2014) theory of Signifyin(g) Mayo 
analyzes these two websites. In Black People Love Us (http://blackpeopleloveus.com/index.html) the creators 
parody stereotypes of a white couple with black friends.   In Rent-A-Negro*, creator Ayo places a monetary value on 
different forms of microaggression, e.g. $200/hour for claiming black friends (characters Sally and Johnn y in Black 
People Love Us would need retroactive billing according to Ayo.) In one image of Black People Love Us, Sally 
and/or Johnny is pictured appropriating what they perceive as Black slang.  If I was teaching this class currently, I 
would introduce this article and the website and ask how much they would charge HL for appropriating albeit out -
of-date Black slang.  *Upon research this website could not be located.  
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his inexperience with contemporary lingo (his choice of words, his misspelling), at his 
transgression.   
“Well he said he was nervous, he’d never done Library Instruction before.” 
“That’s obvious.” 
“You know he came from the other campus and… well… he’s new here.  He was 
upstairs in an office somewhere. He’s never worked with students.  He told me he’d try his best.” 
“His best was homie!”  Again they laugh.  
Perhaps through Butler (1997b), their laughter is an expression of the racialized subject’s 
psychic turn—a contradictory “jolting combination of pleasure and critique” (Mayo, 2008, p. 
244), one in which the laughter itself is the Signifyin(g) contradiction.  While they are confused, 
shocked, indignant about homie, they are simultaneously amused , “he even spelled it wrong.” 
The sardonic laughter of the subjugated racialized subject Signifies upon the utterance homie in 
that it “offers a way to move from spectator to participant… to be in on the joke…  being part of 
the reason for the laughter and as such being part of the problem.” (Mayo, 2008, p. 244).  Their 
laughter is the articulation of their psychic ambivalence in which they simultaneously accept and 
reject the performative nature of homie.  
Single mom reiterates, “And he didn’t even spell it right.” Her mockery of this is also an 
act of Signification.  To be addressed as homie reveals  ‘the loss or lack [of one’s] own body’ 
(Bhaba, 1992, p. 65).  But it is through her mockery of his misspelling that she is able to also 
disincorporate his authority. (Bhaba, 1992).  Not only is HL unable to choose a more appropriate 
word, he is unable to properly spell the word he chooses.   
“So professor is he racist or not?” They turn to face me versus each other.  
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As “authority” in the classroom, they are asking me to assess HL’s behavior as indicative 
of his moral ideology.  I have become Williams’ (1991) priest-turned-god, the all-knowing 
keeper of answers. 
I don’t know… I shrug. Like them I too was spectator constituted by the utterance homie. 
Unlike them, my subject-position as both priest-turned-god and drowning/dying mortal 
(Williams, 1991) casts me in doubled subjection.  I am neither and both, incomplete and 
contradictory.   
“I don’t know,” I answer honestly.  “I don’t think so…”  My answer is met with the 
“yeah right look.”149   
“Guys, I don’t know if he’s racist150 or not.  But I do know he didn’t know what he was 
doing.” 
“You can say that again.” 
“But we need to go back to the library—”  
Before I can finish there are eye rolls and sighs. “Guys, maybe we can give him a second 
chance,” says my straight-A Latinx student.  “You never know.  Maybe he was nervous or 
something.” 
“And so let’s look up homie because I’m nervous.” The comment silences the room. 
Finally I offer, “Okay, here’s what we can do.  I can tell him we don’t need his services.  
I can do library instruction anyway and it will make more sense, or we can find another 
librarian.” 
 
149 The “yeah right” look is an expression of incredulity, but the lips are twisted and the  head is cocked to one side.  
Culturally in communities of color, it metaleptically means “sure you’re right” but is a  metaphor for “we don’t 
believe you.” 
150 While I did not have the conversation with them at this juncture, I have attempted to tease out the nuanced 
difference between racism, prejudice, discrimination and white privilege so that as critical thinkers my students can 
understand the power behind words, labels and their meanings.   
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“Yeah that’s better.”  The quieter students are nodding, especially the two young women 
who struggle with English, who are too shy and/or self-conscious to speak. One even offers, “I 
didn’t know what was going on. I was confused.” 
“You do it professor.” 
“Yeah, you do it.” 
There is consensus.  “Professor we trust you.   And we already know you.  We know 
what you want and you know what to do.  Please do it. Why do we need those librarians 
anyway? They’re always nasty.”  The traditional fear of the librarian has not changed much; 
students instead turn to what they know for assistance—Google. 
“Okay,” I concede.  “I’ll let him know.”  
That settled, my intent is to now focus on a much-needed overview of writing a research 
paper.  Many in the class have never written a research paper (a curriculum requirement at the 
College), some have never written much of anything, for school or otherwise.  And while I know 
this conversation should continue, so that we can unpack why homie was inappropriate by a 
white instructor to an all-Black and Brown classroom, so that we can critically assess language 
and its power to subjugate, so that we can critique ways to respond response-ably in  meaning-
full ways to those unrepeatable moments in the classroom (Miller, 2005), I say, “Okay guys, let’s 
move on.  We have a lot to accomplish today.” 
Before I can transition, Single mom quips, “It would have been better if he said nigga.”  
Part 1(a) 
I want to tell you that the remainder of the class passed unremarkably.  But it was the 
nuanced shift in the psychic space of the classroom that was remarkable.  It was an excessive 
moment—one in which my and my students’ subjectivities, knowledges, histories and power 
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relations overflowed beyond the classroom (Orner et al., 2005). One that marked the seemingly 
innocuous and ordinary as extraordinary. Was HL aware of his faux pas as he continued with his 
prepared lesson?  At the moment, absolutely not.  Post-HOMIE, was the class receptive to his 
instruction?  Absolutely not.  At one point I did have to interrupt HL and instruct him to steer 
back on course, “HL we don’t have a lot of time and they still need to know how to use the 
databases.” “Oh right!  Okay!” he answered in his too-chipper voice. But the misspelled homie 
burned in the minds of my students for the remainder of the class.  The psychic shift in the white 
space of the library computer lab was their recognition of their own irresolvable grief.  HOMEY  
became psychically internalized as part of the “social regulation of psychic life” (Butler, 1997b, 
p. 167), as part of the  white space that psychologically and psychically institutionalizes bodies 
within the grid (Connellan, 2013); their bodies were made into subjects through the discursive 
function of naming. HOMEY. Normative and normalized by the sovereign speaker, homie 
performatively performed as a “black word” in white space, subjugating each student within 
discourses of educational segregation and racist language.  Like me, their heightened 
consciousness and irresolvable grief is framed through the discovery that they have been 
discursively constructed as the object, the objectified subject—the HOMEY.   
“Let’s try homie! H-O-M-E-Y! Nothing!  So this can show you how looking up certain 
things will bring no results.”  HL summed up the remainder of the class succinctly— 
N-O   R-E-S-U-L-T-S. 
Part 2(a) 
I tick off the number of people I did tell and begin to question my own service to the 
college, to my students, to my community, to HL.  Why hadn’t I spoken to him immediately?  
Why had I let this fester for so long?  Why had I felt the need to jocularly retell this story to my 
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besties and not to HL himself?  How do I teach those with white privilege about themselves 
when I skip, ignore, make fun of a teachable moment?   
So now I tell him: “Yes, one student even said you’d have been better off saying the N 
Word.” HL looks horrified, as if he would never.  But I understand this particular student’s point.  
In her mind, this would have clarified HL’s philosophy or positionality.  If indeed racist, then 
show us your racist card so we know where you stand.  Ironically, it would also have proven 
effective in terms of a viable search option for research purposes.  And while her comment was 
made in hindsight, I wonder how my students would have reacted had HL actually suggested 
researching nigga.  More to the point, what would I have done in that moment?  
I continue: “Yes, well, in class the following day they asked me if you were racist, or 
what your deal was.  Homie was not the best choice.  And HL, you spelled it wrong… 
incorrectly.”  Why did I feel the need to correct myself?  Was code switching and presenting 
myself in a particular way so important to me at this moment when it was I who was responsible 
for his lesson?  When it was I who finally had the opportunity to hold the whip?  
“A couple of them said they were offended, or they didn’t know if they should be 
offended.” 
“And that’s not me.”   
Suddenly, I am laughing openly in HL’s face.  I cannot help it.  It is that funny, and I 
expect HL to join in with me, but he cannot.  I see the look of consternation between my giggles, 
and I place my hands on his, resting on the top of the computer on his desk.  “Oh HL, I’m sorry,” 
I splutter, “I don’t mean to laugh.” But I do. I do mean to laugh. I mean to laugh in the way that 
Ellison describes the father’s ironic laughter, cackling, hearty and  nightmarish.  I mean to laugh 
in the way that W.E. B. Du Bois identifies laughter for the African American, “to the black 
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world alone belongs the delicious chuckle…we are the supermen who sit idly by and laugh and 
look at civilization” (as cited in Mayo, 2008, p. 245).   
My laughter did not connote a nervous giggle, nor was it entirely at HL’s expense 
(although I suspect that he thinks it was… and if I want to feign some honesty… it partially 
was). My laugher was based on this newfound information—HL thought he was being up-to-
date. Prior to this moment, I had no idea why HL chose homie as his word of the day. Prior to 
this moment my laughter was tinged with irony as I digested the audacity of his decision.  I did 
not laugh with my students, instead allowing them their own moment of  ‘uncomfortable 
pleasure’ (Mayo, 2008) through which they could express their own forms of agency and power. 
Yet I’d like to think of my uncontrollable laughter as Mayo (2008) describes Black humor: a 
‘doubled interplay of aggression and invitation… working with and against white bias…” (p. 
246) which invites one to think differently and encourages learning.  I am laughing too 
voraciously to explain to him the humor in his attempt at being up-to-date but spelling the word 
incorrectly, a move indicative of “white desire for black recognition and affection” (Mayo, 2008, 
p. 247).  I do manage to eek out, “you spelled it wrong” between squeals. 
HL counters, looking quite mollified, “Look, I’m from Mountainside. Do you know how 
many Black (or does he say African American?) families are in my town?” I am no longer 
laughing.   
“Negative zero.” 
“About seven.  Well, there’s more than that now, but at one time it was seven. I was born 
in 1941. My grandfather was a huge proponent of the N Word.  So, I come from a white town. 
But I have tried to move away from that.  I honestly did not grow up around Black people, and to 
be honest I always thought that I wasn’t prejudice but one day I realized I am. You know there 
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was an entire period though when I did subscribe to the thinking of the African American race 
based on their behavior.  I thought that, you know, certain behaviors were unacceptable.  Like, 
African American men who are “in your face” (he mimics an “in your face” movement with his 
head while saying this). I thought that wasn’t a way to behave and I thought that was racial, but I 
realize now that “in your face” isn’t racial and that African American men have to be in your 
face. But it isn’t racial.” 
“But then I’m walking down the hall on the Cranford Campus and two African American 
men are talking and it’s like ‘you N’ and they’re using that back and forth between them.  Why 
do you think that is?” 
I hesitate.  I am not sure if HL is being rhetorical or if he is asking me to be an authority.  
“Are you asking me?”  
He nods, a slight smile? on his lips.  A test?  Once again, I am positioned as authority, 
and it is this situatedness that fetters me.  I do not desire to be the authority on nigga or racialized 
language for that matter.  I am but one of many voices attempting to articulate one situated 
interrogation of the fluid, incomplete, ambiguity of one racialized utterance.  My answer, which 
can only be articulated through language, is also incomplete.  
“Well honestly HL I think there are many answers to that question.” 
“I mean if it’s so bad why use it?” (The age-old question…) 
“Who says it’s bad?” 
“Well… you know… if it’s considered bad, why use it?” (Correction: the age-old “white” 
question). HL is in good company.  An ardent proponent for the eradication of nigga comes from 
British critic Piers Morgan (2014) who contends that nigga should be “…tied to a literary post 
and whipped into such brutal submission that it never rears its vicious head again.” Morgan 
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claims this will not occur until the black community obliterates it from its social and cultural 
vocabulary.151  While I won’t take the time here to scrutinize Morgan’s figurative use of the 
slave whipping post, I will acknowledge that he incorporates somewhat questionable data, which 
indicates that nigga is twice as likely to be used on Instagram as compared to dude or bro. HL’s 
assertion that nigga is “bad” (an ambiguously subjective word in itself)  echoes Morgan’s (2014) 
argument that black Americans know the history of the word as a derogatory slur yet “…enjoy 
the freedom… to say it…in the knowledge that it’s become taboo for whites…” (Morgan, 2014). 
Yet complementing with Morgan’s outcry is the NAACP which funeralized nigga in 2007. 
While I don’t believe HL’s question is based on the taunt “if you can do it why can’t I,” I do 
think that the question begins and ends with the basic assumption that nigga can only be good or 
bad, rather than a complex utterance with a range of meanings that exists along a continuum.152    
“Well, it depends on whom you ask.  I mean… even in the African American community 
there are different answers, and those answers are based on more than just color.  It’s based on 
context, relationship, age, situation…”  He is nodding as if he understands, “I mean, even if I 
answered you now, my answer could be completely different tomorrow, in another context or 
space.”  Would my answer be the same sitting in a coffee shop, or a bar?  It is at this moment 
that I remember that he knows my research.  “And by the way I read that article you suggested.  I 
read two actually, that one and another one that CCC has.” 
I can tell he’s excited.  “Yeah well did they help?” 
 
151For a response to Piers Morgan see Talib Kweli Greene’s (2014) article “Nigga? Please” where he contends that 
nigga is a symptom, which, at least in the present, cannot and should not be censored. “It’s not the word nigga that 
should die, it’s racism.  You don’t cure an ailment by attacking the symptom, and black people who call each other 
nigga is most definitely the symptom, not the cause of racism.”  
152 I think here of Ta-Nehisi Coates’ (2013) Op Ed article “In Defense of a Loaded Word” in which he argues that 
there are inappropriate uses of nigger; however, the word itself cannot be buried or eradicated from “one of the most 
vibrant cultures in the Western world.” According to Coates, eradicating nigger is an ironic twist on the politics of 
respectability (See Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham’s 1992 coinage of this term) in which Black people are being 
asked to raise themselves to a double-standard that erases context and relationships in human communication.  
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“Tremendously, especially one of the articles because he is doing exactly what I want to 
do.  He is using empirical research.”   
HL continues, “No, I wish you had told me sooner. But it’s okay.  I’m glad you finally 
told me.  Because most people don’t go beyond…” He gestures into the great nothingness of the 
room with his hand.  
“I don’t know what that means, beyond. Beyond what?”  
“Well… it’s like this.  If I get upset, then it’s your responsibility to fix it.  I’m angry and I 
will just sit with that.  We can be upset, but we don’t go past that.  We’re upset and that’s it, and 
then we make that the responsibility of the person speaking.  ‘I’m angry.  You did this to me, so 
now what are you gonna do about it?’  We don’t…” 
“Dialogue,” we say simultaneously, and now I am racking my brain for Butler’s 
discussion about inflammatory speech.  Butler (1997a) contends that when we simply point out 
inflammatory speech, the conversation stops and closes the possibility of futural articulations.  
Because discourse exceeds the speaker based on its historical past and unknowable future, it is 
the condition of a particularized context and moment.  I want to believe that HL would agree 
with Butler’s notion that a politics of speech cannot merely begin and end with policing.  Instead, 
HL’s questions, “Why would they do that? If the word is so bad why use it at all?” intuits 
Butler’s arguments:  
… the question is how is that person… renewing and reinvigorating racist rituals of 
speech, and how do we think about those particular rituals and how do we exploit their 
ritual function in order to undermine it in a more thorough-going way, rather than just 
stopping it as it’s spoken.  What would it mean to restage it, take it, do something else 
with the ritual so that its revivability as a speech act is really seriously called into 
question (Butler, as cited in Bell, 1999, p. 166).   
 
When I ask HL what he thinks about the two young men he encountered who were saying 
nigga in the hallway he answers:  “I think they are snubbing their noses.  It’s showing that they 
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can use it while others can’t.  And I would never (he draws his hand across his body as proof) 
use it.  But that’s what they’re doing.  They’re using it because they can.” (HL, CC, 27032019) 
HL’s argument aligns with Gates (1988/2014). The young men are Signifyin(g), placing nigga 
on the rhetorical y-z axis in such a way that it literally and figuratively substitutes for other 
words within the context of speech.  The restaging of nigga in the presence of HL is both 
performative and performance.  While the young men perform a linguistic African American 
ritual, this is citational.  It is a performance that installs them in a “…historicity that is not [their] 
own’ (Butler, cited in Bell, 1999, p.166).   
However, HL is also installed in this historicity. By virtue of proximity he, too, is 
tethered to this moment.   As such, although not invited in, he is audience member in which his 
witnessing is a condition of his own autonomy.  “Why use it” is in deference (or reference) to 
racist discourses of the past “the centuries of bondage, the decades of terrorism, the long days of 
mass rape, the totality of white violence that birthed the black race in America” (Coates, 2013, 
para. 10). “I’m a child of the fifties” connotes one singular, static subjectivity, but like Butler 
argues, this closes the conversation to the ways in which HL perceives nigga based on one 
historically contingent moment.  
Instead, through the discursive act of Signifyin(g), the ex-citability of nigga is its 
restaging as a performative contradiction, one that subjugates HL to futural unknowable 
articulations.  His witnessing, much like their performance, is “expropriated by a past [and 
future] discourse” (Butler, as cited in Bell, 1999, p. 166). HL is witnessing the rhetorical trope 
antonomasia, the substitution of an epithet or title for a proper name. In part, HL much like Piers 
Morgan, is missing this form of paradigmatic speech.  If I am to refer to Gates (1988/2014) 
and/or Coates (2013), this is due to the ways in which racialized groups speak within their 
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communities.  However, this simplifies nigga within the binary domain of white and black 
speech that not only universalizes (and essentializes) the speech act, but also misses the 
disruptions, ruptures, gaps and fissures of rhetorical language in the first place. As witness HL 
enters this speech event, yet he does not recognize linguistic rupture, the rhetorical troping of 
nigga.    
Before leaving HL tells me he doesn’t like bullies. He was bullied throughout his school 
years, including college, “I know what it means to be on the receiving end.” He tells me the story 
of a college pick up football game in the quad.  When the game is over, one of the players says to 
him, “You were the most feared  quarterback out there.”  He explains, “It wasn’t because I was 
exceptionally good. It was because I threw the ball to anyone.  They never knew who I was 
going to throw the ball to, unlike other quarterbacks who threw the ball to the same person every 
time.” 
“This,” he says, “is how I try to live my life.”   
“Like homie, we need to dialogue.  I mean it could have gone another way.  They could 
have all gotten up right then and there, but they didn’t. But it would have been nice to have the 
conversation.” 
I respond, “So I guess you need to lead the next library instruction then.”   
“Okay, and we can have the conversation.  I’m open to it.  That’s why I like education.  
There’s always room to learn.” He shrugs, “Hey I’m a child of the fifties.  And I have to realize 
there’s a white racist inside me too.” 
Part 3(a)  
In the next class I tell the students that HL would like to have a conversation with them 
about homie, and they are receptive. 
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“Okay,” says burner phone, “thas wuts up.” He is nodding and looking around. 
“How about the rest of you?” 
Single mom is skeptical, “I don’t know Professor. What’s the conversation about?  Why 
does he want to talk to us?” 
“Well… I told him that what he said was inappropriate and that the class was offended.  
He was shocked.” 
“Shocked?  You mean he didn’t know what he said was wrong?” 
“Well how would he know?  Did he ever show any indication that he thought what he 
was doing was offensive?” I point to burner, “He didn’t even get it when you sarcastically 
shouted out beaver.” 
Burner phone laughs, “Riiighhhttt!” 
“But hear me out.” I say, “He also said he wants to learn.  He’d like to have a 
conversation. He’d like to hear from you.” 
“Guys, I think we should do it. C’mon…” says my always conciliatory Latinx student.  
“It could be a learning experience for him.” I add. “You get to be the teachers.” 
“But professor you already told him. What am I gonna teach him? What else we gotta 
say?”  
“You can teach him why you were offended.  Teach him about what he should and 
shouldn’t or at least think about saying before he actually says it.  Much less uses it in a class 
lesson.  You even said he’d have been better off saying nigga.  I told him that.” 
“Professor!” The class is incredulous. “You told him that!?!” 
“Aww man, why’d you tell him that?!?” 
“Professor you be wildin’!!” 
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Single mom smiles, “Y’all know professor is wild.” 
“I told him because he needs to know.  You can explain that to him as well.  Don’t worry.  
I don’t think he’ll actually say nigga.” 
“Mmm… I don’t know.  What’s the point?” Single mom needs cajoling and those that 
agree verbally nudge her. 
“Cmon.  Let’s do it. It will be interesting to see his reaction.” 
“Yeah!  I wanna see how red he gets!” 
“I need a consensus,” I say.  “I don’t want anyone feeling uncomfortable or like you’re 
being forced. But the point is, he needs to hear from you, not me.” 
Reluctantly, single mom agrees.  “Okay… okay.. if you say so.” 
“Yesss,” burner phone claps his hands. “This is gonna be fun!” 
****** 
Author’s note:  Due to unforeseeable circumstances, this conversation never took place. There 
was limited time in the class period to include the conversation and HL was too busy to leave his 
desk to come to our classroom.  Thereafter, HL retired and while some of the students were also 
in my Composition-Literature courses, the moment had passed. Most of the students in this class 
have since moved on.  HL and I occasionally keep in touch, not as much as we said we would, 
but I wonder about those students.  The young woman who was obtaining a divorce from her 
abusive husband and father of her daughter, and who was fighting him to fulfill his promise to 
help her gain citizenship.  The woman whose sister spent three days in an INS human freezer at 
the border after crossing illegally with her daughter and who, upon release, was thinking of 
running if she did not receive good news at her upcoming hearing.  Single mom who birthed a 
football player at the tender age of 15 and who was now finally attempting to obtain a college 
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degree, yet she fretted over her quite, handsome, muscular now 15-year old son who was popular 
with the ladies (she didn’t want him repeating her “mistake”), and burner phone, who bragged 
about multiple women (although he ‘came out’ to me in private) and lived in a shelter due to 
abandonment by his mother.  Had HL known these individual stories, would he have chosen the 
misspelled homey, and in doing so essentialized their language and their experience into a sum 
total of black slang?  Or would their individual stories have registered with him the way they did 
with me, compelling him be aware of his own “willful critical blindness” in his pedagogy 
(Miller, 2005, p. 228).   I wonder about them, where they are, what they are doing, how they are 
surviving.  I wonder as well if, within the chaos of COVID, social justice and racial justice 
issues, the fight for citizenship, parenthood, health, security, and survival, this ‘unrepeatable 
moment’ has left any “visible trace of its happening…” as they each make sense of “what counts 




Chapter 9: The Polysemy of nigga: A Most Contagious Word 
…language, image, and experience…Language (saying, listening, reading) can encourage, even 
mandate, surrender…Image… rules the realm of shaping… These two godlings, language and 
image, feed and form experience.      —Toni Morrison 
 
9.1 Nigga Instance #26102015: Miiiiisssssss: Nigga and the Paradox of Respect 
“So I’m like if this nigga…” We are in my office having a student conference about 
writing, grammar, her paper that she needs to revise.  The conversation takes a turn, she is telling 
me about her boyfriend who is going to Texas for basic training.  “He’s Mexican,” she states, by 
way of explanation.  This is significant because she is El Salvadorean; she has already rebelled 
against  the cultural expectations her parents have placed upon her by not dating a countryperson, 
and worse yet, “he’s Mexican.”  Now, he was joining the military, an acceptable career choice 
for her parents’ consent. “He needs to do something,” she says. She continues about their future 
together once she graduates and he finishes his basic training. In the midst of her chatter about 
their impending long distance relationship she comments on the possibility of infidelity. “So I’m 
like if this nigga… miiisssss…[long pause] he know, I don’t play.”  Threat issued, she continues 
to discuss his upcoming move. I listen until the conversation seamlessly slips back to the banality 
of comma splices and punctuation.  It is only then that I speak. 
 
Miiisss (often pronounced meese based on accent and/or country of origin), symbolizes 
respect in various Spanish-speaking countries and cultures.  I do not remember how or why I 
know this.  I am not offended when I am addressed as miss.  I have had this conversation several 
times with students and faculty of various backgrounds.  Those not understanding (or accepting 
of) the nuances of the translation often indicate that the appropriate title of respect is Professor 
(professora); hence I (or we in the case of some faculty) should be addressed as such (as an 
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aside, a student asked me if I am going to require that people call me Dr. once I receive my PhD.  
While my answer was, ‘I have to think about that,’ my colleague-friend responded, ‘She earned 
it, it should be used.’) In some of my classes students have corrected their peers: “Miiisss!?!” 
“She’s not a miss, she’s a professor.” Often this is met with an embarrassed, “I- mean- 
professsorrr.” I smile “You can call me miss.” Other times I say nothing at all, I watch to see 
how this will play out, and then there are times when I explain why miss is acceptable for me.  In 
the Spanish language señora is a respectful address for a female elder.  It is used both formally 
and informally (i.e., with strangers, family, friends, acquaintances).  I accept miss as a substitute 
for professor because it signals respect.  However, after speaking with a fellow graduate student 
who teaches in both Spanish and English, I learned that in the United States “miss” represents 
the distance between student and teacher, a usage which is not common  in South American 
countries.  This distance is often a carryover from high school, which is more formal and 
discipline based.  “But in English especially, we try to minimize that space.  We create a more 
informal, personal space so the distance gets minimized.  Especially our students… they go 
through an unlearning process… this creates informality” (MIO, Critical Conversation (CC), 
#022021).  Hence, while “miss” is a carryover from a distant, formal educational setting, nigga is 
a reflection of the informal, the personal, the safe space that many in Developmental English, 
Intro to Composition and Comp-Lit work arduously to create, “a space in which they are able to 
articulate their ideas, their voice, their identity, if only for the moment” (MIO, CC, #022021).  
The irony does not escape me.  My student respects me; therefore, she addresses me as 
“miss”(senora).  Not only is my student comfortable enough to discuss her relationship with me 
(this does not surprise me in the least; as a matter of fact it is all too common), she feels intimate, 
informal, relaxed enough to utter nigga. Usage in this case, because she is Spanish speaking, 
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does not translate to black, as in negro, or mi novio negro. She did not say: si este negro.    
Instead, the U.S.-based, American English version nigga performatively acts as a racialized, 
gendered distinction.  The boundary between professor and student has been blurred, or better 
yet, ruptured.  This was no longer a student conference about grammar, spelling, syntax, 
structure, this was the intimate language of two girlfriends talking about their… niggas, 
[definition: a common usage among African American women when talking about their 
boyfriends, as in the following exchange between two black women: “Oh I meant to tell you, 
yesterday my boyfriend went on an interview and his license is from two years ago.  So he didn’t 
get it.  He had everything but his license. It isn’t updated.  Two years!  I was like niggaaa… I’m 
tired of being the one.”(Nigga Statement (NS) #250316)].   As a matter of fact, the formal usted 
(Ud.) has elided into the personal tú as evidenced by her statements “So I’m like…” vs. “So I’m 
thinking…” and “he know I don’t play” vs. “He knows I am very serious about our relationship,”  
(the word ‘play’ in this case is an abbreviation for play games, which is  Signifyin(g) on the 
SBAE-BVE axis for being serious). 
This informality is situated within and placed next to the respectful “miiiissss.” The 
informality of her speech as well as her use of nigga is subsumed by the respectfully formal 
señora, with these two words literally placed next to one another in her speech. It is through the 
discursivity of nigga that my identity as professor (and to a certain extent the more formal 
“miss”) are superseded by my subjectivity as female (of color) confidant who understands (and 
may have experienced) how niggas like to fumble (NS #050315); I am constituted as friend, who 
commiserates with the possibility of infidelity and identifies with the female response: Don’t try 
me nigga (NS #100315); I am constituted as heterosexual recognizing heteronormative language 
used between women  about their male partners--“it’s a form of endearment when speaking to 
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certain… predominantly black men…” (EE, CC, #200315). Yet while the performative nigga 
personalizes and establishes familiarity, the respectful and somewhat distant “miiiss” situates 
nigga within discourses of academia and cultural norms.   As utterances, miiisss and nigga 
complement and contradict, intersect and parallel revealing the ambiguity of formality and 
informality, intimacy and distance through which, as humans, we relate. 
9.2 Nigga Instance #09042015: Giving nigga Space 
“Yo give my nigga some space.” My doctoral research class has just ended. It is one of 
the last hoops we must jump through prior to becoming ABD and each of us is working on 
various articulations of our research for the dissertation.  My peer—white, male—rushes up to 
me after class.  “Joyce, I couldn’t wait to tell you this.  Guess what happened to me?”  “Hey… 
what happened?”  “So I’m on my way here and I’m standing in the train station waiting for the 1.  
You know, it’s around 3:00 so it’s crowded with a lot of kids coming out of school.”  “Mmm 
hmm…” “So these two girls, I dunno, I think they were Spanish?   They’re behind me and one of 
them keeps bumping me with her bookbag.  I don’t say anything, right, cuz… well you know 
how the train is at that time.”  “Mmm hmmm.”  “Right so, she keeps bumping me and there’s 
really no where to move and then outta nowhere her friend pulls her back and is like, “Yo, give 
my nigga some space.”  The look on his face is a mixture of shock, glee and admiration.  
“Really… and you know she was talking about you?” “Yeah… can you believe it?  She pulled 
her back because she saw that she kept bumping into me.  But look at me. I’m as white as can be. 
You can’t get any whiter than me.  But that’s what she said, ‘Yo, give my nigga some space.’ 
Like I’m her friend, or we’re cool….so of course I thought of you and couldn’t wait to tell you!  




Miron and Inda (2000) assert that racial performativity is the “power of the discourse to 
procure what it names… its referents [are] inherently unstable, thus making it open to multiple 
rearticulations” (p. 103).  My peer, the referent in ‘Yo, give my nigga some space’ is produced 
through a naming process. For my classmate, this naming is fascinating as he links his materially 
marked body to the utterance nigga.  Paradoxically, by linking nigga to the materially marked 
(white) subject, nigga is delinked from a racialized discourse.  To be clear, this is not a rupture, 
or clean break.  Instead, as a hiccup, it reveals the ambiguous, multiple, unfixed rearticulations of 
nigga.  
Through the speaker’s use of “my” nigga is performatively delinked from the materially 
marked Black body, thus rupturing its connotation (and denotation) as ideationally strict. The 
ironic contradiction of nigga has, through the speech act of the speaker, superseded its historical 
roots and cultural limits and is now “less stringently ideational” and  is “fair game, open and a 
matter of satire” (Dr. Kirkland, Critical Conversation, 23042017).  While I do not believe the 
speaker’s intention is satirical, discursively nigga satirizes its strict ideational usage as an epithet 
through the naming process of the racially (white) subject.  Once this removal from the category 
of epithet occurs, the argument that nigga is reappropriated only within the limits of black 
American speech and conversation is vacuous; 
   If it is not maintaining strict ideational use the term varies in its meaning. If the speaker 
is not maintaining strict ideational usage then the locutionary, illocutionary and 
perlocutionary forms will all shift.  This is based on the speaker’s intention, hearer’s 
understanding and context in which it is uttered.  The more these play in terms of 
meaning, the less insulting the term becomes.” (Kirkland, CC,  #23042017). 
 
“My nigga” immediately constitutes the racialized (white) subject as friend 153 or 
companion to the speaker. As speech act, the speaker linguistically positions my classmate 
 
153 The phrase “my nigga” is understood along the y-z axis of Standard Black American English (SBAE) and Black 
Vernacular English (BVE) as a companion, friend, lover, boyfriend, husband.  It can refer to either gender and 
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within the linguistic universe of Standard Black American English (SBAE) and  Black 
Vernacular English (BVE), and while she is not directly addressing him, her speech includes 
(dare I say embraces?) him through the act of naming.  In this speech event, while the possessive 
pronoun “my” signifies ownership, “my nigga” Signifies camaraderie, unity, and good will, thus 
displacing nigga’s origins as insult or epithet as well as its racial performativity.  Nigga ruptures 
the conceptualization of sovereign autonomy and becomes ex-citable precisely because it 
performs meanings not previously stated (Butler, 1997a); hence its reversal, reappropriation and 
rearticulation becomes a “…repetition of an originary subordination for another purpose, one 
whose future is partially open” (Butler, 1997a, p. 38).  Nigga’s sovereignty as racialized 
utterance wanes as the new articulations “expand the domain of linguistic survival” (Butler, 
1997a, p. 41).  As such nigga is reSignified; it is (re)produced in new contexts and spoken in 
ways that have yet to be legitimated, thus producing its legitimation in new and future forms 
(Butler, 1997a).  As reSignification, the rhetorical tropes of antonomasia and metalepsis154 
(Gates, 1988/2014) create the ex-citability of nigga, “which is at once the deliberate and 
undeliberate effect of a speaker” (Butler, 1997a, p. 39).  Through citationality the racialized 
(white) subject is brought into a linguistic world by the language of the Other in a language that 
does not mirror his own (Butler, 1997a).  Yet he recognizes himself as the hailed subject, and in 
so doing, his recognition is a tropological inauguration which is incomplete, ironic and 
‘permanently uncertain’ (Butler, 1997a, p. 3-4).  
“So what happened?” I ask.  
 
typically communicates an intimacy or closeness between two (or more) people.  For scholarship on this see Geneva 
Smitherman’s (2000) definition in Black Talk: Words and Phrases from the Hood to the Amen Corner.  
154 Both antonomasia and metalepsis (as discussed previously) are rhetorical figures of substitution. 
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“The girl moved.  She took her bookbag off and said, ‘Sorry.’ I told her, ‘No problem.’ 
And then the train came.  But isn’t that cool?  I think it’s fascinating that she would refer to me 
in that way.” 
He doesn’t say the word . 
I don’t miss the irony—while it is cool to be “my nigga”, it’s not cool to say what one 
has been named, even when that naming is embraced.  Evidently “the ‘constructive’ power of the 
tacit performative… establish[es]… not only a sense of what the body is, but how it can or 
cannot negotiate space…” (Butler, 1997a, p. 159).    
9.3 Nigga Instance #14022019: Black language, Haitian sensibilities: What about 
this nwa? 
“What about this nigga?” Here is the joke:  Haitian parents, especially Haitian mothers, 
will never accept their sons marrying an African American woman (In other words: I. Am. The. 
Joke).  This is the conversation, the joke, that J., P. and I are laughing about in my office.  “Or 
Spanish,” P adds.  He has decided that, although Haitian-born and immigrant to the United 
States, he wants to marry an African American or Spanish woman and J, Haitian-raised, born in 
the U.S. asks incredulously, mockingly, sarcastically, “Do you want to get sent back?”  P. 
laughs, “She already did!”155 He shrugs, “She’ll just have to accept.  It’s my life.”  J. shakes his 
 
155 I have learned through several of my immigrant students that disruptions in the household based on finances, 
employment, a  cultural impasse or unacceptable behavior can result in the child being sent “home” to live with 
relatives in the parents’ native country, i.e., birthplace country. Based on circumstances the child has no choice in 
this decision. While there are cases where the child desires to be “sent back,” there are equally as many cases where 
the child does not want to go. “Home” evokes a range of possibilities and contradictions as one’s connection to it 
varies by multiple degrees.  In this case “home” for J (born in America) and P (born in Haiti)  is articulated through 
the words “sent back” as opposed to “sent home” or “go home.”  In terms of language use “sent back” is both 
semantic and rhetorical denoting and connoting that the receiver participate in an action.  Through an Austinian lens, 
“sent back” is a performative in that some action (in thought or deed) is required, i.e., a  disciplinary action or a 
reevaluation.  One is “sent back to prison” or “sent back to reform school.”  Additionally,  one can be “sent back to a 
doctor” and in sports a player can be “sent back to the minor leagues.”  In other words, to be “sent back” is to return 
or to be relegated, consigned or demoted. J.’s “sent back [home]” and P.’s response indicate that returning to Haiti. 
i.e. going ‘home’ is punitive and/or devalued.  
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head, “She’ll be pissed.  She won’t say it, but you’ll know.”  P. admits that his mother’s primary 
reason for preferring a Haitian wife for her son is due to the language barrier.  We both 
understand that, but I also remind him that, beyond language, African American women don’t 
“typically” (or on a daily basis) eat or cook the dishes of Haiti (I know I’m being essentialist 
here).  I provide a stereotypical list as evidence— green plantain, avocado with salt and white 
rice, potato salad with beets, a whole plated fish.  We all laugh.  I add to the list, “our rice is 
different. Haitian rice is sticky and we don’t eat it with everything.”  J. exclaims, “Yeah and you 
buy your rice in a box!”  I laugh, “You won’t find 50 lb. bags of rice in the typical African 
American kitchen.  Just a small box… and sometimes it’s minute rice or boil in a bag…” J. 
chimes in, “Yeah, what the hell is that?  How can rice come in a bag.”  I add, “And our rice is 
loose, each grain is separate.  You can eat your rice with your hands.  We can’t or rather don’t.”  
From the thoughtful look on his face, it appears as if P. is rethinking this.  “You better marry 
Spanish,” I say, “at least the food is closer.”  J. adds, “Yeah, Dominican!”  “Oh no!” P. yells, 
“my mom is not going for that.  I cannot bring home a Dominican.  Never!”  He turns to J., “You 
know because of the history and the past...”  J. nods. Then P., talking to me but gesturing 
towards J., “you’re talking about me, what about this nigga?”  
 
Within the context of the conversation, I have to wonder if J. and P. consider themselves 
Haitian, Haitian American, American, black, black American, Caribbean American… or 
something else? While the conversation itself underscored the socio-cultural distinctions between 
African Americans and Haitians (both immigrant and US citizen), nigga, as P. uses it, becomes a 





Neither of us (myself and J.) comment on his use of nigga, although I believe I see a quizzical 
look on J.’s face as if he is determining whether or not I am offended or whether or not his 
language was appropriate.  And if so, what would this offense look like?  Should I chastise and 
correct, educating about the lexical and etymological history?  Should I castigate him as the site 
of injury even as he iterates nigga? Should I take offense based on our constructed identities as 
professor/student, elder/youth, female/male, African American (black)/Haitian-possibly 
American (black)?  Should I take offense because we are sitting in my office in an academic 
institution in which erudite knowledge, language and discourse is normalized while subjugated 
knowledges and languages are partially ignored (and eradicated)? Should I take offense as his 
English professor in which, as priest-turned-god, I should demand that he use “better, astute, 
respectable” language? Instead, I lose focus on the conversation, wander into my own thoughts 
about how and why one word enacts universalizing and essentializing subjectification.  Based on 
our conversation, our laughter, our jibes, it could be contended that P. felt comfortable enough to 
utter nigga. Yet in so doing, we are no longer distinguishable by cultural and social constructions 
of what it means to be Haitian, Haitian American or African American; instead, we are made 
subjects of one linguistic reified category, black. i.e., nigga. “a truly American word” (Kennedy, 
1999). When I inquire with another Haitian student if there is a Creole word for nigga she replies 
“Um… not really” (N., Personal Communication, 02062020).  Later she writes, “We call nigga 
in Creole ‘neg’ or ‘nwa’” (N., Personal Communication, 02062020).  Hence, P.’s speech act is 
ideationally an Americanism on the rhetorical axis of Black vernacular English.   
Within the context of the conversation, I wonder if P.’s rhetorical substitution of nigga is 
his way of presenting himself as “more” Black American and “less” Haitian.  Early in my 
teaching career I learned that, for some, there is a difference between Black and Haitian.  As one 
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female student quipped, “I am not Black.  I don’t want to be Black.  I am Haitian.”  In other 
words, the cultural differences between Black Americans and Haitians (and Haitian Americans) 
are so distinct that individuals identify across ethnic and national characteristics.  Black 
American, in the context of our conversation, is starkly different from Haitian American. As 
speaker, the reappropriated nigga situates him withing the linguistic universe of African 
American speech and vernacular.  As the addressed (J. through naming and me as listener) nigga 
is understood as a Black (not Haitian) utterance.  Hence we are all made subjects of the 
condensed historicity of nigga as an utterance spoken by, about, and to Black Americans.  So 
what of Haitians and/or Haitian Americans?  Quite possibly, P. was preparing himself for his 
future with a Black American wife; quite possibly P. saw himself, within the context of his lived 
experience in the United States and/or Haiti, as Black and/or American (regardless of cultural, 
ethnic or national qualifiers).  Quite possibly he might just like the word nigga, which I have 
been told on more than one occasion by young African American and Latinx youth is the case—
“I love nigga,” as opposed to the Creolized neg or nwa (or maybe he knew I would not know that 
word). Whatever the case, I would like to believe that P.’s use philosophically represents his 
understanding that, at least in the United States, and especially among those United States 
citizens (I assume) who currently race hate and desire to “Make America Great Again,” the color 
of our skin unites us far more than food and language.  While P.’s mother is concerned about a 
language barrier between her future daughter-in-law and herself, she need not worry about nigga  
or nigger for that matter—these two words (with reference to racial difference or racial 
unification) are universally understood.  
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9.4 Nigga Instance #28102015: I need an ‘A’ nigga 
“Write that down, nigga,” my student says to his friend.  It is after class.  The two young 
men, both Dominican, are asking about the upcoming midterm.  They are conscientious, 
studious, committed to their education and obtaining a “good grade.”  I am answering their 
questions—is it multiple choice, how many questions, will we have to…  J. interrupts me, turns 
to M. “Write that down nigga.”  “I am nigga,” M. has already reached into his bag for a pen.  I 
pause. Wait.  He nods with pen in hand, leaning over a notebook he’d placed on the professor 
desk. I repeat my suggestions.  I never comment on their usage.  
9.5 Nigga Instance #280520: They’re not Black, they’re African 
“You making up your own rules, nigga?” 
While I sit in my room attempting to work on the next Chapter of this dissertation, I hear 
my neighbors’ sons outside playing basketball.  I hear the word nigga twice and I tell my 
husband who laughs and says “Interesting!”  I look out the window to see if I can catch voices, to 
ascertain which young man said it.  Then I question my intent.  If I know who said it, what will I 
do with this information.  One of my subjectivities wants to yell out the window and say, “Yo!  
You can’t say that word.”  Another meddling subject position wants to sit and watch, eavesdrop, 
overhear and observe.  Instead I walk into the next room where my husband is working.  “You 
said interesting.  Why?”  “Because,” he answers, “they can’t say that word.” “Why not?” 
“They’re not black.”  “Well what are they?”  “Not black.”  “Well what are they?” “I don’t know 
what they are, but I know what they’re not. They’re not black.”156   
“They’re African,” I counter.  “They’re from Egypt.”  
 
 
156 i.e., African American 
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In both instances above, the exchange between young men of color reveals the ways that 
nigga performatively Signifies external to the African American community. Yet while there is 
much ado about who can and cannot say nigga, it is being shouted, quoted, sang/rapped among 
Gen Z-ers nationwide.  Should my Dominican male students be prohibited from saying nigga to 
one another in the classroom? Are the young men engaged in the all-American language games 
of competitive sport allowed to use nigga even though they physically present as (and most 
likely are) Arab?  Is nigga allowable if they are  Dominican or Egyptian by heritage but United 
States citizens by birthright (what if they are “something else”—green card holder, naturalized 
citizen, illegal—so many categories… so many boundaries)?  Should they be allowed to use 
nigga if they identify as Black and/or African American and/or Latino (White or Black) (it 
should be noted that these have become separate categories157)?  Are they, in the words of 
Dominican-born Junot Diaz, Diasporic Africans,  African Americans, Africans in America or 
American Africans?  Furthermore, as 20-something, Latino-, Arab-, Muslim- “Americanized” 
youth visibly influenced by hip hop culture, social media and sports, should they be allowed to 
use nigga as part of their socio-cultural orientation and dailyspeak?  Yet it is through the 
mediums of hip hop, social media and sports that the linguistic value of nigga derives.  In both 
instances, the interpellated responds, thus revealing the acceptance of being named, hailed, called 
upon as nigga. Hence, regardless of their essentialized ethnic or racial identities, their language 
practices are multiply fragmented and influenced by the discourses that surround them.  Whether 
on the court or in the classroom, whether US citizen or (non)citizen or some other category 
created by the federal government, whether student, ball player, brother, friend, male, youth, 
 
157 As clarification, while many African Americans define themselves racially as Black, this category defines 
several groups including people from the Caribbean, Africa, Europe (or any part of the world for that matter).  In 
contrast, African American is a nationally (and/or ethnic group) similar to Haitian, Dominican, British, Kenyan, 
French.  Any of these nationalities can also be Black.    
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nigga performatively constitutes their subjectivities, knowledges, histories and power relations 
(Miller, 2005) in ways specific to contemporary social processes that have been normalized and 
internalized within their psyche.  I could tell my students to stop saying nigga; I could ask my 
neighbors to temper their language, but would it matter?  Who am I to dictate their worlds, their 
experiences, their language practices? Who am I to determine that nigga does not “belong” to 
them? For it is through “the changeable life of [a] term,” i.e., Signifyin(g) that we are able to 
unmoor its negative connotations and use it for an unknown and unknowable future, “one whose 
contexts are never fully determined in advance… to function in contexts where it has not 
belonged, [which] is precisely the political promise of the performative…” (Butler, 1997a, p. 
161). 
9.6 Nigga Instance #12022015: Nigga and the politics of respectability  
“Nigga!” My African American student-friend turns and hollers across the expanse of 
about 20 feet in the middle of the cafeteria.    In response, another young woman whom we 
passed while leaving the cafeteria, turned, the expectant look on her face indicat ing that she was 
aware she was being addressed.  “Holla at me! Don’t forget.” The addressee nodded and saluted. 
Later, on the elevator, I said, “I’d like to talk about your use of nigga one day if you have time.” 
Hastily she apologized, “I’m sorry Professor Maxwell.  I didn’t mean to offend you.  That’s how 
we get down.” 
But I wasn’t offended.  Just… curious.  
 
When I indicated that I’d like to discuss nigga with her, her first instinct is to apologize 
and explain this is how she and her homegirl talk.  This particular student is “non-traditional” 
(yet another label) because she is an adult student, returning to college for a degree after 
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spending years in the workforce.  I liken her need to apologize to Pryor’s (2016) discussion 
about the etymology of nigger in the antebellum North in which educated African American 
activists of middle class standing abhorred the use of nigger by black laborers. Although my 
student and I are both African American (black American) women, her apology stems from her 
(or my) assumed difference of social and economic class, which supersedes our collective racial 
identity.  As well, our collective racialized subjectivities are superseded by the discursive 
statements of the institution—as student and professor, as soon-to-be educated vs already 
educated, as degree-less vs degreed (or pedigreed based on the academic institution granting the 
degree).  The discussion of appropriateness is not a 20th Century or 21st Century phenomenon; 
activists and abolitionists the likes of Hosea Easton, Frederick Douglass, Fannie Lou Hamer, and 
David Walker vehemently rejected the use of nigger by laborers arguing that it was an epithet 
which should not be accorded to black speech. As a discourse this inhabited the social, cultural, 
economic and political mobility of the Black race.  Behavior, morals, music, and religious beliefs 
became infused with notions of what it meant to adhere to hegemonic ideas of respectability in 
an attempt to counter the negative stereotypes created by the dominant racial group. The notion 
of a politics of respectability (aka respectability politics) first coined by Evelyn Brooks 
Higginbotham (1992) included appropriate language use and decorum.   
While I can admit that I do not typically yell nigga! across the room at work, or home, or 
in any other space, my student-friend’s apology speaks to the continuity of a politics of 
respectability in contemporary Black behavior.  Like my student G. (see Critical Conversation 
#17032014) opponents of nigga typically argue that its racist past should not be repeated by 
people of color. According to Rev. Al Sharpton, “If you call yourself the n-word you can’t get 
mad when someone treats you like that.” (as cited in Coates, 2013).  In 2007 Councilman Leroy 
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Comrie sponsored a moratorium in New York City which symbolically banned nigger-nigga in 
an attempt to quell its use among NYC youth and expunge it from hip hop music.  However, Ta-
Nehisi Coates (2013) argues that  
the politics of respectability is an attempt to raise black people to a superhuman 
standard… as in all cases of respectability politics, what we are really saying to black 
people is, ‘Be less human.’ This is not a fight over civil rights; it’s an attempt to raise a 
double standard (para. 7).   
 
Those who support (or at the very least justify) nigga do not solely operate within the 
music or film industry.  In recent conversation Randall Kennedy indicated on CNN’s Smerconish 
that it is acceptable to enunciate nigger for pedagogical reasons because “it brings home a point 
all Americans should know about.  How can you know about it when you don’t know the 
paradigmatic nature of a racial slur?” (Smerconish, 2020).  Part of the discussion between 
Michael Smerconish and Randall Kennedy ties to the May 2020 controversy of Stanford Law 
professor Michael McConnell who quoted nigger while reading text about Virginia’s 
Ratification of the Constitution.  While most students in the class were offended (resulting in a 
written statement by the Black Law Students Association and McConnell’s response about 
pedagogical choice), the one African American student in the class, Andrew Ezekoye, indicated 
that he was not offended.  
   “Scrubbing the word from the quote would have made Patrick Henry appear damn near 
saint-like… He was not. He was a flawed human being — the unvarnished quote got that 
point across… I was not anywhere close to being offended. Honestly, to suggest 
otherwise not only is annoying, but is tiresome. I can make the distinction between 
gratuitous offense and pedagogically necessary material. This was entirely the latter.” 
(Woo, 2020, para. 37 - 38).   
 
Much like Ezekoye, I too can make the distinction between speech used to denigrate and speech 
used for reversal, revision or inversion. 
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9.7 Nigga Instance #12022016:What a small white world 
“Nigga gimme my shit. You gonna ask to use my shit and roll your eyes.”  We are in the 
cafeteria and I have stopped to chat with students from my Intro to Lit course.  J. (Haitian 
American) and I. (Egyptian Moroccan American) incessantly tease Y (white, I am ashamed to 
admit I do not know her ethnic background) both in and out of class.  Based on my own 
observational bias, they banter with her because of phrases like “Nigga gimme my shit!”  Unlike 
the black and brown girls in the class, she is much more jovial, interactive, dare I say “hood” and 
her language is perpetually punctuated with slang colloquialisms.  J. and I. laugh, mimic and 
taunt: “Nigga gimme my shit!” J. repeats in a high pitched squeal while holding Y.’s belongings.  
She returns their quips and actions in kind. After much back and forth and upon retrieval of said 
items, she sucks her teeth.  Snatching these, she retorts, “Niggas!” (Yet why did I hear niggers?)  
Other members of the class (two males and one female of Latinx descent) watch their antics.  I 
watch too… and listen. 
 
In my own imagination of the racialized Other, I conceive of Y. as saying nigger not 
nigga. Am I guilty of placing the epithet in her mouth as opposed to its more ambiguous 
descendent? Is this common banter for Y? Is she relishing in the opportunity to use nigga against 
them?  On the surface, I could contend that this was Y.’s moment, her desire, to use the 
illocutionary force of nigger against two men of color; however, this assumption and/or 
accusation makes the speaker the site of injury and stops the speech situation at the level of the 
utterance.  However, it is evident from J.’s and I.’s playful responses that neither considers her 
address a slur.  Instead, their mimicking and continued banter reveal their acceptance of her 
speech act as well as their acceptance of her naming.  As speech act Y’s retort falls within the 
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African American Signifyin(g) tropes of dissing and addressing.  Her “nigga gimme my shit!” is 
both playful and biting. Here, a racially marked (white) woman is calling two black men nigga 
without invocation of epithet or slur and without invoking anger, indignation or chagrin (except 
possibly in me).  And what is it in my psyche that causes me to turn in ways that I. and J. do not?  
They mock her, they laugh, they taunt and they do not “give her her shit.”  There is an undertone 
of flirtation, and I flash to Wells (1892) Lynchings in which black men were murdered for 
associating with white women.  Yet here, in the cafeteria of a local community college, two 
black men are bantering back and forth with a white female in a highly seductive and sexualized 
way.  On both sides there are discursive acts of Signifyin(g).  They diss, cap, jibe in ways that 
supersede the racialized boundaries often placed on the sayability and allowability of nigga. In 
effect, their entire linguistic and material performance is, for lack of a better word, fun.  Nigga is 
tossed back and forth in linguistic play as part of ordinary language and in doing so ruptures 
strict ideational usage of who should or should not address the Other as nigga.   
This rupture of use within the context of the black/white dichotomy enables a 
“constitutive ambivalence” in which race and racism cannot solely rest on the premise that 
utterances such as nigga only and always (re)invigorate oppressive regimes of power (Butler, 
1993). Instead, the (re)production of racist terms can potentially allow for reversal and 
displacement of its origins. Because race (and gender) is/are produced through a historical chain 
of performatives (Butler, 1993), the historical chain of terms, which produces race as a fixed, 
static entity, also contains the potential for disruption and opposition (Miron and Inda, 2000).  
The play between the racially marked (white) subject and the racially marked (black) subject is 
both violating and enabling; however, it is through their subjectivities that their play, while 
potentially injurious, is also a site for contestation and agency. Y. utters “nigga gimme my shit” 
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and in response J or I mimic “nigga gimme my shit,” thus “the force of repetition becomes the 
very condition for an affirmative response to a potential violation.” (Butler, 1993, p. 83-4).   
Yet while their subjectivities allowed for openness, play and a looseness, my own 
racialized subjectivity as witness did not allow me to turn in the ways that J. and I. did.  What 
was revealed to me were the ways in which my own psyche was formed through the 
internalization of social normative processes. My own psychic ambivalence became clearer 
(though still muddied and only available to me through the opacity of language) when I imagined 
Y. saying nigger as opposed to nigga.  And it is this ambivalence that is “painful, dynamic and 
promising… vacillat[ing] between the already-there and the yet-to-come” (Butler, 1997a, p. 18).  
Psychically, I semantically looped Y’s address of nigga back to nigger, thus removing the 
Signifyin(g) play that took place before my eyes.  Instead, I placed the site of injury within Y. 
while J. and I. participated in the inauguration of past and futural possibilities. Instead nigga as a 
Signifyin(g) performative contradiction subjectified me causing dislocation, loss of context and 
ambivalence.  This Signifyin(g) performance is, ironically, precisely what I have attempted to 
interrogate throughout the dissertation. Yet when I witness the reversal of nigger, one in which 
the racially white subject names racially black subjects as nigga, it is not their subjectivity that 
suffers disorientation and melancholia, but my own.  Y’s usage inaugurates a new, unforeseeable 
reality that contains within it the historical past, the in-the-moment present and the unknowable 
future, yet I am made vulnerable. I am triggered… 
9.8 Instance #062019: What am I missying? The Missy158 Moment 
It is after a Summer workshop for full-time faculty of the English Department.  I am one 
of the few left in the computer lab attempting to navigate the latest software that Administration 
 
158 Link to Missy Elliot, Get Your Freak On video 
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has decided to foist upon us for the Fall.  My colleague-friends are leaving, the host of the 
workshop asks me to turn off the lights when I am done.  It is at this point that everyone is asking 
“How’s your Dissertation?” As they leave, one of them turns in the doorway and says, “You 
know, just the other day as I was driving, I was listening to that song… you know… the one by 
Missy Elliot?”  I don’t know… the one… by Missy Elliot, but I turn anyway.  “Mmm hmm,” I 
say, “which one?”  I like Missy Elliot’s music; when her songs blare through my car radio, I bop 
along and throw in the one or two random words I know. But I do not know her music, cannot 
recall a title, verse or line. “Oh… you know… the one where she goes…” and the humming 
starts. I smile although I don’t really recognize it. “The one where she goes…” and she makes a 
high pitched sing-song noise.  I vaguely recognize the sound, “Oh yeah…” I say, even though I 
don’t know which song she is referring to.  “Where she goes ‘listen to me now, I'm lasting 
twenty rounds, and if you want me,” there’s the high-pitched sound again, “di- didididididi- di 
didididididi- di di.159 “Yeah,” I say, a bit more familiar.  “I love that song.  I love Missy Elliot 
anyway.  But I realized as I was singing that I don’t sing that word. You know?  I skip over it 
completely. Even in my car I can’t bring myself to say that word. Isn’t that interesting?”  “Oh, 
yeah that is interesting.”  They turn to leave, and I turn back to my computer, open up a new tab 
in Youtube and watch the video for Get Your Freak On while reading the lyrics online.  I had no 
idea nigga was in the song. 
 
Should I applaud my colleague for her admission?  For her love of Missy? For her 
knowledge of the lyrics? Or for her allyship—for admitting to me that even in the privacy of her 
own car, where she can turn Missy up as loudly as her suburban New Jersey neighborhood will 
 
159 Hip hop heads and rap aficionados will recognize the tune I am attempting to mimic. 
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allow, where she can sing along without camera phones, witnesses, or a stadium-filled audience 
witnessing her debasement by Missy herself.160 I didn’t know what to do with her admission 
then; I don’t know what to do with her admission now.  Nor am I clear about her purpose for 
telling me.  While we had often discussed my dissertation topic and research through the lens of 
classroom teaching and literature, we had not discussed an affinity for Missy Elliot or any other 
hip hop artist for that matter.  So while I am aware that on its surface, her comment aligns with 
contemporary arguments that claim ownership of nigga by and in Black speech communities, 
especially hip hop, at its unfathomable and ambiguous depths her declaration explores at 
minimum issues of white guilt and the linguistic property of nigga. Paradoxically, her admission 
also highlights the performative power of nigga as a speech act which subjugates and 
subjectifies. Even in the sanctity of her car, she will not allow herself the small pleasure or the 
expansive guilt of singing along with one of her favorite artists.  Does she fear that the 
passengers in the next car over will hear?  Will they chastise her or call the language police to 
have her arrested? Her self-imposed censorship reveals her adherence to the commonsense 
theory that one’s speaking voice places one as the site of injury (Butler, 1997a) even though it is 
unclear as to whom is being injured.  Maybe she would injure herself.   
 
160 For an example of this, see BBC news article “Kendrick Lamar stops white fan using N-word on stage at 
concert”  https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-44209141, in which Lamar chose a young white female from the 
audience during his concert at the Hangout Festival in Alabama to sing the lyrics to his song M.A.A.D. City, of 
which nigga is a  common utterance throughout.  When the young lady sang nigga, Lamar stopped the show and 
proceeded to explain to the fan why she cannot say that particular word.  He then turns to the audience, 
predominantly white, who is now booing her, and asks “Should we give her another chance?” In conversation about 
Lamar’s actions, hip hop aficionado and lover of the lyrical intelligence of Lamar, R. tells me, “It’s about the value 
of the word.  Because of our (black peoples) experience, history, and culture we have an invested value in nigga.  As 
a linguistic commodity, it is our right to place ownership on it.  Lamar has earned the right to take a word that was 
once used to degrade him and use it however he sees fit.  White people used the word nigga  to devalue us.  Now the 
word is ours and we have the right to value it how we please.  We also say white people cannot use the word.  If 
they choose to we can devalue their lives. The original devaluation was… we beat they asses.  Now… we would get 
them fired, lose their families, their friends, their respect… what they once did with stripping our value from us, now 
we strip their value from them.” (R. Personal Communication, 20032021). Meanwhile I just keep wondering why 
Lamar chose that particular audience member to sing that particular song.  
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Gates (1988/2014) acknowledges that Signifyin(g) extends beyond intertextual literary 
criticism into other artforms such as jazz, but he especially highlights sampling within hip hop161 
as a form of musical Signification.  Hip hop’s method of ‘embedded signification’ involves a 
complex interplay of quotation, reinvention, revision and innovation through the art of 
sampling162 (Gates, 2014, p. xxxi - xxxii).  However, Signification does not only occur at the 
compositional level.  At the level of the utterance, i.e., the lyrical play or bars, the lyricist 
employs literary and poetic devices, from the conventional such as metaphor, simile and rhyme, 
to the irregular such as the verisimilitude of Eminem’s Stan or Slick Rick’s Children’s Story. In 
the traditional rhyme163 of Elliot’s Get Your Freak On, nigga disrupts both the rhyming pattern 
and the meter. I point to this structural break in Elliot’s pattern to show the operation of nigga 
semantically within the structure of the lyrics itself.  Rhetorically and paradigmatically on the 
vertical y-axis nigga is a substitution for the second person you.  As the speaker/narrator within 
the verses, Elliot begins with the third person naming of herself, Missy, in her first line and 
thereafter switches to the first-person I, “Missy be puttin' it down/I'm the hottest 'round.”  But in 
this rhetorical I-Thou exchange, you (in this case the receiver of the message) is hailed through 
the rhetorical trope of antonomasia, “And if you want me (nigga)/Then come on, get me now.” 
Finally, nigga, as part of the entire speech event, tropes through “calling somebody out”164 
 
161 See “Introduction: Hip Hop and the fate of Signifyin(g)” in the 25 th Anniversary Edition of The Signifyin(g) 
Monkey (2014).  This introduction is not located in the first edition of the text.  
162 Sampling is the art of lifting the beat and/or melody from a previously recorded song and reinventing it in a 
contemporary song.  Gates (1988/2014) contends that through repetit ion and revision, the art of sampling creates a 
two-dimensional work that is simultaneously working in the past and present in which the contemporary song 
becomes part of the original while the sampled original becomes part of the new composition (p. xxxi)   
163 Structurally, the poetic meter in Elliot’s verses alternates.  In the first quatrain (stanza/verse) the meter of the 
first and third line is iambic hexameter, and  the even lines are iambic pentameter. This, however switches as well in 
the following stanzas in which the odd lines are iambic pentameter and the even lines are iambic hexameter.  It 
should be noted that I only registered the meter of the first verses in which nigga is included.   
164 Calling somebody out is a  form of challenging someone.  Elliot challenges her listeners to “see her,” in other 
words she is inviting or open to a confrontation.  Figuratively there are multiple interpretations for Elliot’s 
challenge. As a form of Signifyin(g) her challenge could be ensconced within the discourses of pro-feminist 
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(Smitherman, 2000, p. 87).  In this instance, nigga acts as part of the calling out process through 
Elliot’s discursive act of “calling somebody outta they name”165 (Smitherman, 2000, p. 87).   
On the surface, my colleague-friend’s self-censorship is a choice based on an 
internalization of contemporary social processes which situates the utterer as the site of injury.  
However, as subject she is installed in a language not her own, which simultaneously precedes 
and succeeds her.  Her (non)turn (or refusal to turn) signifies her refusal of the discursive process 
of naming or hailing.  Yet it is through this refusal that the subject acknowledges and submits to 
the ‘condensed historicity’ (Butler, 1997a) of nigga.  By singing along, my colleague is both 
listener and participant; however, she cannot sing nigga due to “the ritual dimension of 
convention… the moment of utterance… informed by the prior and… future moments that are 
occluded by the moment itself… In some sense it is an inherited set of voices, an echo of others 
who speak…” (Butler, 1997a, p. 25).  Elliot is Signifyin(g) through her rap of the utterance 
nigga, simultaneously addressing, hailing, and naming, yet this linguistic act cannot Signify upon 
the materially white, listening-participating subject who only receives (hears) nigga along the 
syntagmatic x-axis of SAE due to its semantic looping of nigger. The racialized (white) subject 
cannot be rhetorically hailed, named or addressed as nigga nor can the subject participate in the 
Signifyin(g) tropes of hailing, naming, calling out (outta one’s name).  My colleague’s refusal 
(or reluctance) to sing nigga signifies her inability to participate in the master trope of 
Signification. Due to contemporary discourses of racialized language and racial ownership of 
 
sexualization in which nigga rhetorically hails a sexual partner (based on the heteronormative, homophobic parlance 
in rap music this can be assumed to be a Black male).  Likewise she could be Signifyin(g) on her listener, i.e., Missy 
defines her lyrical skill as “lasting twenty rounds” and challenges any listener to best her.  Finally, in a much more 
literal sense, twenty rounds could refer to a physical confrontation. While it has been argued that nigga typically 
refers to a black man (EE, Critical Conversation, 20032015), in these last two possibilities nigga is not gender-
specific, nor is it ideationally referring to an African American individual, as evidenced from the racial diversity of 
both rap music and usage.   
165 Unlike calling out, calling somebody outta their name is a verbal insult.  
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nigga, this refusal exceeds a conscious self-censorship. Instead, the psychic reality of the 
materially marked white subject submits to the normative rejection of nigga by accepting 
Signification as belonging to the racially marked (black) subject within the discourse of rap 
music. Nigga as performative subjectivates the white listening subject who psychically submits 
to a self-imposed governmentality, normalized “as a sign of guilt and transgression, as the 





Chapter 10: A Final (but not complete) Conclusion: A word about… 
Words 
Reclaiming that from which one has been disinherited is a good thing.  Self-possession in the full 
sense of that expression is the companion to self-knowledge.  Yet claiming for myself a heritage 
the weft of whose genesis is my own disinheritance is a profoundly troubling paradox.  
         —Patricia J. Williams 
 
nce upon a time there was a community of mortals, who lived below the Celestial City. 
But the mortals under the city did not call it the Celestial City, their name for it was 
(Im)Material.  While this City was secured by gates with word-combination locks, underneath 
the city was a maze of tunnels created and constructed by the mortals, unbeknownst to the 
priests.  These tunnels ran the length and width of the City and, also unbeknownst to the priests, 
enabled the mortals to enter the City in the dead of night, undetected, while the priests busied 
themselves with their own self-aggrandizing Word Combinations. The mortals watched and 
listened and witnessed as the priests created ascendingly intricate levels of Word Magic.  They 
spied as the priests renamed themselves gods and engaged in games, riding their steeds around 
heaven, jumping word hurdles, playing polo with the moon and stars and making sport with their 
time in eternity.  The mortals returned to their tunnels and in the recursive passage of reiteration 
they created word-combinations in their own image renaming these Wordplay.  They fashioned 
intricate tales full of figuration.  They conceived coded language mazes that led nowhere and 
everywhere;166 they built call and response echoes in their tunnels. They constructed language 
labyrinths that descended deep into the earth, and those that decoded exceedingly complex levels 
 
166 Gates (1988/2014) highlights the theory of J.L. Dilliard who defines Signifyin(g) as a mode of communication 
by indirection (p. 77).  In other words, through modes of figuration and linguistic circumnavigation, strategies of 




of Rhetorical Substitution touched the very core of existence. It was at this level that the mortals 
attained (im)mortality. And due to the steady rain of thundering hooves above, they developed 
antiphonal sound structures with which they passed their time (not leisurely I might add, because 
they were always seeking) and which only they could hear or understand with their Third Ear.167 
In time, some of the mortals ever seeking in their quest for knowledge, realized that more 
lay beyond the breadth and depth of their tunnels. Dedicated to the meaningfulness of Words, 
they tunneled out, passing beneath the gates of the city above. Through their travels they learned 
Discursive Practices and acquired knowledge about the Rhetorical Nature of Words.  
 It is in this way that they happened upon the same Deep Blue Sea as those of the priests.  
Rather than building boats and practiced in burrowing, they hollowed logs and fashioned 
canoes, following the uncharted course of the priests-turned-pilgrims’ boats.  They observed the 
priests from afar as they did so many times previously.  And when they reached the place where 
the priests let down their plumblines, they floated, remaining adrift  for they had reached the 
place of Floating Signifiers. 
Beneath the city otherwise known as (Im)Material, the remaining mortals, tired of their 
suffering, tunneled further into the earth, away from the thunderous hooves above, while at the 
bottom of the Deep Blue Sea the drowning mortals upon realizing they would never reach the 
priests’ taunting plumb lines reached for their own (the mortals) who, ever looking down, 
reached into the water to save them. 
  
 
167 Citing Hermese E. Robert’s theory, Gates (1988/2014) identifies “’The Third Ear” as “an intraracial ear through 
which encoded vernacular la nguage is deciphered” (p. 77). It is with the third ear that allegorical speech, critique of 
white speech and the politicized language games of black speech is understood.   
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I began my dissertation discussing Patricia J. Williams’ (1991) allegory about the Power 
of Words from her text, The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law Professor, in order to 
highlight the ways in which, as linguistic beings, we cannot step outside of language; we are 
made vulnerable by language (Butler, 1997a); we make it as much as it makes us.  Williams 
(1991) distinguishes between the priests-turned-gods and the dying, drowning mortals in her 
critique of who controls and/or dictates language. As I indicate in my introduction, Williams’ 
parable emphasizes the brutality of language and proof of this exists in the various linguistic (and 
as a consequence physical) forms of carnage we see in the media each day. However, while the 
violent force of language ensnares humanity, it is also through language that we seek and 
articulate agency. If language has the ability to subjugate, can it not also have the ability to 
liberate?    With this in mind, I Signified on Williams’ original work, imagining this allegory 
from the perspective of the mortal.  For as Hegel tells us, there could be no priest (master) 
without the mortal (slave).  
For me, this reiterated tale explores the ‘vulnerability and unpredictability’ of the mortals 
based on the conditions to/of/with which they are subjected.  What were they doing while the 
priests busied themselves with their Word Games?  Did the mortals simply sit in their 
subjugation, passively accepting their fate? Or did they turn, based on their condition, and 
construct their own world in response to the larger universe that subordinates them? By reading 
the mortals’ agency through the lens of Butler (1997a, 1997b), Gates (1988/2014), Williams 
(1991) even Morrison (1993), my assumption is while they psychically accept their condition, 
they simultaneously express their rejection of their subordination through their own intricate 
Wordplay. Hence even in their dying, drowning state, they are able to create in their own image, 
(de)linked from the priests but also existing within the larger linguistic universe of the priests-
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turned-gods Celestial City. By (re)citing this story and privileging the mortal, I (re)establish their 
agency through the linguistic play of Signifyin(g).   
My Signifyin(g) revision of Williams’ allegory is meant to show the ironic reversal that 
the master trope Signifyin(g) encapsulates. Through modes of sampling and mimesis, I trope (as 
in turn) Williams’ work through both revision of the text and repetition of figuration within the 
text. Like Gates articulates, there is a double-voicedness in the master trope Signifyin(g). 
Through the art of sampling “riffing and quoting from the original text” and mimicry, my 
revision Signifies upon Williams’ text; in addition, within the text itself, the disenfranchised 
mortals Signify upon the priests. The labyrinth of tunnels that stretch horizontally and vertically 
below the city allow the mortals to steal upwards into the Celestial yet (Im)Material world and 
travel below to touch the core of the earth.  While the priests ride round and round along the 
syntagmatic plane, the mortals travel horizontally and vertically traversing the syntagmatic and 
paradigmatic planes; yet while the priests are self-absorbed in their own Word Games, the 
mortals are watchful, attentive to the priests’ linguistic universe as well as their own.  The 
mortals’ ability to move between and through linguistic universes illustrates what Gates 
(1988/2014) defines as a parallel (yet negated) discursive, ontological, political universe.  Within 
this parallel universe, the mortals are 
subjects who have been excluded from enfranchisement by existing conventions… [yet 
they] seize the language of enfranchisement… … exposing the contradictory character of 
previous conventional formulations… (Butler, 1997a, p. 89).   
 
Butler defines this act as a ‘performative contradiction;’ an act with consequences, ex-
citable168  because its originary purpose has been wrested and ruptured. As author of this text 
 
168 While not previously noted, Butler’s wordplay has in this moment become clear to  me.  While she hyphenates 




(and admirer of Williams), I Signify in the way that it is described vis-à-vis hip hop, as sampling, 
“an ‘embedded signification’ since the process entails… revision through recontextualization)” 
(Gates, 2014, p. xxxi). Hence, in its double-voicedness, the mortals and I have wrested meaning.   
Williams’ text, centered as it is around contract law, explores the language of the 
sovereign authority who has constructed the Celestial City as a means to legalize practices which 
ultimately disenfranchise the mortal, such as the contractual boundaries of purchasing and selling 
human beings.  My reversal is meant to portray (convey) the theory I have grappled with 
throughout the dissertation.  We are both exploring the Power of Words and the (Un)Doing of 
Words (although a more concise articulation would be the Inconsistency, Ambiguity, 
Fleetingness… of Words).  Yet, my ‘embedded Signification’ focuses on the mortal herself, one 
who may have even entered the Celestial city, but who cannot delink herself from her mortality. 
Through the lens of the mortal, I portray how the possibility of an utterance is made conceivable. 
Similar to Williams, my revision serves to interrogate the language of the sovereign authority; 
however, it also highlights how the disenfranchised use that same language for new, creative, 
imaginary, unknowable purposes. 
I see myself in the mortal.  Passing through this final stage of the Doctoral Program, the 
dissertation, passing through the Celestial City of the Ivy, I continue to question my own 
language practices.  I refer to thesauri for verbose meaningful language, read pages of respected 
authors in order to wrap their words like a pilgrim’s cloak around my shoulders.  “She’s 
graduating from Columbia!” my mother exclaims to her friends.  Yet while I have managed to 
somehow enter and be accepted (I think) into the Celestial City, I still view it as (Im)Material. I 
am unable to delink myself from my mortality.  I look down rather than up, dig my fingers into 
the soft earth with my mother at my side as we plant tomatoes, watermelon, collard greens, lilies, 
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irises, begonias; I appreciate the artistry of my mother’s gardens. At times I feel as if I am on a 
Signifyin(g) loop, performing race, gender, intellect so that I may continue to participate in 
intricate Word Games, which I then pass on to other mortals who vie for priesthood status.  But 
as I watch and listen to my students, their wordplay varies from the expectations placed upon 
them in the classroom, or more to the point, in their papers. “Niggas think that you can only get 
books with financial aid and shit,” I overhear my student say as complaint while the student 
office worker sits on the phone in a casual-sounding conversation rather than assisting him.  Or 
in class discussion about Sembene Ousmane’s Xala, my male student mocks “This nigga be like, 
no technically it’s our nigga. It’s my turn!” as he takes on the personas of Adja Awa and Oumi 
N’doye, the first and second wives of El Hadji.   It is with them in mind—their realities, 
subjectivities, histories, and power relations—that give me pause.  If my student is articulating 
his reality and engaging with the text through his own linguistic practices, do I stop the 
conversation to correct or reprimand him?  Do I let the conversation continue and hope no one is 
upset? Or do I note it as yet another example of Signifyin(g) performativity?  And so my 
decision to chase the fleeting, trickster figure known as nigga is due to my own oscillating ideas 
about its use as both discursive act and speech act.  
I have realized that my own subjectivities have shifted during this research and writing 
process.  In 2014, (as per the requirements) I wrote an emic memo for my qualitative research 
class.  I was conducting a small study about microaggressions among Black and Latinx male 
students and noticed their use of what I then called “the N word.”    
April, 2014, ITSF 5000 Participant Observation in Qualitative Research, Teachers 
College (excerpt from an Emic Memo):  A common reoccurring discussion has been 
centered on use of the N word.  Discussion of the acceptability of the N word among 
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Black and Latino men has occurred both in the focus group as well as in individual 
interviews.  Initially I had no expectations in terms of the use of this word within the 
group.  My bias led me to believe that no one would use this word during focus groups as 
I deemed it “unacceptable” to be used as a term of friendship, endearment or otherwise 
by people of color.  I also realize that I did not consider the use of this word as it related 
to microaggressions as I categorized it as overt racism when used against someone 
identifying as Black.  Yet data analysis indicates that the ways this word is used and 
perceived varies among Black and Latino men dictating its significance. 
My own subjective thoughts about nigga have radically transitioned.  For one, I no longer 
write “the N word” for, as Killer Mike articulates, everyone knows what you are talking about, 
and I rarely if ever say “the N Word;” hence I pay particular attention to those moments when I 
opt for the more euphemistic phrase.  (I wonder if this is the (im)mortal in me—the little girl of 
some 40 years ago now instituting my own forms of insurrectionary speech.)  As well, my ideas 
about acceptability, allowability, and sayability have shifted.  Pondering about the young men’s 
usage throughout the years, I have come to complicate the argument through the lens of 
poststructural theory (quite difficult to do, I might add).  The incompleteness of language itself 
complicates this endeavor, yet it is that same fleeting quality which reveals the arbitrariness of 
language, the unceasing shifting of subjectivies and thus the arbitrary nature of nigga.  While 
nigger concretized into the most despised word in the English language, the evolution of its 
meaning from color to label to slur (Pryor, 2016) is evidence of the ways in which meanings in 
language can, over time, transform, even when looped semantically to a violent past.  The 
question for me then becomes what changes instituted this shift? What discourses were/are at 
play that dictate use and meaning in a particular speech moment? 
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Much of this dissertation was a thought project.  It was my attempt at articulating what 
Butler asks (1997a): What would it mean to restage the racist rituals of a word?   My 
interrogation into the paradoxical nature of nigger-nigga began with Gates’ (2014) theory of 
Signifyin(g), one possible form of restaging, as derived from tales of the Signifyin(g) Monkey.  
While Signifyin(g) within one’s own speech community is often meant for the purpose of 
entertainment, humor or one-upmanship, when deployed in opposition to the dominant racial 
group, Signfiyin(g) potentially operates as insurrectionary speech and linguistic agency, allowing 
black peoples to “move freely between two discursive universes.” (Gates, 1988/2014, p. 82).  It 
is this movement, from nigger to nigga, in my own life as well as in the linguistic life of society 
and the life of language itself, that is one aspect of this dissertation. 
 
“Well back in the jungle in the wood deep, the bad lion stepped on the Signifyin’ 
Monkey feet,” so begins Johnny Brooks’ (1978) tale of the Signifyin’ Monkey and the Lion.169  
As these tales go, it is the monkey who, using figurative language, outsmarts the lion and in 
doing so usurps his sovereignty as king of the jungle.  The lion, interpreting the monkey’s idioms 
at the literal level, is often belittled and/or physically marred by the elephant, who is brought into 
the monkey’s language games unknowingly.  As king of the jungle, the lion is sovereign while 
the monkey is positioned as his subject but also the subject-object of derision. The monkey, 
aware of his own physical skill level, uses wordplay to dupe the lion.  In several of these tales the 
monkey, in his glee, falls from his tree and is pounced on by the lion.  In some cases this is his 
folly; however in other stories, through wordplay, the monkey is able to free himself, unharmed.  
While many tales end in humor, irony, or sarcasm, the lesson is clear:  
 




Signifyin' Monkey, stay up in your tree 
You are always lying and signifyin' 
But you better not monkey with me (Brown, 1960) 
Much like the Signifyin(g) Monkey, nigga Signifies on nigger through the mortals’ 
ability to restage language in his own image, usurping the sovereign epithet. Through rhetorical 
modes of speaking, the monkey (aka mortal aka nigga) taunts the lion (aka priest aka nigger) as a 
mode of disincorporation (Bhaba, 1992).  I chose Signifyin(g) as part of my theoretical lens 
because, as Gates contends “’Signification’ and ‘signification’ create a noisy disturbance in 
silence at the level of the signifier.” (p. 51). In the dissertation I explore this ‘noisy disturbance in 
silence,’ those oxymoronic moments of which neither I, nor others, are prepared—at home, on 
campus, in the subway, in the classroom, on the Red Carpet, in the cafeteria, in the White House 
Correspondents’ Dinner, within myself. Throughout the dissertation I have wondered at and been 
uncertain about these noisily silent, excitable, excessive moments. Each has multiply, incomplete 
effects of which I have only skimmed the surface.  Each has conflicting, intersecting constitutive 
elements which, were it a repeatable moment, would render different effects.  Although Gates 
admits that black vernacular exists within (and is counter to) a larger social and political context 
of white standard English, “…the use of language is itself enabled by first having been called a 
name… by which one is, quite without choice, situated within discourse.” (Butler, 1993, p. 82). 
Gates’ speaker-centered vernacular is in response to the language of the sovereign speaker; yet 
the “oppression” of which Butler’s subject “has no choice” is due to discourse itself and the ways 
it constitutes and subsumes the subject.  Theoretically I wed Signifyin(g) and performative 
contradiction as a fusion of the discursive act and the speech act. It is through this theory that I 
interrogate these two components—how we use language and how language uses us.   
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I find myself secretly defending nigger and nigga and then feel guilt after witnessing yet 
another hateful assault on someone of color.  Is it possible to produce scholarship in which nigga 
is theorized as a speech act in the midst of Capitol Hill riots in which officers are called nigger 
and camera footage is released of Black males being maced or shot? What does it mean to justify 
a professor’s reading of nigger in his Literature class or course on Hate Speech yet witness a 
man, hands in pockets, kneeling on another man’s neck? How might I situate this research within 
current fields such as Raciolinguistics and #BLJ (Black Linguistic Justice)?  It is through 
Butler’s (1997a) theory of the ex-citability of speech that I analyze nigger-nigga as performative, 
as an utterance that enacts and constitutes the subject (the body is addressed and thus assigned a 
social existence). Yet it is through communally shared experience and the materiality of my own 
skin that questions the efficacy or futility of this endeavor at all. In this way, I feel like the priest-
turned-god, going round and round in a neverending game of Wordplay, while the injurious 
nature of speech and conduct continues to mar the mortal.  
May 2017, the office of the Vice President of Academic Affairs:  VPAA: “What’s 
your topic?” After a brief pause, I answer, “I’m studying the word nigga.” She stops 
looking at the file in front of her, raises her head, looks at me and at the Dean of 
Humanities, who is also in the meeting.  I do not turn my head.  “And what about it?”  
“Well, I’m curious about its usage among students. Students say it all the time, yet 
everyone suddenly gets nervous when they meet it in a text.  So… I’m curious mostly 
about their language practices.” “Really, I think anyone who uses that word is awful.” 
“No,” I say. “I think it’s interesting.” 
Nigger-nigga  lives and breathes in my skin.  It has become my own personal trickster 
figure, ever elusive, taunting me each time it pops up in conversation, in the media, in yet 
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another Higher Education article about a professor who has been reprimanded, disciplined, 
dismissed (or not).  Yet I still can offer no concrete “findings.”  What I can offer are musings, 
suggestions, ways of thinking based on my own shifting subjectivities and uncertainties.  Butler 
(1997a) tells me that by keeping words unsaid and unsayable, there is the ironic possibility of 
locking them in place.  And so I ask: If language (and its use) is the tool of our trade, how do we 
grapple with in-the-moment instances when language conducts itself as tool, weapon, armor? 
How can we—, What does it meant to— Restage? Undermine? Signify? What strategies can we 
employ to study, talk about, interrogate difficult knowledge and difficult language (which 
constructs knowledge) in difficult (and different) situations during difficult (and different) times? 
How should we approach impossible speech? And under what conditions is impossible speech 
no longer speech but conduct?  
Nigga could not exist without nigger; and through this research I have developed a 
‘strange and passionate attachment of love’ for these utterances.  
Each time someone asks my dissertation topic I begin with the words: “Trigger 
Warning!”  and ask if the listener knows what those words mean.  Now, depending on my 
audience, and mood, and positionality and a host of other subjectivities and discourses 
circulating within that particular contextualized and contingent moment, I will provide a highly 
erudite theoretical presentation of the N-Word as a Signifiyin(g) performative and its impact in 
the classroom or I will simply say “I’m researching the word nigga.”  However, each time I am 
asked (most often by academics, students, educators, fellow doctoral students), I am keenly 
aware of my self-conscious need to over (or under) explain based on my concerns with offending 
the listener, being misunderstood, or most significantly, desperately attempting to justify my 
research.  I realize that this floundering attempt at justification parallels nigga.  In other words, 
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there is a continuum of justificatory practices that surround nigga.  These range from legal 
explorations (Kennedy, 2003) to critical race theorizing of nigger as assaultive speech (Matsuda 
et al., 1993) to socio-cultural explanations of usage (Alim & Smitherman, 2012; Asim, 2007; 
Spears, 1997) to historical, philosophical, anthropological, psychoanalytic or linguistic usage 
(Parks and Jones, 2008; Haslanger and Anderson; 2012; Anderson and Lepore, 2013; Andrews, 
2014; Jones and Hall, 2015; Pryor, 2016; Jerry, 2018).  What many essays, articles, blogs, posts, 
memes and texts share are the rationalizations of usage, appropriateness, inappropriateness, 
linguistic freedom vs. linguistic censorship, and ownership.  And while this has often been a 
discussion based on the discourses of law and the First Amendment, entertainment and social 
freedoms, or language and race, nigger-nigga in education, and more to the point, as spoken, 
read, quoted, cited, discussed and/or analyzed in the classroom, has recently taken center stage in 
Academia.  Is it the onus of African American professors to teach texts which include nigga?  
Should professors not of African descent be expected, in their acknowledgment of an inclusive 
curriculum, to simply ignore the N Word when it appears? If reading and discussing literature 
requires an examination of the language of the text, by bypassing nigger-nigga are professors (of 
any race) linguistically castrating the text, acting out a type of “willful [color]blindness” (Miller, 
2005)?  
I ask these questions not because I am attempting to ascertain whether or not it is 
acceptable for a racially marked “white” professor to utter nigga as compared to a racially 
marked “black” professor.  First, I ask these questions because I grapple with my own shifting 
subjectivities and relationships with nigga (both in and outside of the classroom).  I ask these 
questions because I am not sure as to whether or not nigger-nigga should, could, or can be 
discussed in a classroom space.  I ask these questions because recent coverage of nigger-nigga 
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being addressed in the classroom has uncovered several instances in which its use has caused 
discomfort, confusion, tension, ambiguity and dissension so that the professor becomes the “site 
of speech” disciplined by the State (academic institution) based on the query of its citizens 
(students).  I acknowledge that these instances vary and are partial representations of the 
subjectivities of both students and professors, yet these same conflicting subjectivities, histories 
and discourses impact use in the first place.  
The notion of  how the utterance nigger-nigga within particular moments is constitutive 
of and constituting became the crux of this dissertation.  My interest in use, and configurations of 
use, lay in moving away from (as much as possible given my own humanist orientations) the 
speaker as sovereign utterer and the site of speech.  Instead, how might the speaking-subject be a 
belated metalepsis (Butler, 1997a)—as the example of Nasir bin Olu Dara Jones and Kelis 
Rogers (See Nigger artifact 1957/2018)?  How for example, might one who was previously 
called a nigger (re)cite the epithet but through a restaging process construct it differently (as in 
Nigga Instances #09042015 and #12022016)?  To be clear, this shift in my positioning of the 
speaker was not meant to dismiss instances in which nigger-nigga is used as epithet or deemed 
unsayable.  Instead, my intention was to analyze nigger-nigga as a speech act, as a type of 
performative in language with its own effects simultaneously dependent on and independent of 
the speaker and listener, as discussed in G.’s experience in Critical Conversation #17032014. By 
moving away from the utterer as the site of the infraction, I hoped to move away from (not 
denigrate) the commonsense argument of what racial group can (should) or cannot (should not) 
say nigger-nigga.  By presenting analysis of nigger-nigga in use through speech act theory and 
discourse analysis, my intention is to shift the conversation about licit and illicit speech onto the 
very utterance itself. The performativity of Signifyin(g) as a contradiction tells me that not only 
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can a community of speakers wrest language and restage it in new alterable ways, but that words 
themselves can and will morph.  Nigga is my evidence of this. 
February 2020, JoLLE Conference at University of Georgia:  I have just finished my 
presentation titled “Trigger Warning! N**ger as Text/N**ga as Speech: Contradiction(s) 
and the Canon.”  An attendee and black male graduate student at University of Georgia 
(UGA) and I go for coffee.  As we are walking he says, “I’m going to be honest with you.  
When I walked into your presentation I believed under no circumstances should a white 
professor say nigga.” “Not ever?” “Never. If it was in the text they should skip it, say the 
N word, something, but they should never say the word.  But after listening to your 
presentation, I have to admit, my thinking has changed.”  
What nigga, nigger, niggah, nigguh, nizzle, nicca, neezy “means” at any given moment is 
framed by the discursive relations within which it is located as well as the norms that then 
become solidified around particularized meanings; however, these meanings are open to constant 
rereading, reinterpretation and reSignification.   Due to its rhetorical nature, its meaning(s) at any 
given time are multiply inflected, constitutive of the subjects, the relationship between subjects, 
and the power relations embedded within the webwork of bodies-subjects-institutions and 
institutionalized discourses.  As such, nigga is not constituted fully by the speaking subject but 
by the social realities that language itself constitutes (Butler, 1997a; Foucault, 2010; Weedon, 
1997). Just as the raced or racial subject is socially constructed in great part, but not  wholly, 
based on a range of discursive practices, so too is nigga, the meanings of which are a constant 
site of struggle over power (Weedon, 1997, p. 21).  The power vested in nigga continues to 
uphold illusory qualities of language as a concrete artifact that concretizes experience, identity 
and most significantly, agency as static conditions under normalized realities.  I wonder if the 
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Grad Student’s perspective would remain consistent if this occurred in one of his graduate 
classes at UGA. While I realize my own ambivalence, uncertainty and doubt, I don’t  know if I 
want to place these reservations on others.  Rather than change his perspective… I just wanted to 
have the conversation. 
As a thought project, I realize that I do not follow the traditional arc of Qualitative 
research writing.  I admit with chagrin (not really) that there are no final conclusions or findings, 
no generalizable outcomes that can be applied with loose precision to further studies.  I think 
here of a conversation with Dr. Ernest Morrell who indicated that he too felt that there was much 
to be interrogated through the lens of poststructural theory, and yet, many scholars of color align 
with critical theories or postcolonial theory as there is an end point, an action or action research 
component, the potential for generalizable outcomes that can be used in further research for the 
benefit of the marginalized community.  In contrast, poststructural theory is contested as 
vacuous, ambiguous, empty of identity categories and boundaries.  As I have indicated 
elsewhere, my poststructural orientations are not meant to remove or redact the significance of 
critical theories; instead, my orientations are meant to further complicate an already complicated 
discussion.  While there are countless entry points for discussions about race, for me, the entry 
point is language.    
Unlike a traditional literature review, in Part I of the dissertation I focused on the 
theoretical framework through which I hoped to analyze nigga. While I realized, much later 
mind you, that my Literature Review could (and quite possibly should) focus on current research 
and scholarship about nigga, I did not take this course of action.  This then is a gap in the 
dissertation and had I the opportunity (and time and/or inclination) to return to this, I would 
include more scholarship about nigga (see Appendix A for a list of readings).  Although I focus 
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(primarily) on two seminal texts, Randall Kennedy’s nigger: The Strange Career of a 
Troublesome Word  and Jabari Asim’s The N Word: Who can say it, Who shouldn’t and Why, I 
have since unearthed articles in literacy studies, English, Anthropology and Linguistics which 
grapple with “the N Word.” These articles I believe should be included in Part I. 
Part II is my attempt, albeit incomplete, at further analysis of the ways in which nigga is 
deployed, especially on a college campus.  I weave instances, events and artifacts throughout the 
dissertation rather than placing these in the traditional data collection chapter due to my 
narrativizing of my data.  Partly due to my ontological underpinnings and partly due to my 
background in (and love of) fictional texts, narrating my data points “made the most sense,” felt 
the most “authentic.”  Simply inserting instances or conversations in the traditional Chapter 4 felt 
inherently “false,”  less like communication and more like reporting communication.  As I 
indicated in my introduction, my intention was to interrogate speech acts as these are presented.  
And while there is an impossibility in presenting conversation “as it occurred” due to my own 
biased subjectivities, due to my own fallible memory, due to the opacity of language, my turn 
towards narrative provided an opportunity to simultaneously present and analyze my data as 
examples of the theory I was grappling with.  I continue with this format in Part II in which I 
endeavor (with great difficulty mind you) to investigate nigger-nigga in use in the English 
classroom and on the college campus. Again, in hindsight, I would have liked to develop my 
analysis of my classroom observations and will, in some future moment, spend more time with 
these observations; multiple factors constrained this.  However, in one final “attempt” at 
traditional qualitative writing, I will present the research questions from my Introduction and 
briefly speak to these.   
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● Initially I asked:  What processes and/or systems exist that allow particular forms of use 
of nigga in particular contexts over others? Through a poststructural lens, this is 
fluctuating and indeterminate.  Within the institutional space of the university campus, 
policy decisions and actions for and/or against the use of nigger-nigga is contradictory, 
varied and unclear. It is not my intention to offer findings or solutions to this; my 
intention is to merely present the multiply fragmented silent murmurings beneath the 
continuity of historicized racial discourse, which is impacted by academic discourse, 
institutional governance, and governmentality (Foucault, 1978) (by which subjects of the 
institution police themselves and one another).  Ultimately the allowability of nigga is 
contingent upon a host of intersecting material and linguistic elements, one of which is 
the racial markings of the speaking subject, yet this is not the sole factor.  In hindsight, if 
I were to (re)ask this question I would ask: In what ways can I complicate use based on 
the linguistic terms available to me, with particular attention to the College classroom and 
the College campus.  
 
● In what ways have discourses governing erudite knowledge come to regulate local 
subjugated knowledges with respect to nigga? Normative and acceptable use of nigga in 
contemporary society has “typically” placed ownership within black American discursive 
communities, even when those same communities attempt to eradicate nigga. The 
contradictions are evident interracially but there are also intra-racial linguistic class 
distinctions.  Discourses such as the politics of respectability regulate nigga within the 
black community. Yet it is this very discourse that is predicated upon an assimilation to 
psychic whiteness, which continues to govern erudite knowledge (even in its absence).  
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Hence the discourse of respectability within a black community of speakers is 
constrained and maintained through the institutionalization of hegemonic discourses of 
social conformity and cultural normalization, which are historically Eurocentric and 
Western.  While nigga continues to be appropriate in particular public discourses such as 
comedy and rap music, within the formal classroom, nigger-nigga continues to be 
contentious. As an alteration to this question, I would ask: What makes some discourses 
allowable and others prohibitable with respect to nigga?    
 
● If the classroom is the potential space for critical intellectualism, then in what ways—if 
any—is it possible for nigger/nigga to participate in this process? Like Butler (1997a) I 
can only hope for an unknowable future, one which I can only imagine.  I would like to 
believe that discussions about racialized language can occur in the classroom, yet nigger-
nigga’s continued vitriolic past makes this particular utterance something of a 
conundrum.  It is not simply the contradictory nature of nigga as utterance that disallows 
intellectual discussion and interrogation; it is also the intersecting and competing 
discourses which govern and indoctrinate beliefs about appropriateness and sayability.  In 
hindsight I would change this question to: What does the classroom space look like when 
discussions about nigga arise?   
 
In Butler’s (1997a) words, “the changeable life of a term does not preclude the possibility 
of its use.” (p. 162).  If, in society, we are not creating new words but reiterating old words with 
new meanings, then to what effect? Rapper Talib Kweli Greene tells me that eradicating nigga 
will not end racism, and Butler tells me that stopping an epithet in the moment of its elocution 
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only serves as a policing function that does not probe the root of such language.  If this is the 
case, then arguing for or against usage of nigger-nigga especially in the English classroom (a 
place where these conversations should be allowed to take place, I believe) does not necessarily 
eradicate its demonized or demonizing existence.  Alternatively, I wonder how it might be 
possible to explore nigger-nigga in the ways that Butler (1997a) vis-à-vis Morrison defines 
language, “…partly as a system, partly as a living thing… but mostly as agency—an act with 
consequences… an extended doing, a performance with effects.” (p. 6-7). If, as a society we 
dream of a day in which racism is eradicated, then is it possible to engage utterances such as 
nigger-nigga at the level of meaning itself (Gates, 1988/2014)?  Is it possible to delink it from its 
denotative meaning or its illocutionary force without erasing the past?  The indeterminacy of 
language tells me this is possible.  If not, how and/or why is it possible for nigga to 
simultaneously Signify on a violent historical past and rhetorically Signify in the present?  I 
present my interpretations of this in Nigga artifact 04302016 (p. 64) and Nigga Event #03242015 
(p. 96).  In both cases nigga is rhetorically invoked by the speaker, thus constituting himself and 
his listeners in multiple ways.  In both cases, surrounding discourses dictate the appropriateness 
of the utterance.  And whether ironic or parodic, its use is contingent upon (and constitutive of)  
particularized histories, subjectivities and power relations. Am I incorrect by allowing a pass 
when my students say nigga in the classroom? The scholarship of Koritha Mitchell (2018) would 
argue yes, under no circumstances should I allow this to take place.  However, I think of the 
words of Ta-Nehisi Coates who indicates that what we have created are a politics of 
respectability (especially for black peoples) that constructs us as superhuman, i.e., (im)mortal, in 
our attempt to prove our worthiness, respect, and value in the face of racism.  What I do think I 
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can improve upon are the spaces in which this utterance is discussed, in order to move the 
conversation forward.  
Butler (1997a) asks,  
If a term becomes questionable, does that mean it cannot be used any longer, and that we 
can only use terms that we already know how to master?... Are we not paralyzed by a fear 
of the unknown future of words that keeps us from interrogating the terms that we need to 
live, and of taking the risk of living the terms that we keep in question? (p. 162-163).    
 
I do not believe there is one concrete answer to this, but instead a spectrum of answers, 
none of them necessarily incorrect.  What I have presented throughout this dissertation are a 
plethora of events, instances, and conversations; my goal was not to define under what 
circumstances someone said nigga. Instead, I intended to exhibit the ambiguity, inconsistency, 
contradictions and ironies with which nigga is uttered, controlled and managed. Rather than 
argue for or against use of nigga as appropriate or inappropriate or as the effect of a speaking 
subject’s linear, rationalized, unified experience (“Oh, I actually say it now” a student once told 
me who in the past indicated he substituted nigga with the word ninja); I merely present my 
complicated interpretations of (im)possibility.  In my quest to rid myself of my own paralysis, a 
paralysis that has haunted me for some forty-odd years, as (im)mortalized priest-turned-god I 
dove into the abyss of the Deep Blue Sea, in search of plumblines and floating signifiers and 






March, 2021, A final rememory:  My mother turned 85 on February 12, 2021.  Nieces 
and nephews, great and great-great nieces and nephews, many of whom she (nor I) have seen in 
years (we’re not a very tight-knit family) showed up virtually on Zoom to honor the matriarch of 
the family.  She is the last living of her generation, the youngest of her siblings, the oldest of our 
tree.  I watch her as she shuffles around the house, a bit stooped, much slower, but still engaged 
with the world.  She zooms, texts, sends gifs and memes, has her own Bitmoji avatar, and makes 
monthly visits to Atlantic City (she is currently planning a cruise).  She has participated in the 
election of the first POTUS of color and the first female Vice-POTUS of color; yet she recalls 
the first time she cast her vote for Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956.170    
In January 2020 she moved in with us; now, she hears about the dissertation almost every 
day. “Mommm… I need to write.” “How many more pages you got to go?” she asks.  
“Ummm….” I never have a concrete answer.  I don’t know how to explain it’s not the number of 
pages, but the number of ideas (which sounds so simple when I type it on the page). “When I’m 
done, I’m done.  I’ll know it.” “Okay,” but the expression on her face tells me that my answer 
doesn’t sound very promising.  Once in passing she said, “Please finish before I die.” (Great, 
more pressure). Now, when I ask my mother if she can remember that sunny day when we were 
running errands and two boys called us nigger, she chuckles and says she cannot. But her 
chuckle says she believes it to be possible.  She asks, “what did I say?” I tell her she responded 
with “honky,” and while previously she corrected me and said she doesn’t think that’s the word 
 
170 My mother registered as a Republican as per her mother’s instruction. At the time, my grandmother had a job 
working on the polls and did not want to lose her position if my mother didn’t register as such.  According to my 
mother, my grandmother was able to get a job because politically, she aligned herself with the Republican Party, and 
racially she was fair-complexioned. As my mom puts it, “My (her) mom had nice speech and nice features, she 
brought voting records home and everything… for a Negro to do tha t? That was unheard of.” 
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she would use now, she says, “that sounds about right.”171 The contradictions in her answers, 
along with our separate conflicting memories reflect the fragmentary nature of subjectivity and 
memory; it also reflects the incompleteness of language.  Both answers are authentic, truthful, 
valid (if I am to use traditional Quantitative or even conventional, humanist Qualitative Inquiry 
jargon), yet in their contradiction, both are ‘a site of disunity and conflict’ as constructed through 
language (Weedon, 1997). My mother’s shift in what she might have said reflects the opacity of 
language and the multiplicity of subjectivity even as we use language to construct our 
experiences, our lives, our memories.  Her answers (and my memory—I can neither claim, nor 
desire to claim a whole, complete self) limn the actual and the imagined. 
She asks, “What happened? What did I do?” I tell her that we were in the middle of the 
street and she let go of my hand.  She responds, “Well I probably dropped it in case I had to 
fight.  That would be the only reason I would have let your hand go.  I needed to be prepared to 
fight.” She chuckles.  Her response unnerves me; I’d never considered that possibility.  In my 
head, I’d constructed a failed narrative of my mother. Through the eyes of the eight-year-old, her 
behavior was a “sacrilegious betrayal.” I characterized her release as the shock of one who is at a 
loss, much like the melancholia Butler (1997b) discusses vis-à-vis Freud.  Yet, through the eyes 
of the 85-year-old woman, her behavior was necessitated by the potential need to fight—not a 
failure but a realization, an insurrection.  She was preparing herself, single woman—with child 
in the middle of the street—to hold her own against two white men.  Her anger, her shock, her 
indignation was not based on a psychic interiority of ungrievable loss, it was, instead, a  mental 
constellation of revolt (Bhaba, 1992).  My mother, unbeknownst to me, was prepared to 
physically dismantle their sovereign smugness.  Had my mother literally fought these young 
 
171 In Chapter 1 of the dissertation my mother indicated that she would not have said this word.   
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men, what would have occurred?  Would she have been knocked to the ground like Miss Sophia 
in The Color Purple while I gawked in amazement and fear?  Had this gone to court, would the 
boys’ speech be considered under the fighting words doctrine based on an “immediate breach of 
peace”?  Quite possibly those two boys were lucky to keep walking.  At the age of eight I ’d 
witnessed my mother take on my father, and while I cried for the safety of my mom, it was my 
dad who took the physical beating.  Quite possibly much like our competing subjectivities about 
why she let my hand go, “honky” or “cracker” or whatever utterance she dispelled that day is my 
own imagined situated moment.  Quite possibly she said nothing at all. 
I end with this final rememory to show the incompleteness of language, the multiplicity 
of subjectivity, the questionable nature of validity, authenticity, perhaps even qualitative research 
itself. On any given day this memory-story can morph, each iteration nuanced in its own way, 
slightly different from the previous, yet no less authentic. While I had constructed one set of 
possibilities, her suggestion constructs others.  And there are more.  What would those two boys 
say today? Would they remember?  Would they deny ever having said such a thing?  Would they 
apologize?  Or would they fiercely defend their right to freedom of speech?  This shift in 
perspective intersects the shifts in language itself.   
Over the expanse of some forty odd years, nigger-nigga has evolved, each 
iteration/citation nuanced in its own way.  While as qualitative researcher I could have used 
traditional methods of coding and categorization by classifying each utterance of nigger-nigga, 
for me, this method would not highlight subject position and the ways utterances such as nigger-
nigga shift based on institutionalized discourses, context, situation, and the subjectivities of the 
speaker and listener. Presenting this new information from a childhood memory complements 
and contests the ambiguity, inconsistency, contradictions and ironies of nigger-nigger. Yet in my 
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own reflexive writing I define the circumstances by which my mother experienced nigger.  
Ironically, her final comment ruptures my own humanist inflected ways of remembering, thus 
demonstrating the incompleteness of linguistic beingness.   
I still hold my mother’s hand.  It is more important to me now than forty years prior.  As 
a child, handholding meant security, safety, protection, and these continue to exist; however, as 
an adult, it signifies connection and a lustful desire to never let go, to hold onto each previous 
moment that we have left.  She no longer towers above me, so much so that, as a child, my 
outreached hand strained to reach her.  Now I am the leader, the guide to our destinations.  My 
hand engulfs hers; and while she will always be my mother, it is I who have taken on the parental 
role.  Rather than worry about two white boys sauntering by spewing nigger, I worry about 
young men of color with pants sagged and scraggly hair sauntering by singing the likes of the 
Migos or Kendrick Lamar, nigga falling from their lips in rapid fire lyrics. Once again, the 
paradox of usage is revealed—I can accept my students saying nigga in the classroom, but I 
cannot accept a stranger walking by and rapping nigga in front of my mother. When we are 
crossing the street or taking a walk, I instinctively grab my mother’s hand to steady her, to guide 
her, but most importantly to connect. Like the little girl of yester-year, I continue to crave those 
moments when our hands clasp.  I treasure these because I don’t know how many more I will 
have. Recently we attended a funeral. She was 84, my mother’s friend; she lived in the house 
next door and her unfortunate passing was in a fire (possibly caused by her own hand).  
Afterwards my mother said, “That’s the kind of funeral I want.  No sadness, just a celebration of 
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